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BRITTON







# THE CIVIL WAR ON THE BORDER

A NARRATIVE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MISSOURI, KANSAS,  
ARKANSAS, AND THE INDIAN TERRITORY, DURING THE  
YEARS 1863-65, BASED UPON OFFICIAL REPORTS  
AND OBSERVATIONS OF THE AUTHOR

BY

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OF SCIENCE

VOLUME II

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

NEW YORK

27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET

## LONDON

24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND

The Knickerbocker Press

1904

THE NEW YORK  
PUBLIC LIBRARY  
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THE BRITTONS' PRESS, NEW YORK



## PREFACE.

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THE first volume of my "Civil War on the Border" met with such favorable reviews by the leading journals of the country, and the demand for it by the public has been such, that it has appeared to me advisable to issue the second volume of the work, the two volumes covering the field of operations in that section during the war. In saying that I am the only writer who has attempted to cover that particular field of operations during the war, I do not mean that other writers have not covered, more or less completely, particular campaigns in that section. My diaries of events relating to the war in that section for the years 1863-65 cover in outline the operations described.

In the examination of several thousand witnesses in that section since the war while in the Government service investigating property and pension claims, many important facts were obtained by making extracts from depositions and using the matter where it had an appropriate bearing. A good many of the chapters consist almost entirely

of material drawn from officers and soldiers who participated in the events described and whose statements were taken down with the care of taking a deposition. The descriptions of the larger operations are mainly based upon the official reports as published by the Government, and these reports have also been used in verifying the accounts of minor operations as far as practicable. Having participated in the operations described, and having subsequently for years travelled over that section sifting the testimony of witnesses relating to the war, I may perhaps justly claim special advantages for doing the work which I have undertaken.

A number of gentlemen who have manifested an interest in the work have furnished me valuable data for its preparation. I am particularly indebted to Colonel George S. Grover, of St. Louis, Missouri, who loaned me his manuscript notes of the Shelby Raid of 1863 and the Price Raid of 1864, on which I have drawn in connection with other material.

The substance of some of the chapters has appeared from time to time in the *National Tribune*, Washington, a paper that has given a great deal of space to the literature of the war, having as contributors nearly all the leading Federal Generals of the late war.

It has not been an easy matter to fix a limit to

the field of operations described in this work. After some consideration, I determined to embrace in the work the operations of the Army of the Frontier, even if that army should go beyond the limits of the territory appropriately designated as the Border, meaning by the Border the western parts of the States of Missouri and Arkansas and the eastern parts of Kansas and the Indian Territory. When, therefore, the Army of the Frontier was merged into and became a part of the Seventh Army Corps, and was officially known as the Frontier Division of that corps, it seemed appropriate that I should describe its operations. I have therefore described the Camden Expedition and given one chapter to the Building of the Red River Dam for the passage of the gunboats, because these operations were intimately connected with the operations in which the Frontier Division was actively engaged.

WILEY BRITTON.

WASHINGTON, 1898.







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## THE CIVIL WAR ON THE BORDER





# THE CIVIL WAR ON THE BORDER—1863-65.

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## CHAPTER I.

### NEW DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS OF THE ARMY OF THE FRONTIER.

THE year 1863 opened with the Federal arms in possession of the country north of the Arkansas River above Little Rock, including the Indian Territory north of that river. The defeat of General Hindman's army at Prairie Grove, his retreat to the south side of the Arkansas River, and the capture and destruction of all his steam-boats and their valuable cargoes of supplies at Van Buren by General Blunt so demoralized the Southern forces in Western Arkansas that General Hindman found it expedient to retreat to Little Rock and Arkadelphia. In fact, everything in the way of forage and subsistence had been so completely used up by the large army operating in that section during the past autumn that there was nothing left for him to forage his animals or subsist his troops upon. He was dependent upon his river transportation for his supplies. There was, therefore, no course left for him but to retreat, since his steamboats, his only means of transportation, had been destroyed. The destruction of General Grant's supplies at Holly

Springs, Mississippi, in December, causing him to change his plan of operations against Vicksburg, seems to have encouraged the Confederate leaders in the West to make desperate efforts to hold on to the Arkansas River below Little Rock.

While the Southern forces occupied the lower Arkansas, it did not seem advisable to General Curtis, commanding the Department, to have the Army of the Frontier occupy a position during the winter south of the Boston Mountains. As this army could not subsist off the country south of the mountains, its supplies would have to be hauled in wagon trains from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or from Rolla, Missouri, a distance of nearly three hundred miles. The supply trains would each need a strong cavalry escort with one or two pieces of light artillery to defend it against attacks of guerillas. In view of the difficulties of keeping open such a long line of communication, General Schofield, who relieved General Blunt on the 1st of January and resumed command of the Army of the Frontier, also thought it advisable not to attempt to winter his troops south of the mountains. He even ordered the army to retire from Rhea's Mills and Prairie Grove to the northern line of Arkansas. This movement was probably hastened by General Marmaduke's rapid march through Northern Arkansas and Southern Missouri to make an attack on Springfield, as well as by the growing scarcity of forage in the section where the army was then encamped. Had Marmaduke's attack on Springfield been successful, it would have temporarily crippled the operations of the Federal troops in Northwestern Arkansas and the Indian Territory, for Springfield was the principal depot of supplies between Rolla and the army.

On the return of the army from Van Buren, General Schofield ordered General Blunt's First Division from Rhea's Mills to Elm Springs, about twenty-two miles

north, and the Second and Third Divisions under General F. J. Herron, from Fayetteville. There were some expressions of regret in the army at this retreating movement, but of course the soldiers were not in position to know the causes which determined any given movement. They knew that they had been successful in all the recent operations from Newtonia to Van Buren, and had driven the enemy beyond the Arkansas River and from Western Arkansas, and could not understand why all this territory was to be abandoned so soon after it had been gained.

The Federal sick and wounded in the field hospitals at Rhea's Mills and Prairie Grove were removed to Fayetteville, where better accommodations were to be had for them in the churches and houses, several days before the army broke camp. As there was no organized enemy in front of the Army of the Frontier, General Schofield reviewed the several divisions on the 7th and 8th, after which he issued orders making new disposition of his troops. General F. J. Herron retained command of the Second and Third Divisions; Colonel William Weer, Tenth Kansas Infantry, was assigned to the command of the First Division; and Colonel William A. Phillips, Third Indian Regiment, was assigned to the command of the Indian Brigade, consisting of the three Indian regiments, a battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Captain John W. Orahood, and Captain Henry Hopkins' four-gun battery, which had been captured at Fort Wayne in October, 1862. Having received information of Marmaduke's rapid march from Lewisburg, Arkansas, towards Springfield, Missouri, General Schofield ordered Colonel Weer to put the cavalry and light artillery of his division in immediate motion to reinforce General E. B. Brown, commanding at Springfield.

Colonel Phillips was directed to take position with the Indian Brigade at or near Maysville, on the line of Arkansas and the Indian Territory, so that he could give pro-

tection to such of the Cherokee families as might wish to return to their homes. His district embraced the Indian Territory and the counties of Arkansas and Missouri bordering on that Territory. His troops would be employed in holding in check the Indians who had joined the Confederate cause and the white troops operating with them, and particularly in giving protection to the loyal Cherokees as far as practicable. His troops would also be posted and employed in such manner that no considerable body of the enemy would likely be able to enter Kansas through the Indian Territory without meeting with resistance. General Herron moved his two divisions from Fayetteville to Huntsville, thence into Southern Missouri to cover any possible movements of the enemy from the direction of Little Rock, and to obtain forage for his cavalry and transportation animals. This gallant officer and his gallant division were ordered in the spring of 1863 to reinforce General Grant in the Vicksburg campaign, and his name does not figure any more in the operations herein described. Detachments of his cavalry, however, had a few spirited contests with the Southern guerillas of Northern Arkansas and Southern Missouri; but no regularly organized force appeared in his front before his departure for Vicksburg.

In the reorganization of the Army of the Frontier, and in making new disposition of the troops, General Schofield left Colonel M. La Rue Harrison, First Arkansas Union Cavalry, in command of the post of Fayetteville, with instructions to keep as much of his cavalry as could be spared from the post scouting the country between that point and Van Buren, and to the southeast in the direction of Ozark. It was considered almost certain that as soon as the withdrawal of the main part of the Federal army from Northwest Arkansas became known to General Holmes, commanding the District of Arkansas, he would order a force of Confederate cavalry into that section.

As all the sick and wounded from the Army of the Frontier, particularly the large number of wounded from Prairie Grove and Cane Hill, were left in the general hospital at Fayetteville, and as the place was a recruiting rendezvous for raising two new regiments of loyal Arkansans, it was regarded as an important point which should not be given up without a struggle. It was well known to the Federal officers, even up to the Department commander, that there had been a strong Union sentiment in Northwest Arkansas from the beginning of the war, and the Federal occupation of Fayetteville it was thought would encourage the Unionists to organize for their own defence. Having made such disposition of his troops as seemed desirable, General Schofield returned to Springfield and thence to St. Louis, from whence he directed their further movements as Department commander.

Up to this time the operations of the Federal forces in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas had been mainly as an army directed against an army, and no determined effort had been made to hold any place of less importance than Springfield. Now that the Southern army had been driven beyond the Arkansas River in a demoralized condition, it was the policy of the General Government to have the loyal militia of the State, together with such Regular forces as might be required, occupy all the country towns in Southwest Missouri. As soon as all the towns of importance were occupied by the military, the loyal people who had become refugees to Kansas, Springfield, and Sedalia, during the Southern domination, would find encouragement to return and re-establish themselves in their homes. Even if the militia stationed in any town were not from that county, they would be loyal men from some other section of the State and would feel an interest in protecting the loyal people of every locality. It would also be an advantage to have

the military stationed in the midst of a friendly population as far as practicable, for then the mutual coöperation could be turned to preserving the tranquillity of that locality.

Very few of the Southern families had moved South, and the male members of these families were in nearly every case either in the Southern army, with some guerilla band, or hiding out and communicating with their families clandestinely. So many Southern men, even of the non-combatant class, had expressed such strong hostility to all Unionists during the occupation of that section by the Southern army, that up to this time they rarely had the courage to come into any of the military posts and throw themselves upon the mercy of the Federal officers. This would certainly have been the safest course for those who were simply Southern sympathizers and who had taken no conspicuous part in the war, for if found in the brush with the guerillas they would have been fired upon by the militia the same as if they had been waging open war. Many Southern men who would not act with the knights of the brush sympathized with them and encouraged them in their mode of war, and assisted them when they felt they could do it with safety. In all the county-seat towns the court-houses, which were generally of brick, two stories, and standing on a square, isolated, were used by the militia for defensive purposes. The windows on the four sides of such a building, with a few portholes if necessary, made a good defensive position for one or two companies if suddenly attacked by a superior force without artillery. At all these stations the troops were generally mounted, and it frequently happened that as much as one half of the men were away on scouting service. In some of the towns where no strong brick buildings standing isolated could be obtained, the commanding officers had blockhouses built, with earthworks thrown up around them. The

Southern sympathizers who lived in town, in the vicinity, or who had been pulled out of the brush, were required to furnish teams and help work on the fortifications thus constructed, much against their inclinations.

When the troops of the Indian expedition, including the recently organized Indian regiments, fell back to Baxter Springs, in Southern Kansas, in August, 1862, nearly all the families of the loyal Indians left their homes and followed the army to that point; for no sooner had the Federal forces commenced to retreat than the Southern forces under General Cooper and Colonel Stand Watie crossed to the north side of the Arkansas River and advanced north through the Cherokee Nation until they came in contact with Colonel Phillips' scouting parties. There was soon a large camp of refugee Indian families at Baxter Springs. In the fall of 1862, when the Federal forces advanced into Northwest Arkansas, the families of the Indian soldiers moved to Neosho, in Newton County, where they went into camp and into such houses as could be obtained. A battalion of Indian soldiers was sent to Neosho under Major John A. Foreman, Third Indian Regiment, to afford protection to these Indian families against the raids of guerilla bands and to relieve them from the suffering and hardships of their situation as much as possible. There was a good deal of suffering among them during the winter, in spite of the efforts of those whose duty it was to look after them. There was probably no suffering for want of food, for there was a fair supply of corn, wheat, cattle, and hogs in that section that fall, and there were several good water-power mills near Neosho to make flour and meal. Such suffering as existed came from exposure incident to the changed conditions these people were required to meet. Considering their hard situation, it is to their credit that very few complaints were made against them for depredations against property. Whatever was

taken for their benefit, was taken by direction of proper officers of the army. As supplies for the Southern army had been drawn mainly from the Unionists when it was in that section, it was regarded as no more than right that the secessionists of the country should contribute some of the supplies for subsisting the troops and Indian families at Neosho during the winter.

Generals Blunt and Herron had depended upon the country they occupied to furnish forage for their cavalry, artillery, and transportation animals, numbering, perhaps, nearly six thousand horses and mules. This large number of animals would have drained the country of forage quite rapidly, even had it not contributed largely to the Southern troops in the early part of the last autumn. It was therefore considered desirable that the cavalry should be distributed over as large an area as easy coöperation between different commands would permit. With the cavalry distributed over a large area and with foraging and scouting parties going out constantly from every camp and station, the different guerilla bands could be more effectually broken up or driven out of the country occupied. Confederate recruiting officers with a few followers each, from the Missouri troops under General Hindman, were found now and then endeavoring to work their way into Missouri for the purpose of visiting their families and obtaining recruits for the Southern army. It was very important that the Federal officers should use such vigilance as would prevent recruiting in the rear of the Federal lines as far as practicable. If such recruiting was not checked, the enemy would soon become more formidable in the rear of the Federal forces than in their front.

In spite of the activity and vigilance of the Federal cavalry, some of the Confederate recruiting parties were able to march a hundred miles or so into the State unobserved. This was not remarkable in view of the fact that the soldiers in the Confederate army from Missouri

were as familiar with every section of the State as the Unionists. These recruiting parties not only knew the country through which they would pass, but they generally had friends in neighborhoods on their line of march who would give them information of the strength and position of Federal detachments, and how to avoid them. It sometimes happened that some of the small parties from the Southern army were men who had become tired of the war and who had returned with the determination of surrendering to the nearest Federal officer and renewing their allegiance to the Government. The recent reverses of the Southern army in Western Arkansas had had the effect of increasing the number of men who wished to sever their connection with it, and who were anxious to return to their homes and to remain if they could do so unmolested. Very many of these men who were returning from the Confederate service, and many other secessionists who had gone South when the Southern army was driven out of Missouri and were desirous of returning to their homes, misapprehended the humane policy of the Federal Government, or took it for weakness, and violated their oaths of allegiance with impunity. A man who had been brought in, or who had come in, to take the oath of allegiance, and who had been drinking when he took it, was heard to say to some of his friends directly after leaving the provost-marshall's office that he had vomited up the oath, meaning that he did not regard it as binding. In the contests with the bandits it frequently occurred that when the Federal cavalry killed, wounded, or captured one, the oath of allegiance was found in his pocket, even in the face of the fact that there was printed at the end of the oath this solemn warning: "The penalty for the violation of this solemn oath and parole of honor will be death."

This shameful violation of their oaths led to the execution of ten Southern bandits at Palmyra, Missouri, on

the 18th of October, 1862, under orders of General John McNeil, in retaliation for their crimes in murdering, or for participating in murdering, Union citizens in that section, and was the subject of correspondence the latter part of December between General Curtis, commanding the Department of the Missouri, and Confederate General Holmes, commanding the District of Arkansas. Under instructions from President Davis, General Holmes requested to be informed of the circumstances in regard to the execution of these "ten Confederate citizens of Missouri," as he called them, and in reply General Curtis stated that there were no "Confederate citizens" in Missouri, and reminded him that he had no military power in the State and had had none in North Missouri for the past year; that there was only one class of citizens in Missouri, and that they were Federal citizens. For the execution of these bandits, General McNeil was severely criticised by some of the conservative newspapers of the North, and the editorials of several English newspapers were even more severe. But it is perhaps safe to state that no loyal man in Missouri who was familiar with all the circumstances in regard to their execution ever censured General McNeil for the act. His conduct was not only not censured by his immediate superiors and the Federal authorities at Washington, but Mr. Lincoln soon afterwards appointed him Brigadier-General of Volunteers, thus giving him a wider field of service.

It will be well to give a brief account of the occurrences which led to the execution of the men about which so much was said at the time by those who were continually finding fault with the general policy of the Government in regard to the conduct of the war, and for which the Confederate authorities demanded the surrender of General McNeil. It was difficult for any one not living in Missouri at that time to understand and appreciate the

situation of affairs in that State. When General Price was driven into Southwest Missouri in the latter part of 1861, he not only sanctioned, but authorized and encouraged, guerilla operations in the rear of the Federal army, for the purpose, as he alleged, of destroying roads, burning bridges, and tearing up culverts, and when he was driven from the State with all the organized Southern forces at the battle of Pea Ridge, guerilla bands appeared in nearly every part of the State, robbing and plundering and murdering Union men, even in North Missouri, which was upwards of two hundred miles within the Federal lines. These bandits, who sometimes called themselves Partisan Rangers, always dressed in the garb of citizens, or in the uniforms of Federal soldiers whom they had killed, and in many cases when not out on their marauding expeditions might have been found at their homes as peaceable, law-abiding citizens, or in the towns or camps where the soldiers were stationed. But they held themselves in readiness to respond to the calls of their leaders when a particular movement or midnight raid was to be made upon their Union neighbors. Early in September a force of these men, several hundred strong, from Marion and adjoining counties, collected under Colonel J. C. Porter, and at daylight on the morning of September 12th made a dash upon the town of Palmyra, and, driving in the picket, attacked the small force of militia left to guard the place in the absence of General McNeil, who was then in pursuit of Porter. After a skirmish, in which some of the militia and several citizens were killed and wounded, the bandits captured the town, released the prisoners in the jail, and burnt the provost-marshal's office. A part of this force, on entering the town, went to the house of Andrew Allsman, a prominent Union man of Marion County, who was too old for the military service and who was not in the army, and, in spite of the entreaties of his family, took him off

and murdered him in the woods, leaving his body to be devoured by hogs or birds of prey.

General McNeil was at the time north of Palmyra, in Lewis County, but was quickly informed of what had taken place, and hastened to overtake the bandits, which he did, killing and capturing a good many in the pursuit. He continued to press them day and night until they broke up into small parties and finally disappeared as an organized force in the wooded region through which they were pursued. On his return to Palmyra the General found the Union citizens expressing great anxiety in regard to the fate of Allsman, for it was not then known whether he had been murdered or whether he was still held a prisoner by Porter. After ascertaining the circumstances under which Allsman had been taken away, General McNeil caused a letter to be addressed to Colonel Porter, which was published in many of the newspapers of North Missouri, stating in effect that if Allsman was not returned unharmed to his family within ten days from the date of the letter, ten of the bandits, whom he had recently captured and was holding, "will be shot as a meet reward for their crimes, among which is the illegal restraining of said Allsman of his liberty, and, if not returned, presumptively aiding in his murder."

The mild policy of the Government had so often been mistaken for its weakness by the Southern people in Missouri that many of them in General McNeil's district believed that his letter to Porter in regard to executing the bandits was simply a threat to scare them, and declared that he dared not do it. At the expiration of ten days nothing was heard from Allsman, and the ten bandits were shot. They had all, before they were captured, been once pardoned, and had taken the oath of allegiance and given their paroles of honor not to take up arms against the United States again, and had justly forfeited their lives. They all belonged to the band who had re-

cently shot, hung, and cut the throats of eight to ten Union men in that section, besides whipping and hanging nearly to death other Union men, and one of them was one of the party who murdered a Mr. Pratt near Palmyra.

General Halleck, commanding the Department, had in March, 1862, announced in General Orders that guerillas "will not, if captured, be treated as prisoners of war, but will be hung as robbers and murderers." And General Schofield, who afterwards commanded the Department of the Missouri, in General Orders characterized the guerillas in Missouri as robbers and assassins, and stated that "when caught in arms, engaged in this unlawful warfare, they will be shot down upon the spot."

Persons who engaged in guerilla warfare in the rear of the Federal lines without uniforms to distinguish them from private citizens were regarded by most of the Union generals as a kind of land pirates and not entitled to the treatment of prisoners of war, and General McNeil was not the only Federal officer who ordered their execution when they were caught.\*

*Action on Little Blue, November 11, 1861.*


In the fall of 1861, after Price had been driven into Southwest Missouri, large bodies of secessionists passed to the rear of the Federal lines to the Missouri River counties in Central and Western Missouri. These organized bodies of secessionists were well mounted, and as they were not burdened with artillery or trains they could, when attacked or threatened by a superior force, retreat without inconvenience and take up another position where the advantages would be in their favor. They were constantly kept advised of the movements of the

\* See oration of Colonel Wells H. Blodgett, at memorial exercises dedicating McNeil Monument, in the Archives of the Loyal Legion, St. Louis, Missouri.

Federal troops by the Southern sympathizers of every neighborhood. In fact, these western counties of Missouri were so much overrun by bodies of secessionists that most of the outspoken Union men who were subject to military duty left their homes by the early part of the winter of 1861.

In the autumn of that year Colonel C. R. Jennison was sent to Kansas City with his regiment, the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, and frequently sent out scouting detachments into different parts of Jackson County. These scouts sometimes saw small parties of secessionists, but had no important skirmishes with them, and could hear of no considerable body of the enemy until the early part of November. Information then reached the commanding officer at Kansas City that a force of several hundred secessionists under Colonel Upton Hays, of Jackson County, was on the waters of Little Blue River, twelve to fifteen miles southeast. The number of men he had was not known, but a force of three companies of the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel D. R. Anthony, was sent to the neighborhood where the enemy were reported to have been seen to make a reconnaissance on the 11th of November. When Colonel Anthony arrived at the edge of the timber on Little Blue, near the Alex. Majors farm, his advance was fired upon by an unseen foe. He then rapidly advanced, driving the pickets of the enemy before him for some distance back upon the main body, when he dismounted his companies, every fourth man holding horses, to fight the secessionists on foot. Colonel Hays had taken up a strong position behind logs and trees, and it would have required a superior force to dislodge him. A hot fire was kept up between the opposing forces for more than an hour, when the secessionists commenced flanking Colonel Anthony, and he was obliged to retire. He was satisfied from his observations during the fight that the secession-

ists had at least five hundred men, while he did not have half that number in the action. In this fierce little fight his casualties were seven men killed and one officer and eight enlisted men wounded. Mr. James A. Capen, of the Seventh Kansas, who participated in the fight, and who furnished the data for this account of it, thought that the loss of the secessionists was fully as heavy as on the Federal side.





## CHAPTER II.

### OPERATIONS OF THE INDIAN BRIGADE IN NORTHWEST ARKANSAS AND SOUTHWEST MISSOURI.

THE Indian Brigade under Colonel Phillips had scarcely pitched their tents on the camping ground of Camp Walker, near Maysville, on the line of Arkansas and the Indian Territory, on the 11th of January, 1863, when snow commenced falling and continued to fall until it covered the ground to the depth of from four to five inches. This place had become somewhat noted from the fact that in the early part of the war it had been used as a rendezvous and camp of instruction in the organization of the Arkansas State forces. It was an excellent place for a camping ground, for there was an abundance of timber and water, with a level prairie near at hand for drilling purposes. In this section the prairie region opens up and is much more inviting than the rough, hilly region to the eastward.

The refugee camp near the camp of the troops, made up mostly of Indian families, and negro families who had recently left their masters to taste their newly acquired freedom, did not present a very cheerful sight for mid-winter weather. Had not the military authorities furnished food for these people, there would have been actual suffering among them. The improvised quarters of some of these families was little more than a quilt stretched over a horizontal pole and brought down to the

ground on each side and fastened to wooden pins driven into the ground like a wedge tent, with a blanket or some article of clothing to close up the ends. By banking up the earth around such quarters and using plenty of straw inside for bedding, the tenants were able to stand quite severe weather.

Such were the hardships which the war in this section imposed upon hundreds of not only Indian and negro families, but upon hundreds of white families who had been either driven from their homes or robbed by the guerillas, so that they were obliged to leave their homes in an almost destitute condition.

The white and colored refugees were sent north to Fort Scott with nearly every empty supply train that returned to that post for supplies for the army. This arrangement prevented the white refugees in particular from increasing in very large numbers. With the Indian families, and many of the negro families, it was different. All the loyal Indian families who had returned to their homes in the nation, or who were not with the Indians at Neosho, were encamped near the Indian soldiers, under Colonel Phillips, and moved whenever his command moved. Most of the colored men who had belonged to Indian masters had enlisted in the Indian regiments, and of course their families encamped with the Indian families. There was no recognized difference of social status between the Indians and negroes, so they mingled together on terms of perfect equality. No matter how poor a white family was, the fortunes of war did not bring it to the point of yielding anything to the social recognition of the colored people. Nor, on the other hand, did the colored people exhibit any desire for such recognition, as had been predicted by those who had been fearful of the freedom of the slaves. Unionists held that they could wish even for the abolition of slavery without wishing to disturb racial relations to the extent of free intermingling of the two races.

The organization of a colored regiment in Kansas by Colonel James M. Williams had been in progress for several months, so that a good many of the negro men of Southern Missouri and Northern Arkansas, who had come to the Army of the Frontier, took the first opportunity to go to Kansas with the view of enlisting. There had up to this time been a good deal of opposition all over the country and in the Union army to the enlistment of negro men for the service, and the discussion of the question was carried on in camp among officers and soldiers, as well as in the newspapers and by politicians. Some officers were so strongly opposed to the measure that they resigned their commissions in the army after Mr. Lincoln issued his emancipation proclamation, offering freedom to the slaves if the Confederate authorities did not accept the terms which he had offered them. From the knowledge of the fact that the slaves had been used to raise the supplies for supporting the Southern armies, and in many instances to build their fortifications, and on account of the growing sentiment against slavery, no thoughtful person who had been watching the course of events could reasonably hope for the continued existence of the institution, should the war close at once. Sentiment had already changed to such an extent in the army that no officer or soldier thought of discouraging the negroes from coming into the Federal lines when they had left their masters to gain their freedom. In fact, the humane policy of the Government was gaining it friends everywhere.

Shortly after assuming command of the Indian Brigade, Colonel Phillips was impressed with the fact that important responsibilities had been imposed upon him—responsibilities that required him not only to look after the interests of his troops and of the movements of the enemy in his front and rear, but responsibilities that required him to look after the interests and well-being of several thou-

sand Indian families of different tribes who were exiles from their homes. He had been prominently identified with the Free-State movement in Kansas; he had been a friend of Horace Greeley and a correspondent of the *New York Tribune* in Kansas during Territorial times, and had written a history of the Territorial troubles; he had been a careful observer of events of national interest, and believed that the Government's Indian policy should be based upon principles of justice and honor, and without doubt there was not another officer in the Army of the Frontier who was so well qualified to take charge of the Indian troops and to administer the affairs of the Indian Territory as he. His connection with the organization of the Indian regiments during the past year had won him the confidence of the Indians, and he showed on every occasion that their confidence should not be abused.

When the severe winter weather came upon his command near Maysville, he had men detailed to repair the mills in that section and to run them in grinding such corn and wheat as could be obtained to make meal and flour for the refugee families in and about his camp. The people who had not left their homes raised fair crops of corn, wheat, and oats in that section the past year, and as the armies had not so nearly exhausted the forage and subsistence as in the counties south of his position, he determined as far as practicable to winter his command there and feed the refugee families in Northwest Arkansas and Southwest Missouri off the country. He kept his wagon trains busy going to and returning from Fort Scott for supplies for his troops, and when it became difficult to obtain within ten or twelve miles of his camp forage for his animals and subsistence for the refugees he moved to a neighborhood where these supplies were more abundant. Even in the most severe weather most of his troops were kept busy. It took upwards of two hundred men to escort a train to and from Fort Scott. He was obliged

to keep mounted detachments constantly employed on scouting service to the south of his position, and his forage trains that had to go sometimes twenty miles or more for forage had to have ample escorts, for he was almost daily advised by his scouts, or by Unionists coming into his camp, of small parties of guerillas or of secessionists quietly returning to nearly every neighborhood.

A good many secessionists who had left Missouri when the Southern forces were driven out of the State during the Pea Ridge campaign and during the past autumn hoped to return with General Hindman in his proposed march to the Missouri River, but since his defeat they determined to venture through the Federal lines and if possible reach their homes. Having ascertained that the policy of the Federal Government was not as rigorous as had been represented to them, some of these secessionists reported to the commanding officers of the nearest posts and took the oath of allegiance, while others were picked up by the Federal cavalry and brought into different posts and took the oath of allegiance to the Government.

In Northwest Arkansas, Southwest Missouri, and in the Cherokee Nation there was very little land in cultivation except along the creek valleys, which generally did not exceed half a mile in width. Rough, steep hills rose precipitously from one side or the other of the creek, which were here and there broken by deep hollows or gorges that extended back a mile or so. It was this rough, hilly region that afforded favorite haunts for guerilla bands, and it was along the bluffs of these creeks, where the roads ran near them, that Federal detachments and escorts to trains were fired upon by the bandits. Having taken up a good position that gave him easy access to the Spavinaw Hills, the hills of Honey Creek, and of other small streams in that section, Colonel Phillips determined to make a vigorous campaign against the

bandits of his district. The hunting habits of his Indian troops made them well adapted to going into the woods and hills in pursuit of marauders or bandits.

On the 12th of January he sent Captain H. S. Anderson, of the Third Indian Regiment, with a company of mounted men, to Spavinaw Creek, some twelve miles south of Maysville, where he had received information that there was a force of upwards of one hundred guerillas belonging to the band of Major Thomas R. Livingston, who had been the leader of the Partisan Rangers, as they called themselves, in Jasper and Newton Counties, Missouri, the past year. Captain Anderson, having ascertained the position of the enemy, attacked them with such energy that they soon broke up into small parties, and were pursued until they were lost in the woods and hills of that region. The bandits were under the immediate command of Captains Timon, Smith, and Alex. Price, who had been operating in that section for some time. In the action and in the pursuit, Captain Anderson reported one of his own men killed, and eight of the bandits killed, including Captain Smith.

This vigorous action of the Federal commander had the effect of making guerilla leaders cautious about approaching very near the Indian troops. Instead of being constantly on the alert to meet the attacks of these bandits, it would now be the policy of Colonel Phillips to hunt them down by following them into their most obscure hiding places when practicable. Heretofore the Federal troops passing through that section, if fired upon by the bandits, pursued them until they lost sight of them in the woods and hills, generally inflicting very little punishment upon them.

Having used up very closely the forage and subsistence supplies in the vicinity of Maysville, Colonel Phillips moved his command on January 30th twenty-two miles north to Elk Mills, on Elk River, in McDonald County,

Missouri. Along this stream and along Buffalo Creek, that empties into it near Elk Mills, there were some of the best farms in the county, and as there had been no large body of troops of either side encamped in that section during the past autumn for more than a few days at a time, Colonel Phillips calculated that these farms would furnish forage for his command until spring, when he proposed to face south and move into the Cherokee Nation.

Cowskin Prairie, which had been noted as the rendezvous of the Southern forces of Missouri in the early part of the war, was only two or three miles from Elk Mills. The place had also been a favorite camping ground for smaller commands of Southern troops, Indians and whites, operating in the northern part of the Cherokee Nation and in Southwest Missouri. Most of the people of that section were secessionists, and had been giving aid and comfort to the Southern forces and guerilla bands, so that Colonel Phillips deemed it expedient to let them contribute some of their supplies towards supporting the Federal forces for a while. Though his position as a Federal officer commanding a large force in the enemy's country, or a section recently occupied by the enemy, imposed upon him the necessity of taking property from the citizens for the use of his troops, he was always careful that such property was taken by officers or non-commissioned officers regularly detailed for the purpose.

His orders strictly prohibited any soldier or citizen connected with his command from taking anything from citizens not actually required for the use of his troops. While encamped near Maysville, half a dozen or so negro men, refugees, or "contrabands," as they were called, were arrested and brought before his provost-marshal on the charge of taking property from citizens and appropriating it to their own private use, and found guilty and

a punishment imposed upon them. They were each required to carry a log or stick of wood four or five feet long and of forty to fifty pounds weight on their backs up and down a beat for about half a day, with a guard to keep them moving. This public punishment was seen by nearly every one in camp, and was talked about and no doubt had a good effect, for complaints of pillaging rarely came in to the commanding officer after that. Nearly all the white people of that section had all their lives heard of Indian massacres and cruelties, and they were generally instinctively afraid of the Indian soldiers, so that any loose discipline which would have permitted them, or the colored contrabands with them, to commit against the citizens any unlawful acts, or acts not directed by military authority, would likely have attracted wide attention and called forth protests from other sections of the country. There was one white officer and a white orderly sergeant to each Indian company to enforce the discipline prescribed for companies of white regiments, and it was the general verdict of these white officers that the Indian officers and soldiers did not show a disposition to ignore the prescribed discipline. These Indian troops had been in Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas the last six months as a part of the Army of the Frontier, and they had shown by their conduct that their service should not disgrace the cause which they had espoused.

While the Indian Brigade was encamped at Elk Mills, known also as Scott's Mills, a few Cherokee families returned to their homes in the nation, along Elk and Grand rivers, within twelve to fifteen miles of the troops. Their country, however, had been so completely despoiled during the past year of its herds of cattle and horses, that these families found very little to live upon except wild game, which had multiplied in the desolated localities. Even the families of the Indians who were fighting on the Southern side had lost nearly all their

cattle and horses during the past summer and autumn, and were therefore too poor to divide such little subsistence as they had with any families who returned to the neighborhood. There were very few of the Cherokees who had yet become prosperous farmers,—farmers who raised large quantities of corn, wheat, and oats,—having up to the war depended very largely upon Western Missouri and Arkansas for the meal and flour required for consumption. The wealth of these people then consisted mostly of herds of cattle and horses that lived on the range the year round. These facts being known to Colonel Phillips, he knew that to be able to obtain forage for his command and subsistence for the refugees during the winter he must look to the counties of Western Missouri and Arkansas. And as there was a general thawing out of the ground in that section in the early part of February, and freezing and thawing after that off and on up to about the middle of March, making the roads almost impassable for heavy wagon trains, it was of course desirable that the troops should be encamped as near the neighborhoods furnishing forage as practicable.

The Cherokee Council was in session for a week or so while the Indian Brigade was encamped at Elk Mills, and had under consideration some important measures touching the interests of the Indians. During the session of the Council the question in regard to the abolition of slavery in the Cherokee Nation was brought before it for consideration, and the discussions of the leaders of the Indians showed that they were in favor of being guided by and of following the policy of the General Government relating to the matter. Although slavery had existed for some generations among the Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Creeks, it was well known to those familiar with the institution that it never existed in the form that characterized it in the slave States of the Union, particularly the Southern States. The worst

features of slavery, such as the hard treatment imposed upon the slaves of the South, was hardly known to the slaves of these Indians prior to the war. Indeed, the negroes brought up among the Indians were under such feeble restraint from infancy up, that owners and dealers in slaves in Missouri and Arkansas did not hesitate to acknowledge that Indian negroes were undesirable because of the difficulty of controlling them. Most of the men who owned slaves in the Indian Territory were white men who had married Indian women, or half-breeds who were the children of such unions; and it was mostly these white men and half-breeds who had espoused the Confederate cause, particularly among the Cherokees.

The Rev. John B. Jones, chaplain of the Second Indian Regiment, had passed most of his life up to the time of the war as a missionary among the Cherokees, and on account of his perfect knowledge of the Cherokee language had great influence among them. He was a stanch friend of the Union and strongly opposed to slavery at the breaking out of the war, and probably no man among the Indians did more to mould and prepare public sentiment to acquiesce in the downfall of the institution. The agitation, however, of the slavery question among the Indians had been so feeble that it never excited the interest that it had among the people of the States of the Union. There were no large slave-owners among the Indians, and the institution had so little to do with social status that perhaps a considerable majority were indifferent as to its existence. In the discussion of the slavery question, therefore, the leaders of these Indians never exhibited the strong bias that characterized its discussion among the whites.

On the 21st of February, immediately after the adjournment of the Cherokee Council, the Indian Brigade moved from Elk Mills up Elk River to Pineville, and from that place marched to Bentonville, Arkansas, where

it encamped for several weeks. This movement was preliminary to opening the spring campaign, and of marching into the Cherokee Nation. The Indian soldiers in particular were delighted that there was a prospect of going back into their own country again in a short time. While encamped at Bentonville the smallpox broke out among the Indian soldiers, and a good many were taken down and a few died before the surgeons could check the spread of the disease by vaccination. Very few of the Indians had been vaccinated up to this time, and when the disease appeared among them, it soon spread rapidly. Nearly all the white soldiers escaped the disease, having been vaccinated before or shortly after enlistment. A smallpox hospital was established about half a mile from the camp of the troops, but in spite of the isolation of the patients the disease did not die out until late in the spring. It was impossible to prevent the spread of the disease while the refugee families and the soldiers of these families freely mingled together.

Now that he had advanced twenty-five miles south, Colonel Phillips sent his scouting parties to the front almost to the Arkansas River, to ascertain as far as practicable what preparation the Confederate leaders were making to oppose him. He soon found that General Steele, commanding the Confederate forces in the District of the Indian Territory, was at Fort Smith with three hundred or four hundred men, and that he was making preparations to open the spring campaign as soon as the roads were in condition to enable him to march his troops with their artillery and trains from Red River, where they had been sent to be reorganized and equipped, to the south bank of the Arkansas. The Texas and Indian soldiers who had been furloughed in the early part of winter had been ordered to return to their several stations at once, and General Steele was making every possible effort to have a strong and well-equipped force on the banks of the

Arkansas, in the neighborhood of Fort Gibson, at an early day. He ordered his chief quartermaster and chief commissary to obtain large amounts of supplies for their respective departments on Red River, which were to be brought forward with his troops, so that there might be no delay when the moment arrived to commence active operations. He kept himself advised of the movements of the Federal troops in his front, and of the departures of the wagon trains which brought them supplies from Fort Scott.


These signs of activity displayed by the Confederate leaders convinced Colonel Phillips that he should establish his headquarters at Fort Gibson as early as practicable, if it was determined to hold the Indian country north of the Arkansas River. He could march into the Indian Territory any day, but he knew the moment he entered that Territory the Indian families at Neosho would wish to return to their homes, and he was desirous that they should remain where they were until spring should advance far enough to enable their ponies to live on the range. He saw that if these families should join his command before entering the Indian Territory they would increase the size of the refugee camp and expose them to the contagion of smallpox, which had already invaded a good many families encamped near his troops. He had been able to forage off the country during the past winter, but when he entered the Indian country he would be obliged to have corn and oats for his animals transported from Fort Scott in wagon trains. In a few weeks the grass on the Arkansas River bottom would furnish good grazing for such of his cavalry horses as would not be employed in active scouting. In the meantime he determined to keep out strong detachments of cavalry scouting the country to Van Buren and north of the Arkansas River as far west as Fort Gibson, depending on Colonel Harrison, commanding at Fayette-

ville, to keep the enemy from menacing his left flank on the east and southeast.

The continuous and active scouting and escort duty required of his mounted troops during the past winter, and the increasing scarcity of forage toward spring, had so reduced in strength and flesh many of the horses that they were unfit for active service. Indeed, there were times when the forage ration was reduced to such extent that many of the horses tied near each other in camp ate each other's manes and tails off, so keenly did they feel the pinch of hunger. A few weeks' herding on the range in the grazing section of the Cherokee country would greatly improve this stock and fit it for light service. It was desirable, therefore, that the command should move forward to its destination as rapidly as the opening of spring and circumstances would permit, for the Indians were anxious to get back into their own country. They had suffered much from the war—as much as, or perhaps even more than, the people of the States bordering on their Territory. It was the earnest wish of the Federal authorities to restore them to their homes as early as practicable and to afford them protection. The Federal troops had twice occupied their country for a short time during the past year, so that when he got ready to march into it again, Colonel Phillips determined to take up a position which the Government could not well afford to abandon.

On the 17th of March, a day or so after the return of his forage train of one hundred wagons from White River, loaded mostly with corn, his command broke camp at Bentonville and marched fifteen miles southwest to Big Springs at the head of Flint Creek *en route* to Fort Gibson. His position here and on Illinois Creek, twelve miles south, where he was encamped some ten days, had the effect of checking a movement of Colonel Carroll's Confederate brigade, which was stationed a short distance

below Van Buren, and which was preparing to march north of the mountains to threaten Colonel Harrison at Fayetteville. While the Indian Brigade and the Federal force at Fayetteville were only fifteen to twenty miles apart, Colonel Carroll did not deem it advisable to move north of the mountains with his main command. But his scouting detachments and the partisan companies of that section kept him well informed of the movements of the Federal troops in his front.





## CHAPTER III.

### FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF FORT GIBSON.

THE signs of renewed life and activity brought by spring to other sections of the country were but feebly displayed in Northwest Arkansas and Southwest Missouri, so severely had that section been swept by the flames of war during the past year. Nearly all the Union people had most of their property that could be used for subsistence, foraging, or for other army purposes taken from them by the Confederate forces and partisan bands when the Federal army came into that section the past autumn, and had been obliged to move north, to Springfield, or into some of the Federal posts to obtain subsistence. A good many of their farms had the fences burned from around them by troops camping on the premises. The Southern families, too, who still remained on their farms, had fared very little better than their Union neighbors in this respect, for the fences had also been at least partly burned from around their farms in many instances.

Such preparations as the people were making to put in crops were on a much smaller scale than usual. On many of the farms the fences had been burned only along the roads and in exposed places, leaving the inconvenient lines of fences untouched. Where the fences had been thus partially destroyed, they were reconstructed by collecting the rails to inclose smaller tracts. The means

of cultivation had also been reduced. All the horses and mules fit for army use had been taken from the people by either the Confederate or Union forces, leaving only the old, blind, or inferior stock for farm purposes. And then only women and children and old men could with safety remain at home to carry on such farming as was possible.

Prior to the war very few of the white women in that section worked in the fields, but now the stress of circumstances not only obliged them to work in the fields, but to endure many other hardships incident to the war on the Border. There was very little encouragement for the people of some parts of that country to raise a surplus of farm productions, for if the war continued they were not only likely to have any surplus they might have raised taken from them by the armies, but they would be fortunate if they could keep enough of such products for their own use. The officers of the Confederate forces paid the Southern people in vouchers or Confederate money for supplies taken from them, but the vouchers and Confederate money were worthless when the Federal forces occupied the country. All supplies taken from the people by the Federal troops were or should have been receipted for by the officer taking them, the officer generally adding the remark to the receipt, "*Payable on proof of loyalty*," if the loyalty of the party was regarded as questionable. The holders of these receipts could take them to the nearest quartermaster or commissary, and, on proper identification, obtain vouchers for them, and get the vouchers cashed at a slight discount by the nearest merchant or banker, provided the voucher did not contain the fatal remark, "*Payable on proof of loyalty*."

Very few of the Unionists ever received receipts or vouchers or any evidence of indebtedness for the supplies taken from them by the Confederate forces. They sometimes, however, had a broken-down horse or mule left with

them for a serviceable one taken from them. But they could not keep even this broken-down animal after they had fed it and put it in condition to use, unless it had some defect rendering it unfit for army service. A Federal force in hot pursuit of the foe, or being closely pressed by him, might sometimes appropriate property of the citizens in an irregular manner; but except under some such conditions the appropriations were regular, and often even profitable to the citizens. The blockade of the ports of the Southern States by the United States Navy, the stoppage of commerce between the loyal and insurrectionary States, and the prohibition of the sale of all articles held as contraband of war to the people living in insurrectionary districts were depriving the people of the South, and even of Western Arkansas, of many articles of food and clothing which they had always esteemed as necessities of life. Many Southern families, therefore, who lived near Federal posts or camps, were only too anxious to exchange their butter, eggs, chickens, and dried fruits with the soldiers for coffee, tea, sugar, salt, and other articles which could not be obtained from any other source. Nearly every company commissary had a surplus of some of these articles which he was authorized to exchange with citizens for other articles that the company desired.

It was the policy of the Federal authorities to prohibit the wanton destruction of property. On the line of march of the Federal troops a standing chimney and the ashes of a recently burnt house might now and then have been seen; but in every case in which a house had been burned by the troops, investigation showed that it had been burned because the troops had been fired upon from it by the occupants, or by bandits harbored by the occupants. Those who wilfully harbored bandits were held as no better than bandits, and the destruction of their property was regarded as a legitimate penalty for their

offence. This was so well known to the Southern sympathizers that they did not often encourage the bandits to stay about their premises when the Federal troops were in the neighborhood. The bandits, too, who did not wish to bring such severe punishment upon their friends, were generally cautious about visiting them or of being seen about them.

On the return of Captain N. B. Lucas, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, from a scout of several days in the direction of Fort Smith with one hundred men, the Indian Brigade, on April 3d, moved from Illinois Creek to Cincinnati, a small place on the line of Arkansas and the Indian Territory, *via* Dutch Mills to Park Hill, which is only seven miles from Tahlequah, the capital of the Cherokee Nation. The information obtained by Captain Lucas showed that there was no Southern force north of Van Buren or north of the Arkansas River in the Indian Territory, and as the grass on the bottoms of the Illinois and Arkansas rivers was getting so that stock could live on the range, Colonel Phillips regarded the time as propitious for leading the Indians back into their own country. When it had become definitely known to the Indian soldiers that they were on the march to Fort Gibson, every morning on starting out they put on their faces their brightest war-paint, and their war-whoops, which commenced at the head of the column and ran back to the rear several times in succession, had more animation than usual, for the realization of their hopes appeared to them near at hand.

On leaving Dutch Mills Colonel Phillips sent Major Foreman, with three hundred mounted men, in the direction of Webber's Falls, on the Arkansas River, with instructions to thoroughly scout that section and to rejoin the main command at Park Hill. While on this reconnaissance the Major came up with a detachment of Southern Indians of General Cooper's command near the mouth of Illinois River, and in the skirmish that took

place six of the enemy were killed, including one captain and one sergeant, and several men captured. The prisoners were badly frightened, for they probably expected to be killed in retaliation for six loyal Indians, known as Pin Indians, who had recently been surprised and killed near Park Hill by a party of Southern men dressed in Federal uniform. The Federal detachment also captured and brought in about three hundred head of cattle, some of which were in fair condition for beef. This scout developed the fact that the Indians in the southern part of the Cherokee Nation had not suffered as much from the war as those in the northern part, for many of those who had espoused the Confederate cause had lost but little of their live stock, as horses and cattle. In this part of the Indian Territory Federal detachments had penetrated several times, but had not taken time to bring out any stock; whereas in the northern part of the Territory each side had collected and driven off the horses and cattle of the Indians to prevent the other side from getting them. Of course in this indiscriminate spoliation of the Indians a great deal of their property was appropriated to private use by white men who did not belong to the army.

On the morning of April 9th the refugee train, a train of wagons perhaps more than a mile long, with an escort of three hundred Indian soldiers under Captain A. C. Spillman, arrived at Park Hill from Neosho, Missouri, bringing all the Indian families who had spent the winter at that place. Many of the Indian women and children were riding their ponies, their effects and the old and the invalids being hauled in the wagons. This meeting of the Indian soldiers with their families near the capital of their country, after a separation of nearly a year in some instances, was the occasion for much rejoicing, for it was an event the consummation of which they had been earnestly wishing for through the long weary months of

hardship and exile. But while all these people were gratified and even thankful to be able to come together under the bright skies of their own beautiful country, all the greetings of husbands and wives and members of families and friends did not present scenes of rejoicing. Many of these families had been exposed to the epidemic of measles at Neosho during the past winter, and the mortality from the resulting sequelæ of the disease had been very great, particularly among the children, on account of the inadequate facilities for taking proper care of the patients. There was very little correspondence by writing between the Indian soldiers and their families, and at the greetings of parents, reference was soon made to a child or member of the family who had fallen a victim to disease and had been left behind to be mourned by loving hearts. Thus were hearts torn by trials and severe afflictions, so that there was weeping as well as rejoicing when the Indian soldiers met their families returning from exile.

Now that nearly all the families of the loyal Indians had been brought together in their own country, the question was at once presented to the Federal commander, Would not the presence of these families increase the burden, already great, of providing subsistence for his troops, since the only part of the ration he could depend upon the country to furnish would be fresh meat? While he saw that he might be obliged to issue to some of the Indian families part of the subsistence supplies brought down from Fort Scott for his troops, it was his policy to encourage the families living north of the Arkansas River to return to their homes as far as practicable for the purpose of putting in their usual crops of corn and garden stuff. Even in peaceable times a good many Indian women had been in the habit of working such patches of corn and potatoes as were cultivated. When leaving their homes most of these Indians had been able

to bring out a good many of their ponies, probably at least one for each member of the family to ride, except children in the arms of their mothers, and now that the range was getting good this stock could be better taken care of and made more useful at the homes of families than in camp near the troops.

Very few of the houses and fences had been burned in the Indian Territory, except such as were burned by accidental fires breaking out, and those families who returned to their homes generally found their premises in nearly the same condition in which they left them, and in some cases were able to find on the range some of their horses and cattle which had not been killed or driven off in their absence. After the defeat and breaking up of General Cooper's force at Fort Wayne in October, the Southern Indians had not ventured north of the Arkansas River, except along the State line between Fort Smith and the Boston Mountains a week or so during the Prairie Grove campaign, so that they had not been able to collect and drive off much stock during the past winter.

As the winter had not been very severe, most of the abandoned stock in the Territory had been able to live in the canebrakes and on the range in the timber along the streams. A process of natural selection had made the Indian cattle and horses hardy breeds, and, as many of the cattle would soon be in condition for making good beef, it was of the utmost importance that they should be protected from the depredations of partisan bands who were already making efforts to collect herds of them to drive south for the use of the Southern army. When the loyal Indian families commenced returning to their homes, the presence in any neighborhood of partisan bands or other agents of the Confederacy collecting stock quickly excited attention and was likely in a short time to be made known to the Federal commander of the Indian troops, for an Indian woman did not seem to

regard it as much of a hardship to mount her pony and ride twenty-five to thirty miles in a day or night on an important mission.

Having by his scouting detachments made himself better acquainted with the situation in the Indian Territory, and having given the Indian soldiers and their families several days to make such arrangements as they desired for the future, Colonel Phillips marched his command, with baggage trains and artillery, from Park Hill to Fort Gibson, arriving at the latter place in the afternoon of April 13th. He had, however, several days before sent forward a battalion of the Second Indian Regiment and one company of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry to reconnoitre the position and to ascertain if practicable if there was a Confederate force in the vicinity south of the Arkansas or west of Grand River. The commanding officer of the detachment ascertained before reaching Fort Gibson that there was a company of Colonel Stand Watie's Southern Indians there, and determined, on nearing the place, to charge them, which he did in a gallant manner. In the charge the enemy were put to flight, four or five killed and wounded, several captured, and the remainder so completely hemmed in near the mouth of Grand River that they were obliged to plunge into the Arkansas and swim it to save themselves from capture. In a few days after his arrival at Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips saw that Generals Steele and Cooper were preparing to use all their power to compel him to evacuate his position. But knowing the importance of that position, and that it would be ruinous to the Union cause in the Indian Territory to evacuate it, he determined to hold on to it to the last extremity.

The military post of Fort Gibson was established by the Government about 1830, and two or three companies of Regular troops were stationed there up to the outbreak of the war. No defensive works had been constructed

except a couple of blockhouses, which were in a state of decay and which were practically useless as a defence against modern artillery. The position was naturally a strong one, for there was no point of equal height within a mile or so from which an enemy could use artillery against it with advantage. The new Government buildings stood on a bluff, probably seventy-five feet high, on the east side of Grand River, three miles above its junction with the Arkansas. Looking to the east one could see in the distance, some ten miles off, in bold outlines, the range of hills which were the western terminus of the Ozark Mountains. Turning to the south and overlooking the Arkansas River, three miles distant, the eyes rested upon the opposite heights and the prairie country beyond. Turning to the west and southwest were presented to the view the western heights of Grand River, a mile and a half to two miles off. Farther to the southwest could be seen a prairie region with a strip of timber running through it in a southeast direction. This ribbon-like strip of timber marked the course of the Verdigris, which empties into the Arkansas five or six miles above the mouth of Grand River. The junction of these rivers within a few miles of each other had made Fort Gibson a central point from the fact that it was the head of navigation on the Arkansas and its tributaries. There were two good substantial stone buildings standing on the bluff a hundred yards or so from the water's edge, which had been used by the Regular army as quartermaster and commissary storehouses, and which were turned to that use again.

The wagon trains hauling supplies for the troops from Fort Scott passed down on the military road on the west side of Grand River, and crossed the river opposite the fort on ferryboats, which Colonel Phillips had constructed for the purpose on moving in. In view of the activity the enemy were displaying in his front a few days after his

arrival at Gibson, he put all of his troops not employed in scouting and escort duty to working on fortifications on the bluff a few hundred yards north of the old wooden buildings around the plaza.

In spite of the reputation of the Indian for a dislike of manual labor, the Indian soldiers worked on the fortifications with picks and shovels with commendable industry without a murmur, and in a few weeks threw up a line of breastworks about a mile in length, including the angles. The breastworks thus constructed extended around three sides of an area of about fifteen acres, the precipitous bluff forming the west side, which was large enough for all the troops and trains to camp on the inside in an emergency. Barbettes were also constructed for the guns of the battery so that they could fire over the parapet and sweep the approaches in every direction except along the west bluff. In view of the strong probability that he would be obliged to use the greater part of his troops in making reconnoissances and in furnishing escorts to his supply trains, the Federal commander saw that his position should at once be strengthened so that he could hold it with the smaller part of his command against any attacking force which General Cooper would likely be able to bring to bear upon it.

The Arkansas was sometimes fordable at different points below the mouth of Grand River even in the spring season, and Colonel Phillips determined to be prepared to meet any movement the Confederate leaders might attempt to make. He knew that inasmuch as they held no particular place in the Indian Territory they could and probably would use all their forces to threaten and disturb his line of communication with his base of supplies at Fort Scott, a distance of 160 miles north. He would be obliged to guard eighty to one hundred miles of this line, as far north as Baxter Springs, which would constantly require large details from his mounted

troops. He proposed, however, to hold his troops in hand in such manner that he could use them to act on the offensive when desirable, and, if practicable, strike the enemy when they would least expect his blows.

He saw that the Southern leaders would not likely have any great advantage over him in regard to ascertaining each other's movements, for considerable numbers of Creek and Seminole Indians who had hitherto been friendly to the Confederate cause, and whose territory lay south of the Arkansas, had, within a few days after his arrival at Fort Gibson, sent in a request under a flag of truce to ascertain on what conditions they could come in and renew their allegiance to the Government. When they found that no hard conditions would be imposed—in fact, that they would be welcomed—they commenced coming in in squads of a dozen or so at a time, and in a week or two more than one hundred had arrived, a good many of whom at once joined the First Indian Regiment, which was composed of loyal Creeks and Seminoles. The statements of these Indians showed that there was a good deal of dissatisfaction among the Southern Indians of General Steele's command on account of the indifference with which their interests had been treated by the Confederate authorities.

It was through information obtained from these Indians and from white deserters from General Cooper's command that Colonel Phillips ascertained that a proclamation had been issued for the rebel Cherokee Legislature to meet at Webber's Falls, twenty-five miles below Fort Gibson, on the south side of the Arkansas, on the 25th of April, and that a Confederate force of about five hundred men was being concentrated at that point under Colonel Stand Watie, the leader of the Cherokees who had espoused the Confederate cause. When this information was received, the Federal troops at Fort Gibson had just completed the celebration of the event of raising the

National Flag at that post, and Colonel Phillips had just sent out two hundred cavalry to meet and reinforce the escort to his supply train of 125 wagons from Fort Scott, for a rumor prevailed that day that General Cooper had despatched a cavalry force of about one thousand men to cross the Arkansas above Fort Gibson for the purpose of capturing or destroying the train if practicable. The train, however, came in during the night without accident, and Colonel Phillips determined to make a night's march, and surprise, attack, and break up the Confederate force at Webber's Falls at once. There had recently been a rise of several feet in the Arkansas, and he soon found that he would be obliged to wait a day or two for it to fall before he would be able to cross it at any of the fords below Fort Gibson. During this interval he heard of General Cabell's attack on Fayetteville, Arkansas, on the 18th, and of his repulse by the Federal troops under Colonel Harrison after several hours' sharp fighting. The information of the success of the Federal arms at that point relieved him of anxiety about a hostile movement from the direction of the Arkansas line.

On the 24th his scouts informed him that the Arkansas was fordable at the point where he desired to cross it, and that evening about dark he took some six hundred mounted men, drawn from the three Indian regiments and the battalion, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and started out to seek the enemy. He forded the Arkansas below Fort Gibson, and, making a night march, at daylight struck the enemy under Stand Watie at Webber's Falls, and after a short, vigorous attack, completely routed them, killing fifteen, including two captains, wounding about the same number, and capturing a few prisoners, together with all their camp equipage. The sudden appearance of the Federal force at that early hour was a surprise to Stand Watie, who, after his partially formed line gave way,

made very little further effort to rally his men, a good many of whom dispersed into the cane, but most of whom fled in the direction of Northfork, where General Cooper was encamped with his main command. Some of the members of the rebel Cherokee Legislature, who were also closely pressed by the Federal cavalry, dispersed into the canebrakes, and were soon lost sight of by their pursuers.

A hard night's march had so exhausted the strength of the horses of the Federal mounted troops that they could not be used to advantage in making a vigorous pursuit of the flying foe. The Federal loss in the affair was two men killed, including Dr. Gillpatrick, a special agent of the Government, who accompanied the expedition from Fort Gibson. After the skirmish was over he was requested by some one to dress the wound of a Southern soldier who had fallen near the scene of action, and while attending to this duty was shot by a small party of Southern men who came out of the cane only a few rods off. He was a prominent citizen of Kansas, and was brought back with the command to Fort Gibson and buried there Sunday afternoon.

After destroying such of the captured property of the Confederate camp as he did not wish to bring away, Colonel Phillips recrossed the Arkansas, fording it at Webber's Falls while it was rising and very deep, with his command, and marched in the direction of Evansville, on the western line of Arkansas, where he was informed there was a Confederate force encamped for the night. Before reaching that place, however, the Confederates heard of his approach and of the affair at Webber's Falls, and immediately retreated back towards Fort Smith. Hearing of the retreat of the Confederates, he changed his line of march and returned to Fort Gibson. On his return to that post he heard with a feeling of keen disappointment of the evacuation of Fayetteville by

Colonel Harrison on the 25th, and of his retreat to Cassville, Missouri. He had expected the coöperation of Colonel Harrison to keep the enemy off his flank. This movement threatened to give him serious trouble, for General Cabell, who had recently been assigned to the command of the Confederate forces in Western Arkansas, would probably move north of the Boston Mountains at once, if he had not already done so, and occupy the territory which Colonel Harrison had evacuated. This would isolate the position at Fort Gibson and expose it to a flank attack on the east for nearly one hundred miles north.

Indeed, on the same day of his return from Webber's Falls, Colonel Phillips was informed by his scouts that General Cabell had already advanced north of the mountains and was encamped in the vicinity of Cane Hill with about one thousand cavalry. He determined to check the advance of this force on his flank, and at once sent out Lieutenant-Colonel Fred. W. Schaurte, Second Indian Regiment, with eight hundred men and a section of Hopkins' battery, to attack the enemy if found. After nearly a week of hard marching in the mountainous region along the State line, Colonel Schaurte was unable to get nearer than within about ten miles of the Confederate force, which retreated in the direction of Van Buren on his approach. His expedition, however, had the effect of temporarily checking the boldness of the enemy, who were endeavoring to work around the Federal flank on the east so that they could menace the Federal line of communication with Fort Scott.





## CHAPTER IV.

### ACTION AT FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS, AND REPULSE OF GENERAL CABELL.

ATTENTION may now be directed briefly to the operations of the troops under Colonel M. La Rue Harrison, commanding the post of Fayetteville. After the different divisions of the Army of the Frontier had been withdrawn from the vicinity of that post and distributed to points in the northern counties of Arkansas and in Southern Missouri, his position became isolated and one likely to attract the attention of Southern officers commanding troops south of the Arkansas River. His command then consisted of his own regiment, the First Arkansas Union Cavalry, part of the Tenth Illinois Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel James Stuart, temporarily assigned, and as much of the First Arkansas Union Infantry as had been recruited, under Colonel James M. Johnson. This last-named regiment was filled up rapidly by the loyal Arkansans who had been conscripted into the Confederate service and who had refused to serve, and by other Union men who had made their way into the Federal lines from adjacent counties and from distant parts of the State. At Huntsville and other towns in Northern Arkansas public meetings were held, which were addressed by prominent men who discussed the issues involved in the war. Detachments of Federal cavalry were sent to the towns where these meetings were held to protect the peo-

ple in the expression of their views and from interference by any of the independent or partisan companies of that section. In the hilly and mountain regions of the State the people generally owned small farms; they had no interest in slavery, were devoted to the Union from the beginning of the war, and were determined not to fight for the Confederate cause under any circumstances. As they had been hunted and harassed and threatened by Confederate conscripting officers and Southern Home Guards, they welcomed the Federal cavalry with expressions of joy, and were soon offering their services to the Government. They had been intimidated, robbed, and plundered, and obliged to live in the woods and hills and caves until their ragged clothing presented a most disagreeable sight to those who had been strangers to such hardships and modes of life. After some of these men enlisted and had their hair cut and put on their new blue uniforms, their friends hardly knew them, they were so changed in appearance. Long hair was the fashion in the South, in that section, and among Southern soldiers, and there was at least one instance where one of these Arkansas recruits refused to have his hair cut and had to be caught and held until the operation was performed, and where one man was sent to the guardhouse because he refused to serve as one of the detail to catch and hold the comrade for shearing. Most of these men were therefore already inured to hardships and dangers equal to, if indeed not greater than, those entailed by camp life or service in the field. It was desirable that this infantry regiment should complete its organization as early as practicable, so that it could do the garrison duty at Fayetteville, for Colonel Harrison wished to use his cavalry for scouting service; and then the constant communication between these soldiers and their families scattered over Northern Arkansas would likely be useful in disclosing the movements of guerilla

bands, and perhaps even larger Southern forces. At any rate, scouting parties visiting the localities of these Union families had already received important information from them of the movements of the enemy in their neighborhoods.

Within ten days after General Blunt had withdrawn his troops from Van Buren, Brigadier-General William Steele, of the Confederate army, was assigned to the command of the Indian Territory, with headquarters at Fort Smith. He reported that on his arrival at that post he found that section utterly exhausted of its resources from having had to contribute to the large Confederate forces which had been stationed or operating in and about Fort Smith since the beginning of the war; that the recent retreat of General Hindman had left the people, with few exceptions, gloomy, desponding, and thoroughly demoralized; that he found only about 350 men for duty under Colonel J. C. Monroe, First Arkansas Confederate Cavalry, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Crump, of Lane's Texas Regiment, Partisan Rangers, with about fifteen hundred inmates of the numerous hospitals of the place in a wretched condition; and that in view of the difficulty of obtaining supplies for his command from Red River or Texas, he urged the commanding general of the Department to send a sufficient force of cavalry for service along the north side of the Arkansas River to protect the boats bringing up army stores from Little Rock, and to annoy the Federal troops at Fayetteville. He also strongly encouraged the formation of partisan companies, or guerilla bands, as the Federal troops called such organizations.

It will thus be seen that very soon after the different divisions of the Army of the Frontier were withdrawn from the vicinity of Fayetteville, Colonel Harrison would have all that he could do to maintain his position. From Unionists south of the Arkansas River, and from desert-

ers from the Southern army, he ascertained that General Steele had a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Carroll at Roseville, about forty miles below Fort Smith, and about a regiment above that point on the north side of the river to protect his boats bringing up supplies from Little Rock. Colonel Harrison determined if possible to capture the boats employed in transporting supplies to the enemy, and to break up or demoralize the force of cavalry guarding them, and for this purpose, on the 23d of January, directed Lieutenant-Colonel James Stuart, Tenth Illinois Cavalry, to take sixty men of his own regiment and ninety men from the First Arkansas Cavalry, under Captain Charles Galloway, and two howitzers, and proceed to Van Buren, or some point on the river in that vicinity where he might obtain definite information of the movements of the enemy. He crossed the Boston Mountains on the Frog Bayou road and arrived at Van Buren the next evening, where he received information that a steamboat, the *Julia Roan*, in the service of General Steele, had recently gone up the river to Fort Smith with a cargo of corn and other supplies for the Southern troops, and was expected down that night or early the next morning. He at once placed a patrol guard on the bank of the river to watch for the boat, and with the remainder of his detachment patrolled the town and captured twenty-five Confederate soldiers with their horses and arms. Shortly after daybreak the next morning the boat was sighted coming down the river and he made arrangements to receive her and soon brought her to, opposite the levee. He found on board 248 Confederate officers and soldiers who were on their way to Little Rock, part of the men being of the sick from the hospitals at Fort Smith. All the officers and men thus captured were paroled, subject to exchange for Federal prisoners, and the boat allowed to proceed down the river. A small Confederate force came down from Fort Smith and fired

on Colonel Stuart's command from across the river opposite Van Buren that day, but he soon dispersed it with a few rounds from his howitzers which he had along. After stopping nearly two days in Van Buren, Colonel Stuart returned to Fayetteville without the loss of a man on the expedition. He received important information to the effect that General Steele had only four hundred or five hundred men at Fort Smith fit for duty; that there was great demoralization among the Southern forces in that section, and that there was such disaffection among the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek Indians that they were ready to join the Federal side.

In about ten days after the abovementioned expedition, Colonel Stuart returned to the Arkansas River with a scout of 225 men and two howitzers for the purpose of attacking and dispersing any Confederate troops found in that section. Shortly after he had advanced south of the mountains he ascertained that a small force of the enemy was encamped about three miles below the mouth of Frog Bayou on the south side of the Arkansas at Threlkeld's Ferry. He determined to make an effort to capture this force, and at once obtained some skiffs and had others constructed with which he had one hundred of his men ferried over to the south side of the river, with instructions to proceed cautiously to the enemy's camp and attack them. When he got his men ferried over the river, he moved down on the north bank with the balance of his command and the two howitzers, opposite the camp of the enemy, for the purpose of driving them out of their log buildings should they take to them for defence. The attacking party moved forward as directed and engaged the enemy, and a sharp skirmish took place in which several of the Southern men were killed and wounded and seven taken prisoners. The movement of the Federal detachment was discovered by the enemy in time to enable many of them to escape.

A day or two after this affair while marching along the Ozark road, some eight miles below Van Buren, Colonel Stuart's detachment was attacked by about one hundred men of Colonel C. A. Carroll's Arkansas Confederate Cavalry, who were taking down the telegraph wire along the road to Ozark. The Federal commander quickly formed his men in line and directed Captain W. A. Chapin to take fifty men and charge the enemy, which he did in a gallant manner, dispersing them in every direction.

On this scout Colonel Stuart captured and brought into Fayetteville thirty bales of Confederate cotton, and captured and paroled twenty-one Confederate soldiers. His casualties were one man drowned in crossing the Arkansas River, and one taken prisoner.

Within a few days of the movement under Colonel Stuart, another scout was sent out from Fayetteville under Captain Charles Galloway, with eighty-one men of the First Arkansas Cavalry, *via* Huntsville to the Arkansas River. After winding through the mountains south of Huntsville, the Captain marched to Ozark, on the Arkansas, where he was informed there was a small Confederate force waiting for the arrival of a steamboat. On his arrival at that place, and finding no enemy or steamer, he proceeded on the march up the river on the Van Buren road until he came to White Oak River, where his advance was attacked by 180 men of Colonel Dorsey's Confederate Cavalry. After exchanging shots with the enemy, his advance under Lieutenant James Roseman fell back on his main column, which he had drawn up in line in a strong position, and then awaited the further movements of the enemy. In a few moments the Confederates advanced, charging furiously and yelling like demons. They were allowed to approach within 150 yards when Captain Galloway ordered his men to fire. The volley from his rifles emptied some saddles and

brought the assailants to a sudden halt, after which they soon retreated and were pursued about ten miles. Captain Galloway reported that his casualties were two horses killed and one of his men slightly wounded, and that the enemy lost eight men killed and fifteen to twenty wounded, besides six horses killed.

The next day Captain Galloway sent Captain R. E. Travis of his detachment, with eight men, to reconnoitre a canebrake near the mouth of the Mulberry, where he was informed there were a number of men belonging to Mankin's Partisan Company. Captain Travis was not long in finding the enemy, thirty strong, as he was informed, in a log house, and he at once attacked them with seven men, leaving one man to hold his horses. He kept up the attack for about half an hour, when the enemy retreated, leaving most of their horses. But in the meantime the Captain had been seriously wounded in the hip; two of his men had been killed and one mortally wounded, so that he was unable to profit by his success. On returning to Fayetteville, Captain Galloway reported capturing on this scout three Confederate officers and nine soldiers.

When General Hindman was driven from Fort Smith the last of December, he ordered General Cooper, commanding the troops in the District of the Indian Territory, to retire on his depots on the South Canadian, about ninety miles southwest of Fort Smith, and to furlough his Indian troops as far as practicable for periods of sixty to ninety days.

On assuming command of his district at Fort Smith General Steele found the regiments of Speight's Texas Brigade in such a demoralized condition that he was obliged to send them to Red River to be subsisted, recruited, and equipped until they could be made available for active service. As an illustration of the demoralization that existed, he found Lane's Texas Regiment, which

originally consisted of fourteen full companies, able to report only 150 men present for duty. He could not therefore assume aggressive operations north of the Arkansas River until he reorganized his forces, which could not be efficiently done before spring. This demoralized condition of the Confederate forces in the Indian Territory and Western Arkansas enabled the Federal commander at Fayetteville to scout the country to the Arkansas River with very little opposition, except such as came from the partisan bands which had sprung up in different localities, until towards spring. The reduction in numerical strength of the Confederate regiments, General Steele asserted, was due in large measure to desertions; and he seems to have been disturbed more by the operations of what he termed "traitors, deserters, and Union men" around him than by the regularly organized Federal forces in his front. Indeed, the Union men and deserters from the Southern army collected in the mountains south of Fort Smith in such numbers as to give the Confederate forces a good deal of trouble. Early in March, Captain Brown, a Union man from Arkadelphia, arrived at Fayetteville with eighty-three men from south of the Arkansas, some of whom were recruits for the First Arkansas Infantry, and reported that on the 15th of February he was attacked in the mountains of Washita River by three hundred Southern men; that the action was a hotly contested one and lasted from early morning until noon, when the enemy were driven from their position with a loss of sixteen killed and twelve wounded. He reported his own casualties at two killed and four wounded.

When the skeleton Texas regiments had been sent back from Fort Smith to Red River to be subsisted, equipped, and reorganized for service, the success of the Federal arms in Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory gradually became known among the people of Northern

Texas. The knowledge of this success encouraged the Union men, who were numerous enough in some counties to have secret organizations of their own, and who had been much persecuted on account of their suspected loyalty to the Government, to collect together in small parties with the view of making their way to the Federal lines. At Gainesville, Texas, sixteen men were hung on one tree on account of their Union sentiments. This hard action of the Confederate authorities created consternation among the Unionists and those suspected of Union sentiments in Northern Texas, and they determined to get out of the country if possible. Captain Martin Hart, a prominent lawyer of Greenville and the leader of the Union men of Hunt County, and Captain Joseph R. Pratt, a leader of the Unionists in the section around Gainesville, Texas, were able after many hardships and dangers to make their way through Southern Arkansas to the Federal lines with a few followers. They represented that the Union men of Northern Texas were hunted down by the Southern men with bloodhounds, and in many instances treated with great cruelty, and that others had great difficulty in getting out of the State when the bloodhounds were put upon their tracks. These men travelled overland upwards of three hundred miles to reach the Federal lines, and they were then in nearly an exhausted and destitute condition, for their long journey over mountains and through swamps, and in rain, mud, sleet, and snow, with scanty clothing and shelter, had taxed their power of endurance to the utmost limit.

In Texas and Arkansas, and even in some parts of Missouri, it cost a man a terrible sacrifice when his judgment and conscience led him to affirm his allegiance to the Government and to oppose secession. The interest in the institution of slavery had made it impossible for toleration and the free discussion of political issues to

gain a footing as rapidly in the slave States as in the Northern States of the Union. The leaders, and indeed the creators, of public opinion in the South had been in the habit of presenting only their own side in the discussion of political questions, and of suppressing or misrepresenting and painting in the darkest possible colors the views of their opponents, so that the great mass of the people were kept incorrectly informed of the true situation, and were easily led not only to adopt but to clamor for harsh treatment towards their opponents. When the Southern soldiers, who were mostly from the poorer classes of Southern men, saw, from the prisoners they had taken, or when they were themselves by the fortunes of war made prisoners, how well the Federal soldiers had been provided with clothing, subsistence, and medical supplies, and how neat and clean they were in personal appearance, and contrasted all this with their own untidy, half-clothed and half-starved condition, it commenced to dawn upon their minds that the "Yankees" were not such bad people as had been represented.

It was not therefore surprising that General Steele should feel obliged to refer to the numerous desertions from Confederate regiments, and of the general demoralization that existed in his district. But in spite of the embarrassments with which he had to contend, he seems to have been not without hopes of accomplishing something for the Confederate cause in his field of operations, for he urged General Holmes, commanding the Department, to send a cavalry force to the rear of Colonel Harrison at Fayetteville, and to instruct Colonel Carroll, commanding a brigade of Arkansas cavalry at Roseville, to move against the Federal front, with the view of beating or forcing the Federal commander to evacuate Northwestern Arkansas. The movement to the rear of Fayetteville was not made with any Confederate force except by partisan companies; but early in March Colonel

Carroll moved his brigade to the north side of the Arkansas River, a few miles below Van Buren, and commenced sending out scouting detachments in the direction of Fayetteville. In the meantime Colonel Phillips moved the Indian Brigade from near Pineville, Missouri, to Bentonville, Arkansas, and was in position not only to coöperate with Colonel Harrison, but to send mounted detachments to the neighborhood of Van Buren to guard his own front. Colonel Harrison's force had also grown stronger, for the First Arkansas Infantry had nearly completed its organization, which enabled him to use most of his cavalry for scouting purposes. It was upwards of fifty miles from Fayetteville to Van Buren and points on the Arkansas River, and as the roads over the Boston Mountains were very rough, every scout to the south of them made a severe draught on the strength and endurance of his cavalry horses. But the safety of his command depended upon his vigilance, and as spring advanced, which came a week or so earlier south of the mountains than north of them, the Confederate leaders began to display greater activity by sending scouting detachments of upwards of one hundred men north of the mountains, even to the neighborhood of Fayetteville. They were also making every possible effort to obtain recruits to fill up their depleted regiments, promising pardon to all deserters who returned to their commands at once. They determined, as soon as reorganization and equipment put their troops in condition for the field, to open an aggressive spring campaign in Northwestern Arkansas, and if practicable drive out the Federal forces and occupy that section with Southern troops.

The latter part of March, Brigadier-General William L. Cabell was assigned to the command of the Confederate forces embraced in the District of Northwestern Arkansas, and, on his arrival at Ozark, immediately commenced collecting his troops to prepare for a move-

ment north of the mountains, with the view of attacking Colonel Harrison, commanding the post of Fayetteville. He knew that Colonel Phillips, commanding the Indian Brigade, had marched from Northwestern Arkansas into the Cherokee Nation and had captured and was occupying Fort Gibson, thus leaving Colonel Harrison's position at Fayetteville isolated. He saw that the distance from Fayetteville to Fort Gibson was upwards of sixty miles, a distance too great to allow the forces at those places to support each other in an emergency, and a distance greater than he would be obliged to march to attack Fayetteville. And when he got ready to move he knew that General Steele had ordered his Texas and Indian troops, under General Cooper, from Red River to the north bank of the Arkansas, to threaten the front and flank of Colonel Phillips. He had a section of artillery, six-pounder guns, which would give him an advantage over Colonel Harrison, who, he was informed, had no artillery, and was on the point of leaving Fayetteville to join Colonel Phillips. General Cabell was also led to believe that Colonel Harrison's command was composed of deserters from the Southern army and of Union men from the mountains of Arkansas, who would not fight and who could be easily stampeded by his artillery. Early in April, Colonel Harrison commenced constructing earth fortifications and rifle-pits, that he might be prepared to meet an attack from a superior force of the enemy. He was informed of General Cabell's presence at Ozark with several regiments of cavalry, and of his intention of shortly moving north of the mountains, so he kept his scouts well out in that direction. His troops had been well supplied with subsistence, and Colonel Johnson's First Arkansas Infantry had recently been armed and equipped, so that he determined that the enemy would be obliged to do some hard fighting before he would evacuate his position. Most of his men were familiar with the use of

firearms and were good marksmen even before entering the service, and with the new long-range rifles recently issued to the infantry he felt that he would be able to annoy the enemy a good deal before they could approach very near his fortifications. And then any of these infantrymen detached as sharpshooters would also be able to render effective service if the troops should have time to prepare for action.

Lieutenant J. S. Robb returned to Fayetteville from a scout in the direction of Ozark on April 17th, and reported to Colonel Harrison that he could hear of no preparation of the enemy to advance north. Having obtained information of the strength and position of the Federal force at Fayetteville, General Cabell determined to attack it, and for this purpose left Ozark before daybreak on the morning of April 16th, with Colonel Carroll's regiment, Arkansas Cavalry, commanded by Colonel John Scott, Colonel Monroe's regiment, Arkansas Cavalry, Major Caleb Dorsey's battalion, Arkansas Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel — Noble, commanding battalion of Parsons' Texas Cavalry, a section of artillery under Captain W. M. Hughey, and the partisan companies of Mankins, Palmer, and Brown, and crossed the mountains on the Frog Bayou road. After he got his command over the mountains about noon on the 17th, he halted to feed and rest until sunset, when he resumed the march with the intention of reaching Fayetteville at daybreak. The night was dark and the roads so rough that he was obliged to make a few short halts for his artillery to come up. This delayed him so that he did not get his troops in position to open the attack until some time after daylight. He managed, however, to surprise and capture Colonel Harrison's picket, but not before the picket discharged his rifle, which alarmed the Federal camp and enabled the officers to get their men in position to receive the Confederates as they came up within range. On

hearing the shouting and yelling of the Confederates as they approached the town, Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Searle, assisted by Major E. D. Ham, quickly formed the First Arkansas Infantry on their parade-ground.

They soon left this position, however, for Colonel Harrison ordered Colonel Searle to retire slowly towards the camp of the First Arkansas Cavalry, Union, where Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Bishop was forming his men, dismounted, for action. As the First Arkansas Infantry had not yet received their uniforms, it occurred to Colonel Harrison that they might be taken for the enemy and fired upon by his cavalry if assigned to a position requiring separation from the cavalry. He therefore ordered Colonel Searle to post five companies of his regiment in a sheltered position in the rear of the line as a reserve. In forming his line, Colonel Harrison took command of the centre in person, composed of four companies of the First Arkansas Cavalry and three companies of the First Arkansas Infantry. Major Ezra Fitch, with the Third Battalion, First Arkansas Cavalry, commanded his right wing, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bishop, assisted by Major T. J. Hunt, with the Second Battalion, First Arkansas Cavalry, and two companies of the First Arkansas Infantry, commanded the left wing. The Federal force thus formed had only a few moments to wait when they were furiously charged by a regiment of Confederate cavalry led by Colonel Monroe from the east side of the town. A well-directed volley from the Federal line and from sharpshooters posted in houses and sheltered positions repulsed the attack and sent the Confederate cavalry in confusion back to the timber and brush from whence it had emerged, with the loss of a number of men and horses killed and wounded. Immediately after the charge of his cavalry failed to penetrate the Federal line, General Cabell ordered Captain Hughey to take position on the hillside east of the town with his section of artillery

and open fire on the camp of the First Arkansas Cavalry, which he did, with canister and shells, but without wounding any men or doing any serious damage to property.

The fire from the battery was kept up but a short time when two companies of the First Arkansas Union Cavalry, under Lieutenant Robb, advanced within rifle range, and guided by the smoke from the discharge of the guns, which were nearly concealed by brush, poured several volleys into the position, killing and wounding four horses, killing one man, and wounding several others, including Captain Hughey. This disaster caused General Cabell to withdraw his battery from that position and use it at a safer distance. But it was practically useless afterwards, for he believed that the range of the Federal rifles was equal to the range of the guns of his battery. After some further skirmishing he ordered another cavalry charge, which was made by Colonel Scott, commanding Carroll's regiment and Dorsey's squadron, Arkansas Cavalry. Colonel Harrison had advanced his entire line and was prepared for this movement, so that the Confederates were under a heavy fire from the moment they came within range of his rifles until they passed beyond range in their precipitate retreat. The firmness of the Federal line and the heavy casualties in killed and wounded in each charge convinced the Confederate officers that they had underestimated the fighting qualities of their opponents. Before giving up the contest General Cabell determined to make another effort, and directed Colonel Monroe to dismount his regiment and charge the Federal position on foot. The Colonel detailed a sufficient number of men to hold horses, formed the remainder of his regiment in line, and then moved forward to the attack. Colonel Harrison saw the Confederates the moment they touched the open ground in his front, and when they approached within easy rifle range, opened such a hot fire upon them that they were

obliged to retire to the cover of the woods, leaving on the ground a number of men killed and wounded.

Finding that he could not dislodge the Federal troops from their position after nearly four hours' fighting, General Cabell withdrew his command and returned to Ozark, leaving all his killed and seriously wounded on the field. He reported his loss at twenty killed and thirty wounded, besides a good many horses killed and deserted by his men during the action. Colonel Harrison reported his loss at five men killed and seventeen wounded, including Captains William C. Parker, G. W. R. Smith, and William S. Johnson. He also reported that he captured during the action Major H. G. Wilson, wounded, Captain T. P. Jefferson, wounded, fifty-three enlisted men, part of whom were wounded, fifty horses, and one hundred stands of arms. His horses had been so actively employed in scouting, and many of them so worn down, that he was unable to mount a force strong enough to pursue the enemy.

The uniforms of the First Arkansas Infantry had just arrived in a train from Springfield, and he was anxious to have them issued to the men at once so that he would not again be subject to the embarrassment which had just occurred, of keeping them with the cavalry and in reserve that they might not be mistaken for the enemy. He considered his victory so decisive that he issued a congratulatory address to his troops, commending them on their good behavior during the action. This was the first substantial success that had been gained by the loyal Arkansans without the assistance of other troops, and they felt very much elated. The moral effect was also good, for they had been so much dominated, insulted, and traduced on account of their Union sentiments, that as soldiers they had been spoken of with contempt by the secessionists, even after they had entered the Federal service. The raid of General Marmaduke

into Southeast Missouri at this time had the effect of drawing the troops of the Army of the Frontier in that direction, so that Colonel Harrison's command at Fayetteville was the only Federal force in Northwest Arkansas. It was 110 miles to Springfield, from whence Colonel Harrison drew all his supplies in wagon trains, requiring strong escorts; the partisan bands were growing bolder, and General Cabell had given out that he would soon return, better prepared to take the place, and that if he could not take it by assault he would operate in its rear and cut off Colonel Harrison's supplies. His position being thus isolated and his line of communication with Springfield threatened, the Colonel determined to evacuate Fayetteville and retire to Cassville, Missouri, fifty-five miles north. A few days before the action with General Cabell he had sent many of the Union families north in the empty trains returning to Springfield, and on April 25th he evacuated Fayetteville with his entire command and marched to Cassville.





## CHAPTER V.

### FIGHTING GUERILLAS IN NORTHWEST ARKANSAS AND SOUTHWEST MISSOURI.

THE several divisions of the Army of the Frontier were held in the counties of Northern Arkansas and Southern Missouri until spring so that the troops might cover Springfield and be in readiness to coöperate in any movement from Southeast Missouri against Little Rock. It was also necessary to distribute the troops over a large section so that the cavalry and artillery horses could be foraged off the country. The cavalry of each division was kept constantly scouting in every direction and had a few contests with guerilla bands, who had hitherto regarded that section as a safe retreat.

On the 8th of January, only a short time before the First Division moved into Carroll County, Colonel John F. Philips, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding station at Elkhorn, on the battle-field of Pea Ridge, sent out a scout of seventy-five men under Captain T. W. Houts of his regiment, in the direction of Berryville, to look after a gang of guerillas reported to be in that section. The Captain made a rapid night march, and near Berryville surprised, attacked, and killed ten guerillas, who were well armed, mounted on good horses, and clothed in Federal uniforms. Only one of the party of guerillas escaped, and he was wounded. All their arms and horses, except those killed and

wounded, fell into the hands of the Federal detachment and were brought back to camp. Bandits who put on the Federal uniform for the purpose of deceiving Union men and small Federal detachments rarely offered to surrender, even when forced into the most desperate situations, for they knew their acts were not recognized as legitimate war.

From Dardanelle, on the Arkansas River, to the north line of the State was a rough region of country that had been rarely visited by Federal scouting detachments, and the saltpetre works established by General Hindman on Buffalo River, in Newton County, continued in operation for some time after he was driven from Western Arkansas. Information in regard to the operation of these works reached General Herron, and he determined to destroy them at once, and thus deprive the Confederacy of the means of obtaining powder for its troops so near his lines. He ordered Major J. W. Caldwell, First Iowa Cavalry, then encamped at Huntsville, to take three hundred men of his regiment and to proceed to Kingston and thence to the works, and if practicable capture the parties engaged in the manufacture of the contraband article. The Major left Huntsville on the morning of January 9th, and encamped that evening four miles east of Kingston, having in the meantime, with the new guides whom he had secured, ascertained the exact location of the saltpetre works. He resumed the march the next morning before daybreak, and at daylight surprised the small force at the works, capturing seventeen out of twenty of the men employed, the lieutenant and two men making their escape. The entire plant, consisting of fourteen new buildings, two steam engines, three boilers, and seven large iron kettles, with half a ton of saltpetre, was destroyed, the buildings being fired. While completing the destruction of this plant, Major Caldwell sent a detachment of one hundred men of his command,

under Captains A. G. McQueen and D. C. Dinsmore, four miles down the river to destroy another plant which was engaged in making saltpetre. The party working it received notice of the Federal advance in time to escape, but the works, consisting of several new frame buildings and four large iron kettles in full operation, were destroyed by the Federal detachment. In addition to the destruction of the saltpetre works in that section and the capture of nearly all the force operating them, Major Caldwell's expedition captured and brought in some twenty well-known bandits and their horses and arms from the mountainous region visited.

In the spring after Major Caldwell's expedition was in that section, a Confederate force, about four hundred strong, was sent into the southeast part of Carroll County and encamped on Crooked Creek for a short time. The presence of this force at Clapper's steam-mill was soon made known to Colonel Weer, commanding the First Division, Army of the Frontier, then encamped at Carrollton. He immediately sent a detachment of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, with two howitzers, under Lieutenant Colonel R. H. White, with instructions to attack and disperse the enemy if practicable. Colonel White made a rapid march that afternoon, took in the Confederate picket, and opened on the Confederate camp with his howitzers about ten o'clock that night, completely surprising it. He then drew up his cavalry in line, and, there being a field in front of the camp, the fences intervening were quickly thrown down, and he charged into the camp, but all the enemy, except one man wounded, had made their escape, leaving many of their arms, wagons, mules, and camp equipage on the ground. Owing to the darkness of the night and the camp being in the timber, it was impossible for the Federal cavalry to pursue the fugitives with advantage. The muster-rolls and correspondence of the Confederates were cap-

tured, and showed that these troops had been sent there by Colonel Brooks from Clarksville, and that the Confederate leaders were making every possible effort to obtain recruits for their depleted regiments.

In the new assignments of troops to posts and districts, the Army of the Frontier gradually lost its organization as an army. Early in February, Colonel W. F. Cloud, Second Kansas Cavalry, who had commanded the Third Brigade of the First Division during the Prairie Grove campaign, was assigned to the command of the District of Southwest Missouri, with headquarters at Springfield. He had shown himself to be an energetic officer in the field, and he was now placed in charge of a district that would require his best efforts to make it an uncomfortable abiding-place for the different bands of guerillas, who were increasing in numbers and activity. He was not an officer who could be satisfied by simply sending out scouting parties, but at the head of two or three hundred cavalry he visited in person every part of his district where the bandits were reported to have been recently operating. On the 15th of February he left Springfield with one hundred men of the Second Kansas Cavalry and two hundred men of the Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry for a week's scout in the counties of Lawrence, Jasper, and Newton, and to ascertain the efficiency of the troops stationed at Neosho, Granby, and Newtonia. He could hear of the depredations of the guerillas of that section under the notorious leader, Major Thomas R. Livingston, but was unable to find him. This noted partisan leader had been very successful in making his appearance at points where he was least expected, and, when pursued, of soon vanishing so completely as to leave no trail. His men were thoroughly acquainted with that section, and when closely pressed took to the paths and by-roads in small parties, and were soon lost to the pursuers in the thick woods and timber that ex-

tended back a mile or so from the valleys of the streams. They had friends or relatives in every town, and were constantly advised of the movements of the Federal troops stationed in the towns, and were generally prepared to attack small detachments going out, or to evade those too strong to attack.

The picket of Captain A. C. Spillman's Indian command at Neosho was fired upon one night the early part of February, and a detachment of mounted men was sent out at once, but returned without being able to find the bandits. A few weeks after this, part of Livingston's men made a raid on Neosho in the night and captured and took off ten to fifteen negroes and as many head of horses and ponies. Captain Spillman immediately sent out a force in pursuit, but was unable to overtake the enemy.

While scouting in the western part of Jasper County, in February, Captain Theodore Conkey, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, had a skirmish with Livingston, and lost eleven men by capture. About the 1st of February a forage detail of some thirty men was sent out from Neosho to Buckhart Prairie, sixteen miles northwest, and meeting with part of Livingston's command a lively skirmish took place, in which two of the Federal detail were seriously wounded. On the return of the detachment to Neosho, a stronger force was sent out, but when it reached the place of the skirmish the enemy had left the neighborhood, and it was impossible to ascertain in what direction they had gone. It was the policy of Livingston to use his force in attacking small Federal detachments engaged in foraging, carrying the mail, or escorting trains. As the Federal cavalry were almost constantly hunting him, he was sometimes surprised and obliged to fight; but it was generally a running fight, in which he was endeavoring to get away. His operations were of such character as to develop in the loyal militia officers of that section

an aggressiveness that put him on the defensive and increased his casualties until they probably exceeded those on the Federal side.

In February, Major Edward B. Eno, Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, an energetic officer, was sent to Newtonia with a battalion of his regiment, with instructions to hunt down the guerillas of Newton and Jasper Counties, and to give them no rest until they were driven from that section. A Federal officer acquainted with that section knew that a march down Spring River below Carthage, or down Centre Creek to its mouth, or down Shoal Creek below Neosho to its mouth, would almost certainly enable him to obtain information of the movements of some of Livingston's guerillas. Shortly after arriving at his station Major Eno started out on a scout with 150 men in search of the marauders. He marched down Centre Creek to Sherwood, thence up Spring River to Carthage, where he met about sixty men of the Enrolled Militia from Bower's Mills, who had just returned from a skirmish with Livingston's men on Dry Fork, in the direction of Lamar. These men of the Enrolled Militia reported that the guerillas had scattered, and Major Eno returned to Centre Creek and beat the brush until within a short distance of Fidelity, a small place of probably half a dozen houses, and then charged in and wounded one and captured three of the bandits, the others of the party making their escape, being mounted upon fresh horses.

The strips of timber and brush along the creeks in that section were generally from a half to a mile or so wide, the country beyond this timber line being open prairie. If he had reason to believe that the bandits were in the brush and timber along any particular creek, Major Eno adopted the method of a "drive," similar to that of a "wolf drive." He divided his command, sending a half or a third around so as to strike the stream at a point

eight to ten miles above or below the point where he entered the timber with the other division. This division which made the drive was formed like an extended skirmish line across the strip of timber and brush, and then he moved forward up or down the stream in the direction of the detachment that had been stationed at a given point to take in any of the bandits who attempted to pass. In the spring of 1863 the Major made one of these drives down Centre Creek, entering the timber about six miles south of Carthage, and had not one of his captains, whom he had ordered to take position at French Point, some ten miles below, with fifty men, retreated from his station without orders, would probably have captured or killed most of the bandits started up. In making disposition of his force for the drive, he ordered Captain Jacob Caissart to move down the south side of the creek with forty men of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and Captain M. C. Henslee, with thirty-five men of the Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, to move down on the north side, while he took seventy-five men and moved down the centre. The bluffs and rough nature of the ground along the creek made it impracticable for his centre to keep up with his flanks. Early in the afternoon the detachments of Captains Henslee and Caissart drove in the pickets of the bandits from the north and south sides of the creek and pursued them in an exciting chase to the main body of guerrillas, who were strongly posted in and around a log house in the woods, fully one hundred strong, under Livingston, on the south side of the creek, about one and a half miles from French Point. The Federal detachments at once commenced a vigorous attack on the marauders, and as some of them were dressed in Federal uniforms, the opposing forces soon became engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict. In a short time, however, the Federal detachment was obliged to fall back to the edge of the prairie, where Captains Cais-

sart and Henslee rallied and re-formed their men and opened fire again upon the enemy, who in turn retreated. Major Eno, who had not kept up with his flanks, was back about two miles when he heard the firing, and then pushed forward in a gallop and came up just as the fight was over. Finding that the enemy had retreated when he came up, he immediately started in pursuit and pressed them so closely that he recaptured several of his men who had been taken prisoners in the fight in the brush around the log house. As he had anticipated, the guerillas passed through French Point, and he was keenly disappointed when he was informed that the detachment which he had sent there did not remain.

Major Eno reported his casualties in this action at four men killed and two wounded, and that the guerillas lost fifteen to twenty men wounded. The next day the Major struck the trail of the bandits and followed it to Spring River, and thence on to the prairie, where he lost it, the enemy appearing to have divided up into small parties of four or five men each, and each party taking a different direction after separation. He continued to scout that section for three or four days longer, frequently starting up and chasing small parties of the bandits of three or four men each, and overtook and shot down two and wounded several others.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas T. Crittenden, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, who commanded the post at Newtonia, and who had eight companies of State Militia and a section of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery at that station, reported that the scout under Major Eno had a good effect in checking the boldness of the guerillas, and probably prevented Livingston from concentrating a force of three or four hundred men for an attack upon the Federal troops at some point in that section.

After Colonel Harrison had been obliged to fall back from Fayetteville to Cassville, the country was open from

Neosho and Newtonia to the Arkansas River, so that all the Southern sympathizers and bandits who had been driven out of Western Missouri into Southern Arkansas during the past autumn and winter were drifting back into the State and increasing in boldness.

Major Milton Burch, Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding a battalion of his regiment at Neosho, had distinguished himself on several occasions in conflicts with guerilla bands in the Ozark Mountains of Southern Missouri, and Lieutenant John R. Kelso of his command was one of the most noted guerilla fighters in the State. It was generally understood that bandits did not stop long in the vicinity of Major Burch's command, for they were as likely to be surprised in the deep recesses of their hiding-places in the night as during the day. Shortly after he was ordered to Neosho in the spring of 1863, the Major received information of a small party of bandits in the neighborhood of Elk Mills, in McDonald County, who were gathering up the stock of Union men whom they had driven from their homes and were preparing to drive it south. He ordered Captain Ozias Ruark of his command to take Lieutenant Kelso and thirty men and proceed to the disturbed locality, and if practicable punish the outlaws.

Nearly all the families living in the western part of McDonald County were Southern sympathizers, the Union families having been driven out, so that it was almost impossible for a Federal scout to that section to obtain reliable information of the movements of guerilla bands. Knowing this fact Captain Ruark marched until the middle of the afternoon without discovering any signs of the enemy, and then detailed Lieutenant Kelso with five men dressed as citizens, or in "butternut," and well armed, and sent them forward to obtain such information as they could pick up, while he, with the balance of the detachment, marched to Elk Mills and encamped, and awaited the

return of the Lieutenant and his comrades. They returned to the detachment about midnight, and the Lieutenant reported that he had found a "kennel" of the marauders, and that in the fight that ensued two of them were killed. He also reported that he found a pasture on Cowskin Prairie with a number of cattle in it which the bandits had gathered up with the intention of driving to the Southern army in a few days. Captain Ruark at once ordered his men to saddle their horses, and he started in search of the bandits, and after surrounding several houses, started up the desperate outlaws, who fought to the death. He then went to the pasture and found forty head of cattle which the bandits had collected, and took them and drove them to Neosho and turned them over to the commanding officer for the benefit of the Government.

On leaving the detachment that afternoon Lieutenant Kelso had little trouble in passing himself off with the Southern families along the valley of Buffalo Creek and on Elk River as a Southern officer in that section on important business, and obtained their confidence in such a degree that they gave him all the information in their possession in regard to the partisan bandits in that region. The information thus obtained enabled him to go straight to two of the bandits who were collecting cattle, and introducing himself as a Confederate officer of a certain command, soon obtained their confidence. The conversation of the men drifted along on certain subjects until it came to their arms, and then in such manner that he was permitted to seize hold of one of their guns and in the struggle wrenched it from his hands. The moment he disarmed the bandit, he opened fire on them and shot them down, and then mounting his horse with his trophies joined his comrades, who had been stationed a short distance off, and rode into camp with them. Before the last act he was playing in the game with the bandits, he

agreed to assist them in collecting cattle to sell to the Southern army, and actually helped them drive in a few head. He would despoil a slaughtered foe of his arms or of anything that he valued as a trophy, but he was never charged with committing any acts of plunder, or of turning captured property into channels of private gain. His acts were of course characterized as cruel by those who sympathized with the South, but he modestly justified his conduct on the ground that those upon whom his avenging hand had fallen had been guilty of violated oaths, of murdering and robbing Union men, or of wilfully harboring those who were guilty of such acts. One of the men killed on this scout had the oath of allegiance in his pocket, and he boasted that he had been up to Fort Scott, and as a prisoner took the oath to get released, and that he then stole a mule team and returned to his home in McDonald County and assisted in driving out Union men.

Captain Kelso, for he was promoted about this time, had scouted over Southern and Southwest Missouri, and was acquainted with the characters of most of the bandits of that section, and made no mistakes as to the men he dealt with. He knew that a small party of a dozen or so Southern bandits, with their headquarters in the almost inaccessible regions of the hills and mountains of Southern Missouri and Northern Arkansas, could, by making one or two night marches, strike at daybreak the picket of some post, as at Ozark, Galena, Cassville, or Neosho, and by killing such men as the opportunity afforded, capture and get away with some booty. His experience had shown him that when vigorously pursued the bandits scattered and took different paths, and being generally mounted upon the best horses in the country were rarely overtaken and captured or killed, but soon regained their hiding-places to prepare for another raid. No Federal outpost or escort to trains felt secure from the sudden

and unexpected attacks of these desperate bandits. Was there not some way by which these desperate outlaws might be made insecure in their isolated hiding-places? Captain Kelso believed there was.

On another occasion, while scouting in the rough, hilly regions of McDonald County, and after several days had been consumed in marching and examining the roads and dim paths for horse tracks in the section where the bandits had been reported as having been seen, he finally heard of half a dozen marauders who made their headquarters in the almost inaccessible brakes of Elk River. He was satisfied from what he knew of the rugged and precipitous bluffs along that stream that their position was such that it could not be approached without giving them the alarm and time to scatter in the thick woods and along the bluffs of the river. He therefore determined to disguise himself and visit their camp, ascertain their plans, and if possible execute some desperate, bloody act before leaving them. He designated a place where he proposed to re-join his command in a few days, and then, leaving them, took it afoot and started in search of the camp of the guerillas. He was not long in finding it, for he had been accustomed since the early days of the war to following dim paths through dark forests and over the rough regions of the Ozark Mountains.

Approaching the camp of the bandits he introduced himself as a knight of the brush, and by his affable manners apparently soon won their confidence. There were six men in the squad, and he noticed after a while whisperings among them that satisfied him that they mistrusted him. He pretended, however, not to notice the signs of their mistrust and acted towards them as if he had unlimited confidence in them as knights of the Southern cause. After staying with them a day or so, he felt that he had somewhat allayed their suspicions as to his true character, so that on the second morning all

the men except two left camp on some business unknown to him, leaving him with their two comrades. But he noticed all day that the two men with whom he was left stayed together and never took their hands off their guns for a moment. Being satisfied from their conduct that they had him under surveillance, in the afternoon he pretended to have got a thorn or splinter in his finger, and making a display of the feigned injury and of trying to get the thorn out for their benefit, in a few moments went directly to them to have them assist him in getting it out. The confidential manner in which he approached them for this purpose caused them to slightly relax their vigilance, so that each let the butt of his gun drop to the ground while holding it with one hand near the muzzle. The moment the men assumed this position to inspect his finger, the Captain with his left hand seized the gun of the nearest bandit and in another moment with his right hand drew his revolver and shot him, and the other bandit also before he could get his gun in position for defence. He saw that his own life was in the greatest peril, and deliberately planned the scheme, so that when the opportunity came he put it into execution with such rapidity that the bandits were dazed and powerless to help themselves. The struggle was short, but desperate and bloody, and when he had despatched his foes to the shades of darkness, and despoiled them of such of their arms as he desired as trophies, he mounted one of their horses and rejoined his command as prearranged, and, like some of the heroes of ancient times, delighted in relating to his comrades the success of his bold exploit.






## CHAPTER VI.

### ATTACK ON FEDERAL TRAIN, AND ACTION AT FORT GIBSON, CHEROKEE NATION.

ABOUT the time of Colonel Harrison's evacuation of Fayetteville, General Marmaduke's raid into Southeast Missouri, and the requisition on the Department of Missouri for troops to reinforce General Grant before Vicksburg, had drawn away from Southwest Missouri so many of the Federal troops that Colonel Cloud, commanding that district, was unable to make frequent reconnoissances into Northwest Arkansas. In a short time, therefore, after Colonel Schaurte's expedition to the vicinity of Cane Hill, General Cabell moved back north of the mountains and occupied Fayetteville with a brigade of Arkansas cavalry. In connection with this movement, General Steele ordered General Cooper to move forward with his brigade of Texas and Indian troops and battery of four guns to the south bank of the Arkansas in the vicinity of Fort Gibson. In compliance with this order, General Cooper with very little delay marched forward and took up a position about five miles south of the fort, and his camp might have been seen by the Federal troops from their fortified position on the bluff except for the intervening timber along the Arkansas. From his position he could watch the movements of the Federal troops at Fort Gibson, and by fording the Arkansas and Verdigris Rivers a few miles above his camp he could send

out his cavalry to attack and annoy the trains of the Federal army going to and returning from Fort Scott. With General Cooper encamped only a few miles in his



FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF FORT GIBSON, APRIL, 1863.

front on the south side of the Arkansas with a brigade consisting of two Texas and four Indian regiments, and General Cabell with a brigade in position on his flank,

Colonel Phillips saw that he would be obliged to exercise the greatest vigilance and caution to maintain his position in the face of so much preparation to make it untenable or to crush him. Indeed, he was not himself more correctly informed of the departure of trains from Fort Scott and their progress *en route* than were Generals Cooper and Cabell.

The country along the State line from Maysville to the neighborhood of Fort Scott was open, depopulated, and nearly as much traversed by the Southern guerillas and their friends as by Federal scouting detachments, so that information of Federal movements in the direction of Fort Scott or Springfield was easily obtained and carried south to the nearest Confederate officer as rapidly as mounted couriers could take it. That the Confederate leaders had planned and determined to capture or destroy his next train with supplies from the north was no secret to Colonel Phillips, for he was constantly advised of their contemplated movements by information brought into his lines by deserters from their forces, and by his own scouts and spies. To meet the increased danger to which his next train would be exposed *en route*, he determined to send out a strong detachment to reinforce the escort, and to request Colonel Blair, commanding at Fort Scott, to send with it a stronger escort than usual from that place, for Major Livingston, with a well-armed force of two or three hundred Partisan Rangers, had recently crossed the Arkansas and Verdigris rivers about ten miles above Fort Gibson *en route* to the scenes of his former operations in the western parts of Jasper and Newton Counties, Missouri, and would certainly know the strength of the escort, and, if weak, attack it.

In the meantime Colonel James M. Williams, commanding the First Kansas Colored Infantry, which he had recently recruited and organized, and which was one of the very first colored regiments raised in the country,

was directed to take up a position at Baxter Springs, sixty miles south of Fort Scott on the military road to Fort Gibson, a point within the range of Livingston's operations. This force, which had a section of Captain E. A. Smith's Second Kansas Battery attached to it, would of course afford protection to the trains passing that point; and Colonel Williams would be able to reinforce the escorts if threatened in that vicinity; but having no cavalry for scouting purposes, his operations were necessarily confined within narrow limits. There was at this time among the white soldiers a decided feeling against serving with colored troops, and this was perhaps the reason he had no cavalry attached to his command. But events were rapidly forcing a more rational view of this matter, so that in a month or two later the white soldiers when hotly engaged with the foe manifested but little interest in regard to the color of the troops who supported them on the right or left of the line. The companies of this colored regiment were well drilled for the time they had been in service, and Colonel Williams had confidence that the men would give a good account of themselves when the time came to test their courage and endurance. Their behavior under fire in the first general action was looked forward to with a good deal of interest, for if it was creditable it would do much to disarm many people of the prejudice they entertained against enlisting colored men for soldiers in the war.

In the organization of the colored troops the commissioned officers were all white men, and perhaps most of them had seen service in other regiments; besides, they were men who were thoroughly loyal to the interests of the Government in regard to the conduct of the war, and believed that the time had come for the abolition of slavery, and that the slaves should be permitted to assist the Federal Government in fighting for their freedom. The non-commissioned officers of the companies were

colored men, and though generally unlettered, were intelligent in other respects, and took an interest in performing their duties as soldiers. And under the careful discipline of Colonel Williams, the regiment, after the men had received their uniforms, arms, and equipments, presented a fine appearance, of which men and officers exhibited conscious pride. Even before these colored troops were put in the field to the front, a good many Southern officers threatened to show them no quarter, asserting that they would not take colored soldiers prisoners, meaning that they would shoot down all who fell into their hands. This was no idle or meaningless threat made in the heat of passion, but a deliberate intention, for on the 18th of May, a short time after his arrival at Baxter Springs, Colonel Williams had occasion to send out a forage detail of forty to fifty white and colored soldiers with five or six mule teams some ten to twelve miles, to the vicinity of Sherwood, Missouri. The detail was surprised and attacked by Livingston's command, and twenty negroes and three white men of Captain E. A. Smith's Second Kansas Battery killed, the negroes being shot down without being given any quarter. After this affair, Colonel Williams was furnished with a detachment of cavalry, and, ascertaining from his scouts the retreat of the enemy, surprised them, and took good care that a sufficient number to balance the number of his negro soldiers killed did not escape.

While these events were taking place on the line of communication with his base of supplies, Colonel Phillips was still able, by making frequent reconnoissances, to hold General Cooper's force south of the Arkansas River. In the meantime the Federal and Confederate commanders had picket stations placed at different points along their respective sides of the river to watch each other's movements or attempts to cross the river. This proximity of the hostile pickets soon drew each other's fire, and then after

that every day for several weeks, at intervals of an hour or so, there was firing between these pickets across the river, which was distinctly heard at Fort Gibson. There were a few men wounded on each side by this firing, but as those engaged in it shielded themselves behind trees and logs, and as the range was very long, the casualties were not very serious. These pickets gradually became more tolerant of each other's presence at some points on the river, and finally there was an agreement between the men of some of the hostile stations not to fire upon each other except under certain contingencies. This truce was faithfully kept except in one or two instances, and the belligerent pickets became so friendly that several of each side, divesting themselves of their arms, would come down on sand-bars to the water's edge at a narrow point in the river on their respective sides and talk for some time—generally of the most recent news each side had of army operations in the East, where everything was on a larger scale than along the Upper Arkansas River. They not only held mutual conversation across the water, but in a short time ventured to go in swimming together, each keeping nearest to his own side except when they agreed to mutual exchange of certain articles. They then approached in midstream, swimming, or wading if the water was not of too great depth, and the young Federal soldiers generally gave the Confederates coffee for tobacco, coffee being scarce and a luxury in the Confederate camp, and tobacco being scarce in the Federal camp. Of course the soldiers of both sides who participated in these friendly conversations on the picket-line were white men, those on the Southern side belonging to the Texas regiments, and those on the Federal side belonging to companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry. In these conferences, as a rule, the men did not give each other information of important movements of their respective sides. On several occasions, however, the Confed-

erates did mention facts showing that they were familiar with the movements of the Federal supply train from the north, stating that Livingston had written General Cooper that the negro regiment would escort the next train.

The unusual activity displayed in General Cooper's camp about the middle of May was noted by Federal officers with field-glasses from the roofs of the stone buildings on the bluff at Fort Gibson, and that the Confederates were preparing for an important movement was confirmed by the reports of the Federal scouts. Whether this movement was a heavy reconnaissance to cross the Arkansas below Fort Gibson to attract the attention of the Federal troops on the east while a larger force crossed that river above the fort for the purpose of marching north to meet the train, or whether it was simply a demonstration to feel the strength of the Federal forces, Colonel Phillips was unable fully to determine. To ascertain, if practicable, whether the Confederates were making a movement on his right, he sent out some four hundred cavalry, which forded the Arkansas above Fort Gibson, and, marching to the Creek Agency, captured from the Confederate force encamped at that place sixty head of horses and mules. This scout obtained information which showed that General Cooper had made extensive preparations to capture the Federal train *en route* south, and had a heavy force of cavalry all in readiness to march up on the west side of Grand River to meet it.

From the moment the Federal troops occupied Fort Gibson, their serviceable cavalry horses had been constantly employed in scouting and escort duty, and much of the time on short rations of corn and oats, which had greatly reduced them in strength and flesh. As soon as the grass on the prairie and open grounds within two or three miles of the fort was high enough for good grazing, Colonel Phillips directed that all the stock not in use be sent out to graze from morning until night, under proper

guards. This stock was divided into several herds and driven to different localities within a safe distance of the fort. From the heights on the south side of the Arkansas, the Southern officers with good field-glasses saw this stock daily driven out from the fort and grazing upon the prairie. This was a prize that General Cooper could not resist the temptation to make an effort to capture. When his attention was first called to this stock grazing several miles from the fort, the Arkansas was past fording from a recent rise, so that he was obliged to wait a few days for it to fall before making his intended raid. At this time some eight hundred Federal troops were guarding the line north to cover supply trains that were *en route* to Fort Gibson, and the scouts of Colonel Phillips reported everything quiet and no enemy north of the Arkansas, nor on the east or west side of Grand River.

On the 19th of May General Cooper ascertained that the Arkansas was fordable at several points below Fort Gibson, and that night sent out parts of five regiments to cross the river below that post to make a demonstration against the Federal troops and to capture as much of their stock as practicable. After his troops crossed the river they advanced rapidly, killing and capturing the Federal pickets and herders until they arrived within less than two miles of the Federal fortifications. Some of the pickets and herders, however, who were not cut off from the fort, on hearing the firing and seeing the enemy advancing in large numbers, hurried in and reported the situation about nine o'clock. The bugles at once sounded the alarm and the troops at the fort were under arms in a few moments, but mostly dismounted, for their horses had been sent out with the herds early that morning. All the men that could be mounted at the post were quickly sent forward under Majors Foreman, M. B. C. Wright, and James M. Pomeroy, and Captain N. B. Lucas, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, to check the advance of

the enemy, and if possible recapture some of the stock they were driving off. After passing the open ground for nearly a mile east of the fort, this Federal mounted force came in sight of the enemy, who were forming in line in the timber on the western slope of the mountain.

A sharp skirmish took place in which the Federal cavalry were driven back some distance, and it looked for a time as if the Confederates intended attacking the Federal troops behind their fortifications. In a short time, however, a number of herds were driven into the fort, and as rapidly as the men could be mounted they were sent forward to reinforce those at the front. Not knowing the strength of the attacking force, Colonel Phillips ordered everything moved inside the fortifications, and then took two battalions of Indian infantry and a section of Hopkins' battery under Lieutenant B. S. Bassett and moved out about a mile east of the fort, and ascertaining from his skirmishers the position of the enemy opened fire upon them with shell. His cavalry having now been strengthened, he ordered an advance on his left, and with the assistance of the heavy fire from the guns of his battery soon drove the enemy from their position in the timber, and gradually pushing them back over the mountain recaptured part of the stock which had been taken in the morning. A shell from one of his guns burst in the midst of a body of Southern Indians, killing and wounding a number and throwing the others into a panic. The Federal cavalry pursued the retreating foe ten to fifteen miles down the Arkansas River in the direction of Webber's Falls, continually firing upon their rear-guard and causing some casualties.

While the force which he had sent north of the river was engaging the Federal troops in front of their fortifications, General Cooper ordered the captain of his battery, with three guns, supported by a strong force of infantry, down to the ford on the Arkansas, three miles south of

Fort Gibson, and opened a heavy cannonade upon the Federal picket station, and sent some of his men into the river as if he intended to force a crossing. The attention of Colonel Phillips having been directed to this demonstration in his front, he left his cavalry to pursue the retreating enemy, and took his infantry and section of artillery down to the river opposite the Confederates who were threatening to force a crossing, and opened fire upon their guns with shot and shell with the hope of dismounting them, and soon compelled the captain to withdraw his battery. The Federal loss, including the pickets and herders, was twenty men killed and as many wounded. Colonel Phillips reported that from the best information he could obtain, the Confederate loss was about equal to his own. Most of the Federals killed were herders and pickets who were surprised, cut off, and shot while endeavoring to get back to the fort.

After the raid and demonstration of May 20th, General Cooper continued for several days to attract the attention of the Federal troops at Fort Gibson by cannonading the Federal picket stations on the Arkansas below the fort. And on the return of his troops who were on that raid he sent out an expedition of upwards of one thousand men under Colonel McIntosh to cross the Arkansas and Verdigris above the mouth of Grand River and march up the west side of that river to attack, capture, or destroy the Federal train, which he was informed was *en route*. This force had no sooner crossed the Verdigris and headed north than a Federal scout who was watching it returned to the fort at once and reported the movement to Colonel Phillips. The Colonel had also received information that General Cooper had recently been largely reinforced by troops from Fort Smith and was preparing to send another force north to coöperate with Colonel McIntosh in the effort to capture the Federal supply train, and determined to make a demonstration against the Confeder-

ate camp with the view of delaying the departure of this last-named force as long as practicable. On Sunday afternoon, May 24th, he took about five hundred cavalry and dismounted men and a section of Hopkins' Kansas Battery and marched down to the Rabbit Ford on the Arkansas, five miles below the fort, and opened a heavy artillery fire on the Confederate outpost on the opposite side of the river. After shelling the woods on each side of the road around the outpost for some time, his column, which had been in position a short time, started forward, and when the advance had reached the middle of the stream, which was running well up on the sides of the horses, the Confederates, who had posted themselves behind trees and logs, commenced a hot fire with small-arms upon their adversaries. The channel of the river was close to the south bank, and there was a sand-bar on the north side, perhaps a hundred yards wide, on which the Federal infantry formed. This infantry was posted so as to cover the advance of the cavalry, and returned the fire of the Confederates, but as the movement was intended only as a feint, Colonel Phillips retired with his cavalry without crossing. His artillery, however, kept up a cannonade until sunset, when he returned to the fort with his troops, except a guard left at the ford to watch the movements of the enemy. This reconnaissance had the effect of causing General Cooper to reinforce his outpost at the ford and of interfering with his plans in regard to capturing the Federal train.


That night after returning to the fort from Rabbit Ford, Colonel Phillips ordered all his troops to move inside the fortifications, and then sent out all his available mounted men to meet and reinforce the escort to his train, which he believed would be attacked by the enemy during the night or the next day. These troops formed a junction with the train escort about eight to ten miles out on the military road, and as it was known that the

enemy were in the vicinity watching for the train every precaution was taken to guard against a surprise. It was decided by the commanding officer of the escort to make a night march and reach Fort Gibson early in the morning of the 25th, instead of that evening. This movement might throw the enemy off their guard; besides, the train could be as easily defended at night as in the daytime. The wagon-masters were instructed, if an attack was made, to drive the teams two abreast as far as the road would permit, to shorten the length of the train, which had about two hundred wagons in it and stretched out a distance of upwards of a mile.

The escort when reinforced from Fort Gibson was perhaps fully a thousand strong, and disposed in such manner as to be ready for immediate defence. Scouts were kept out on each flank with the view of discovering the presence of the enemy in time to make some preparation to meet his attack. The train and escort moved along during the night up to about an hour before daybreak without particular incident until approaching the timber on Grand River, about five miles northwest of the fort, when the Texans and Southern Indians were discovered advancing in line, and at once commenced the attack by firing a volley into the escort. The Federal escort promptly returned the fire, and in a few moments the action became general, the flashes in the darkness from the long lines of muskets giving an aspect to the fight not usually seen by those engaged. Perhaps nearly one half the escort fought dismounted, so that the outlines of the mounted troops of the enemy standing out against the clear sky in the darkness made excellent targets for the Federal soldiers. The Federal force was so disposed as to keep the road open in front, so that the train was kept moving during the entire action, and arrived at Fort Gibson shortly after sunrise without the loss of a wagon. Every assault of the enemy was repulsed, and they were

finally driven off and pursued to the Verdigris River, leaving thirty-five men killed on the field. The Federal loss was five men killed and ten to twelve wounded. Two wagon-loads of the Confederate dead were picked up and brought into Fort Gibson that day and buried, most of whom were Indians. General Cooper had another force north of the Arkansas, which failed to coöperate with the one attacking the train, the original plan of attack being impracticable after holding troops in camp to meet the Federal reconnaissance from the fort the day before.






## CHAPTER VII.

### ACTION AT CABIN CREEK, CHEROKEE NATION.

WHILE the failure of his troops to capture or destroy the Federal train was a keen disappointment to General Cooper, it did not cause him to relax his efforts to harass and annoy the Federal forces at Fort Gibson as much as possible. He knew that the capture or destruction of the train would at once compel the Federal commander to evacuate that post, and in fact all the Indian Territory except the northern part of it, and fall back in the direction of his base of supplies at Fort Scott. And such movement he fully realized would perhaps completely demoralize the Indian troops in the Federal service. In a few days, therefore, after the return of the expedition sent against the Federal train, he ordered Colonel Stand Watie, with the available men of his regiment, which was composed of Cherokees, to cross the Arkansas below Fort Gibson and make a raid up through the Cherokee Nation for the purpose of collecting such supplies as practicable for the Southern troops and to threaten the Federal supply line in that direction. This force he desired to operate on the Federal flank east of Grand River until the next Federal train might be expected *en route* the latter part of June. While some of the men of this command were plundering the house of a loyal Indian family near Tahlequah, the Indian woman of the house, unobserved, mounted one of their horses and rode to Fort

Gibson and informed Colonel Phillips that the enemy were in her neighborhood on their way north.

If Colonel Watie did not in the meantime draw a large number of the troops from Fort Gibson to pursue him in fruitless efforts to engage him, General Cooper determined



to order him to reinforce the troops which he proposed to send up on the west side of Grand River in another effort to capture the Federal train. While the Arkansas was yet fordable he sent another Confederate force to the

north side of it, below Fort Gibson, to threaten the Federal troops from the east, and to raid their herds again if practicable. He hoped by his superior numbers and large proportion of white troops to keep the Federal force confined within a space of a few miles around their fortifications.

The movements of the Confederate forces were made known to Colonel Phillips with very little delay, and he showed by his vigorous action that he had no intention of confining his operations within a limit of a few miles around his post. When his commissary train had finished unloading he started it back to Fort Scott, and sent with it most of his available cavalry and one howitzer as far north as Baxter Springs. On returning to Fort Gibson the commanding officer of this cavalry was instructed to march down on the east side of Grand River and endeavor to strike the force under Colonel Watie and to drive it out of that section. Hearing that the enemy were in the vicinity of Maysville committing depredations upon the loyal Indians, Major Foreman was sent after them with 325 of this cavalry, and advancing near the Southern Indians prepared to attack them, when Colonel Watie, to avoid a fight, moved over on Grand River near the mouth of Spavinaw Creek, where he endeavored to cross the river to join a Confederate force on the west side, but was unable to do so on account of the river being up. He then retreated down Grand River to Grand Saline, where he again attempted to cross to the west side and failed. At this place his rear-guard was overtaken by Major Foreman, and in the attack three of the Southern Indians were killed. After this affair he retreated rapidly in a southeast direction through Tahlequah and Park Hill to the Arkansas River, where he was met by a large Confederate force which General Cooper had sent over, under Colonels Thomas C. Bass and Tandy Walker, to cover his retreat. Major Foreman gave up the pursuit

at Tahlequah on account of his horses being worn out from constant marching, and returned to Fort Gibson.

Colonel Watie was being pressed closely when he passed through Tahlequah, and information of the fact was conveyed to Colonel Phillips in about two hours, who at once collected some four hundred men, mounted and unmounted, and sent them out under Colonel S. H. Wattles, with one piece of artillery, on the road leading down the north side of the Arkansas, for the purpose of intercepting the Southern Indians before they crossed the river. He also sent orders to Major Foreman to continue to press the enemy with all possible energy, at the same time advising him of the coöperating force sent out under Colonel Wattles. But when the orders reached the Major he had given up the pursuit and was *en route* to Fort Gibson.

In the meantime Colonel Wattles had marched about fifteen miles down the river in the night, and, ascertaining that Foreman had given up the pursuit, was at some loss to determine what further movements he should make. He also received information about daylight from his scouts, whom he had stationed at several points to watch any movements the enemy might attempt against his flank or rear, that the Confederates had crossed the Arkansas during the night and were forming in his rear in the timber on the south side of Greenleaf Prairie. In view of this unexpected phase of the situation, he determined to return at once and attack the force formed in his rear, which he did, and soon succeeded in driving it back towards the river. The Confederates, however, receiving a reinforcement, rallied and drove his mounted men back upon his infantry and howitzer, and attempted to take it, but were repulsed and driven again towards the river, Captain Sol. Kaufman, commanding the howitzer, using shell and canister when he could do so effectively. When he arrived at Greenleaf Prairie, which lay between him and

Fort Gibson, Colonel Wattles noticed the enemy at the farther edge of it and in the timber on his left forming in line, which threatened to cut him off from the fort. He gained the timber, however, on the west side of the prairie with very little opposition, again formed line, and sending out scouts in different directions, rested his infantry until he could obtain more definite information of the strength and intentions of the enemy. Shortly after taking up this position he was relieved by Colonel Schaurte, who had been sent forward with five hundred infantry and cavalry and one howitzer, with instructions to push the enemy more vigorously. On the arrival of Colonel Schaurte's command, the Confederates retreated down the river and recrossed to the south side at Weber's Falls.

The Federal loss at Greenleaf Prairie, as reported by Colonel Phillips, was seven men killed and eight wounded, and the Confederate loss at seven men killed, number of wounded not known.

With the view of preventing the Federal commander from sending out a large force to intercept the retreat of Colonel Watie, General Cooper made a demonstration in force in front of Fort Gibson by opening fire with his artillery upon the Federal picket stations on the Arkansas and by sending his men into the river as if he intended crossing and attacking the Federal troops behind their fortifications. A few days before this feint he sent a reconnoitring force of about three hundred cavalry north of the Arkansas and west of Grand River, within about three miles of the fort, for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Federal commander in that direction, so that the Southern Indians under Watie might remain undisturbed in the northern part of the Territory until the Federal train would be due. This force on the west side he also desired, if practicable, to raid the herds, which were in part sometimes sent out on the west side of the

river from the fort, for he knew that the large number of horses and mules in the Federal camp were rapidly using up the grass for several miles around. He, too, was obliged to depend upon the wild grass of the prairies to keep his horses in condition for the cavalry service, and about this time the grass had been grazed so short in the immediate vicinity of his camp that he was compelled to move back to Elk Creek, some fifteen miles south. But in making this movement he left heavy picket posts along the Arkansas in front of Fort Gibson.

The loss of some of his stock in the recent raid, and a large number of his horses having, on account of insufficient forage and by constant escort and scouting duty, become unserviceable, were gradually making it more difficult for Colonel Phillips to mount a sufficient number of troops to meet the requirements of the situation. Indeed, his position was getting to be a state of siege, for the enemy, strongly posted in his front, were now constantly menacing his flanks and rear. Having only a battalion of white troops, he knew that he was not strong enough to cross the Arkansas and attack General Cooper, who had at least two white regiments of Texans and four or five Indian regiments, on ground of his own choosing, with a fair prospect of success. He therefore, in a communication, laid the situation before Major-General James G. Blunt, who had recently been assigned to the command of the District of Kansas and the Indian Territory, and urged upon him the importance of sending forward reinforcements at once, with the view of commencing an offensive campaign against the enemy from Fort Gibson. General Blunt keenly appreciated the situation, and realized that the evacuation of Fort Gibson would be ruinous to the Union cause in the Indian Territory, and advised Colonel Phillips that Colonel Williams, commanding the colored regiment at Baxter Springs, with a section of the Second Kansas Battery, and Lieutenant-

Colonel Theodore H. Dodd, commanding the Second Colorado Infantry, had been ordered to reinforce him, and would accompany the next commissary train south. The General also set to work to collect such cavalry as could be spared from other points in his district to send forward as early as practicable. The investment and siege of Vicksburg by General Grant was rapidly approaching a determination, with strong indications that the Confederates would be compelled to surrender that stronghold, and thus open the Mississippi from St. Paul to the Gulf. Of course the fall of Vicksburg would enable General Grant to return to the Department of Missouri a large number of troops which had been drawn from it to reinforce him. While his Department was thus depleted of troops, General Schofield was unable to make any aggressive movements, but determined to hold his advanced positions until the fate of Vicksburg was decided.

In the meantime Confederate General Steele obtained the promise of General Cabell, commanding the Southern forces in Western Arkansas, to coöperate with him in another effort to capture or destroy the Federal train *en route* to Fort Gibson. About the 12th of June, General Cabell, who had been engaged the past month in watching the movements of the Federal forces from the direction of Springfield, marched to the vicinity of Cincinnati, a small place on the western line of Arkansas, with about fifteen hundred men and three pieces of artillery, that he might be in position to coöperate with General Steele's forces under General Cooper, the main division of which was to march north on the west side of Grand River to meet and attack the Federal train. The presence of this large force on the line of the Territory caused some excitement among the loyal Indian families of the neighborhood, and several Indian women mounted their ponies and hastened to Fort Gibson and informed the Federal officers what they had seen.

Information also received through his scouts convinced Colonel Phillips that General Cabell was preparing to join the forces of General Cooper in an attack on the Federal train at some point perhaps forty to fifty miles north of Fort Gibson. From the reports of his scouts and from the statements of recently arrived deserters from the Confederate camp in his front of the preparations the Confederate generals were making to capture his train, the Colonel determined to send six hundred men, all that he could mount, and one howitzer, under Major Foreman, as far north as Baxter Springs to meet it and reinforce the escort from that point *en route*. On June 20th, at the time of sending out this reinforcement for his train, his troops were on short rations, and a few days afterwards the ration was reduced to fresh beef, salt, rice, and wheat, which was obtained from the farms of the Indians in that section, it then being harvested. This radical change of diet caused some sickness in his camp, and there were even a few deaths from sporadic cases of cholera.

The sanitary condition of the troops was looked after by the medical officers, but it was impossible to enforce cleanliness and sanitary rules among the large number of Indian families encamped around the fort, for scanty provisions and few conveniences imposed severe hardships upon these people. These families were mostly Creeks and Seminoles, whose country was occupied by the Southern forces south of the Arkansas, many of the Cherokee families living north of that river having returned to their homes during the spring.

The detachment sent out under Major Foreman to reinforce the train escort met it at Baxter Springs, but, moving fifteen miles south to Neosho River, a detention of three days at that point was caused by high water in that stream intersecting the line of march. The escort to the train was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore H. Dodd, Second Colorado Infantry, and on leaving

Baxter Springs, June 25th, consisted of six companies of his own regiment, one company Third Wisconsin Cavalry, one company each from the Ninth and Fourteenth Regiments Kansas Cavalry, one section of the Second Kansas Battery, under Lieutenant A. Wilson, and the detachment of Indians and Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Major Foreman, from Fort Gibson.

Having received information that a large Confederate force was being concentrated to attack the train *en route*, Colonel Williams, commanding the colored regiment and a section of artillery, under Captain Jack Armstrong, manned by men detailed from different companies of the regiment, concluded to accompany the train down and offer his assistance should it be attacked; he left Baxter Springs, June 26th, and overtook it the same day at Neosho River. After crossing the Neosho a fresh trail was discovered in the prairie grass, and Major Foreman detached Lieutenant L. F. Parsons, Third Indian Regiment, with twenty Cherokees, to follow the trail and ascertain what made it, which he did after following it for four miles. He then came upon thirty men of Stand Watie's advanced picket, and vigorously attacking them, killed four and took three men prisoners, the balance of them falling back upon the main command. Information was obtained from these prisoners that Colonel Watie was in command of the expedition sent out by General Cooper, and was strongly posted on the south bank of Cabin Creek, completely commanding the ford; that his force of about sixteen hundred men consisted of two Indian regiments and parts of two Texas regiments; that General Cooper had sent another large force up the east side of Grand River that was to be joined by General Cabell from Arkansas with fifteen hundred white troops and three pieces of artillery to coöperate in the attack on the train, and that General Cabell had arrived on the east bank of Grand River, but was unable to cross that

stream on account of high water. The Confederate picket, upon being attacked, retired upon their command, and informed Colonel Watie that the approaching Federal train would shortly be in sight, and every preparation was made for attacking it when it came up. A line of rifle-pits was thrown up along the sloping bank on the south side and covered with the boughs of willows so that it could not be seen from the north bank.

About noon, on July 1st, the Federal train and escort arrived upon the heights on the north side of Cabin Creek; the train was corralled on the prairie a mile or so back from the ford, and a skirmish line thrown forward, under Major Foreman, to the right and left of the road up to the ford to develop the position of the enemy. This reconnaissance, which was supported by artillery and the First Kansas Colored Infantry, had the effect of satisfying Colonel Williams, the ranking officer present, that Colonel Watie had no force north of the creek except his picket, which had retired to the south side with the loss of several men killed and captured; that his troops were posted in the thick woods along the south bank of the creek, and that his plan was to attack the escort and train while crossing the creek, which was then very high from the recent heavy rains. The soundings of the creek having been taken under the fire of shell and canister from the Federal artillery, and being found too deep at the ford to cross the train, the Federal troops without further operations were ordered into camp in the edge of the timber until the next morning to await the falling of the stream. That evening, after the troops had gone into camp, Colonel Williams had a consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel Dodd and Major Foreman, and it was determined, as soon as the creek should become fordable, to unite under him all the troops that could be spared from the immediate defence of the train in an attack on the Confederate position, under cover of the

artillery, to force a crossing. To guard against a surprise during the night, Lieutenant-Colonel Dodd had his pickets posted so as to watch the movements of the enemy and to cover all the approaches to the train.

When Colonel Watie saw that the Federal commander was not going to be satisfied with simply defending his train, but had come prepared and with the determination to fight his way through, he then desired to hold the Federal forces until he could get the assistance of General Cabell, who was held with his command by high water on the east bank of Grand River only a few miles distant. During the night the creek had fallen sufficient to allow the Federal troops and train to cross, and Colonel Williams having formed a plan of attack to dislodge the Confederates from their position, Lieutenant-Colonel Dodd ordered to his support all the troops that could be spared from the immediate defence of the train. In making disposition of his troops and artillery for the attack, Colonel Williams ordered Lieutenant Wilson, commanding a section of the Second Kansas Battery, to place his two guns on an elevated position on the extreme left; Captain Armstrong, with a section of artillery, was directed to take position in the centre and within perhaps two hundred yards of the position occupied by the Confederates, and Lieutenant J. C. Cayot, with one mountain howitzer, was placed in position on the right. Major Foreman, commanding a mounted company of the Third Indian Regiment, was assigned to the advance to lead in the attack, the balance of his Indian detachment being posted to guard the creek above and below the ford. Directly in the rear of Major Foreman was the First Kansas Colored Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Bowles. Next in the column was a battalion of the Second Colorado Infantry, under Major J. Nelson Smith. Last in the formation was a battalion of three companies of cavalry under Captain John E. Stewart, Ninth Kansas Cavalry.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 2d, everything being in readiness, Colonel Williams directed his artillery officers to open fire with their guns upon the Confederate position, which they did, using shell and canister for about forty minutes. Reports then came to him from his signal stations that the storm of shell and canister from his batteries was making some confusion in the Confederate line. He then gave orders for his batteries to cease firing, and for his column to move forward to the attack. When the advance, led by Major Foreman, was nearing the opposite shore of the creek, the Confederates, who were lying down in a ditch behind a breastwork which they had thrown up along the sloping side of the creek bank and covered with the boughs of willows, only a few rods from where the Federal force would be obliged to pass, rose up and delivered a heavy fire of musketry into them, wounding Major Foreman and several of his men. This sudden fire of the enemy from their concealed position, and the wounding of their leader, who was obliged to be borne to the rear, caused some confusion in the advance, and the men fell back to the north side of the creek.

The Federal soldiers had not seen the breastworks on the opposite shore or any indications of an enemy at that point until they saw the smoke rise from it in the volley that wounded Major Foreman. They had been firing over the breastwork into the brush along the bank, as they could hear the Confederates talking over there, but could not see them. The colored infantry along the north bank of the creek commenced a hot fire at an easy range upon the Confederates behind their breastwork the moment the smoke from their small-arms disclosed their concealed position, and soon drove them out. When the Confederates delivered their volley into the cavalry advance, the head of the column of the colored infantry had just reached the water's edge, and Colonel Williams


directed that the three leading companies file to the right and left along the bank, which brought them into line facing the Confederate position on the opposite side of the creek. His artillery also played again upon the Confederate position, and kept it up for about twenty minutes, when he directed that the section on his left cease firing.

He then brought up a company of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry, under Lieutenant R. C. Philbrick, to take the place of the Indian company in the advance, and ordered the Lieutenant to move forward at a double-quick, which he did under cover of the fire of the artillery on the right and of the three infantry companies on the bank, until he secured a footing on the south side of the creek. This gallant movement, however, was not accomplished without drawing a hot but ineffectual fire from the Confederates—ineffectual, because the moment they showed themselves they were exposed to the fire of the Federal artillery and small-arms of the infantry companies along the north bank of the creek. His cavalry advance, having successfully crossed, formed on the south side of the stream, and Colonel Williams at once pushed forward his infantry and cavalry and crossed over, his infantry wading in the water up to their waist belts, and formed in line on the bank in front of the enemy. He then soon drove the Confederates from their position in the brush, but they formed in line again in the edge of the prairie about a quarter of a mile in advance. The Colonel now saw that he must make preparation for decisive action. That a weak point might not be left unguarded, he ordered Captain Stewart, with two companies of cavalry, to take position on his right to prevent a flank movement of the Confederate cavalry in that direction. Lieutenant Philbrick was then ordered to move forward with his company and charge the front line of the Confederates and break through it and endeavor to ascertain their strength and

position. The Lieutenant gallantly executed this movement, charging upon the Confederate front, breaking it and throwing them into disorder. This feeble resistance offered by the Southern forces induced Colonel Williams to order all his cavalry to the front, under Captain Stewart, to follow up the success already achieved. After the Confederate line was broken, Colonel Watie seems to have made very little effort to rally his men, so that Captain Stewart continued the pursuit about five miles south, killing and wounding a good many and dispersing the others, who took to the timber and brush along Grand River and on other streams intersecting their line of retreat.

It was not considered advisable by Colonel Williams to use the troops who had been sent to his support in a pursuit that would take them too great a distance from the escort, for by so doing he might endanger the safety of the train. He therefore recalled his cavalry and sent them back to Lieutenant-Colonel Dodd, commanding the escort, that afternoon, and the train at once moved out and arrived at Fort Gibson without any further trouble.

The Federal loss, according to the official reports, was three men killed and thirty wounded. Colonel Williams reported that from the best information he could obtain, he thought that the Confederate loss was about fifty men killed and nine prisoners.





## CHAPTER VIII.

### ACTION AT STOCKTON, AND DEATH OF MAJOR LIVINGSTON.

THE action at Stockton, in Cedar County, Missouri, July 11, 1863, deserves mention from the fact that it was an event that closed the career of Major Thomas R. Livingston, whose name was familiar to the Unionists of Southwest Missouri on account of his numerous depredations in that section, having commanded a battalion of Confederate Partisan Rangers from the beginning of the war up to his death. Although he appears to have been commissioned by the Confederate Government as a Major of Partisan Rangers, his command was known to the loyal people of that section as "bushwhackers," or guerrillas. He lived in the western part of Jasper County up to the war, and was a man of some local prominence and influence. His business relations had made him thoroughly acquainted with the people of his section. He was not considered a bad man as men were then accounted bad. As the leader of his band, his name became associated with transactions that could not by any means be sanctioned by legitimate war. His knowledge of men and affairs made him the natural leader of those around him who determined to cast their fortunes with the South. His thorough knowledge of the country, and his ability to obtain through the secessionists information of the movements of Federal detachments and trains, en-

abled him to give the Federal officers operating in that section a good deal of trouble. When least expected he had in a number of instances dashed down upon some station or train and escort and carried off stock or supplies or prisoners in spite of the vigilance of the Federal officers. His men were well mounted and equipped, so that when he undertook to make a dash upon a place, his movements were quickly executed. His attack on Stockton, in July, 1863, where he was killed leading his men, was witnessed by James M. Traverse, of Dade County, who was a member of Captain Alexander Simmons' company, Seventh Regiment Missouri Provisional Militia, who participated in the affair on the Federal side, and from whom the particulars of the action were drawn.

The companies of Captains Simmons and Walker were stationed at Stockton that month, engaged in scouting and keeping the peace of the country. The officers and men of the militia were not only acquainted with the methods of guerilla fighting in that section, but they generally knew personally most of the men of the guerilla bands against whom they were operating. There were upwards of sixty men in each of the companies stationed at Stockton, mounted upon their own private horses. Captain Simmons' company was quartered in tents about one hundred yards southwest of the court-house, which was located in the centre of court-house square.

On the day of the attack there was public speaking in Stockton, the previous announcement of which had attracted a few citizens from the country. W. C. Montgomery and Orville Welch were candidates for the Legislature and were there in joint debate presenting their respective claims to the people for political preferment. It was warm weather, and the soldiers were lounging around, exhibiting no particular interest in the discussion, and there were not perhaps more than one

half of the men in the brick court-house when the enemy made the attack. Most of the militia generally wore their side-arms when off duty. As it was warm weather there probably would have been fewer men in the court-house at that time of the day than there were, had it not been for the public speaking attracting them there. Of course there were a few citizens present in the court-house, and who dispersed when the firing commenced.

Livingston had been frequently heard of south of Cedar County, operating in the counties of Jasper, Newton, and McDonald, but had not prior to the day of the attack made a raid as far north as Stockton, and there had been no rumor of his approach or of a hostile demonstration from any quarter. Captain Lafayette Roberts' company of guerillas had been operating in the county, generally on Horse and Cedar creeks, so that Captain Simmons, the senior captain, always kept picket guards on the four principal roads leading into town to guard against a surprise. It was such a smoky day, which was unusual for the season of the year, that mounted men could not be distinctly seen more than two or three hundred yards off, so that the guerillas approached so near the picket stationed on the Greenfield and Stockton road, a short distance south of town, that he was unable to reach camp, but was obliged to take to the brush to save himself. In his flight he did not even think of discharging his gun to give the alarm to his comrades.

Hence the guerillas were able to move rapidly into town and open fire upon the militia on the street and around the court-house without any warning whatever. Immediately after the enemy opened fire the militia in camp and on the street sought safety in the brush north of town and in houses in town. Only about twenty men remained in the court-house and did the fighting. Lieutenants Alexander C. Montgomery and William A. McMinn were among the officers of the militia who stayed

in the court-house and participated in the fight from that point. The guerillas, estimated at three hundred strong, after the militia on the street had dispersed, surrounded the court-house, and most of them, dismounting upon the court-house square, opened fire on the men within from every side. As the arms of Captain Walker's company were in the court-house, the men inside had plenty of arms and ammunition, and from every window kept up a hot fire on their assailants on the outside until they withdrew. After the first volley from the guerillas the militia in the court-house firmly barred the two down-stairs doors with heavy hewn timbers and then retreated up-stairs, from whence they did their fighting until the enemy were repulsed.

The attack commenced about three o'clock in the afternoon and lasted fifteen to twenty minutes with almost constant flashes of fire and puffs of smoke from every window, when the guerillas, having lost two of their principal officers, Major Livingston and Captain Vaughn, the latter of Osceola, and two enlisted men, killed, withdrew, leaving their dead on the ground. Lieutenant McMinn and one of his men were severely wounded in the court-house, and one man, Gould Kington, was captured and killed, and one or two militiamen were mortally wounded on the street. The guerillas left fifteen of their wounded at Whitehair, ten miles southwest of Stockton, that day.

As soon as the enemy withdrew from town, Captains Simmons and Walker rallied their men in the court-house, and fearing another attack that evening commenced preparations to resist it. They set their men to carrying water and filling tubs in the court-house for use in the event they should be surrounded and attacked again. But the enemy were too severely punished and too much demoralized to renew the attack, and retreated southwest in the direction of Barton County.

The report of the fight spread through the country by

some of the militia who were cut off from their command, and a company of State militia came in from Greenfield the next morning under Captain James J. Akard, Eighth Missouri Militia Cavalry, to reinforce Captains Simmons and Walker. The court-house made a strong position against an attack by small-arms, and after the loyal militia rallied it would have taken a stronger force than that which made the attack to have dislodged them without the use of artillery.

Captain Akard received information of the fight just as the sun was sinking below the horizon that day, and left Greenfield at once, marching all that night, and when within a few miles of Stockton met a man on the road, mounted and in Federal uniform, who represented himself as a Federal soldier. Believing that he was in the immediate presence of the enemy, the Captain concluded to hold his captive stranger to obtain from him such information as was possible, and to prevent him, if he was an enemy, from giving the bandits any information of the movements of the reinforcing detachment. In the darkness none of Captain Akard's men recognized the prisoner, and he represented in reply to questions that the guerillas were still holding the town, having driven the militia out in the fight. This statement caused the Captain to halt his command for a while and to approach the town cautiously by daylight. When daylight came the Captain and his guide, Robert Underwood, dropped back to the rear of the column to have another talk with the prisoner in regard to the situation in town. On coming up to him the guide instantly knew him, having captured him in a fight in that section some months prior to this second capture. He finally admitted his identity, recollected the incidents connected with his exchange, and on being further questioned about the fight at Stockton, admitted that the militia had driven the guerillas off with some loss and were still holding the town.

Captain Akard then marched into town, having first taken precaution to ascertain that the loyal militia really were in possession. After a halt of a few hours to breakfast and to rest and feed his horses, the Captain started out on the trail of the guerillas and pursued them into the southern part of Barton County, but without being able to come up with the main body of them.

The death of their leader had the effect of breaking Livingston's band up into smaller bands, and his name did not figure in guerilla operations in Southwest Missouri any more during the war. After many successful contests with the Regular Federal forces, he met his defeat and death at the hands of the Enrolled Militia, whom he had affected to despise on account of their inferior arms and equipments and generally unsoldierly appearance.

When planning this, his last fight, Major Livingston knew that the year before, in July, 1862, Colonel John T. Coffee had surprised and captured a company of Enrolled Militia at Greenfield in the adjoining county without the loss of a man, and did not doubt but that he should be equally successful in making a dash upon the militia at Stockton. Colonel Coffee was a lawyer living at Greenfield up to the war, and, then espousing the cause of the South, raised a regiment for Price's army. He was therefore perfectly familiar with the country, and had accurate information of the strength of the Union force occupying the town. The Union force in town on the day of the Confederate advance was a company of Enrolled Militia under Captain Nathan McClure, which had that day just completed its organization. Captain McClure had not made any preparation for defence, nor put out any scouts or pickets to give notice of an approaching foe, so that the Southern forces were in sight of town before the Unionists knew they were in the country. When Colonel Coffee came up in sight of town, he divided

his command, which was mounted, into two wings, and then moved forward rapidly to encircle the town, and before the militia could escape therefrom they were surrounded on all sides. The militia and Union citizens, probably numbering about one hundred, were in the court-house square when the Southern troops closed up their lines. Knowing that he was in no condition to make a fight, Captain McClure allowed the enemy, estimated at one thousand strong, to approach within easy range of small-arms without offering resistance.

On seeing that the militia were not displaying a belligerent attitude, Colonel Coffee rode up and told the men in the court-house square that they were his prisoners. He then told them to go up-stairs in the court-house and remain there for further instructions. He put a guard around them and kept them there until after midnight that night, when he paroled them. That night, after the men were captured, he went up to see them and made a little speech, telling them that they should be treated as prisoners of war, and that they should not be hurt. He advised them not to leave before daylight, as some of his men might attempt to do them harm if they left earlier. His advice was followed, and the Unionists retired to their homes without disturbance. Captain McClure and his men lost all their private horses and equipments and such arms as they had. They had not drawn any clothing or other Government property. He had one man, Mr. — Willett, who was slightly wounded, having got a cut over the head in a rather laughable manner. When the militia saw the Confederates coming in on a charge, Mr. Willett mounted his ass, which he had ridden to town that day, and started home, urging it forward with all his might. As soon, however, as the Confederates got within hailing distance they called to him to halt. The ass was hard-mouthed, but slow of speed, and hearing the uproar in the rear, Mr. Willett could not check it, and

one of the Confederates galloped up and cut him over the head with a sabre. The wound, however, was not serious.

The Confederates captured the town late in the afternoon and left early the next morning for Stockton and points north, increasing their numbers by each day's march. In this raid, Colonel Coffee's movements were frequently so rapid that they were not always known to the officers of the regularly organized Federal forces in the State. It was not therefore strange that the militia officers who had not yet seen any service should have been surprised and taken in.

After the death of Major Livingston, Captain Kinch West, a citizen of Dade County up to the war, became the leader of the guerilla bands in the section where Livingston had been operating. Captain West, being perfectly familiar with the country in Southwest Missouri, had given the militia and Federal officers commanding stations and escorts to trains a good deal of trouble. When he made a raid into the open sections of Dade, Lawrence, or Barton County, he would, if pursued by a superior Federal force, make for the rough and mountainous regions of McDonald or Barry County. He and his men appear to have been more interested in robbing and plundering than in assisting the Confederate cause. They shot down and killed in cold blood a good many Union citizens in the section where he operated, and he invariably shot down the Union soldiers that he captured. In some of his contests with the militia he got badly punished, even if he did have the advantage of choosing the time, place, and disposition of his force in making an attack.

In the fall of 1864, while the Price Raid was exciting very great interest all over the State, he collected the independent bands of guerillas in Southwest Missouri to the number of about three hundred men, most of whom

were well mounted and armed, and aimed at the capture of Greenfield. There were about fifty men under Captain James Kirby, of the Enrolled Militia, stationed at Greenfield at the time of the attack. Captain Kirby had taken the precaution to keep out a picket in the direction from which the enemy approached, but it was too near camp to be of much advantage in warning his men to arms in the event of a sudden attack. The court-house had been burnt by Shelby's Southern forces on his raid north in the fall of 1863, but the Wells House, a good strong brick building on the southeast corner of the public square, which had been used as a hotel up to the war, was used as quarters for all the soldiers who did not sleep in houses around town, and was selected as the rallying point in the event of attack. At this time, however, only twelve men, under Sergeant Stubblefield, of the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, slept in the Wells House, Captain Kirby and his men occupying quarters around town.

The first warning of the approach of the enemy was just at daylight, before most of the militia had awakened from their peaceful slumbers. The yell of the guerillas and the discharge of small-arms were then heard as they came charging into town, all well mounted. All the militia who were not cut off, on hearing the firing, started for the Wells House, and most of them succeeded in getting there. Some few of the Unionists, however, who found that they were cut off from their comrades, took positions in houses and fired upon the guerillas when they came within range.

The bandits came into town from three different directions, and as soon as they came to the public square they received a heavy fire from the militia in the Wells House, which caused them to quickly fall back and take positions behind houses. It was soon discovered that they were endeavoring to get the horses belonging to the militia out of the stables on the south side of the public square.

When this information reached the Wells House, Sergeant Stubblefield took his twelve men and some of the Enrolled Militia who had joined him, and opened fire on the guerillas and drove them out of the stable, after which they soon commenced to retreat, and kept it up until they were out of sight. The militia lost three men killed. The guerillas had several men wounded in the affair, but their exact casualties were not known, as they took their wounded along with them. The three militiamen killed were Morgan, Acuff, and Isaac Owens. These men were cut off from joining their comrades and surrounded and captured, and killed after their capture. A comrade, Jesse Cartwright, who was cut off from his command with them, ran, and in jumping a fence fell on the opposite side; knowing that the enemy were right at his heels, he lay on the ground as if dead, for they were firing at him as he ran, and by thus feigning death saved his life. While lying on the ground he saw his comrades shot down and their pockets rifled not more than thirty yards distant.

It was supposed to be the purpose of the guerillas to pillage the town and to do it with as little fighting as possible. It was the almost universal verdict of the loyal people of Southwest Missouri that Captain West got to be a hard character during the war. As an illustration of his character it was known that on one occasion he captured his uncle, Jacob Cox, a well-to-do farmer, living in the south part of Dade County, but a Union man, and demanded of him his money. At first Mr. Cox refused to give up his money, and then West put a rope around his neck and fastened it to the horn of his saddle and dragged him up and down the road until he consented to give up all the money he had with him. The greater part of his money Mr. Cox had deposited in Greenfield, and it was this balance that West was trying to force him to give up. When West and his men found that they could

not get all of Mr. Cox's money, they stripped him to his shirt and drawers and turned him loose, and when he came into Greenfield in this condition his neck was badly bruised and skinned from the hard treatment he had received.





## CHAPTER IX.


### BATTLE OF HONEY SPRINGS, CREEK NATION.

ON July 3d several Cherokee women from near Grand Saline arrived at Fort Gibson and reported that the day before they heard heavy artillery firing in the direction of Cabin Creek on the west side of Grand River. Of course, until some definite information was received of the result of the action, the troops at Fort Gibson felt a good deal of anxiety for the safety of their supply train. But at that time Grand River had been very high at Fort Gibson for three or four days, and Colonel Phillips was satisfied that the force General Cooper had sent up on the east side of that stream, and the force under General Cabell from Arkansas, would be unable to cross to the west side to form a junction with the troops which had been sent up on the west side under Colonel Watie.

On the morning of the 5th, the arrival of the Federal commissary train not only ended the suspense and anxiety of the troops at that post, but also the long fast which had been imposed upon them by most of their rations having been exhausted for a week or so. The arrival of reinforcements of infantry and artillery also had a good effect upon the loyal Indian troops, who had been exerting every effort to hold their position against superior numbers and under very trying conditions.

After the failure of General Cooper's expeditions to capture the Federal train at Cabin Creek, the Confederate

forces in the Indian Territory were gradually pushed south in the direction of Red River. They were soon after that action employed in protecting their own supplies.



MAP OF BATTLE OF HONEY SPRINGS OR ELK CREEK, CREEK NATION.

Having received information that General Cooper was constantly sending out strong expeditions of cavalry on

the flanks and in the rear of Colonel Phillips' position at Fort Gibson, and knowing that most of the available troops of that post were guarding the Federal supply line, General Blunt collected such cavalry and light artillery as could be spared from Southern Kansas, consisting of a battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and two mountain howitzers and a section of Captain E. A. Smith's Second Kansas Battery, and, leaving Fort Scott July 6th, by rapid marching arrived at Fort Gibson on the 11th.

The defeat of General Lee's army at Gettysburg on the 3d and the surrender by General Pemberton of Vicksburg to General Grant on the 4th, with upwards of thirty thousand prisoners and nearly two hundred cannon, all pointed to the conclusion that Federal operations in the Department of the Missouri would in a short time assume an aggressiveness that had not been displayed in the earlier part of the season. General Grant would soon be able to return to the Department of the Missouri the troops which had been drawn from it to reinforce him in the siege of Vicksburg. General Schofield determined, as soon as these troops should come under his command, to push forward his forces and occupy the country north of the Arkansas from Fort Gibson to its mouth, and so dispose his troops as to control the navigation of that river for transporting supplies to his army.

On the 4th of July the Confederate forces, under Generals Holmes and Price, about eight thousand strong, attacked the Federal forces at Helena, Arkansas, under General Prentiss, about four thousand strong, and were defeated, after desperate fighting, with the loss of upwards of sixteen hundred men killed, wounded, and captured. This battle had an important bearing upon the military operations on the Border, for the reason that the Confederate troops engaged in it were almost the only troops the Confederate authorities had to defend the line of the

Arkansas from Little Rock to Fort Smith. Directly after this battle, General Holmes, commanding the Southern forces in the District of Arkansas, commenced fortifying Little Rock and concentrating his troops in the vicinity for the defence of that place.

On the Federal side, Major-General Frederick Steele arrived at Helena on the 31st of July, with instructions from General Grant to fit out an expedition from that point against Little Rock. The troops assigned to him for the expedition were at once organized and furnished with the necessary supplies, and on the 17th of August commenced crossing White River at Clarendon. At this time General Price had recently been temporarily assigned to the command of the Confederate forces in the District of Arkansas, and he saw that he was being pressed so closely by the Federal forces advancing from Helena and from Southeast Missouri that he could not spare from the defence of Little Rock, the capital of the State, any troops to reinforce Generals Cabell and Steele in the western part of the State and Indian Territory. Hence, Confederate General Steele was obliged to rely on the troops which he then had in the Indian Territory to meet the troops of General Blunt, who were ordered on his arrival at Fort Gibson to make preparations for crossing the Arkansas at once for the purpose of attacking General Cooper in his position on Elk Creek, twenty-five miles south of that post on the Texas road.

After his failure to form a junction with Colonel Watie in an attack on the Federal train at Cabin Creek, General Cabell marched back into Arkansas, and in a few days afterwards was ordered to join General Cooper at Honey Springs, south of the Arkansas, in a combined movement against the Federal forces at Fort Gibson. On his arrival at that post, General Blunt received information of this proposed movement of the Confederate leaders, and determined to cross the Arkansas and attack General Cooper

before the reinforcements under General Cabell could arrive. As the Arkansas was not fordable at any point below the mouth of the Verdigris, he had flatboats constructed for taking over some of his troops and ammunition. In a day or so the river commenced falling, and on the 15th of July he ascertained from his scouts that the Arkansas was fordable a short distance above the mouth of the Verdigris. Shortly after midnight of the 16th, he took the battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, with two howitzers and a section of the Second Kansas Battery, and crossed the Verdigris and Arkansas about twelve miles above Fort Gibson without serious opposition, and, marching down the south side of the Arkansas, was desirous of capturing the Confederate pickets guarding the different fords on that river. The Confederate pickets on the river, however, heard of his advance in time to escape to General Cooper's main outpost, several miles north of Elk Creek. General Blunt's other troops for the expedition crossed the Arkansas near the mouth of Grand River in the evening and night of the 16th, some of the troops not getting over until about eleven o'clock.

The General organized his troops for the attack into two brigades. The First Brigade, consisting of the First Kansas Colored Infantry, under Colonel James M. Williams; the Second Indian Regiment, dismounted as infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fred. W. Schaurte; a battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and two howitzers; a battalion of the Third Wisconsin and two howitzers, under Captain E. R. Stevens, and four guns of the Second Kansas Battery, under Captain E. A. Smith, was commanded by Colonel William R. Judson, Sixth Kansas Cavalry. The Second Brigade, consisting of six companies of the Second Colorado Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore H. Dodd; the First Indian Regiment, dismounted as infantry, under Colonel Stephen H. Wattles, and Hopkins' Kansas Battery, four guns, under

Captain Henry Hopkins, was commanded by Colonel William A. Phillips, Third Indian Regiment.

Immediately after the troops had all crossed over the river in boats, the march south was resumed, and at daylight the Federal advance under Captain William Gordon, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, came upon the Confederates' outpost about five miles north of Elk Creek, and at once formed to attack them. The Captain, however, was soon obliged to fall back before superior numbers until he was reinforced by the other three companies of the regiment, which were brought up at a gallop. The Confederates were then driven from their position and fell back upon their main force posted in the timber on the north side of Elk Creek. As there was a large force of Choctaws and Texans at this outpost, General Blunt did not feel certain but that General Cooper had determined to meet him at that point, and commenced to form line of battle.

On moving forward again and finding the enemy strongly posted in the timber north of Elk Creek, the battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry halted, and a company was thrown forward to reconnoitre, and soon found that their line was formed on the right and left of the road for some distance. General Blunt, with some members of his staff and escort, rode forward with this advance cavalry to examine the Confederate position and to ascertain where General Cooper's battery was posted. He then left the companies of the Sixth Kansas on the skirmish line to watch the movements of the enemy, and rode back and halted the head of his column and all his troops as they came up, behind a ridge in the prairie about half a mile in front of the Confederate line, to rest and lunch and prepare for action.

The troops had been marching all night and all the morning up to eight o'clock, and the infantry in particular felt the need of a little rest and of an opportunity of

eating a lunch from their haversacks before going into action.

Just before the column halted, a hard shower of rain came up, lasting about a quarter of an hour and filling all the little depressions along the road with water, from which a good many of the soldiers filled their canteens, having exhausted during the night's march the water they had obtained from the Arkansas.

Having rested his troops on the prairie for about two hours, General Blunt then formed them into two columns, the First Brigade, under Colonel Judson, on the right of the road, and the Second Brigade, under Colonel Phillips, on the left of the road, and moved forward, the infantry in close columns of companies, the cavalry by platoons, and the artillery by sections. He desired in coming on the field in this order to deceive the enemy as to his strength. When he arrived within a quarter of a mile of the Confederate line, his two columns suddenly deployed to the right and left into line of battle, covering the Confederate line, which appeared to be a mile and a quarter in length. As the troops came into line, the First Kansas Colored Infantry formed on the left of the First Brigade on the right of the road; the Second Indian Regiment formed on the right of the colored infantry, and the battalion of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, with two howitzers, formed on the right of the Second Indian Regiment.

In the Second Brigade, the Second Colorado Infantry formed on the right on the left of the road, and on the left of the colored infantry. The First Indian Regiment formed on the left of the Second Colorado, and the battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry formed on the left of the First Indian Regiment, having been assigned to this position in the Second Brigade after the troops came on the field. General Blunt wished to have white troops on his extreme flanks. The First Kansas Colored

Infantry formed the left centre, and the Second Colorado Infantry formed the right centre of the Federal line. Captain Smith's guns came into battery in front of the colored infantry, and Captain Hopkins' guns came into battery just in front of the Colorado infantry.

On the Confederate side, General Cooper had his line formed on both sides of the road along the edge of the timber on the north side of Elk Creek when the Federal forces came in sight. The Twentieth Texas, dismounted cavalry, under Colonel Thomas C. Bass, formed his left centre. The Twenty-ninth Texas Cavalry, under Colonel Charles De Morse, and Fifth Texas Partisan Rangers, under Colonel L. M. Martin, formed his right centre. His right wing was composed of the First and Second Cherokee regiments, commanded by Colonel Stand Watie, and his left wing was composed of the First and Second Creek regiments, commanded by Colonel D. N. McIntosh. His reserve consisted of the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment, commanded by Colonel Tandy Walker, and two squadrons of Texas cavalry, commanded by Captains John Scanland and L. E. Gillett, posted near his headquarters at Honey Springs, about two miles in the rear of his line of battle. His battery, under Captain R. W. Lee, was posted in front of the Twentieth Texas, and supported by that regiment.

These dispositions having been made on both sides, General Blunt, after his troops came into line, and after throwing out a skirmish line, moved forward until he drew the fire of the Confederate artillery. He then halted his line, and Captain Smith's guns on the right and Captain Hopkins' guns on the left commenced playing upon the Confederate position and battery with shot and shell and canister, which was continued for upwards of an hour, dismounting one of their guns near the corn-field and silencing the other pieces. But up to this time the guns of the Confederate battery had not been idle;

they had been throwing a storm of shot and shell and canister into the Federal position, killing and wounding several men of the Federal batteries. A single shell from one of Captain Hopkins' guns burst, killing and wounding every horse of one of the Confederate guns, besides killing and wounding most of the men of that gun.

Meanwhile the Federal cavalry on the right and left of General Blunt's line had dismounted and were skirmishing in the timber with the Southern Indians and Texans, who were making efforts to flank the Federal position.

When the artillery ceased firing, the Federal infantry were ordered forward to attack the Confederate line, which was concealed from view in the brush and timber. On coming up to within forty to fifty yards of the Confederate line, which had until this moment been hidden from view by the thick brush, Colonel Williams, of the colored regiment, and Colonel De Morse, of the Twenty-ninth Texas, dismounted, gave the order to fire almost at the same instant, and immediately there burst forth from the hostile forces two lines of smoke and flame, and a terrific roar of small-arms. In this volley from the Confederates, Colonel Williams had his horse killed, and also fell himself at the same time, severely wounded in the breast and face. On the Confederate side, Colonel De Morse was also wounded in the arm. Colonel Williams was obliged to be taken to the rear, but a continuous fire was kept up for some time between the opposing lines, the colored infantry loading and firing lying down on the ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Bowles assumed command of the colored regiment after Colonel Williams was wounded. He was on the right of his regiment at the time, and noticing some of the mounted Indians of Colonel Schaurte's command on his right riding between him and the Confederate line, ordered them back out of the line of fire.

The commander of the Texas regiment directly in

front, hearing the order of Colonel Bowles, supposed it was an order for the colored regiment to retire, and at once ordered his own regiment to advance. They came up within twenty-five yards of the colored regiment, who gave them a volley of musketry, shooting down their color-bearer, besides killing and wounding a number of other men and quickly sending the others back in considerable confusion. Their colors were again raised, but in a few moments were shot down again by the volleys from the colored infantry and left to fall into the hands of the Federal forces by the retreating Texans. The centre of the Confederate line was now broken and obliged to retire some distance.

While the colored infantry were thus employed, the Second Indian Regiment, on the right of them, under Colonel Schaurte, was deployed as skirmishers, and, entering the timber, soon compelled the Southern Indians to retire across Elk Creek. Captain Stevens, commanding the battalion of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, who was posted on the extreme right of the Federal line, dismounted part of his men to skirmish the woods, and with the assistance of his howitzers forced the left of the Confederate line back upon their centre.

Early in the action, before the Confederate line had commenced to yield, three companies of the right wing of the Second Colorado Infantry, on the left of the colored infantry, came near being cut off and captured.

While the Federal line was advancing through the brush, which was thick enough in places with the leaves and heavy foliage to hide from view a foe a few yards in advance, these companies had got out of alignment—had got as much, perhaps, as twenty paces in advance of the left of the line of the colored infantry—and coming to an impassable ditch or washout directly in their front, filed to the right and crossed it just in front of the left of the line of the colored infantry. When the Colorado

men got over the ditch, they filed to the left again and came into line, but still in advance of the colored infantry on their right. At this moment a Confederate force which had been lying down concealed in the brush behind the ditch or gully, but now between the Colorado men and ditch, rose up to cut them off. The colored regiment was almost instantly ordered to oblique to the left, and coming up within less than fifty yards of the Confederates poured several well-directed volleys of musketry into them, which caused them to break, and they ran back in the direction of the Colorado men, who, now realizing the situation and seeing the enemy in confusion, turned and opened fire upon them only a few yards distant, killing and wounding a good many and capturing a few.

While these movements were taking place in the centre of the Federal line, the First Indian Regiment, under Colonel Wattles, on the left of the Second Colorado Infantry, and the battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, on the left of the First Indian, had entered the timber and were driving the Southern Indians, under Colonel Watie, and the Texans supporting him, back upon Elk Creek, and soon compelled them to cross to the south side at the lower ford. The Confederate line had now been forced to retire to the south side of Elk Creek in a good deal of confusion, leaving one of their guns, which had been dismounted, and the tents and camp equipage of one regiment to fall into the hands of the Federal troops.

A feeble effort, however, was made to hold the bridge over Elk Creek and some of the fords, but the troops defending them were speedily driven from these positions by the Federal infantry and the guns of Captain Hopkins' battery, which had moved forward and taken up the position which had just been occupied by the guns of the Confederate battery, one of which, the dismounted piece, was lying on the ground near the corner of the field.

After the Southern troops had been driven from all their positions on Elk Creek, the Federal forces crossed to the south side and pursued them about three miles south, or a mile or so south of Honey Springs depot, which they had set fire to, consuming a large part of their supplies, being pressed so closely that they were barely able to get their baggage trains out of the way. One of their commissary buildings, however, was captured by the Federal troops before it had burned, containing large quantities of bacon, flour, salt, and dried beef, from which the tired and hungry Federal soldiers made a bountiful supper.

The soldiers of the colored regiment inspected with a good deal of curiosity three or four hundred handcuffs, which were captured in the depot buildings at Honey Springs, which the Southern troops had there for the purpose of putting on colored soldiers they expected to capture. David Griffith, a colored man, who was waiting on Major J. A. Carroll, of one of General Cooper's Texas regiments at the time of the battle, and who left him and came to the colored regiment at Fort Smith in September and enlisted in Company G of that regiment and served his time out, stated that he frequently heard Southern officers say that the handcuffs were brought there to be put on colored soldiers they expected to capture. He also said that he frequently heard the Southern officers, talking with each other, say that they did not believe colored soldiers would fight, and that all the Southern troops would have to do would be to march up to the colored men and take them in. The belief that colored soldiers would not fight was not at that time confined to Southern officers, but a good many Federal officers and people in the North expressed the same sentiment, particularly those who were opposed to enlisting colored men for soldiers in the Union army.

Colonel Williams, who was familiar with the disparag-

ing comments in regard to enlisting colored soldiers, and who had great faith that they would acquit themselves creditably if given a fair opportunity, when the battle was over and the troops recalled from the pursuit, sent for General Blunt to come and see him in the field hospital, where he was suffering from his wounds. The Colonel always talked as if he was grinding his molars or gritting his teeth. When the General came in, the first thing the Colonel said to him was, "General, how did my regiment fight?" The General replied, "Like veterans, most gallantly." And the Colonel added, "I am ready to die, then." After that the Colonel was proud of his regiment, and he stayed away from it no longer than he was kept away by his wounds. And after that battle no one on either side in that section could be heard to say, "Colored soldiers will not fight." Thus was a prejudice of long standing wiped out in a few hours.


It was about two o'clock in the afternoon when General Blunt recalled his troops from the pursuit of the enemy. His men then went into camp on the battle-field, where they remained until the next evening, collecting the wounded and burying the dead of both sides. He then returned to Fort Gibson, having destroyed fifteen wagons, the tents and camp equipage of one regiment, and all the depot buildings and supplies in them at Honey Springs which he could not use. He reported his loss at 17 men killed and 60 wounded. He also reported that his troops buried 150 of the Confederate dead on the field, that they had 400 wounded, and that he took 77 prisoners, 1 piece of artillery, 1 stand of colors, and 200 stands of arms.

General Cooper reported his loss at 134 killed and wounded. He attributed his defeat to the worthless condition of the powder his troops used, stating that on a damp morning or in damp weather it became paste-like and would not ignite. He had eight regiments and two

squadrons to General Blunt's three regiments and three battalions. To make up for inferiority of numbers, General Blunt had eight field-pieces and four howitzers to General Cooper's one four-gun battery.

General Cabell, with a brigade of Arkansas cavalry and four pieces of artillery, who was *en route* to reinforce General Cooper, and who was within hearing of the roar of the artillery during the battle, joined General Cooper about four o'clock in the afternoon, scarcely two hours after the conflict had ended, and in sight of Honey Springs. But even with this reinforcement of upwards of two thousand men, General Cooper's troops were too scattered and demoralized to be again brought into action at once, and the united forces retired south of the Canadian River, where they encamped until July 22d. From that point General Steele ordered them to take up a position at Prairie Springs, fifteen miles southeast of Fort Gibson, where he expected in a few days to receive a reinforcement of a brigade of Texans, under General Bankhead. On the arrival of this brigade he determined to take up a position still nearer Fort Gibson and endeavor to prevent any reinforcements or supplies from coming in to General Blunt. But General Bankhead's brigade did not arrive at the time expected, and the desertions from General Cabell's Arkansas brigade became so alarming—as many as two hundred men leaving in a single night—that General Steele felt obliged to retire again to the south side of the Canadian. Nearly all these deserters were Union men who had been conscripted into the Confederate service, and who determined to desert at the first opportunity rather than fight against their flag and country. They were, perhaps, without exception, men who did not own slaves and who did not desire to own them, and as they could not see how they would be benefited by the success of the Confederate cause, they did not propose to make themselves targets to sustain a

principle with which they had no sympathy or interest, and which they believed tended to degrade their manhood. They had evaded the Confederate conscripting officers as long as possible by hiding out in the woods and mountains, and were then hunted down like criminals or runaway slaves, arrested, taken off and put into the service. All this tended to intensify their resentment against a cause which they believed discriminated against them because they were poor men or men of only moderate means, for they knew that the Confederate Congress had passed a law exempting from military service all men in the South who owned as many as twenty slaves.





## CHAPTER X.

### THE LAWRENCE MASSACRE.

IN the latter part of the fall of 1862 a good many of the guerillas who followed the leadership of Quantrill went south and participated with the Confederate forces under General Hindman in the Prairie Grove campaign. When the Confederate army was driven south of the Arkansas River and from Western Arkansas, these bandits commenced drifting back to the Missouri River counties in small parties, and by the early part of February, 1863, had become so numerous in Jackson County that they were able to concentrate in a short time a force of upwards of a hundred strong. During the winter the Fifth Regiment Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under Colonel W. R. Penick, was stationed at Independence, Pleasant Hill, and Harrisonville, and detachments from those points were busy scouting in those counties, now and then coming in sight of and chasing two or three bandits from the house of a Southern family. But in February, after these knights of the brush had for some time been drifting back from the South in small parties, they commenced to concentrate in larger bodies for the purpose of doing mischief on a larger scale. Colonel Penick received information of their movements and of the position of their camp, and immediately sent out from Independence fifty men, under Lieutenant D. A. Colvin, who came upon them about two o'clock in the afternoon, February 8th,

and attacked them vigorously, and in the running fight, which lasted about half an hour, killed eight men, wounded two, and captured all the horses and most of the arms of the bandits, and sustained a loss of one man in the skirmish.

The President's emancipation proclamation had recently liberated a good many slaves in the slave States, and there was a great deal of discussion as to whether the negro, or "contraband," would fight as a soldier. Colonel Penick determined to try the experiment and sent along a colored man, at his own request, with Lieutenant Colvin's detachment, and the officers and men of the detachment reported that he acquitted himself in the most creditable manner, receiving a severe wound in the shoulder.

As spring advanced, the bandits increased in numbers and boldness, and it was not always easy for the Federal scouts to locate their camps, or to ascertain the number of men they had in any neighborhood. Reports coming to Colonel Penick that a considerable force of guerillas were concentrating in the vicinity of Blue Springs, about twelve miles east of Independence, on the 22d of March he sent out a detachment of fifty men and one piece of artillery, under Captain H. B. Johnson, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, who attacked a superior force of the bandits, and after a desperate fight with them was driven back with a loss of nine men killed and three wounded. The loss of the enemy in the action was not ascertained. They scattered immediately after the fight into the thick-wooded section along the brake of Little Blue River and the Sni Hills, where they concealed themselves until they were ready for another movement, and until they were joined by their old leader, Quantrill, from the South.

When General Schofield determined to advance his lines south to the Arkansas River, he was obliged to take

troops from different points in Missouri and send them to the front to reinforce Steele and Blunt in their movements against Little Rock and Fort Smith. As his forces advanced, the territory to be occupied increased, with a decreasing number of troops to occupy it, thus giving guerilla bands better opportunities to increase and concentrate for any movements they desired to make. Most of General Price's troops in Arkansas were from Missouri, and after his defeat at the battle of Helena and he was put upon the defensive and there was no longer a prospect that he would be able to make a movement north for some time, a large number of his men were permitted on some pretext or other to return to their homes in Missouri. They were generally in small parties of three or four to half a dozen men together; they knew the towns in Missouri in which the militia were stationed; they knew the roads on which there was little travel through desolated sections, and by travelling at night and going around the camps or the towns where the militia were stationed were able to reach points a hundred miles or so in the interior of the State without detection. They could not stay at their homes or in any neighborhood very long without their presence being known to either the militia or the guerillas, and they naturally fell in with the guerillas, with whom they operated in many instances. Not only enlisted men of the Confederate army returned thus clandestinely into the State, but officers even up to the rank of colonel. These hardy veterans, who were inured to the service, and who had lost very little of their bitterness towards Union men, after a little rest were ready to join the guerillas in the most daring adventures.

All over Missouri, and in the western counties of the State in particular, the humane policy of the Government was shamefully abused by the Southern people in harboring guerillas and in encouraging guerilla warfare. In

those counties the people were almost equally divided on the issues of the war, but as that section was almost constantly overrun by the Southern forces until Price was driven out of the State at the battle of Pea Ridge, nearly all the Union men fled to Kansas for safety and enlisted in Kansas regiments. Indeed, in some Kansas regiments whole companies were raised from Missourians, and in several regiments perhaps nearly one half of the men were from that State. Besides the men who enlisted in Kansas regiments, those counties furnished thousands of men for Missouri regiments in the Federal service. There were many influential men in Kansas who had a large following, and who asserted that there was no loyalty in Missouri, and were in favor of cleaning out everything over there. So strong was this feeling of cleaning out everything in Missouri manifested in one Kansas regiment that General Halleck ordered it into the field east of the Mississippi. Unquestionably, officers with these views were unfit for conducting military operations in Missouri.

After the Southern forces were driven from the State, there was now and then a suggestion in regard to adopting a rational policy for dealing with the guerillas, but nothing was done in that direction. The policy suggested was to remove all Southern families in Western Missouri south of the Federal lines. In a number of cases loyal militia officers had suggested to Southern families who were known to harbor guerillas that it would be better for them to move south, and they generally acted upon the suggestion, for they knew that non-compliance meant the destruction of their property. It would not have been difficult to have ascertained the political status of all families, and it would have been less expense to the Government to have removed all Southern families south than to maintain the large force that was required to deal with the guerillas; besides, it would have saved hundreds

of lives on both sides. If the Southern families had been removed, the guerillas could not have subsisted in the country. Of course such a policy would have entailed many hardships upon the families sent south, but the Confederate authorities would have been obliged to provide for them, and this fact would probably have brought General Price to a sense of his folly in inaugurating guerilla warfare, and led him to have discouraged it in other parts of the State. Union men from the Southern States who had left their homes to join the Federal army would have been very thankful if the Confederate authorities had allowed or assisted their families to move within the Federal lines. In some of the counties of Western Missouri the Southern women were so active in aiding the guerillas that they stood guard or picket for them while eating in their houses. While the bandits received such encouragement as this from the women it was almost impossible to drive them out of a section well adapted by nature for their operations. As a rule, the loyal militia of the State were better qualified and more successful in hunting down the bandits than the troops from other States, and had they been armed with a pair of revolvers and the best repeating rifles, as some of the cavalry regiments of some of the States were, they would have been much more successful. Every one knew that the guerillas were armed with two or three revolvers and a rifle or carbine each. More than once complaints were made by militia officers to their superiors of the inefficiency of their long, muzzle-loading guns; that after discharging a round they were left almost helpless in the presence of a foe heavily armed with revolvers and carbines or rifles of the newest models. In several instances guerilla leaders had managed to draw the fire of the militia at long range, and then turned and charged them before they had time to reload, inflicting severe loss upon them. Knowing their disadvantages in this respect, many of the

militia officers and men purchased their own revolvers for use in the service.

Early in June Brigadier-General Thomas Ewing, Jr., of Kansas, was assigned to the command of the District of the Border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Jackson County, a county in which Quantrill, the leader of the guerillas in that section, had made his rendezvous most of the time when in Missouri. General Ewing was a man whose associations and training, and whose familiarity with the principal recent events on the Border, made him a very competent officer to administer the affairs of the new district, and he was probably as free from bias towards Missouri as any man who could have been selected from Kansas. He was selected for this important position because it was believed that he would feel a special interest in protecting the Border counties of Kansas from guerilla incursions from Missouri, of which there had been frequent threats. His district embraced the Border counties of Missouri and Kansas, extending about ninety miles south of Kansas City.

It was generally known in the northern part of General Ewing's district that Quantrill and most of his men had spent the winter south with Price's army, but early in May, Lieutenant-Colonel Walter King, Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding at Lexington, ascertained through a spy that the noted guerilla leader had returned to his old haunts on the Sni in the eastern part of Jackson County, with forty men, and intended to spend the summer in Western Missouri, conscripting and recruiting; that with the men of four or five other guerilla leaders in that and adjoining counties he could raise about 150 men.

In the latter part of May, Major W. C. Ransom, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, made a scout from Westport to Big Creek, near Pleasant Hill, and reported that he had several skirmishes with small parties of Quantrill's men

in which he killed twelve of the bandits and lost one man killed; that he pursued the other bandits until they joined the main force under Quantrill, 150 strong, posted in a good position in the Sni Hills; that after receiving a reinforcement he drove the guerillas from their position, but was unable to pursue them on account of high waters. He also reported that he was convinced that the guerillas could concentrate a force several hundred strong on any point in that section within a few hours. That he had not overestimated the strength of the bandits was shown in the fact that on the evening of the 17th of June Captain Henry Flesher, Ninth Kansas Cavalry, with part of his company, was attacked in the edge of the timber about a mile south of Westport by a force of upwards of two hundred guerillas, who killed fourteen and wounded four of his men. In that neighborhood the farms were inclosed with stone fences, and the bandits got behind the stone walls and delivered their fire with deadly effect, and as Captain Flesher was in a lane with a stone fence on each side he was unable to form his men until he got to the end of the lane, in the meantime suffering heavy loss.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bazel F. Lazear, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding at Lexington, adopted a plan of dealing with the bandits of his section which produced good results. This plan was to fight the guerillas according to their own tactics. He knew the neighborhoods where they had friends, and which were frequented by them. It was known that small parties of the bandits were in the neighborhood of Wellington, a little town on the south side of the Missouri River, above Lexington, and Colonel Lazear sent out fifty men, under Lieutenant J. H. Smith, of his regiment, to watch the roads for the guerillas. About one o'clock in the morning the bandits came along, having just robbed a store in Wellington, and Lieutenant Smith's detachment fired upon them, killing three.

In the early part of July General Ewing received information from every part of his district in Missouri of the activity of the guerillas, and that they were increasing in numbers, some of his officers estimating that as many as one thousand had passed through Bates County, going north, during the last three months. Colonel Edward Lynde, Ninth Kansas Cavalry, commanding at Paola, Kansas, made a scout into Bates County, Missouri, and burnt eleven houses belonging to Southern families, ordered the families out of the country, and drove off nearly all of their cattle, horses, and sheep. Shortly afterwards, Butler, the county town, was evacuated by the Federal troops, and the guerillas, in retaliation, burnt a large part of the place, particularly the property of Union men.

It was an unfortunate policy that permitted Kansas troops stationed in Kansas to go into Missouri and burn the property of Southern people and drive off their stock, for it was certain to arouse the resentment of those against whom such severe measures were taken. If there was a necessity for the destruction or confiscation of the property of these people, it should have been done by the loyal militia of some other section of the State, or by troops who were not their neighbors. To have removed these families south of the Federal lines and left them among their friends could not justly have caused complaint; but to destroy and take away their property and leave them in the midst of their ruin, where they would probably have an opportunity of avenging their grievances, was certainly a bad policy.

So strong was the feeling of a considerable number of Kansas officers and troops that there was no loyalty in Missouri, that in the latter part of November, 1862, Colonel C. W. Adams, Twelfth Kansas Infantry, entered the State at Kansas City, and marching down through Jackson County without calling on Colonel W. R. Penick

at Independence, commenced taking the property of the loyal militia and Union men, as well as that of the secessionists. Complaints immediately came pouring in to Colonel Penick of the depredations that were being committed by the Kansas men, and he communicated the facts to his superiors and asked for instructions. General Richard C. Vaughan, commanding that military district, was at once authorized to disperse the Kansas troops and recover the property which they had taken from citizens of Missouri, and collecting a force of about four hundred loyal militia and two pieces of artillery, came up with Colonel Adams formed in line of battle across the road with his artillery in position. After some correspondence, the Kansas troops stacked their arms, Colonels Adams and Hays were arrested, the property which they had taken given up, and their men escorted to the State line by the militia. Such incursions as this by Kansas troops intensified the resentment of the secessionists, and General Ewing had not been in command of his district many weeks when he commenced receiving information through his scouts and spies that the guerillas were threatening to sack and destroy Olathe, Paola, Mound City, and other towns along the eastern border of Kansas. They had already threatened Lexington, Independence, and Harrisonville, Missouri, and after Colonel Penick's Fifth Regiment Missouri State Militia Cavalry was withdrawn from his district in June and mustered out, Ewing's force was so much weakened that he was obliged to have his troops evacuate several towns in the Border counties of Missouri to strengthen his stations along the State line to prevent the guerillas from making incursions into Kansas.

Part of Pleasant Hill was burnt by the bandits only a few days after it was evacuated by the Federal soldiers, and the latter part of July the General received information that they were concentrating in the Sni region, in

the western part of Lafayette County, for the purpose of making a raid on Lawrence, Kansas. He at once ordered Colonel James McFerran, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding at Lexington, to take a sufficient force and march into the locality where the guerillas were reported to be concentrating, and disperse them. Leaving Lexington late in the night of August 6th, with 150 men and three pieces of artillery, Colonel McFerran arrived at the designated locality the next day, having on the march come in sight of several small parties of the bandits, who fled on his approach. He ascertained that the guerillas had not concentrated, and thought that the heavy rain-storm of his first night's march and his presence in the neighborhood had prevented their concentration at that time. When General Ewing first heard of Quantrill's intention of making a raid on Lawrence, he had a company of infantry stop there for about a week and until his troops had dispersed the bandits. He was constantly advised of their movements and plans after they were dispersed, but could not hear that they were making any preparations for a raid into Kansas.

The Federal officers were thoroughly impressed with the notion that the concentration of the guerillas, several hundred strong, meant mischief—meant that they had determined to strike a severe blow at some point. On the morning of August 20th, Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear, who was at Warrensburg with parts of three companies of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, received information that Quantrill, with 250 bandits, had passed twelve miles north of that place on the 19th, moving west. Colonel Lazear at once despatched couriers to Lexington and Harrisonville, asking that all the troops that could be spared from those places meet him at Chapel Hill the next morning at daylight, and with one hundred men immediately started for that point. He formed a junction next morning near Chapel Hill with

Major A. W. Mullins, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, who had 126 men, but was delayed until evening waiting for a detachment from Lexington, having in the meantime ascertained that Quantrill had the day before passed that point going in the direction of Kansas. On the morning of the 20th, Quantrill was joined by fifty men from the Osage, about ten miles west of Pleasant Hill, on the headwaters of Grand River, and at noon that day set out on his raid into Kansas, entering the State five miles south of Aubrey just before sunset, with three hundred men, heavily armed and well mounted. There were two companies of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry stationed at Aubrey, Kansas, a mile or so from the State line, under Captain J. A. Pike; two companies of the same regiment at New Santa Fé, Missouri, on the State line twelve miles north, under Captain Charles F. Coleman; and parts of two or three companies at Coldwater Grove, Kansas, about twelve miles south of Aubrey, near the State line, under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles S. Clark, Ninth Kansas Cavalry, commanding troops on the Border. These troops were required to keep up a constant patrol along the Border, besides scouting in the Border counties of Missouri, to obtain information in regard to the movements of guerilla bands.

At half-past five o'clock in the evening of the 20th, Captain Pike, at Aubrey, received information of the presence of Quantrill on Grand River, about eight miles east, with a large force of guerillas, estimated as high as seven hundred men, and he at once despatched messengers notifying Colonel Clark at Coldwater Grove, Captain Coleman at New Santa Fé, Major L. K. Thatcher at Westport, and General Ewing at Kansas City. An hour and a half later Captain Pike received additional information that Quantrill had just crossed the line into Kansas five miles south of Aubrey, with a large force, moving west, and again immediately despatched messengers to

Colonel Clark and Captain Coleman to report the fact, and called in his scouting parties. Instead of pursuing the guerillas at once and harassing their rear, Captain Pike waited for Captain Coleman to arrive from New Santa Fé, which caused a delay of about five hours in commencing the pursuit. Captain Coleman arrived at Aubrey about eleven o'clock that night, and with 180 men immediately started in pursuit of the marauders, striking their trail about five miles south of the station. He followed their trail about three miles and then lost it in the darkness, and lost about two hours' time before finding it again. On his arrival at Gardner he ascertained that they had passed that place about midnight, six hours ahead of him, marching in the direction of Lawrence, eighteen miles distant. He urged the citizens to speed the information west and south, and then pressed forward as fast as the tired condition of his horses would permit, and in a short time saw the smoke from the burning of Lawrence.

In preparing for the expedition, Quantrill had his men mounted upon the best horses in the country, and so timed his movements that he could reach Lawrence from the point where he crossed the State line into Kansas near Aubrey in a single night's march. He met with no opposition or delay, and though the country through which he marched a distance of about fifty miles was mostly settled up, only a single effort was made to alarm the people in his front and at Lawrence of his approach, and he reached that place at daylight on the 21st and commenced his fiendish work of murdering the citizens and plundering and burning the city. Having received no warning of impending danger, the people at that early hour were mostly in their beds asleep, and as the bandits on entering the town scattered out to the different houses, it was impossible for the citizens to concentrate in any considerable numbers for defence. In this defenceless

condition, on being called to their doors, or in their flights to escape, they were shot down in the most fiend-like manner. No pleading of wives to spare their husbands, or of mothers to spare their sons, had any effect upon the wicked hearts of the desperate outlaws, and they continued their carnival of murder, robbery, and burning of property until ten o'clock, when they left town, marching southeast in the direction of Brooklyn, having killed 140 men, burned 185 buildings, and robbed most of the stores and banks of the city. Senator J. H. Lane, who resided in Lawrence, and whom the bandits would like to have caught, received notice of their presence in the city in time to escape, and, after a few hours, rallying about one hundred citizens, attacked their rear near Brooklyn.

In the meantime, Captain Coleman had reached a point six miles southeast of Lawrence, and was overtaken and relieved from command by Major P. B. Plumb, General Ewing's Chief-of-Staff, who had just arrived from Kansas City with about fifty men, who had been hastily collected by Captain Cyrus Leland, Jr., Tenth Kansas Infantry. This force was in a short time joined by about 150 militia or citizens, who had been collected by Senator Lane for the pursuit of the bandits.

On taking command, Major Plumb turned south in the direction of Baldwin City, and when near that place saw from the smoke that the bandits were burning Brooklyn. He knew from the reports of his scouts and from the dust and smoke left in the wake of the outlaws that they were moving south on the Lawrence and Fort Scott road, and at once moved rapidly in a southwest direction to intercept them on that road. He came up with their rear near Brooklyn, formed in line before twelve o'clock, and after a skirmish in which both sides fired several rounds, the bandits broke into column and joined the main force. In this skirmish Major Plumb was able

to bring up only a part of his force, on account of the exhausted condition of his horses, most of them having been continually in motion since nine o'clock the night before, and the last three miles urged forward on a charge to come up with the bandits.

His march to Lawrence and the four or five hours he was in the city enabled Quantrill to obtain nearly enough good horses to remount his men, and remounted upon fresh horses they had a decided advantage over the Federal detachments, whose horses were nearly, and in many cases completely, exhausted from long and constant marching. After the first skirmish near Brooklyn, one company of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry and the citizen militia, under Captain Leland, had a running fight all the afternoon with the guerillas until they reached the edge of the timber on Bull Creek, two or three miles west of Paola, about sunset, where the latter formed line of battle. During this chase most of Major Plumb's cavalry were two or three miles in the rear of his advance, their horses being so nearly exhausted as to be unable to keep up. In this last stand made by the guerillas, they charged upon Major Plumb's advance, composed of volunteer militia, and drove it back upon a company of cavalry, which was coming up and which quickly formed in line to receive them. They approached near enough to exchange a few shots with the Federal cavalry and militia, and then retired, and as darkness was coming on their trail was lost and was not found until two o'clock the next morning.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, commanding troops on the Border, who, on hearing that Quantrill had gone in the direction of Lawrence, sent out men to arouse the citizens in all the towns in that section and in the country and to call them out, received information about five o'clock through a scout which he had sent out that Quantrill was advancing from the northwest on the road lead-

ing into Paola. He immediately made arrangements to attack the bandits at the ford on Bull Creek, west of town, but as his men remained in position until some time after dark without hearing anything further from the outlaws, he sent out Lieutenant J. E. Parsons to ascertain if possible their position and movements. Lieutenant Parsons soon found Major Plumb with the troops and militia who had been in pursuit of the guerillas during the day, and who had lost their trail, and were speculating as to what direction they had taken. After some discussion it was decided to go into Paola and feed and rest until the trail of the bandits should be discovered by scouts or troops mounted upon fresher horses. Approaching within a few miles of Paola, Quantrill turned directly north, and, eluding his pursuers, stopped to rest five miles northeast of that place. His camp was alarmed by some Linn County militia searching for his trail shortly after midnight, and he moved on and soon met the advance of 150 men of the Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Walter King, who had been ordered down the line to intercept him. Colonel King ordered skirmishers thrown out to ascertain what troops were in his front, but the darkness and rough nature of the ground enabled the guerillas to escape, and their trail was not found by the Federal detachment that night. On his arrival at Paola at daybreak on the 22d, Colonel King found Colonel Clark preparing to renew the pursuit with the troops and militia of Major Plumb's and Captain Leland's forces which had come in and rested there during the night, the trail of the guerillas in the meantime having been found. They had crossed Bull Creek, four miles north of Paola, and, continuing their march north and east, passed out of Kansas only a short distance from the point where they entered the State.

As it seemed probable that Quantrill was endeavoring to get back to his old haunts in the brakes and thickly

wooded regions on the Big and Little Blue rivers in Jackson County, Missouri, to disperse his men, Colonel King returned as rapidly as practicable to take up a position to cut him off from that section. But the guerillas, after passing out of Kansas into Missouri, turned east to Grand River, where there was an extensive and thickly wooded region, and where they had their rendezvous before setting out on their raid into Kansas, and there, about noon on the 22d, broke up into several bands, part going down Grand River, part going north and east, and many, nearly exhausted from constant marching and exertion the last two or three days, left their horses and took it afoot to conceal themselves in the thick brush in that section, until they could rest and recuperate.

After striking the trail of the guerillas north of Paola, Colonel Clark continued the pursuit to Grand River, Missouri, near the point where he ascertained that they had broken up into several bands; there he halted to rest his men and horses the balance of the day, and then divided his command to continue the pursuit and pick up stragglers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear, who promptly started in pursuit of the guerillas the moment he heard of their movement west, but who met with some delay in concentrating his detachments near Chapel Hill from such distant points as Lexington, Warrensburg, and Harrisonville, struck Quantrill's trail and followed it to a point on Big Creek, five miles west of Pleasant Hill. As his advance was emerging from the timber or brush on the west side of the creek, about two o'clock on the 22d, they noticed a large force of men advancing over the prairie, perhaps not more than half a mile off in front. Colonel Lazear immediately sent forward parties to ascertain who they were, and they replied that they were "Federal troops," but declined to state to whose command they belonged. The Colonel then ordered his men up and into line and

rode forward and satisfied himself that the force in his front were guerillas, and about that time they commenced forming line of battle behind a fence on a ridge. When he dismounted a company to take the advance, they retreated about three quarters of a mile, and again formed behind a ridge. He moved forward again and attacked them vigorously, but after several rounds they broke for the brush and soon commenced to scatter. In this action Colonel Lazear reported that he killed five of the guerillas and wounded several, the whole force, two hundred strong, being under command of Quantrill. The Federal detachment were armed with long, muzzle-loading guns, and Colonel Lazear stated that if his men had been armed with good carbines and revolvers he could have made a charge and killed and captured almost the entire force of guerillas. When the bandits commenced to scatter he divided his force, and one detachment, under Captain H. F. Peery, came up with them late in the evening, and after a sharp conflict in the brush killed five more. The ground over which the first action took place was strewn with goods of every description which the bandits had brought from Lawrence. Colonel Lazear reported that his men while out on that scout killed sixteen of the guerillas, brought in eight male and two female prisoners, besides twenty-five captured horses and a number of guns and pistols. Colonel Clark reported that his scouting parties after entering Missouri captured and killed twenty-one of the outlaws, and four were killed in the pursuit by the troops and militia from Lawrence to Paola. In the casualties on the Federal side Colonel Lazear had one man killed and one wounded.

When the despatches came into General Ewing's headquarters at Kansas City, announcing that Quantrill had passed into Kansas with a large force, the General was in Leavenworth, having gone up there that day on official business. The information was at once telegraphed to

him, but as the telegraph offices at Leavenworth City and Fort Leavenworth closed at eleven at night for want of relief operators, he did not receive the despatch until after ten o'clock on the morning of the 21st. He hastily collected about three hundred men of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, who were being equipped at the fort for service on the plains, and started to join his troops to direct in person their operations against the bandits. He was delayed several hours at De Soto in crossing the Kaw River, and soon after, receiving information of the movements of his troops, pushed on to overtake them, and at dark on the 22d reached a point on Grand River, Missouri, near where the guerillas had that day divided into several bands.

A combination of circumstances made it possible for Quantrill to march nearly fifty miles through Kansas, reach Lawrence, surprise the people, murder the citizens, burn the city, and return to Missouri without serious loss. The first fatal blunder was Captain Pike's failure to pursue the bandits and keep in sight of them the moment he heard of their entering Kansas near his station, instead of waiting for Captain Coleman to arrive from New Santa Fé, thus losing the time required to march twenty-four miles. In the next place, the people along the route traversed by the guerillas displayed an unaccountable indifference, with one or two exceptions, as to the fate of Lawrence and of the people on the road to that city. The people along the route could easily have warned the people of Lawrence of the approach of the bandits, but only one man, a Mr. J. Reed, living near Eudora, made an attempt to do so, and his horse, while he was riding it at full speed in front of the guerillas, fell, and was killed, and he himself injured so severely that he died the next day. Everybody in Kansas knew of the desperate character of Quantrill and his band, and it was expected that if he entered the State he would

leave a path of desolation unless he should be closely pursued by the Federal troops.

The murdering of the citizens of Lawrence and the burning and sacking of the city by Quantrill and his desperate outlaws caused intense excitement all over the State, and indeed was a shock to the entire loyal section of the country. Hundreds of loyal men in different localities in Missouri had been robbed and murdered since the beginning of the war without causing any unusual excitement outside of the State, but the Southern bandits had not, before the Lawrence massacre, entered a loyal State and made an indiscriminate slaughter of the citizens. In the excitement of the moment such influential men as Governor Carney declared that Missouri must be held responsible for the acts of the outlaws; that "no body of men as large as that commanded by Quantrill could have been got together without the people residing in Western Missouri knowing all about it"; that "such people cannot be considered loyal, and should not be treated as loyal citizens, for while they conceal the movements of desperadoes like Quantrill and his followers, they are, in the worst sense of the word, their aiders and abettors, and should be held equally guilty."

Senator Lane and other popular leaders in Kansas used more violent and inflammatory language than Governor Carney, and were in favor of the people of Kansas rising *en masse* for the purpose of marching into Missouri to burn and destroy everything for a distance of forty miles from the Kansas border, and to avenge the outrages committed by Quantrill and his band at Lawrence. At a mass meeting held in Leavenworth City, on the 26th of August, which was attended by many of the leading men of the State, it was resolved that the people should meet on the 8th of September at Paola prepared for a campaign of fifteen days, for the purpose of going into Missouri to search for the stolen property that Quantrill

had taken from Lawrence, and to retaliate upon the people of Western Missouri for the acts committed by the bandits.

Probably no one deplored the atrocious acts of the guerillas at Lawrence more than General Schofield, commanding the Department, but from his large experience in Missouri affairs from the opening of the first campaign under General Lyon, he knew that there was a vast amount of loyalty in that State, and even in the western counties of the State, and saw that it would not do to allow the enraged people of Kansas to enter those counties, ostensibly for the purpose of recovering their stolen property, but really to retaliate indiscriminately upon the Unionists as well as the secessionists for the slaughter of the citizens of Lawrence. So imminent was the danger of Missouri being invaded by a large number of the citizens of Kansas that General Schofield considered it advisable to issue a general order prohibiting the militia of Kansas and Missouri, not in the service of the United States, from passing from one State into the other, without express orders from the district commander. This order, which was immediately published extensively in the newspapers in Missouri and Kansas, also prohibited armed bodies of men not in the United States service, or not belonging to the militia of Kansas and Missouri, which had been placed under the orders of the Department commanded by the Governors of those States, from passing from one State into the other, under any pretext whatever. As an evidence of his earnestness in the matter, troops were stationed along the State line to enforce the order against any parties who might undertake to disregard it.

The great mass meeting to be held at Paola, on the 8th of September, was the absorbing subject of conversation along the Border for several weeks after Quantrill's raid. General Lane, Colonel C. R. Jennison, and Colonel George

H. Hoyt made speeches in nearly all the counties of Eastern Kansas to arouse the people to come out and attend the meeting at Paola, at which it was expected that eight to ten thousand men would assemble. Some able-bodied citizens who had ample opportunity to enlist in the United States service, but who did not do so, went so far as to assert that any one who was opposed to an irresponsible mob of citizens going into Missouri for the purpose of indiscriminate retaliation and plunder was not truly loyal to the Government. But the discussion of the impropriety of the movement, the probability that those who engaged in it would be opposed by United States troops, and unfavorable weather had the effect of making the Paola meeting a tame affair, only a few hundred people assembling to listen to the speeches and resolutions of the promoters of the scheme.

Immediately after the Lawrence massacre, General Ewing issued his famous *Order Number Eleven*, depopulating Jackson, Cass, and Bates Counties and the north part of Vernon County, Missouri, with certain specified exceptions near military stations. This order required the people living within the limits of those parts of the district to which it applied to remove from their places of residence within fifteen days from the date of the order. Those who could satisfactorily prove their loyalty were "allowed to move out of the district, or to any military station in it, or to any part of Kansas west of the Border counties." The secessionists and Southern sympathizers were all required to move out of the district within the time specified. General Schofield did not approve that part of this celebrated order which directed the burning of property, and it was modified in that respect. But before the order was modified in regard to destruction of property, any one from a high point in the prairie region of Cass and Bates Counties might have seen the smoke arising from numerous farms, which was from

burning stacks of grain or buildings that had been fired. In the early part of September a good many Southern families commenced moving south and to other parts of the State, and the few loyal families who lived in those parts of the district to which the order applied moved into the garrisoned towns and military stations that were able to afford accommodations for them. It was generally believed that if the loyal people were permitted to remain on their farms the guerillas would in retaliation have driven them off. Two years' experience had shown that the only way to stop the guerilla war in that section was to remove all Southern families from it. The numerous atrocious acts committed by the guerillas in Western Missouri were gradually forcing many of the militia officers to recommend to their superiors the removal of Southern families from certain localities.

After the Lawrence disaster, everybody in Kansas, from the Governor down, was anxious that measures should be adopted that would prevent the recurrence of such a calamity. General Schofield suggested to Governor Carney that the militia of the State should be organized for home defence, and that the principal towns of the eastern border counties should be garrisoned by the militia. His suggestion was acted upon; the Kansas militia was organized, and a few men stationed in each of the towns along the eastern border, and all subject to call at a moment's notice, as soon as arms were furnished.






## CHAPTER XI.

### THE FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF FORT SMITH.

ABOUT the middle of July, Brigadier-General John McNeil was assigned to the command of the District of Southwest Missouri, relieving Colonel Cloud, who desired to go into the field with such troops as could be spared from that district, to participate in the general advance then being made by General Schofield's forces in the Department of the Missouri. He arrived at Cassville the latter part of July, where he spent a few days in preparing his command to move south in the direction of Fayetteville and Van Buren, Arkansas. On leaving Cassville, his brigade consisted of the Second Kansas Cavalry, the First Arkansas Union Infantry, and two sections of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery. While at Bentonville the Colonel received an order from General McNeil to report to General Blunt at Fort Gibson and coöperate with him in a movement against General Cooper, who, after the battle of Honey Springs, had been reinforced by General Cabell with upwards of two thousand men, and who was daily expecting an additional reinforcement of a brigade under General Bankhead from Texas. From Bentonville Colonel Cloud marched to Fort Gibson, arriving at that place on the 21st of August, and the next day, with General Blunt's forces, crossed the Arkansas River and advanced to attack General Cooper.

A few days before Colonel Cloud left Cassville, Lieu-

tenant John E. Phelps, Third United States Cavalry, with a detachment of twenty-eight men of the Second Arkansas Cavalry, made a scout into Arkansas as far



SKIRMISH ON THE POTEAU NEAR FORT SMITH, AUG. 31, 1863.

south as Fayetteville, where, after a skirmish with the rear-guard of a small Confederate force, in which one

Confederate was killed and four wounded, a few miles south of Elm Springs, he joined Major T. J. Hunt, commanding a detachment of the First Arkansas Union Cavalry, who had been scouting east of the wire road. The two detachments returned to Elm Springs and encamped that night. The next morning Major Hunt marched north, and Lieutenant Phelps took the road in a northwest direction to Maysville. After marching on this road about eight miles he came upon a Confederate detachment of twenty-five men, and attacked them vigorously, killing four and wounding five of the party. He then marched to Maysville, where he obtained information that Colonel Coffee was encamped between that place and Pineville, Missouri, on Butler Creek, with about five hundred men. Not having a force strong enough to attack Coffee, Lieutenant Phelps marched around him *via* Neosho and returned to Springfield and reported to General McNeil.

Only a few days after the report of Lieutenant Phelps was received, Captain C. B. McAfee, commanding a battalion of the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, at Newtonia, reported to General McNeil that he had information, received through one of his officers, Lieutenant Riggs, that Coffee was encamped near Pineville with from three hundred to five hundred men. General McNeil at once sent a force of four hundred or five hundred men and two howitzers, under the command of Colonel E. C. Catherwood, Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, consisting of detachments from that regiment and from the First Arkansas Cavalry, to attack Coffee and break up his camp. Colonel Catherwood left Springfield on August 9th, and by marching day and night for three days, with short intervals to rest and feed, came up with Coffee at Pineville, and after a spirited attack completely routed him, killing, wounding, and capturing sixty to seventy of his men, besides capturing and destroying his trains.

At White Rock Prairie, near Pineville, he received a reinforcement of a battalion of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under command of Major E. B. Eno, and instructions from General McNeil to report to Colonel Cloud at Bentonville, Arkansas. On his arrival at Bentonville, he found that Colonel Cloud had marched in the direction of Fort Gibson, and had left instructions for him to report to him at that place. Although he was without tents and unprepared for such a long expedition, he moved forward and arrived at Fort Gibson to find that General Blunt and the troops which had joined him under Colonel Cloud had already crossed the Arkansas and were marching south to attack General Cooper. He pushed out from Fort Gibson and overtook the Federal forces at Honey Springs, and reporting to Colonel Cloud served in his brigade during that decisive campaign.

When the forces from Southwest Missouri, under Colonel Cloud, joined him, General Blunt had an effective strength of about forty-five hundred men south of the Arkansas, and General Steele's effective strength, counting General Bankhead's brigade, which was in supporting distance, was certainly nearly nine thousand men. But about this time the Southern forces in the Indian Territory were becoming demoralized—the troops of Cabell's Arkansas brigade, in particular, from desertions, and the Indians in Cooper's brigade from lack of interest in promptly executing the parts of the service assigned to them. And then there appears to have been a want of harmony among the general officers.

General Steele had recently challenged the Federal forces at Fort Gibson to battle by moving his entire force up to within fifteen to twenty miles of that post, and now General Blunt determined to attack him again, and if possible make the result more decisive than the battle at Elk Creek. With his forces thus united, he moved forward rapidly to attack General Steele, who had concen-

trated all his troops on the south side of the Canadian, sixty miles south of Fort Gibson. On arriving near the place where he supposed General Steele would be in position to give him battle, he found that the Confederate commander had retreated and divided his force; that he had ordered General Cabell, with his brigade, in the direction of Fort Smith; that Steele had himself retired, with Cooper's command of about five thousand men, southwest on the Texas road in the direction of Perryville, and was then encamped about twenty miles distant. Although his troops and animals were very much exhausted by two days of almost constant marching, General Blunt determined, if practicable, to strike the force under Steele and Cooper and disperse it before it got beyond his reach and before they could remove their supplies from their depot at Perryville, and then turn upon Cabell and capture Fort Smith. After a few hours' rest he moved forward again at three o'clock in the morning of August 25th, in pursuit of the enemy, on the Texas road, and about ten o'clock his advance met a company of Choctaws in the timber who had been detached to watch the movements of the Federal forces. In the skirmish that took place four of the Southern Indians were killed and their captain captured, from whom General Blunt obtained important information in regard to the strength and disposition of the Confederate forces in his front.

Several times during the afternoon the Federal advance came up with General Steele's rear-guard and exchanged shots with them. He made very little effort to contest the advance of the Federal troops until about eight o'clock that night, when they arrived before the little town of Perryville. At that place he posted a considerable part of his force and two howitzers in the timber commanding the road upon which the Federal troops were advancing, with the view of holding them until his

trains could get away. His howitzers were charged with canister, and when the Federal advance came up, they opened fire upon it, wounding four men. General Blunt then brought up the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and dismounted them, and deploying them to the right and left of the road, they advanced up to within three hundred yards of the barricades which the Confederates had hastily constructed, and opened fire upon them with their Sharp's carbines by moonlight. The two howitzers of this regiment were also brought into action, and after throwing about a dozen shells into the position of the Confederates the latter retreated, leaving a large amount of commissary and quartermaster stores to fall into the hands of the Federal forces.

After saving such of the stores as his troops could use, General Blunt ordered the other captured property burned in the buildings in which it was stored. His troops and stock had marched about forty miles that day, and they were too much exhausted as they came up to continue the pursuit during the night over a rough timber country with advantage. He had, however, by the destruction of the Confederate supply depots at Northfork and Perryville, crippled his adversary almost as much as if he had defeated him again in a pitched battle.

Having pursued the Southern forces under the command of General Steele into the southern part of the Indian Territory, and having destroyed his supply depots in that section, General Blunt determined to lose no time in marching against General Cabell in the vicinity of Fort Smith before he could get reinforcements. He also ascertained that General Steele had with him at Perryville only a small part of the two regiments of Cherokees, and that nearly all of the two Creek regiments were under Colonel McIntosh on the Upper Canadian in the western part of the Creek Nation. He sent Colonel Judson with

the troops and artillery of his own district, which he had brought from Fort Gibson, in pursuit of the Southern Indians under McIntosh, and took the troops of Colonel Cloud's brigade from Southwest Missouri and started to Fort Smith to attack General Cabell, who had three regiments and three battalions of cavalry and one regiment of infantry and one battery of artillery under his command for the defence of his position on the Poteau River, nine miles southwest of Fort Smith.

In the march from Perryville to the vicinity of Fort Smith, a distance of upwards of one hundred miles in four days, the men and horses of Colonel Cloud's brigade were put to the severest test of physical endurance, for they had been constantly marching for three weeks, and a good deal of the time day and night. Anticipating that the Federal forces would probably turn upon Fort Smith after giving up the pursuit of Steele, General Cabell kept out scouts as far west as the Sans Boise on the roads leading to Perryville and Fort Gibson. He also, by felling trees, blocked up the roads and fords above his position, and the Poteau bottom road, leading to Fort Smith. He placed Colonel L. L. Thompson's regiment of cavalry in advance of Scullyville to picket the road the Federal troops would probably advance upon. He then ordered the public property at Fort Smith to be loaded into a wagon train and sent to the rear of his position on the Poteau. On the 30th of August General Blunt's advance came upon and exchanged a few shots with the Confederate scouts a few miles west of the Sans Boise, and kept in sight of them at intervals during the day until he went into camp that evening, twelve miles west of Scullyville. He rested his men and animals until about midnight, when he moved forward again, and about two o'clock in the morning struck the Confederate pickets, who, after a short resistance, were obliged to fall back upon the regiment under

Colonel Thompson near Scullyville, with the loss of one man killed and several wounded.

Colonel Cloud's cavalry pushed forward, and after some skirmishing forced Colonel Thompson to retire from his position in the direction of the main force under command of General Cabell, at the crossing of the Poteau River. In falling back he formed his men in line several times during the day; but they did not stand until the Federal cavalry approached within easy range. That evening General Blunt's force arrived within three miles of General Cabell's position and encamped. It was too late to attack that day, and he knew that after a night's rest his troops and stock would be more efficient on going into action. He also desired, before attacking, to reconnoitre the Confederate position, so that about dark Colonel Cloud took a small force, and driving in General Cabell's outpost, captured one prisoner, and advanced nearly to the river and within a few hundred yards of his battery, when he received a volley from the small-arms and artillery in his front. The rapid movements of the Federal troops, their audacity and uncertain numbers, determined General Cabell to abandon his position without a fight, and his troops commenced to retire that night shortly after nine o'clock, almost as soon as the skirmish with Colonel Cloud had ended. Having received no information of the movements of his adversary during the night, at daylight General Blunt advanced to attack his position, but soon found that he had retreated, giving him a bloodless victory.

After crossing the river the Federal troops soon struck the trail of the Confederates, and found that after retreating a short distance in the direction of Fort Smith they had turned southeast and taken the road on which General Cabell had sent his train to Waldron, in Scott County. General Blunt now detached Colonel Cloud, with the Second Kansas and Sixth Missouri State Militia

Cavalry and two sections of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, in pursuit of the retreating Confederate forces, and with his escort and the First Arkansas Infantry marched to Fort Smith and occupied the fort and city without opposition on the evening of the 1st of September.

Meanwhile Colonel Cloud had overtaken General Cabell's rear-guard in ambush at the foot of Backbone Mountain and had a fierce engagement with it. The country was rough and mountainous, and at the foot of the mountain there was timber and brush, in which a large force could be placed near the road without being seen from it. Finding that he was being pursued by the Federal troops, General Cabell formed almost his entire force on the side of the mountain near the road and at the foot of the mountain to repel the attack. His battery was placed in position to command the road, and Monroe's regiment was posted in ambush at the foot of the mountain. When the Federal advance came up, this concealed regiment fired a volley into them with disastrous effect. Colonel Cloud now brought up his cavalry and artillery, and in a few moments a fierce artillery contest was in progress, which lasted for upwards of three hours. He dismounted part of his cavalry and, with the assistance of his howitzers, drove Monroe's regiment from their position at the foot of the mountain and up the mountain-side back upon Cabell's line of battle. Directly after this, one battalion and three regiments of General Cabell's command broke, and in running ran through his provost guard, and carried off with them eighty prisoners, most of whom were Union men, whom he was holding under sentence for treason and desertion. It was not because the men of those regiments were frightened at the sound of battle that they ran, but because they did not wish to fire upon their friends or be placed in position to be shot down by them, for General Cabell stated that those regiments were composed of men who were deserters from

other regiments, and men who had been conscripted and forced into the service.

General Cabell continued his retreat to Waldron, arriving there the next day. He reported his loss in action at Backbone Mountain at five men killed and twelve wounded and an unknown number of missing. Colonel Cloud at once occupied the field, extended his picket, and collected his killed and wounded. He reported his entire loss as two men killed, including Captain E. C. D. Lines, Second Kansas Cavalry, and twelve wounded. He also took thirty prisoners, and while occupying the field that evening a good many deserters from the Confederate service came in and accompanied him to Fort Smith the next morning. On arriving at that place, General Blunt was sick, and ordered him to assume command. In a few days Union men and deserters from the Confederate service came flocking in in large numbers from fifty to seventy-five miles south of the Arkansas River, many of whom enlisted at once in the Arkansas regiments that were then being recruited for the Federal service. Mountain "Feds" was a name given to Union men who collected in the mountains in considerable numbers to resist conscripting officers who were hunting them down to take them and put them into the Confederate service. It was not therefore surprising that Confederate officers met with much trouble in making such men fight to establish a form of government whose cornerstone was slavery, an institution in which they had no interest. These same men, these hardy mountaineers, when they enlisted in the Federal service, made excellent soldiers. No charge of cowardice was brought against them, for they felt that they were fighting for a cause and a government that recognized equal manhood among men.

If not a majority, at least a large minority of the people of Western Arkansas rejoiced at the Federal occupation,

their only fear being that the Federal troops would be unable to permanently hold the country.

Colonel Catherwood and Major Eno, with their detachments of the Sixth and Eighth Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry, remained at Fort Smith until September 8th, when, reinforcements having arrived from Fort Gibson, they were ordered to return to Southwest Missouri. These gallant men, who were State troops and not obliged to leave the State for regular service elsewhere, had been out four weeks without tents or change of clothing, had marched upwards of four hundred miles, and participated in all the operations which closed that short but brilliant campaign.

For a week after his arrival at Fort Smith, Colonel Cloud's office was thronged every day with Union men and deserters from the Confederate army from every direction in that section, who came in to express their devotion and loyalty to the Government, and who wished to inform him what was taking place in their respective neighborhoods. From these people he ascertained that there was a Confederate force, several hundred strong, at Dardanelle, one hundred miles down the Arkansas. He desired to cut off or disperse this force, and besides, his information led him to believe that an expedition into that section would do much good in encouraging the Union men to organize for their own defence. A reinforcement of part of the Second Colorado Infantry having arrived to strengthen the force at Fort Smith, he took two hundred men, under Captain J. M. Mentzer, Second Kansas Cavalry, and a section of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, under Lieutenant Haines, and on the morning of September 9th started out on the march to Dardanelle.

On the march down he was joined by about three hundred Union men, who were assembled on one day's notice, cheering and enthusiastic for the Union. Several officers and about one hundred of these men had fought

him at Backbone Mountain, under Cabell, only a few days before, and some of them were still wearing the Confederate uniform. With this reinforcement he continued his march to Dardanelle, and on arriving there found a Confederate brigade under Colonel Stirman, estimated at one thousand strong, with four pieces of artillery. He made a vigorous attack upon this force, and after about three hours' fighting the Confederates retreated down the river, leaving two hundred cattle, a large amount of wheat and flour and other commissary stores to fall into his hands, besides one captain and twenty privates as prisoners. He stayed at that place three days, and during that time received many assurances that hundreds of men on both sides of the river stood ready to take up arms for the Union. While at Dardanelle he heard of General Steele's capture of Little Rock, and at once started down with one hundred men to open up the river to that place. On the way down he captured two steamboats and took obligations from the officers to report them to Little Rock as soon as the river became navigable to that point. This gallant officer marched two hundred miles through the country held by the Confederate forces with his small command; fought and defeated a force of the enemy much larger than his own, and arrived at Little Rock on the 18th, and informed General Steele of the success of the Federal arms on the Upper Arkansas, resulting in the occupation of Fort Smith, and the driving of the Confederate forces of General Cabell into Southwestern Arkansas, and those of Confederate Generals Steele and Cooper into the southern part of the Indian Territory.

Colonel Judson, who was sent with his brigade from Perryville in pursuit of the two Creek regiments, under Colonel McIntosh, on the waters of the Upper Canadian, ascertained on marching into the Creek country that all of the men of those two regiments, except about 150,

had deserted, and were hiding out in the timber along the streams near their homes. Shortly after this expedition a good many of these Creeks came into Fort Gibson to enlist in the Indian regiments stationed at that place, and others came in and pledged their allegiance to the Government, and asked for protection. They saw that General Cooper had utterly failed to keep his promise to prevent the Federal forces from coming into their country, and the battle of Honey Springs, or Elk Creek, and recent operations convinced them that they had been misled by the Confederate authorities in regard to the power and purposes of the Federal Government in its dealings with them.

If Confederate General Steele had formed a plan of defensive campaign, he either exercised a loose discipline or displayed a wonderful lack of ability to coördinate the movements of his troops to accomplish a given purpose. He admitted that he had timely notice of the advance of General Blunt from Fort Gibson, but stated that he was unable to bring up the Cherokee regiments and the Creek regiments before the Federal forces were upon him. In a day or two after he was driven south of Perryville he met General Bankhead's brigade of Texans, and ordered the commander of these troops to hurry forward and reinforce General Cabell in the defence of Fort Smith. But when General Bankhead arrived in the neighborhood of Fort Smith he found the place occupied by the Federal forces, and that General Cabell had retreated southeast in the direction of Waldron, instead of retiring on the Texas road so that they might unite their forces. It is needless to speculate what the Confederates might have accomplished had these two brigades united, without taking into account what General Blunt might have done, knowing that they were going to unite. In the first place, General Blunt had information which convinced him that if he could make a given movement in a given

time, he could prevent the coöperation of the Confederate forces. His success was not due to chance, but to the successful coördination of movements which he marked out in his plan of the campaign.

Having driven the regular Confederate forces beyond the Arkansas Valley, the Federal commander at Fort Smith was very soon called upon to give his attention to the Southern partisan bandits, who had increased in such numbers and boldness in Northwest Arkansas as to make communication with Springfield very uncertain except under heavy escorts. Lieutenant E. A. Barker, Second Kansas Cavalry, with twenty men of his company, while *en route* from Springfield to join his regiment under Colonel Cloud, was attacked at Fayetteville by Captain Buck Brown, with 150 partisan bandits, and after a short skirmish was surrounded and captured with five of his men, and taken to Fort Smith and paroled only three days before the arrival of the Federal forces. A short time after the capture of Lieutenant Barker, Captain John Gardner, of the same regiment, while bearing despatches from General McNeil to Colonel Cloud in the field, was attacked, with his escort of seventy-five men of the First Arkansas Cavalry, southwest of Bentonville on the State line road by Captain Brown, with about three hundred men, and after some fighting and retreating, in which he lost one man killed and two wounded and his own horse shot under him, he was flanked and surrounded and obliged to surrender with twenty-two men.

Captain John J. Worthington, commanding the escort in the retreating fight, in endeavoring to rally his men became separated from Captain Gardner, and was unable to come to his assistance after his horse was killed. The remnant of Colonel Coffee's command, which had been dispersed by Colonel Catherwood at Pineville in the early part of August, and some of the men who had served in Livingston's band up to his death and who

had been driven out of Jasper County, Missouri, were in Northwest Arkansas, so that with these men and the members of his own band Captain Brown was able to assemble in a very short time three or four hundred men to attack a Federal detachment passing through the country. On hearing of the affair in which Captain Gardner and part of his escort were captured, General McNeil ordered Colonel Harrison, First Arkansas Cavalry, to take three hundred men and a section of Starks' First Arkansas Light Artillery and march into Northwest Arkansas and break up the commands of Coffee, Brown, and Hunter in that section.

Leaving Cassville, Colonel Harrison marched to Pineville, where he halted and sent out scouts to obtain information of the movements of the enemy. His scouts reported that the Southern forces of Brown and other partisan leaders in Northwest Arkansas were concentrating under Colonel Coffee at Elk Mills in the western part of McDonald County, Missouri. It was late in the day, but he moved forward promptly, marching all night, and while crossing Cowskin Prairie the next morning met a Union woman, from whom he ascertained that Coffee had been reinforced the day before, and had moved to Enterprise, four miles beyond Elk Mills. He pushed on, and encountering the Confederate picket near Elk Mills killed one and drove in the others upon the main force posted in the thick brush a short distance west of Enterprise. Here he dismounted a part of his command as skirmishers and commenced shelling the position of the enemy. After this had continued for about an hour, a strong Confederate force attacked his right and rear, but were soon driven off, and then in a few moments the entire force retreated south on the State line road. When he had rested his men and animals a while, he commenced the pursuit of the broken Confederate forces and followed them about twenty miles south of Maysville, when they

appeared to have scattered so much that further pursuit was deemed useless. He then marched to Elkhorn, where General McNeil proposed to establish a station.

When General McNeil heard of the occupation of Fort Smith by his troops under Colonel Cloud, he saw that the occupation of Fayetteville was of such importance that a force should be ordered to that place with the least possible delay. It was a half-way point between Fort Smith and Cassville, and was also a central position from which movements could easily be made against the guerrilla bands of that section.





## CHAPTER XII.

### SHELBY'S RAID IN MISSOURI IN 1863.

IN a short time after the Southern forces were driven from Little Rock back upon Arkadelphia and Camden, in the southern part of the State, General Price became satisfied that General Steele would not immediately endeavor to advance his line south of the Arkansas River farther than was necessary to keep that river open to navigation. In the early part of the campaign, before the fall of Little Rock seemed probable, the Missouri troops of Price's army were led to believe from the general situation that their chief would very soon invade Missouri and give them an opportunity to visit their families and friends, instead of falling back south of the Arkansas River. He determined, inasmuch as many of his Missouri troops were disappointed in being obliged to retire farther from their homes, to send an expedition into the State for the purpose of destroying public property and crippling Federal operations, which would give many of the men thus detached an opportunity of visiting their families. An expedition that promised to give the men engaged in it a chance of visiting their friends and homes was certain to be popular with as many of the Missouri Confederate troops as were able to equip themselves for such a long and perilous march as would lie before them. A veteran cavalry officer, Colonel Joseph O. Shelby, Fifth Missouri Confederate Cavalry, who had

made a raid to the Missouri River in the summer of 1862, was assigned to the command of the expedition, and received his orders from General Price, at Arkadelphia, on the 21st of September. On starting out on his march northward on the 22d, his command consisted of detachments from the three regiments of his brigade, Major Elliott's battalion of scouts, and a section of artillery of Bledsoe's battery, under Lieutenant David Harris, the whole force numbering six hundred men, all hardy veterans. In his march north to the Arkansas River, and through the mountainous regions of Northern Arkansas, he met with very little opposition, for the country between Fort Smith and Little Rock, a distance of nearly 180 miles, was unoccupied by Federal troops.

While the recent Federal movements against Fort Smith and Little Rock had forced the Southern army under Price some distance south of the Arkansas River, the territory in Arkansas north of that river, with the exception of a few detachments, was still unoccupied by the Federal forces. Several companies of Union Home Guards had organized for home protection against the operations of the Southern bandits, but these Unionists were not prepared to engage and resist with much determination a well-organized force of veterans supplied with artillery like that commanded by Colonel Shelby. The raiding force was therefore able to cross the Arkansas River and enter Missouri before its movements were known to the Federal commanders of the Districts of Western Arkansas and Southwest Missouri.

Near Bentonville, Northwest Arkansas, Colonel Shelby was reinforced by Colonel D. C. Hunter, of Vernon County, Missouri, with two hundred men, and a day or two afterwards he was reinforced at Pineville, Missouri, by Colonel John T. Coffee, with four hundred men. His force was also strengthened by some guerilla bands joining him in the counties through which he marched. And

as he reported that he gained eight hundred recruits, he had a force of at least two thousand men in his raid through Missouri. Colonel Coffee had been in Southwest Missouri for two months prior to Shelby's arrival, and was well informed in regard to the strength and position of the Union militia in that section.

Having been informed that there were several companies of Federal militia stationed at Neosho, Colonel Shelby left Pineville early on the morning of October 4th, with his command increased to upwards of twelve hundred men, determined to surprise and capture the Federal force at Neosho, if practicable. His march had been so rapid through the mountainous regions of Arkansas, and there being no Federal troops on the line of his march to oppose him, he arrived at Pineville without his presence being known to the Federal officers in Southwest Missouri. Colonel Coffee's command had been dispersed near Pineville in August by a Federal detachment under Colonel Catherwood, and near Elk Mills, in McDonald County, in September, by Colonel Harrison, and about the 1st of October information reached the commanding officers at Newtonia and Neosho that Coffee was again concentrating his men in the neighborhood of Pineville. For the purpose of again dispersing Coffee's force, Major Austin A. King, Jr., was sent out with a battalion of the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, which was to be reinforced by three companies of the same regiment, under Captain C. B. McAfee, from Newtonia.

On the morning of October 4th, Captain McAfee marched with his three troops from Newtonia to Neosho on his way to join Major King; but being unable to obtain at Neosho any definite information in regard to the Major's movements, he started out on the Buffalo road to Elk Mills in search of him. After marching out about two miles on that road he met Coffee's command, and

both sides at once commenced to prepare for action. In a few moments the Confederates retired a short distance and then commenced to move through the woods around Captain McAfee's left flank in the direction of Neosho. On observing this movement, Captain McAfee immediately sent a messenger back to town to notify the detachment left in charge of his baggage and commissary stores of the approach of the enemy, and returned with his command as rapidly as practicable by another route, and entered the town about the same time as the Confederates, but on a different road. He immediately formed his men in line and opened fire on the Confederates and drove them out of town. But they quickly rallied and renewed the attack, when he noticed the Confederates approaching on nearly all the roads leading into town. He then ordered his men into the brick court-house, the walls of which had been pierced with holes for small-arms, in the event of attack, and again soon drove the enemy out of town. His men fought the Confederates from the position in the court-house for an hour and a half, when Colonel Shelby brought up his artillery and opened fire upon it, sending four cannon-balls through its walls, and then sent forward a white flag demanding the unconditional surrender of the Federal detachment.

On going into the court-house with his men, Captain McAfee had no thought of the Confederates having artillery, and when they opened upon him with their rifled guns he knew that he could not hold out long, for it was a question of only half an hour or so when the building could be knocked down by shot and shell. A number of Union citizens and some of the men of the Enrolled Missouri Militia of that county had taken refuge in the court-house with Captain McAfee's command, and as the atrocious acts of Quantrill at Lawrence were fresh in the minds of the besieged militia and citizens, the Captain was desirous of knowing whether all the militia

would be treated as prisoners of war and the Union citizens unmolested, if he surrendered. Colonel Shelby finally agreed to these propositions, and Captain McAfee surrendered 180 men, including the Enrolled Militia and citizens with his command. His men were paroled on the ground and kept under guard for several hours. He reported his loss to have been two men killed, two wounded in the fight, and that two of the Enrolled Militia, including Lieutenant Elijah Waters, were killed by Coffee's men after they were paroled. He also reported that the Confederate loss was five men killed and nine wounded.

Captain Henry V. Stall, Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, who had been stationed at Neosho with a detachment of his regiment, had just started for Newtonia when the advance of Shelby's column on the Pineville road came up, and he had two men wounded in getting his train out. This, however, was before Captain McAfee returned to town and opened the fight.

After distributing the captured arms and public property among his troops, and burning the court-house, Shelby left Neosho about four o'clock in the afternoon and resumed his march northeast in the direction of Sarcoxie and Greenfield, the last-named place being the home of Colonel Coffee.

On the march to Newtonia Captain Stall heard the sound of artillery in the attack on Captain McAfee, at Neosho, and immediately sent a despatch to General John McNeil, commanding the District of Southwest Missouri, at Springfield, announcing the fact, and that from the best information he could obtain he believed that the forces making the attack were under Shelby and Coffee. This was the first information that the district commander had that Shelby had entered Missouri. But about the 1st of October, Colonel John Edwards, Eighteenth Iowa Infantry, who was temporarily in command of the dis-

trict in the absence of General McNeil, was informed that Shelby and Coffee were at Huntsville, Arkansas, with a Confederate force, and immediately advised General Schofield, commanding the Department, by telegraph. Colonel Edwards was then ordered to concentrate the troops of his district at several points as rapidly as possible. He ordered Major E. B. Eno, with a battalion of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, to Cassville, and Major Austin A. King, Jr., Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was directed to concentrate all the troops on the southwestern border of the district at Newtonia, twelve miles east of Neosho. But Major King was out on a scout with his command, and the messenger who was sent with the despatch to him was captured, which caused a delay in the concentration at Newtonia and prevented an immediate pursuit of Shelby from that point. An hour before daylight on the morning of the 5th, the commands of Majors Eno and King and Colonel John D. Allen, Seventh Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, arrived at Newtonia, and after waiting until evening for their commissary stores to come over from Cassville started out on a night's march for Greenfield in pursuit of Shelby and Coffee, who were twenty-four hours ahead of them.

The telegraph line had recently been constructed from Springfield to Cassville and Elkhorn, so that General Schofield at St. Louis was immediately advised of the movements of the raiders. The General was satisfied that Shelby's destination was Central Missouri, and at once telegraphed General E. B. Brown, commanding that district, that it might be necessary to concentrate his troops to operate against the invaders; also that the co-operation of the troops of General Ewing, commanding the District of the Border, might become necessary.

On receipt of information that after Shelby left Neosho he had marched northeast in the direction of Greenfield,

Colonel Edwards left Springfield, with 150 men and three pieces of artillery, to intercept the enemy, and sent orders to Majors King and Eno and General C. B. Holland, commanding the Enrolled Missouri Militia in that district, to join him with their respective commands in the neighborhood of Greenfield as early as practicable. These officers marched promptly with their commands, day and night, and formed a junction with Colonel Edwards at Greenfield on the 7th, about twenty-four hours after Shelby had burnt the court-house, sacked the town, and marched north in the direction of Stockton. With Majors King's and Eno's battalions of five hundred men and General Holland's Enrolled Militia of six hundred men, Colonel Edwards had a force of 1250 men and three pieces of artillery, and at once pushed on in pursuit of the raiders, following them as far as Quincy, in Hickory County, where he received a despatch from General Schofield ordering him to keep south of the Osage, as Shelby would likely soon be driven back from Central Missouri. He then directed General Holland to move his command to Osceola to watch the movements of the enemy in that direction, and marched himself with the rest of his command to Buffalo, in Dallas County, as his scouts reported that the raiders had turned east and would probably endeavor to go out of the State *via* Linn Creek and Lebanon, or even east of the last-named place.

At Buffalo, on the 12th, Colonel Edwards was relieved of command of the troops in the field in Southwest Missouri by General McNeil on his arrival from St. Louis. On the 14th, after his arrival at Buffalo, General McNeil received information from General Brown which led him to believe that the raiding force would endeavor to pass out of the State west of Buffalo and probably west of Bolivar. He therefore commenced at once to concentrate his troops to renew the pursuit of Shelby's forces

as soon as they crossed to the south side of the Osage River in their retreat south.

In his march north from Neosho, Shelby moved so rapidly that he met very little opposition until he arrived at Warsaw, where Captain Abraham Darst, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was stationed with his company. The town of Warsaw was on a bluff on the north side of the Osage River, the bluff being almost precipitous to the water's edge, and when the Confederates came up on the opposite side and attempted to cross at the ford, Captain Darst formed his men along the bank, opened fire upon them, drove them back, and held them in check for half an hour. But before coming up in sight of the Federal station, Colonel Shelby sent a regiment around to cross the river several miles below Warsaw to gain the rear of the Federal detachment and cut them off from the road to Osceola. This movement against his flanks and rear was discovered by Captain Darst before he was completely surrounded, and he hastily retired in a northeast direction, his men getting into the brush and timber, where it was difficult for the Confederates to pursue them. In his manœuvring he had ten men captured; besides he lost all his transportation and supplies, except one ambulance.

General Brown was at Clinton, Henry County, on a tour of inspection of his district, when he received from Major J. H. Steger, his Assistant Adjutant-General at Jefferson City, General Schofield's despatch stating that Shelby was advancing north in the direction of Central Missouri with fourteen hundred men and two pieces of artillery, and at once issued orders for his troops to concentrate at Warrensburg, Clinton, Sedalia, and Warsaw, and called into active service two thousand Enrolled Militia.

As the raiding force was moving almost as rapidly as a mounted messenger, General Brown was unable to obtain

any definite information as to its position or what point it was marching upon in time to make proper disposition of his troops for striking an effective blow. While waiting at Clinton for the arrival of troops that he had ordered to that point, he received information that Shelby had advanced as far north as Stockton, indicating that he would cross the Osage at Osceola, or above that place. But after dispersing a detachment of militia and burning the court-house at Stockton, Shelby turned northeast, and passing through Humansville and Quincy arrived at Warsaw on the morning of the 8th. Acting on the information that Shelby was advancing north from Stockton and would cross the Osage at Osceola, or in that vicinity, General Brown left Clinton on the morning of the 8th and marched to Osceola, a distance of thirty miles, with about eight hundred men, under Colonel John F. Philips, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and a section of the First Battery Missouri State Militia Light Artillery, under Captain Charles H. Thurbur. That night, after his troops had gone into camp on the south side of the Osage River, the General received information that Shelby had that morning taken Warsaw and was moving north in the direction of the railroad. He then directed Colonel Philips to send two hundred men under a competent officer to Warsaw that night to follow up the Confederates and keep him advised of their movements. Major Emory S. Foster, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was detached for this important duty, and started out immediately to strike the trail of the enemy.

On arriving at Warsaw the next morning after sunrise, Major Foster ascertained that the enemy had marched north on the Sedalia road the day before, and he at once started in pursuit on that road. When within four miles of Cole Camp, at a point where the road from that village intersected the Sedalia and Warsaw road, he encountered and drove in Shelby's pickets, and directly afterwards, in

a skirmish with a Confederate scouting party who had been out gathering up fresh horses taken from the Unionists, wounded two men and captured three prisoners. From the prisoners he ascertained that Shelby had fifteen hundred well-armed men and two pieces of artillery, and that he was marching to Sedalia or Boonville. As Sedalia appeared to be threatened, Major Foster hastened on to that place, arriving there at five o'clock that evening, and reported to Colonel George H. Hall, Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding the post. Colonel Hall had arrived at Sedalia from Marshall on the evening of the 7th, with four companies of his regiment and a section of the First Battery Missouri State Militia Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Bennett P. Newgent, and the next day about noon received information that Shelby had captured Warsaw, dispersed the small Federal force stationed at that post, and was advancing north. As it was extremely desirable to ascertain what point Shelby would strike after leaving Warsaw, Colonel Hall at once sent out detachments of cavalry to the southeast in the direction of Warsaw, and to the southwest, to observe the movements of the enemy. He also called out the citizens, and with the assistance of about sixty men of the Fifth Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, under Major William Gentry, constructed breastworks out of railroad ties and bales of hay. His scouts reported to him several times on the 9th that the Confederates were advancing, and late in the afternoon of that day that the enemy had passed Cole Camp and were marching in the direction of Syracuse, which was confirmed on the arrival of Major Foster.

Colonel Hall telegraphed and also sent messengers to all commanding officers of coöoperating troops in the district of the latest positions and movements of the raiders, so that the Federal forces might concentrate at once for effective operations.

When General Brown, at Osceola, on the night of the 8th, heard of Shelby passing Warsaw, he immediately despatched an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear, who had arrived at Clinton with the First Regiment Missouri State Militia Cavalry, to move east until he struck the trail of the enemy, and then to follow them up. The General rested his men and horses at Osceola that night, and the next morning started on the march to Sedalia, and arrived there on the following morning, the 10th, having marched a distance of sixty-five miles in less than twenty-four hours. Meanwhile Colonel Lazear marched promptly from Clinton, and on the 9th struck the trail of the enemy at Cole Camp, four hours after they had passed through that place. He pushed on in the pursuit, and when nearing Tipton found that he would have to cross a prairie of about four miles, which would expose to the view of the Confederates the number of men he had in his command. As he had only 670 men, less than half of the strength of the Confederate force, he determined to send forward two companies to reconnoitre, and then, with the rest of his command, took up a good position in line of battle in the timber near the edge of the prairie.

The reconnoitring detachment found only a few stragglers of the raiders in town, and killed two and took one prisoner. As soon as he ascertained that the enemy had left Tipton, Colonel Lazear moved up with his main column, but remained in town only a few moments, when, leaving two troops of cavalry to guard his train, he moved with the balance of his command up the railroad to attack the Confederates, who were reported to be drawn up in line of battle about three miles out on the road to Syracuse. He had heard some artillery firing in the direction of the position where the Confederates were supposed to be formed, but did not know what troops had been doing the firing. He arrived on the ground where the enemy had formed shortly after four o'clock

in the afternoon to find that they had marched off in the direction of Boonville. On returning to Tipton he found the companies left there with his train skirmishing with a body of men who were approaching from the east, but who proved to be a detachment of Enrolled Militia from California, under an officer who was careless about ascertaining whom he was firing upon. Night coming on, and being dark and rainy, Colonel Lazear's troops bivouacked in line of battle at Tipton until the next morning.

Colonel Shelby had captured the town that morning, and had sent part of his command up the railroad in the direction of Sedalia to burn bridges, tear up the railroad track, and take down the telegraph wire. This work kept him in the vicinity of Tipton and Syracuse until nearly four o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th, when he marched for Boonville. While on the march to Tipton on the night of the 9th, he detached Captain James Wood, with one hundred men, to destroy the Pacific Railroad Bridge over the Lamine River, fifteen miles east of Sedalia. A detachment of twenty-eight men, under Captain M. D. Berry, of the Fifth Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia, was stationed in a blockhouse at the bridge as a guard. But, procuring a guide, Captain Wood approached the station cautiously through the darkness, surprised the sentinel, and charged upon and captured Captain Berry and seventeen of his men before they were in position to fire a shot. In the darkness ten of his men made their escape. The Confederates burned the bridge, blockhouse, tents, wagons, and other public property, and after paroling Captain Berry and his men marched east through Syracuse to Tipton, where they joined the main column under Shelby.

On his arrival at Sedalia, at daybreak on the 10th, General Brown ordered Major G. W. Kelly, Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and Major William Gentry, Fifth Provisional Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia,

with about four hundred men, to move east along the railroad until they struck the enemy, and then harass him as much as possible; also to form a junction, if practicable, with Colonel Lazear, who was supposed to be close in the rear and in pursuit of the raiders. Major Kelly marched promptly, and about three o'clock encountered the Confederate pickets at Syracuse, about 120 strong, drove them out of town, and skirmished with them until they fell back upon the main force four miles east, when Shelby opened upon him with his artillery. As his object was to make such display of his troops as to force the Confederates to a stand, Major Kelly retired to Syracuse without loss after a short skirmish in which the raiders formed line of battle, opened fire on him with their artillery, and prepared to charge him. Colonel Shelby believed that this force under Major Kelly was much larger than it really was, and that it was under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas T. Crittenden, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, who had early that morning made a reconnaissance from Tipton up the railroad in the direction of Sedalia on an unattached locomotive to ascertain if the raiders had destroyed the Lamine Bridge, and barely escaped capture. The artillery firing heard by Colonel Lazear on approaching Tipton was Shelby's attack on Major Kelly, who, on retiring to Syracuse, made a circuitous march from that place to the south and southwest and joined Colonel Lazear at Tipton that night about eleven o'clock. The night was so dark and rainy that Colonel Lazear was unable to follow up the enemy with his entire command and train, but sent out Lieutenant James Daily, with fifty men, to follow up their trail, harass and annoy their rear, and give them no rest during the night.

The Lieutenant marched out only four miles and then returned, but did not report until six o'clock the next morning. With the addition of Major Kelly's command,

Colonel Lazear had a force of about one thousand men, and early on the morning of the 11th pushed on in pursuit of the Confederates, and came to Shelby's picket-guard just at dark, four miles south of Boonville, and drove them in. The evening was rainy, and it soon became very dark, and Colonel Lazear again had his men rest on their arms in line of battle during the night without food or fire. He was reinforced that evening by Captain W. D. Wear, with 120 men of the Ninth Provisional Regiment Enrolled Militia. Early the next morning he moved forward again, and on approaching Boonville found that the enemy had marched out during the night on the road to Marshall. Colonel Lazear's advance, under Major A. W. Mullins, came in sight of Shelby's rear-guard as it was leaving camp, about four miles east of Boonville. In a short time Major Mullins came up with the Confederate rear-guard, and skirmished with it at intervals until he came to the Dug Ford on the Lamine. At this place Colonel Shelby prepared an ambush for the advancing Federal column. He posted Major G. P. Gordon with his regiment, dismounted, on the west side of the river near the ford, and left two companies on the east side to fire on the Federal advance and then retreat.

Finding that the enemy were defending the ford, Major Mullins ordered Captain Joseph H. Little to charge their position, which he did in gallant style, dashing across the river and receiving a heavy volley from the concealed foe at short range. He soon succeeded, however, in driving the raiders from their position, with the loss of five or six men mortally and badly wounded, and one prisoner, and sustained a loss himself of two men killed and one mortally, two severely, and two slightly, wounded. Colonel Lazear's command then came up and crossed the river and continued the pursuit until General Brown arrived from Sedalia with the Seventh Missouri State

Militia Cavalry, under Colonel Philips, and two sections of Captain Thurbur's battery, Missouri State Militia Light Artillery, and took the advance. In a short time Colonel Philips' advance, under Major Suess, came up with Shelby's rear-guard, and skirmishing with them killed one man. Major Foster was then given the advance with four companies, and pressed the Confederates so closely that they made a stand and determined to fight at Salt Fork of the Lamine River, about nine miles from Marshall. In making disposition of his troops for action, Colonel Shelby crossed to the north side of the creek with his artillery and the main part of his command, leaving on the south side a line of skirmishers, and in the rear of the skirmishers a regiment dismounted in line and posted behind a fence in thick brush, so as to cover the ford.

On coming up almost within range of the Confederate skirmish-line, Major Foster formed his men in line in the timber on high ground overlooking the creek, and in a few moments a severe conflict with small-arms took place between the opposing forces. A section of Thurbur's battery was ordered up, and an artillery contest with Shelby's two guns took place, lasting perhaps for a quarter of an hour, in which one of Captain Thurbur's men had both of his legs taken off above the knees by a cannon-ball, and bled to death in a few minutes.\* Colonel Philips ordered the other companies of his regiment forward to support Major Foster, and dismounting part of his men drove back the Confederate skirmishers and the dismounted line in front of the ford. The fighting was in the midst of a hard rain, and darkness coming on the Federal troops bivouacked in line on their arms, leaving the struggle undecided. Colonel Shelby, however, after the firing ceased and darkness set in, moved out and halted for the night six miles from Marshall, leaving a

\* Paper read before Loyal Legion by Captain George S. Grover, St. Louis, Missouri.

strong force on the north side of the creek to hold the fords.

With his forces now united, General Brown had about sixteen hundred men and four pieces of artillery, and he determined to make every effort possible to force Shelby into an action that would result in dispersing his command, or so cripple him that he would be unable to get out of the State with the large amount of plunder he had secured. To compel the Confederate leader into a decisive action, it would be necessary to get a strong force in his front, for he had already shown that by choosing strong positions he could with a small part of his command hold in check a large pursuing force long enough to enable the main part of his troops and trains to move many miles to the front.

As the night was dark and rainy and the roads muddy, General Brown was satisfied from the information he received that the Confederates had bivouacked in his front on the road to Marshall. He therefore sent one of his aides-de-camp, Lieutenant George S. Grover, shortly before three o'clock in the morning of the 13th, to Colonel Lazear, requesting him to come over to General Brown's headquarters at once. On his arrival there and after exchanging a few words in regard to the situation, Colonel Lazear was directed to move his command of one thousand men and a section of Thurbur's battery on a left-hand road, and march around the left flank of the Confederates in the darkness and head them off at Marshall. In coöperation with this movement, General Brown proposed to march at daylight with Colonel Philips' command and follow up the trail of the enemy and attack them in the rear. Colonel Lazear started out with his command about five o'clock, and reached Marshall at seven o'clock that morning, placed pickets on the different roads leading into town, and allowed his men to feed their horses and get breakfast. His men had hardly finished their

breakfasts when his pickets on the Arrow Rock road east of town came in and reported about eight o'clock that the Confederates were in sight, advancing in strong force. He ordered his men called to arms, and then directed Major Kelly to move out with his battalion of the Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry and hold the enemy in check while dispositions were being made of the other troops to meet the attack of the advancing foe. Major Kelly marched out a short distance, and then directed Captain Joe Park to move down the road and skirmish with the enemy, which he did until the Major came to his support with the other three companies of the battalion. In a few moments the Confederates came up in force and commenced forming line of battle with a determination to make a desperate effort to break and crush the Federal line in their front.

In preparing for the attack, Colonel Shelby placed Hooper's regiment on his left, Gordon's regiment and Elliott's battalion in the centre, and Hunter's and Coffee's regiments on his right. His men were all dismounted, and his two pieces of artillery posted in the centre, with his train a short distance in the rear. Meanwhile Colonel Lazear was occupied in forming his line. He posted Major J. H. McGhee's Second Battalion First Missouri State Militia Cavalry and Captain Wear's company, Ninth Provisional Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia, on his extreme right on a hill southeast of town, with instructions to hold that position at all hazards. In his centre he placed Major Mullins, with three troops of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and Troop L of the same regiment on the left of Major Mullins in town. Major Gentry's battalion, Fifth Provisional Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia, was posted on the Federal left. The troops in the line thus formed were all dismounted. As soon as Colonel Lazear had completed his line, Major Kelly's battalion and one company of the First

Missouri State Militia Cavalry were held in reserve in the rear of the two guns of Thurbur's battery.

When Colonel Shelby got his men in position, he opened with his artillery on Major McGhee's battalion while marching in column to its position on the hill. In a few moments, however, Major McGhee got his men in position, dismounted, and repulsed Colonel Hooper's regiment, which advanced against him to take the hill. In front of Major McGhee's position there was a deep ravine which the Confederates would be obliged to cross to reach him. When, therefore, they made a charge and attempted to cross this ravine they met a destructive fire from the Federal riflemen, and were driven back with heavy loss. Finding that he could not dislodge the Federal right, Colonel Shelby next directed his attack against the Federal centre, held by Major Mullins, making three desperate charges, in each of which his men were repulsed. To meet this assault on his centre, Colonel Lazear ordered his two small guns of Thurbur's battery into action, but as he only had canister for them he was unable to reach the enemy. He then ordered these guns into a new position within 250 yards of the Confederate line, and opened fire upon it; but before they fired many rounds, Hunter's and Coffee's regiments on Shelby's right made a furious charge and attempted to take them, and as Major Gentry's command on the Federal left gave way about this time the guns were withdrawn to a position near the edge of town. Major Gentry soon rallied his men and placed them in a better position, and they held it against several charges and until the Confederates began to give way. Having re-established his line on his left, Colonel Lazear ordered Major Kelly with his battalion north and on his extreme left to guard against a flanking movement of the Confederates in that direction.

After the fight at Marshall had lasted upwards of two

hours, the thundering of General Brown's artillery was heard in the rear of the Confederate forces, and then in a short time the General came up, forming a junction with Colonel Lazear. Knowing that General Brown was pursuing him, and believing that the Federal advance would soon be in sight, Colonel Shelby left Shanks' regiment to destroy the bridge over the Salt Fork a few miles east of Marshall and to hold the crossing as long as practicable. On coming up and finding the crossing over the bridge disputed by the Confederates, General Brown directed Colonel Philips to leave three companies of his regiment and a section of Thurbur's battery, under Major Houts, to engage them, while with the rest of his regiment the Colonel crossed the creek three quarters of a mile below the bridge, which made Shanks' position untenable, and he was soon obliged to retire. Major Houts then crossed the creek over the bridge with his command and attacked Shanks again, compelling him to fall back on Shelby's main force near Marshall.

After crossing to the west side of the creek and encountering many difficulties in marching over deep ravines, rugged hills, and through thick brush, Colonel Philips succeeded in getting into position on the left flank of the Confederates, and soon drew the fire from their two guns, without, however, doing any damage. As the ground in his front was rough and broken and brushy and unfavorable for the movement of cavalry, and as the Confederate line was too great a distance off for his small-arms to be effective, he dismounted his men and moved forward in line to attack the enemy. But before his men advanced fairly within range of the Confederates, they commenced moving off north to escape. Seeing the determination of the enemy to get away, Colonel Philips mounted his men as quickly as possible, led them at a gallop to the northwest of Marshall, in the rear of the Confederate right, and dismounting them again placed them in position, and

they went into action on the left of Major Kelly's battalion, Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry. His section of artillery he also placed in position, supported by several companies of his regiment, and the guns did good service during the action, which lasted nearly an hour on that part of the field.

Both sides now prepared for decisive action. Colonel Shelby mounted his whole force, and seeing that he was nearly surrounded determined to break through the Federal left and escape to the northwest. He encountered some difficulty, however, in getting his command formed so as to save his train and artillery, for in his front there was a deep ravine, or ditch, to be crossed, and beyond that thick brush to be passed through. A temporary bridge was thrown over the ditch, but before he could complete his other movements Major Kelly, with his battalion, Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, charged his centre, cutting his line in two and detaching the commands of Colonels Hunter, Hooper, and Shanks, with the brass field-piece, the other gun, a ten-pounder Parrott, having become disabled and captured. In the capture of this gun, Captain R. M. Box, of Major Foster's battalion, displayed a coolness and courage rarely witnessed on the battle-field, and that elicited the warmest praise from the officers and men of his regiment. After pressing the enemy closely for some time that morning, Major Foster noticed quite a number of Confederates around one of their guns, and suspecting that it was disabled ordered Captain Box to dismount his company, deploy it through a wooded tract of scrub-oak, and charge the gun, drive off the support, and take it. In a moment the Captain had his company dismounted and deployed, leaving the usual number of men to hold horses, and then moved forward in the face of a hot fire from the enemy with as much steadiness as if he were on the parade ground. Halting a moment to dress his company, he

then shouted in a voice easily heard by his men, "Mark time, left, left, left, charge!" and advancing to the front and "waving his sabre in the air," led them in the charge that quickly swept away the support and captured the gun and brought it off the field, proud of the trophy won by his gallantry.\*

Before General Brown could mount his troops and close up his lines, Shelby with the commands of Coffee and Gordon and Elliott's battalion and his train of ammunition and plunder escaped to the northwest through the thick brush and timber on Salt Fork.

After this separation of the Confederate forces, Colonel Hunter turned to the right and retreated down the Arrow Rock road about eight miles and then marched southeast, crossing the Pacific Railroad near Syracuse and the Osage River at Duroc.

When he saw that the line of the Confederates had been broken, and that part of them were endeavoring to escape north through the brush and timber on Salt Fork, Colonel Philips immediately mounted nine companies of his regiment, and with the battalions of Majors Kelly and Gentry and the two guns of Thurbur's battery started in hot pursuit. His advance came upon the Confederate rear-guard just as they commenced tearing up the bridge over the creek, but they were driven off and pursued before rendering it impassable. As soon as Colonel Philips got his command over the bridge and struck the prairie he pressed the Confederates vigorously for about ten miles as they retreated toward Waverly, his troops moving at a gallop a good deal of the time, firing upon the rear-guard of the enemy continually. Shortly before sunset that evening the Federal cavalry came up and attacked Shelby's rear-guard with such energy that he halted and threw his command into line of battle. Colo-

\* See paper by Captain George S. Grover, St. Louis, Missouri, read before the Loyal Legion.

nel Philips ordered his two guns into action and formed his cavalry in line, and after a few rounds from his artillery led his cavalry in a charge against the Confederates, causing them to retire hastily with the loss of one man killed and several wounded. An exciting chase of several miles then took place with the view of forcing Shelby to a stand or to abandon his train, when darkness came on, making further pursuit impracticable during the night, for the Confederates had abandoned the main road and were retreating upon a dim path through the country.

When darkness overtook him, Colonel Philips ordered his command to bivouac upon the dim trail of the enemy, his men having been fighting and marching since daylight, and the last ten or twelve miles moving almost at a charge. About four o'clock the next morning he started in pursuit of the demoralized and retreating foe. On starting out he sent the battalions of Majors Kelly and Gentry back to Marshall, and was joined that morning by Lieutenant-Colonel John D. Brutsche, with two hundred men of the Ninth Provisional Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia, and soon struck the trail of the Confederates, which showed signs of great demoralization, for it was strewn with hats, clothing, and a variety of goods they had taken since entering the State.

Continuing the pursuit, Colonel Philips soon came to where Shelby had abandoned his train, about five miles east of Waverly, leaving five Government wagons, forty head of team mules, and two ambulances. It was ascertained that three of the wagons were laden with artillery and small-arms ammunition, and the others with clothing and plunder which had been taken by the raiders on the march. Finding his wagons constantly impeding his movements in his hasty flight, Colonel Shelby ran them over a steep bank into the Missouri River, and when Colonel Philips came up he did not take the time to draw them out, but took with him the ambulances. He

continued the pursuit twelve miles south of Waverly, when Colonel William Weer, Tenth Kansas Infantry, of General Ewing's command, passed in his front and took up the trail and followed it a few miles, when Colonel Lazear, who was on the march from Marshall with his command, and who had heard of Shelby's flight south from Waverly, took up the pursuit in advance of the Kansas troops. After striking the trail of the Confederates, Colonel Lazear pressed forward closely upon their rear all day, moving at a trot and a gallop nearly all the afternoon, but was unable to get near enough to them to bring them to a stand. He left the trail of the raiders about sunset several miles northwest of Warrensburg and took the road direct to that place, arriving there about nine o'clock that night with his men and horses nearly worn out from constant marching the last eight days, and from being on short rations most of the time. In his retreat Colonel Shelby had nearly all day moved in the direction of Warrensburg, but in the evening he changed his course and passed to the west of that place during the night.

On the morning of the 15th, General Ewing arrived at Warrensburg from Sedalia, and moved to the southwest of that place and struck Shelby's trail; and Colonel Lazear marched with his command to the northwest near Rose Hill in search of the enemy, and finding that they had passed Holden at two o'clock that morning gave up the pursuit, for General Ewing was several miles in advance of him on the trail. When General Ewing struck the trail of the Confederates near Chilhowee he was several hours behind them, but that evening near sunset he overtook their rear-guard in the timber near Johnstown, in Bates County, and skirmishing with them killed one and captured several men. After halting a few hours to give his men and animals food and rest, he took up the pursuit again early the next morning, but was unable

to overtake Shelby. At Carthage, however, he captured Major J. F. Pickler, with thirty men, who had been left by Colonel Shelby at that place to obtain flour from the mills and to collect stragglers. From Carthage Colonel Shelby turned southeast, passing through Sarcoxie, thence south, crossing the wire road, or Springfield and Fayetteville road, a few miles south of Cassville, and on the 20th formed a junction with the separated forces of Hunter, Hooper, and Shanks on the Little Osage, in Arkansas. General Ewing continued the pursuit *via* Neosho to the southern line of the State, when he returned to Fort Scott with his command, having received a despatch from General McNeil, to whom he had offered the coöperation of his forces, that he had struck the trail of Shelby at Sarcoxie, and was strong enough without the proffered aid.

When Shelby's command was divided at Marshall, General Brown ordered Major T. W. Houts, with three troops of the Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, to pursue that part of the Confederate force which retreated southeast under Colonel Hunter, with one piece of artillery. Major Houts pursued the enemy to the vicinity of Florence, when he gave up the chase, Colonel Hall, Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, having passed in his front with fresh troops and horses. But when Colonel Hall struck the trail of the Confederates they were twenty-four hours ahead of him, and he abandoned the pursuit at Duroc, on the Osage River, and returned to Sedalia. Very soon after Colonel Hunter crossed to the south side of the Osage, he was vigorously pursued by Major Austin A. King, Jr., commanding detachments of the Sixth and Eighth Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry. Major King had been watching the fords of the Osage in the vicinity of Warsaw, and when he ascertained that the Confederates had crossed the river below him he marched rapidly and overtook their rear-guard and had

a running fight with them to Humansville, where he captured their last piece of artillery that they brought into the State, with forty rounds of ammunition. He continued the pursuit twelve miles southwest in the direction of Stockton, when it became too dark to follow them. Brigadier-General C. B. Holland, commanding the Enrolled Militia in Southwest Missouri, struck the trail of the Confederates near Quincy only an hour or so in the rear of Major King, and by marching all night got in the advance of Hunter at Greenfield. On coming up near that place and finding it occupied by the militia, Colonel Hunter marched around it through the woods, and continued his retreat south, passing a few miles east of Mount Vernon. He was attacked northeast of Mount Vernon by Major R. K. Hart, commanding a detachment of General Holland's militia; but as the militia were not strong enough to hold him very long he got out of the State without further opposition.

When he heard of the breaking up of the Confederate force at Marshall, General McNeil was at Buffalo, and he moved at once to Bolivar with 260 men and a section of Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, where he found General Holland with five hundred Enrolled Militia. His latest information led him to believe that the Southern force under Hunter would cross the Osage at or in the vicinity of Warsaw, and that the force under Shelby would retreat south through Lamar and Carthage. Hoping to intercept the force under Shelby, General McNeil marched rapidly from Bolivar to Humansville and Stockton, leaving instructions for General Holland to intercept the force under Hunter. On his arrival at Stockton the next morning, he was informed of Major King's fight with the Confederates at Humansville, of his capture of their remaining piece of artillery, and that they had passed ten miles east of Stockton at one o'clock that morning. He therefore marched immediately for Green-

field, and on arriving at that place found that General Holland was ahead of him several hours in pursuit of the force under Hunter. Major King having joined him with 375 men, he then marched to Sarcoxie, where he struck the trail of the force under Shelby, about twelve hours after it had passed. He pressed on from this place, passing through Cassville on the evening of the 19th, and the next evening reached Huntsville, Arkansas, where his cavalry dashed into town and captured part of Colonel Brooks' command, which had for some time been operating in that section.

After the recently separated parts of his command had united, Colonel Shelby commenced to march leisurely towards the Arkansas River. The hardships of the expedition had been a severe strain upon the power and endurance of his men and animals, and they needed rest. After striking the mountainous regions of Arkansas, General McNeil was unable to make as rapid progress as he had made in Missouri, for he was several times delayed by the breaking down of wagons, caissons, and gun carriages, making it very difficult to gain on the enemy. At Huntsville he was reinforced by Colonel Edwards, with three hundred infantry, and by Major T. J. Hunt, First Arkansas Union Cavalry, with 175 men of that regiment, and two howitzers, giving him a total force of six hundred cavalry, three hundred infantry, two field-pieces, and two howitzers. The men of the First Arkansas Cavalry were well acquainted with the country and given the advance, and McNeil pushed on and overtook the united forces of Shelby and Brooks near sunset on the 24th at the foot of Buffalo Mountain, where they were encamped in a valley, and attacking with his cavalry and artillery drove them from their position. It soon became too dark to continue the pursuit through the narrow passes of the mountains, and he bivouacked until daylight the next morning, when he moved forward again.

His advance under Major Hunt skirmished with the Confederate rear-guard the next two days, and in an attack on the enemy on the 26th Lieutenant J. G. Robinson, First Arkansas Cavalry, was mortally wounded. General McNeil arrived at Clarksville on the 27th, and ascertained that Shelby had crossed to the south side of the Arkansas River, and that Brooks was still on the north side for the purpose of picking up stragglers from the Confederate army and to capture any train that might be in the rear of the Federal force. At Clarksville, General McNeil gave up the pursuit, and near Ozark sent the detachments of the Sixth and Eighth Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under Colonel Catherwood, back to Springfield, and the men under Major Hunt, of the First Arkansas Cavalry, back to Fayetteville, and with the balance of his force, under Colonel Edwards, marched to Fort Smith and assumed command of the District of the Frontier, to which he had recently been assigned by General Schofield.


After crossing the Arkansas River, Colonel Shelby marched without interruption, and joined his division under Marmaduke on November 3d, near Washington, in Hempstead County, having towards the end of his expedition encountered a severe storm of rain and snow. His expedition to the Missouri River and return had taken about forty days, and as his men were fighting and marching most of the time, day and night, they were badly worn out on his return. He reported that his loss in killed and wounded on the expedition would not exceed 150 men. He admits that he had 1200 men at Neosho, and gained 800 recruits, making a total force of 2000 men, but does not state how many men he lost by capture. After his force was divided at Marshall, a good many of the men left the separated parts to go to their homes to see their families, and were mostly picked up as stragglers by the cavalry of Generals Brown, Ewing,

and McNeil. The raiders captured and destroyed a large amount of public and private property, but did not get out of the State with any of the captured property, except some horses taken from citizens. They captured 180 militia and citizens at Neosho, 17 at Lamine, and 10 men at Warsaw. Colonel Shelby made no other important captures of Federal troops or militia. His fighting was all with the Missouri militia, except the skirmish that General Ewing had with his rear-guard near Johnstown.

General Brown reported his loss, covering the operations in his district, where nearly all the fighting was done, at 5 men killed, 26 wounded, and 11 missing. In the fight at Marshall Colonel Lazear's men did most of their firing lying down on the ground, which accounts for the casualties in his command being so small.

Towards the close of the pursuit of the raiders by General Ewing, a tragic and in some respects amusing incident came under the notice of his Chief Quartermaster, Colonel Theodore S. Case, when his command halted at Neosho. On the expedition Ewing's forces picked up quite a number of Shelby's men who were pressed so closely that they were cut off, or who, by the hardships of marching day and night, had fallen out of the ranks near the road to get a little rest and sleep. Among the men captured, three or four asked permission to enlist in one of the companies of Ewing's command, claiming that they had been pressed into the Confederate service. General Ewing allowed them to enlist, and when he stopped at Neosho for a short time, some of the Union citizens, while mixing with his soldiers, saw one of the new recruits, and knew him to be a notorious bandit of that section, who was guilty of many crimes. One of the citizens came to General Ewing, and complained that the recruit was a noted bandit, and the General asked the citizen a few questions in regard to what he knew about

the recruit, and the citizen replied, "Know him! He's got on my brother's clothing now, whom he recently murdered." The General turned the recruit over to the sheriff, or quasi-civil authority, and he was taken out and shot after some form of trial. After he was captured he enlisted for the purpose of deserting at the first opportunity, for he knew that if he was held as prisoner and his



ACTION AT MARSHALL, MO., OCTOBER 13, 1863.

antecedents inquired into, he would be tried and probably shot for his crimes. The other recruits who were picked up, knowing the fate of their comrade, deserted at the first opportunity in a day or so, whether they were guilty of any particular crimes or not. They, too, enlisted for the purpose of getting away instead of being held as prisoners.



## CHAPTER XIII.

### GUERILLA WAR IN SOUTHWEST MISSOURI.

AFTER the defeat of General Cooper at Elk Creek, the Federal occupation of the Indian Territory was extended from the Arkansas to the Canadian River. But while Northwestern Arkansas was occupied by the Confederate forces, the Federal supply line from Fort Gibson to Fort Scott would be constantly menaced and in danger. Knowing that a considerable reinforcement of infantry and artillery had arrived at Fort Gibson with the train that had been attacked at Cabin Creek, and having been informed that General Blunt had gone down to take command of his troops, Confederate General Steele determined to order General Cabell from Northwest Arkansas, with his brigade, to reinforce General Cooper, and then to move up so near Gibson as to effectually prevent any further reinforcements or supplies from going in. When General Cabell was withdrawn from Northwest Arkansas, he left nearly every part of that section infested with partisan bands. Just before leaving Fayetteville he fired a number of guns celebrating the victory at Helena, which turned out to be a Confederate defeat. His occupation of Northwest Arkansas, after the Federal forces had been withdrawn from Fayetteville, had been barren of any beneficial results. His march to Grand River to reinforce Colonel Watie in an attack on the Federal train was a march up the hill and a march down again. His

recent scout from Grand River into Southwest Missouri had not accomplished any good for the Confederate cause. On his return to Arkansas, a detachment of his command, under Captain Maghan, had a skirmish near Cross Hollow, Arkansas, on the 12th of July, with a small force, under Captain J. S. Robb, First Arkansas Union Cavalry, from Cassville, Missouri, in which Captain Maghan and six of his men were killed.

On July 17th, Major T. W. Houts, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding the post at Neosho, while scouting with a detachment of one hundred of his men on Spring River, in the vicinity of Carthage, attacked part of Livingston's men who had just returned from the Stockton raid, where their leader was killed, and killed four of the marauders and got one of his own men wounded. A day or so after this skirmish part of the bandits started south, but the greater part of them remained and continued their operations in small squads along Spring River and Centre Creek. The vicinity of Carthage and the lower Spring River had, during the last year, been the worst section in Southwest Missouri in maintaining guerilla operations. No Regular Federal force had been stationed at Carthage, and if a Federal scout came into the neighborhood and chased the guerillas they got out of the way, but returned as soon as the scout had left. It was well known to the Federal officers serving in that section that the Southern bandits had not been in the habit of stopping very long in the immediate vicinity of posts where Federal troops or the loyal militia were stationed. Colonel Cloud, commanding the district, therefore determined to station a force at Carthage strong enough to check guerilla operations in that section. Major Milton Burch, Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, with a battalion consisting of the companies of Captains Lindsay, Moore, Ruark, and Kelso, of that regiment, was ordered to that place, and arrived there July 22d,

from Newtonia, to find that the guerillas had burned the court-house and academy, the only two brick buildings in town suitable for defensive purposes. At points where it was considered desirable to establish stations for the troops to operate from, if a strong brick building could not be obtained, a stockade, or blockhouse, was sometimes constructed for defensive purposes, for at these small stations most of the men were generally absent on scouting duty, leaving only a few men to guard their supplies and camp equipage. There were, however, several buildings in Carthage which Captain Burch could use to quarter his men in, and he at once commenced operations against the bandits of that section. He ascertained from the secessionists about town that Colonel John T. Coffee, who had figured prominently in what was known as the "Coffee Raid," in the summer of 1862, was to take command of Livingston's men since the death of that noted partisan leader. He also had information that Coffee, with three or four hundred men, was at that time in the southwest corner of McDonald County, or in the vicinity of Maysville, Arkansas, and that some of Livingston's old command had left Jasper County to join him. But they did not all go.

Those who remained in the country had defied the Federal authorities so long that they thought they might continue to defy them with impunity. Skirmishes between these bandits and Major Burch's men were of frequent occurrence. On one occasion he sent Captain Kelso out on a scout with a small detachment of men into the western part of Jasper County, along Centre Creek and Spring River, to a neighborhood where a party of the bandits had been reported to have been seen. On nearing the locality, the Captain ascertained that there were several of the bandits in a certain house, under a leader named Finney, and as he charged up with his men, Finney and his men ran out of the house to their horses.

In the excitement and discharge of small-arms that took place, Finney mounted his horse without untying it from the post where it was hitched. Captain Kelso, who had dismounted from his horse a short distance back, ran up and pulled the bandit off his horse before he could loose it, shot him, and took his horse and brace of revolvers from him. A short time after this affair, the Major sent his scout, Joel P. Hood, and four men of his battalion to Fort Scott on business. On the return of the party from that post they overtook four wagons loaded with dry goods and groceries for Carthage, and when within eight miles of that place the party of soldiers and teamsters were attacked by a superior force of guerillas, and one of the soldiers killed, one taken prisoner, and two of the citizens captured. One of the soldiers hastened to Carthage for reinforcements, which arrived upon the scene of the skirmish in a short time, gave chase to the marauders, and overtaking them about sundown killed three, including the leader, Captain Turk, and recaptured the two citizens whom they had taken and two of the wagons.

After the Shelby Raid in October through Southwest and Central Missouri, Major Burch returned with his battalion to Neosho, where he was stationed during the winter, and kept busy in breaking up small parties of bandits who had drifted back into the State during the raid. The winter of 1863-64 was regarded by the oldest settlers in Western Missouri and Arkansas as the coldest within their recollection. The cold set in early in November, and was so severe that the Arkansas River at Fort Smith was not only frozen over, but the ice was thick enough for the Federal troops and trains to cross over for a week or so in the early part of January. This severe weather entailed many sufferings and hardships upon the men engaged in the great conflict, on both sides. And the stress of winter seemed to make the bandits like

hungry wolves, more daring and persistent in their deprivations and acts of violence. At small posts, like Neosho, therefore, the Federal troops were not allowed to spend much of their time in idle winter quarters, but were kept constantly scouting, not only a few miles from the post, but sometimes fifty to sixty miles away, requiring almost continuous marching for nearly a week. If the commanding officer of the post obtained reliable information of a camp of bandits at some distant point, he lost no time in sending a force to capture or disperse them. In the latter part of the month of November, Major Burch received information that a small party of bandits were encamped in a tent in the brush on the waters of Shoal Creek, ten or twelve miles north of that post, and that there were one or two other small parties of the marauders at a house or two on Turkey Creek, five or six miles farther north.

The weather was very cold, and the outlaws thought that Burch and Kelso would hardly venture out to disturb them in their secluded quarters. But the weather was never too cold or too stormy for those energetic officers to go out if they felt certain of locating the enemy. Major Burch, therefore, took Captain Kelso and twenty men, and leaving the post after dark arrived near the place where the party of bandits were reported to be encamped in a tent, and sent Captain Kelso forward to reconnoitre. In a little while the Captain discovered a dim light through the brush and in a direction in which he knew there was no house. He advanced afoot, cautiously, near enough to ascertain that the light was in a tent. He then approached near enough to hear the men talking, and thought there were three in the party. They were discussing as to whether they could not safely go to a house in the vicinity where they could have the comforts of a fire; that it was so cold and stormy that Kelso would hardly venture out such a night. The Captain

then returned and reported. Major Burch took Captain Kelso and three men, leaving the rest of the detachment to fall back upon if the bandits should prove to be more numerous than had been estimated, and cautiously approaching near the tent, at a signal fired, killing the two men who were in it. Each of the bandits was fully armed with a gun and Colt's revolvers, but they were so completely surprised by their dreaded foe that before they recovered their senses they were feeling the effects of that method of war which they and their kind had initiated. They were both men of desperate character, and had given a good deal of trouble in that section by firing from the brush upon Union citizens and passing detachments of Federal soldiers. They had, before paying the penalty of their misdeeds, boasted of the militia and Union men they had killed. It was in this very neighborhood that Moses Carver, a Union man, had coals of fire put to the soles of his feet by such desperate characters to make him disclose and give up his money. After killing the two bandits in the tent, Major Burch proceeded to Turkey Creek, where he dismounted a part of his men a short distance back, and took them and surrounded two houses, capturing two bandits from one and three from the other. He also at the last house re-captured a Federal soldier who had been captured by the bandits and was being held by them, and then returned to Neosho with his prisoners, nearly all of whom were desperate characters, and who were charged with killing and robbing Union men. It was only by a night scout of the kind which Major Burch adopted that such bandits could be captured. As the houses in that section were at that time mostly log houses, and therefore bullet-proof against an assault from the outside, except through the chinks or openings between the logs, men of less daring than Burch and Kelso would hardly have ventured to surround the houses as they did with so few men and

demand the surrender of desperate bandits who were thoroughly armed.

A short time before this scout, a Union man and one or two sons in Lawrence County were attacked one night by a party of secessionists, who were finally driven off after a desperate conflict, with the loss of four or five men killed and wounded. But in the numerous contests between the loyal militia and the Southern guerillas, the militia were sometimes taken at a disadvantage and sustained serious losses, for it was impossible for the small force usually stationed at Neosho to so thoroughly patrol that section as to discover a small party of bandits the moment they came into it.

On the 3d of June, 1864, Sergeant Josiah Ruark and Private Robert C. Poag, of Major Burch's command at Neosho, were sent out north into the country a few miles on some business, and on their return stopped about a mile north of town to bathe in the clear, limpid waters of Shoal Creek. They had been in bathing only a few moments, when a party of eight to ten Southern bandits came upon them and shot and killed Poag while he was trying to escape to the opposite shore, and captured Ruark and started off with him on the road up Shoal Creek. They had not gone far with their prisoner when they met a colored man, named Henry Simpson, who was returning to Neosho from Plummer's Mill, and took him prisoner also and told him that they intended to kill him that day. In a very short time the news of the death of Poag and the capture of Ruark reached Neosho, and Captains Ruark and Kelso at once took about a dozen mounted men and started in hot pursuit of the bandits. They soon struck their trail and followed it until the guerillas left the main road, and then Kelso dismounted and followed it a foot along a dim path for some distance and came upon the enemy in an opening in the woods where they stopped to get dinner and to

let their horses graze and rest. He moved up cautiously until within easy range and then fired the loads of his double-barrelled shotgun at them, felling one or two of the party to the ground before they had any intimation of his presence. The discharge of his gun was a signal for his men, who were following a short distance in his rear, to come to his assistance as quickly as possible, which they did, coming up at a gallop. But when they came up, the bandits had scattered into the brush, some of them mounting their horses and some of them taking to the brush afoot. As Kelso's detachment came up, under Lieutenant John Smith, a hot fire was opened on the enemy, who returned it as they retreated through the brush, killing Lieutenant Smith, the fatal ball entering his forehead. The moment Kelso fired on the bandits, Sergeant Ruark and the colored man, Simpson, broke away from their captors, who were busy looking to their own safety. The colored man, who was terribly frightened on account of the threats of the bandits, declared he saw Kelso's eyes before he opened fire.

Captains Ruark and Kelso and their men pursued the fugitives through the brush and woods until they killed six of their number, and then returned to Neosho with the remains of Lieutenant Smith, and seven or eight captured horses and several revolvers.

In the above affair Captain Kelso displayed his usual tact, daring, and coolness. In fact, it was asserted by those who had served with him from the beginning of the war that he never became disconcerted under the most trying situations. While stationed at Ozark, in Christian County, he made a scout with his company into the White River Mountains of Taney County, near the Arkansas line, and encamped for the night in the vicinity where a small party of bandits had their retreat. After supper he started out afoot to reconnoitre for information as to whether there really were any Southern bandits in

the neighborhood. He returned to his camp about dark, and told his men that he had found where the marauders were camped, and that he intended to visit them that night. He offered to let any of his men accompany him who desired to do so, but the night was dark, and they knew that some desperate plot was in his mind, and no one volunteered. He started out alone, prepared for bloody work, and returned the next morning with six horses, saddled and bridled. His account of his night's adventure, as he related it to his men on his return, was thrilling in the extreme. It is not necessary to follow him over each devious step after he left his camp, for the adventure itself shows him moving along cautiously over the dim path through the darkness to the immediate vicinity of the camp of the bandits, carefully scanning every object in front, with revolver in hand and ears alert to the slightest sound in any direction. After he gets up near to the marauders' camp, who can follow him through his careful reconnoitring of it on up to the commencement of his terrible slaughter, without his heart beating audibly? He finds three bandits sleeping under their crude shelter, and as he has already found six horses saddled near at hand, the thought comes up in his mind, Where are the comrades of the three sleeping bandits? He ascertains that the sleeping bandits are covered with a beautiful quilt, which he desires to take unstained with blood as a trophy, and carefully draws it off them, and in another moment like a tiger springs on his victims and shoots them to death before they are conscious of danger. In the short and desperate struggle of the slaughter the comrades of the victims do not come to their rescue, and Kelso mounts one of the horses standing saddled and rides it into camp, leading the other five as trophies of his bloody adventure.

Captain Kelso did not always stalk his victims, but frequently exposed himself in the most perilous situations

without any outward signs of fear or excitement. He was always equal to the emergency. When in a fight or dangerous situation, no interposing obstacle disconcerted him at the critical moment. On another occasion, when scouting in the southern part of Taney County with a detachment of his company, he heard of three or four Southern bandits who had just come into the neighborhood, or who were passing through the country, and were stopping with several Southern families for the night. After some investigation he decided not to attack the bandits until the next morning, and posted some of his men to watch the houses unobserved during the night so that the men in them might not escape. Early the next morning he surrounded one of the houses in which some of the bandits were known to have spent the night, taking himself the most dangerous position. Coming up in front of the house, he saw three bandits within, and keeping his eyes on them and his hands on his shotgun in the position of "ready," crossed the fence and started for the door. In a moment after crossing the fence, a big dog came snarling and growling at him and seized him by the calf of the leg. Not in the least disconcerted by this unexpected attack of the dog, he stopped, and keeping his eyes on the bandits took with his right hand his revolver from the scabbard, and feeling for the dog's neck shot the beast dead. He proceeded as if nothing had happened, and entering the door found that the bandits had escaped through the opposite door. His daring conduct amazed them so that they fled without firing a single shot at him. In this affair he shot the man of the house and severely wounded his son, both of whom started to run with the bandits, holding that those who gave aid and comfort to the bandits were as deserving of punishment as the bandits themselves.

For centuries upon centuries the admirers of Homer have read in the Tenth Book of the *Iliad*, with bated

breath, the description of the daring acts of Diomed and Ulysses in entering the Trojan camp by night and slaughtering Rhesus and his companions and bringing back into the Grecian camp as trophies the arms, chariot, and snow-white steeds of the Thracian King, the recently arrived ally of the Trojans. But this grandest of scenes in the description of individual heroism in war scarcely surpasses some of the daring acts of Kelso, the student, teacher, and soldier.

As his name was connected with so many acts of daring adventure in Southern and Southwest Missouri during the war, and as he was so much talked about by the Unionists and secessionists in that section the latter part of the war on account of the numerous victims upon whom his avenging hands had fallen, it will be useful to briefly delineate the man as he appeared to those who knew him best during that period of blood and strife. Of course he was popular with and liked by the Unionists, and sincerely hated by the Southern people. He was a commissioned officer of the State during the war except a month or so that he acted as scout for the Federal forces in the Southwest in the fall of 1861. He was about twenty-seven years of age at the outbreak of the war. He was about six feet high; muscular, without an ounce of surplus flesh; dark complexion, with black, straight hair, which indicated the Indian blood which he claimed flowed in his veins. He was mild and courteous in his manners and conversation, and his words were always spoken with precision and deliberation. When grown to manhood he became an itinerant Methodist preacher, but after a year or so, because it was unremunerative or not suited to his tastes, he gave up preaching and adopted school-teaching for a living in Dallas County, Missouri. His thoroughness as a teacher, in enforcing discipline and in producing noticeable results in the advancement of his pupils, was satisfactory to the patrons of his school. He

was truly in earnest in everything he undertook, and he devoted his energies to every undertaking with the earnestness of an enthusiast without displaying any of the outward signs of enthusiasm. He was strictly temperate in his habits of life, and he prided himself in asserting that he had never taken a chew of tobacco, nor used the weed in any form; nor touched a drop of intoxicants of any kind. No language ever escaped his lips that was not fit for the most refined and cultured ears. He was always and everywhere a student of books and of nature.

When teaching in Dallas County before the war, he was attending school at Ozark, Christian County, where one of the best schools in the Southwest had been established. Here he studied mathematics, as algebra and geometry, Greek and Latin and philosophy. He had an insatiable thirst for knowledge—knowledge, too, of the profoundest depths. He always carried a book with him, and was always poring over its pages when he was not occupied in attending to his regular duties. No matter whether he was teaching or attending school, at the close of the day when he left the schoolroom, as teacher or student, he took up his book treating of philosophy or language and perused its pages until he became familiar with its contents. While attending school at Ozark he had no cronies or chums, and never participated in the sports of the other students. But he did not neglect physical exercise, for out of school-hours he devoted much time to walking, but never forgetting to take his book along with him in his rambles. After the most fatiguing scout or march, on halting his command to rest and feed, he soon stretched himself upon the ground on his blanket with his head slightly elevated against a tree or on his saddle, with his book in his hands, earnestly perusing its pages until the bugle-call sounded the march. Indeed, it was the verdict of his men that after the most violent hand-to-hand conflicts with some of the characters with whom

he had to deal, and in which he killed two or three men, he never showed the slightest perturbation of mind, and on returning to camp or halting to rest for a few moments, resumed the study of his book. As far as outward signs were concerned, he seems to have been absolutely without fear. Most of the hotels in the towns in the section over which his operations extended had porticos or verandas extending the entire length of the front of the buildings, and when a company was stationed in any of the towns the officers generally stopped at the hotels. While stationed at Ozark or Neosho, Captain Kelso had quarters at the hotels, and might have been seen any day, when just in from a scout or off duty, pacing up and down the veranda of his hotel with his book in his hands, generally studying aloud. When in camp he paced back and forth in front of his tent with his book in his hand.

When the agitation growing out of the slavery question culminated in the secession of the Southern States and in the war for the preservation of the Union, every man in Missouri of decided political convictions was obliged to determine with which side he would cast his fortunes. At this exciting period, Kelso, the teacher and student, espoused the Union cause, and he was as much in earnest for its success as he had been for every other undertaking with which he had been connected. In the organization of the State forces, Governor Jackson, who was a secessionist, had organized and officered them in the interest of the secessionists, thus putting the Unionists throughout the State at a disadvantage until authority was obtained through Frank Blair and General Lyon to organize the Home Guards. Early in the summer of 1861, therefore, Kelso, the teacher and student, was among the first men in his county to commence the organization of the Union Home Guards, and he was elected Major of the Dallas County Battalion. But after the battle of Wilson Creek and the death of General Lyon, the Union army

of the Southwest was obliged to retreat to Rolla, and the Home Guards were soon disbanded. Directly after they were disbanded, Kelso joined Colonel Sempronius H. Boyd's Twenty-fourth Regiment Missouri Infantry, then being organized in that district. His service in this regiment was in the capacity of scout until he was given a recruiting commission in the Fourteenth Regiment Missouri State Militia Cavalry. As a scout he was considered eccentric, for, instead of going out well mounted, he took it afoot, and in disguise visited the camps of the Southern forces in Southwest Missouri, under Price and McCulloch. He thus had ample opportunity of seeing for himself the ill treatment the Unionists received at the hands of their captors in the camps of the secessionists. Old, white-haired men, past the military age, were torn from their families and homes and dragged into the camps and treated with all sorts of indignities by an undisciplined soldiery, made up mostly of men who, long before the war, had been conspicuous for their domineering conduct towards political opponents. Thus it is easy to see that such scenes in the early days of the war must have produced a deep impression on the mind of such a man as Kelso is shown to have been. He heard secessionists who never entertained a thought that there might be a turn in the tide of success boast of the Federal soldiers and Union men they had killed and the trifling causes for which they had been killed. He had by his own efforts succeeded in solving difficult problems in mathematics, mastering two or three languages, and in comprehending abstract questions of philosophy, and now, if mutual destruction of men was to be the chief occupation as a proof of manhood until the issues of the war were settled, could he not succeed in that business as well as his opponents? If they practised deception, could he not do it also? He took to this new occupation with his characteristic earnestness, and if he heard of a foe within the

territory of his operations, he was restless until he could get at him. He admitted that he was not ambitious of attaining to higher rank than that of commanding officer of a company, for the reason that if he attained to a higher rank than that, he would not have the opportunity of participating in the personal conflicts with the enemy, which appears to have been almost a burning desire with him.





## CHAPTER XIV.

### THE BAXTER SPRINGS MASSACRE.

GENERAL BLUNT, having closed a brilliant campaign in which he defeated the forces of Generals Steele and Cooper at the battle of Honey Springs and drove them into the southern part of the Indian Territory, and in which he captured Fort Smith and dispersed the forces of General Cabell, returned to Fort Scott, September 23d, for the purpose of arranging the affairs of his district so that he could remove his headquarters to Fort Smith in a short time. Reports of his successful operations had already reached Kansas, and the energy he had uniformly displayed had made him very popular with the people of the State, so that he was given a warm reception by the citizens and soldiers of Fort Scott on his arrival at that place. Before leaving Fort Smith he made such disposition of his troops at that post, Webber's Falls, and Fort Gibson as would, by proper vigilance of the commanding officers of these stations, secure the tranquillity of the section which had recently been wrested from Southern domination. He believed that it would be several weeks before the demoralized forces of Steele, Cooper, and Cabell could be reorganized effectively to take the field again, on account of the great loss of supplies they had sustained in the recent campaign. When he arrived at Fort Scott he found that the excite-

ment in regard to the Lawrence massacre and the invasion of Missouri by General Lane, with the armed citizens of Kansas, to search for stolen property taken by Quantrill during his raid, had not entirely subsided. The carrying into effect of General Ewing's *Order Number Eleven*, depopulating the Border counties of Missouri in his district as far south as Vernon County; the destruction of property in those counties; the moving south of Southern families from those counties, and the daily reports of conflicts with guerilla bands were subjects of general interest and discussion. Of course that order was almost universally approved in Kansas, and though it did not contemplate the wholesale destruction of property, yet most of the farmhouses and barns were burned and destroyed in those counties. The atrocious acts of the Southern guerillas in Missouri made many conservative Union men and Federal officers in that State in favor of adopting severe measures against the outlaws and their allies. The loss of life and property at Lawrence were small in comparison with the loss of life and property to the Unionists in Missouri, for in nearly every neighborhood in that State Union men were murdered and their property taken and destroyed by the guerillas.

Reports now and then came to Colonel C. W. Blair, commanding the post of Fort Scott, of intended raids by guerillas from Missouri on that post, but by his vigilance they were always averted. That place being the base of supplies for the Federal troops operating in the Indian Territory and Western Arkansas, it was a point of special importance, on account of the large quantities of Government stores kept there. At times there were serious apprehensions felt for the safety of the place, for the demands for troops as escorts to trains and for scouting purposes frequently reduced the force at that post to only a few hundred men. As there were Southern sympathizers from Missouri trading in Fort Scott nearly

every day, they had no difficulty in ascertaining the fact when there was a marked depletion of the troops at that post, and it was frequently asserted that these people, who were generally women, not only carried information of Federal movements, but even supplies to the guerrillas. Captain Henry Taylor had a company of Southern men in Vernon County, Missouri, and on one occasion came one night within a few miles of Fort Scott and captured a Federal scout, Thomas Whitesides, and took him off and killed him.

Colonel Blair had kept a station or outpost of two companies of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry at Dry Wood, twelve miles southeast of Fort Scott, during the summer, and as part of this force was kept almost constantly scouting in Missouri, intended guerilla movements were discovered in time to disconcert them and prevent a raid. For several months a Confederate force, estimated at five hundred to a thousand men, under Colonels Hunter and Coffee, had been in Southwest Missouri, Northwest Arkansas, and along the eastern line of the Cherokee Nation, threatening the supply line between Fort Scott and Fort Gibson; and though this force had been several times dispersed by the Missouri militia from Springfield and Neosho, the leaders soon rallied their men again, and it was frequently reported that they intended to make a raid north through Missouri, and if possible enter the Border counties of Kansas, for the purpose of plundering the people and destroying their property. As nearly all the Union families had moved out of the southwestern counties of Missouri, or into the military stations in those counties, a Southern force could easily march from the Arkansas line to within a few miles of Fort Scott without causing any alarm. Most of the farmhouses along the roads in those counties had been destroyed, and the few that remained were generally occupied by Southern families who did not care to give

information concerning the movements of Southern troops.

Several companies of Missouri State Militia were stationed at Neosho and Carthage, and by their activity made that section an unsafe retreat for guerilla bands. But there were no Federal troops or militia stationed in Vernon and Barton Counties, east and southeast of Fort Scott, and it was generally known that the bandits of Quantrill and Jackman passed through those counties in going south from the Missouri River counties, or in returning from the south to the Missouri River counties. When the bandits were passing through the country by rapid marches, it was by mere accident if they were met by Federal scouting detachments. It was possible, therefore, for a force of several hundred of the outlaws to come upon a small Federal detachment without any warning whatever. At Dry Wood the Federal detachment had a stockade which would enable them to hold the place if suddenly attacked by a superior force.

After the First Kansas Colored Regiment, under Colonel Williams, which had been encamped at Baxter Springs during the spring, left that place the latter part of June, there was a month or so that there were no troops encamped there. The constant passing of supply trains, escorts, and messengers over the military road between Fort Scott and Fort Gibson, a distance of 160 miles, through a country almost uninhabited at that time, made it very important that there should be established a military station at Baxter Springs. So strongly was Colonel Blair, commanding the District of Southern Kansas, and the post of Fort Scott, impressed that there should be a station at Baxter, that on the 17th of August he ordered Lieutenant John Crites, with his company of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, to that place, and a short time afterwards Lieutenant R. E. Cook, with a company of colored recruits for the Second Kansas Colored In-

fantry, was ordered to reinforce him. From the early days of the war, Baxter Springs had been a noted camping ground for the Federal forces operating in Southern Kansas and the Indian Territory. It was a beautiful site for a camping ground, and was convenient to wood and water. The spring near which the troops generally encamped was about half a mile north of the State line, about a quarter of a mile west of Spring River, and a few rods east of the military road from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson. The timber along Spring River at this point extended about a quarter of a mile west of that stream, so that the spring was almost in the edge of the prairie, near the head of a hollow that gradually deepened and widened until the Spring Branch fell into Spring River, that flowed nearly due south at that point. In a short time after Lieutenants Crites and Cook arrived with their commands, they constructed a blockhouse a hundred yards or so southeast of the spring on high ground; but for some reason or other they removed this blockhouse to the north side of the Spring Branch, a hundred yards perhaps northeast of the spring on the sloping side of the hollow. They had a line of breastworks constructed of logs and earth about four feet high, extending around the north, east, and south sides of the blockhouse, the west side being unfinished and open. There was room enough inside the breastworks for the troops, their tents and supplies, and animals.

Recent reports of unusual activity of the Southern partisan bands in Northwestern Arkansas and Southwest Missouri induced Colonel Blair to order Lieutenant James B. Pond, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, to march with his company and one twelve-pounder mountain howitzer from Dry Wood to strengthen the station at Baxter Springs. On arrival at Baxter, October 5th, the Lieutenant, being the senior officer present, at once put part of his men at work to strengthen his position, and to

extend the breastworks on the north and south sides so as to accommodate the reinforcement which he had brought down.

In a day or so after starting out on his expedition to Missouri from Arkadelphia, Colonel Shelby came into collision with a detachment of the First Arkansas Union Infantry from Fort Smith, south of Ozark, and in the skirmish that took place several of the Federal detachment were killed, wounded, and captured. The commanding officer of the detachment, in reporting the affair to the commanding officer at Fort Smith, was led to believe that Shelby's force was much larger than it really was, and thought it was a movement of part of Price's army against Fort Smith. As General Steele did not show a disposition, or was not prepared, to follow up Price after the capture of Little Rock, the Federal officers at Fort Smith thought it very likely that Price would take part of the troops he had with him about Arkadelphia, and such of the troops of Cooper and Cabell as could be rallied, for immediate and active operations against the Federal forces in Western Arkansas. In view of Shelby's rapid movement north with artillery, and of other reported Confederate movements in front, the commanding officer at Fort Smith despatched messengers to General Blunt, detailing the situation to him as it then appeared from the best information to be obtained. The couriers arrived at Fort Scott with the despatches on October 3d, and General Blunt at once commenced preparations to return to Fort Smith with the headquarters of his district for the purpose of concentrating and making such disposition of his troops as might seem necessary to meet the threatened attack. No report of Shelby's movement north of the Arkansas River had yet reached General Blunt, although Shelby was at that moment in Southwest Missouri.

Information was received at Fort Scott from Kansas

City almost daily of operations in General Ewing's District of the Border, and there had been no recent reports of unusual activity displayed by Quantrill's guerillas in that district.

It was known in a general way that Quantrill had not yet gone south, and that his men were scattered in small bands over the district and in the counties east of General Ewing's district. Quantrill had not up to that time given the Federal troops any trouble in Southwest Missouri or Southern Kansas, and small detachments had since the Federal occupation of Fort Gibson been constantly passing over the military road between that point and Fort Scott without any apprehension of meeting with his desperate outlaws. Since the Lawrence massacre, and after his bands had scattered into the thickly wooded regions of Western Missouri, they had not shown much aggressiveness, and only occupied themselves in keeping out of the way of the Federal troops. About the last of September instructions were sent by him to the leaders of different bands of his command to concentrate at a given place in Lafayette County on the 1st of October. When the leaders of his different bands brought their men together, it was decided to march south, and at daybreak on the morning of October 2d Colonel Quantrill, as he signed himself, at the head of his men, between three and four hundred strong, took up the line of march south. The counties through which he passed were almost depopulated, and he marched upwards of four days without his movements becoming known to the Federal officers at any of the stations along the Border. If any Federal soldier or Union citizen fell into the hands of the outlaws on their line of march, he did not live to report the fact, for they boasted that they did not take any prisoners. Two soldiers of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, stationed with their company at Fort Scott, who were permitted to go home to visit their

families in Vernon County, Missouri, for a few days, before going south with the next supply train, were captured and killed on the night of October 4th by a force of bandits a hundred or so strong, supposed to have belonged to Quantrill's command. The presence of such a large force of the enemy near Fort Scott, and their threatening attitude as seen by several parties who were near them, but who escaped from them and came in to the post and reported what they had seen, caused an alarm that night and the calling out of the troops and the strengthening of the pickets on all the roads leading into the post from the east.

Having made the necessary preparations for returning to Fort Smith, General Blunt left Fort Scott about four o'clock Sunday afternoon, October 4th, with an escort of one hundred men, composed of part of a company of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, under Lieutenant J. G. Cavert, and part of a company of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, under Lieutenant R. H. Pierce, and his brigade band and clerks and orderlies. His brigade band played in front of his headquarters on the plaza for perhaps half an hour before leaving, and a good many citizens and soldiers turned out to see the General off. It was a clear, lovely afternoon, and many of the people said that they had never before heard music sound so sweetly. The General, with the members of his staff, band, escort, and train, marched out that evening six miles south of Fort Scott and encamped until the next morning. Starting early the next morning he marched to Cow Creek and encamped. Resuming the march the next morning, he arrived about twelve o'clock that day within a quarter of a mile of Lieutenant Pond's camp at Baxter Springs, but not in sight of it on account of intervening higher ground, and being some distance in advance of his train and escort, halted for a few moments for them to come up. As his escort came up, and while waiting


a few moments for his wagons to close up, his attention was called to about 150 mounted men, some three hundred yards to his left, forming in line and advancing from the timber on Spring River. Though the actions of the men and officers were such as to arouse the suspicion that they were not friends, the General and members of his staff at first thought that they were Lieutenant Pond's men out on drill, returning from a scout, or out to give him a reception. Captain W. S. Tough, his chief of scouts, rode forward a hundred yards or so to ascertain who the men were, but returned in a moment and reported to the General that the men were rebels, and that a fight was going on at Lieutenant Pond's camp.

In the meantime General Blunt had himself ridden forward far enough to hear a brisk firing at Lieutenant Pond's camp and to satisfy himself that the men on his left were enemies, although they were all dressed in Federal uniforms. Facing the enemy, his escort had been ordered into line of battle, under the immediate direction of Major H. Z. Curtis, his Assistant Adjutant-General, with the wagons and band in the rear. The force of men on General Blunt's left was three companies of the bandits under the immediate command of Quantrill, who had charged on Lieutenant Pond's camp, part of the tents of which were west of and outside of the fortifications, and who had been driven off and had rallied and re-formed on the edge of the prairie about two hundred yards north of the camp. Quantrill had scarcely re-formed his three companies in line when he observed General Blunt's escort advancing on the military road from the direction of Fort Scott, and at the same time heard sharp firing around the Federal camp, where the other half of his command, which had gone around on the south side of it, were hotly engaged. He immediately ordered that part of his command which was still engaging Lieutenant Pond's camp to join him, which

they did on the double-quick. He then advanced upon General Blunt's escort, and seeing from the length of the line that there were less than one hundred men in it, ordered his men to fire a volley and then to charge. When the bandits had approached within sixty yards, the escort fired a volley into them, and then seeing that in another moment they would be surrounded by a force which they estimated at not less than six hundred men, turned and fled over the prairie.

General Blunt and his Assistant Adjutant-General, Major Curtis, endeavored to rally the men; but it was impossible to rally them against greatly superior numbers in an open prairie, and the bandits closed in upon them, and in the pursuit of two or three miles, shot down and killed all the men overtaken, wounded, or captured, except about half a dozen who feigned death after they were terribly wounded. In the pursuit and slaughter, the men of the Federal detachment became a good deal scattered, but after a flight of about a mile and a half General Blunt succeeded in rallying fifteen men with whom he kept off at a distance the bandits who were pursuing him, and even turned upon them, causing them to retire upon their main force. He then sent Lieutenant J. E. Tappan, one of his aides-de-camp, with five men, back to Fort Scott, with instructions for Colonel Blair to send forward at once a reinforcement of all the men who could be spared from that post, and with the other nine men he watched the movements of the bandits until they left the field and moved off south on the military road about five o'clock. Major Curtis, who had become separated from General Blunt after the escort broke, had his horse shot in the hip while riding beside Lieutenant Pierce, which so excited or disabled the animal that in jumping a ravine, it fell, throwing the Major over its head, when he was captured and shot. His new uniform made him a conspicuous mark for the bandits. Part of

the bandits turned their attention to murdering the



teamsters with the wagons, and the members of the band. In the midst of the excitement of the bloody

unequal conflict, the driver of the band wagon, with the members of the band in it, endeavored to escape in a direction different to that taken by the escort; but after getting about half a mile away one of the wheels came off the wagon, and it was soon overtaken by the bandits and all the members of the band, fourteen in number, and the driver, and James O'Neal, special artist for *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, were murdered. After they were shot, their bodies were thrown into or under the wagon and the wagon fired, so that some of them were found to be horribly burned and disfigured when picked up by their comrades. In many instances where the soldiers were closely pursued, they were told that if they would surrender they would be treated as prisoners of war; but in every case the moment they surrendered and were disarmed, they were shot down, sometimes even with their own arms in the hands of the bandits.

Most of the soldiers, not thinking of Quantrill being in that section, and supposing that the bandits were a regular Confederate force, believed that the promises of fair treatment would be respected; otherwise they would have sold their lives as dearly as possible, and the bandits would have had a heavier list of casualties than they had at the end of their bloody and fiendish work.

While Quantrill was being reinforced by that part of his command which had attacked Lieutenant Pond's camp on the south and southwest sides, Major Henning, Provost-Marshal on General Blunt's staff, rode forward a few yards in advance of the General until he came in sight of the camp, to reconnoitre, so that when the bandits opened fire and advanced on a charge, he and Captain Tough were so far on the right of the Federal line that the difficulty of reaching Lieutenant Pond's camp seemed less than rejoining the escort. They therefore dashed forward, and in a few moments arrived at the

camp in safety, having passed near several bandits who had not reached their line in time to participate in the charge, and exchanged shots with them. They hoped to get Lieutenant Pond's cavalry to go to the assistance of the General and his escort; but, unfortunately, all the available mounted men at the station had that morning been sent out with a forage train, and had not returned. Finding that the cavalry were nearly all absent from the station, and that there were not enough of the colored infantry, being less than a full company, to engage on the open prairie the superior force of the bandits with any prospect of success, Major Henning took half a dozen mounted men from the camp, and with Captain Tough returned to the high ground on the prairie near where the escort had first formed, in time to witness the last scenes of the bloody tragedy, the murdering of the members of the band, and the plundering of the train of the valuable effects of the officers and men.

The alarm in Fort Scott the night after General Blunt left was caused by Quantrill's force passing some fifteen miles east of that post that night, and the belief of the parties who saw them that they intended to attack that place. Instead of going to Fort Scott, however, he continued his march nearly south, bearing a little west all the time, and marching almost on a parallel line with General Blunt, the lines of march of the two forces converging to a point at Baxter Springs. On arriving near Baxter Springs, about twelve o'clock, Captain Brinker, commanding Quantrill's advance, reported a train ahead. The Captain was ordered to press on and ascertain to whom the train belonged and what troops were with it. He soon came in sight of Lieutenant Pond's camp, which he supposed was the camp of the train, and, finding that he was not discovered, fell back a hundred yards or so until the main command arrived. At the time Quantrill's advance came up in sight of the Federal camp,

most of Lieutenant Pond's men were at dinner, and others were strolling about camp or in the woods near camp. There was no picket or camp guard out to give any warning of an approaching foe, so that when Quan-trill came up with his main force to where his advance halted, he formed his men by fours and ordered them to charge the camp, leading the head of the column himself. Some of the Federal soldiers who were between the camp and the river were fired upon and shot down by the bandits as they approached the camp. These scattering shots attracted the attention of some of the soldiers in camp; but before they could get inside the fortifications and to their arms, the outlaws were all around and in camp.

First Sergeant W. L. McKenzie, of Lieutenant Pond's company, being among the first men to hear the shots in the direction of the river, hastened to the Lieutenant's tent to arouse him and to give the alarm in camp. The colored soldiers, who were eating their dinner under a shed or an arbor a few yards south of the breastworks on the outside of them, started for their quarters in the blockhouse, where they had their arms and ammunition, the moment they saw and heard the bandits coming up on a charge. Lieutenant Pond and some of his men who were in the western part and on the outskirts of the camp were obliged to pass through the ranks of the bandits to get to their arms, and four of his men were shot down in endeavoring to accomplish the task. In a few moments, however, the white and colored sol-diers were rallied and succeeded in driving the bandits out of the breastworks and out of camp. Lieutenant Pond then got his twelve-pounder howitzer to work, which was outside the rifle-pits on the north side, and after a few rounds drove the bandits beyond range on that side. When the colored soldiers got into the block-house they kept up such a hot fire that they drove the

bandits beyond range or to seek shelter behind trees. A desultory and sometimes sharp firing was kept up between Lieutenant Pond's men and the bandits until Quantrill ordered that part of his command south and southwest of the camp to join him where he had formed line in the edge of the prairie north of the camp to attack General Blunt. When the Lieutenant and his men saw this movement of the bandits, as the latter passed around the west side of the camp to the north side, they supposed that the enemy were preparing for a more determined attack, and a few moments later when they heard the firing from the attack on General Blunt's escort they did not know what it meant until Major Henning and Captain Tough dashed in. Lieutenant Cook, commanding the company of the Second Kansas Colored Infantry, and several soldiers were killed east of the camp before they could get to their quarters.

After the bandits had completed their work of murdering all the prisoners and wounded Federal soldiers who had fallen into their hands, and stripping most of them of their clothing, and plundering the train, they formed in line of battle on the prairie west of the camp, and Captain Todd was sent by Quantrill to demand the surrender of the station, which was, of course, refused by Lieutenant Pond. He also spoke about an exchange of prisoners; but Lieutenant Pond had not captured any of the bandits, and those who were wounded near camp were carried away or managed to get away before the arrival of the flag of truce. Quantrill considered the matter of attacking the camp again, but finding that the troops were fortified, that they had one howitzer, that they would be better prepared for him than in the first attack, and that it would be a fight to the death with them, he concluded that it would cost him too great a sacrifice of life to attempt to take the camp by assault, and at once marched off south, taking his wounded along.

When the bandits had moved off, the work of collecting the dead and wounded was undertaken. They were scattered over the prairie for nearly two miles from the scene of the first attack. Lieutenant A. W. Farr, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, Judge-Advocate on General Blunt's staff, was killed near where the escort first formed. The Federal loss in the disaster was three officers, sixty-seven enlisted men, and ten citizens killed, and eighteen enlisted men wounded, including the killed and wounded in the fight at the camp. Lieutenant Pond reported that the bandits left eleven men killed on the field—number of wounded not known. Nearly all of the soldiers and citizens of the escort who were killed were found to have been shot through the head, and most of them had been shot five or six times, thus showing the fiendish character of the desperate outlaws.

With the few men whom he had rallied, General Blunt followed the bandits, keeping in sight of them until they crossed the Neosho River twelve miles south, when he returned to Lieutenant Pond's camp at Baxter that evening and awaited the arrival of Colonel Blair with troops from Fort Scott. He at once put scouts on the trail of the bandits, and despatched messengers to Forts Gibson and Smith directing the commanding officers at those stations to be on the lookout for and if possible to intercept the outlaws at the Arkansas River. From Baxter Springs Quantrill marched south, crossed the Arkansas River eighteen miles above Fort Gibson, and joined General Cooper's command south of the Canadian River in the Choctaw Nation.

Near the crossing of the Arkansas River the bandits captured a scout of twelve Indian soldiers of the First Indian Regiment from Fort Gibson and murdered them all, shooting them down in cold blood. A colored boy who accompanied the outlaws from Lafayette County, Missouri, escaped from them at Cabin Creek, Indian

Territory, and came to the Federal troops at Baxter, and was able to give an account of the movements of the bandits up to the time he left them. General Blunt, with the troops under Colonel Blair, returned at once to Fort Scott to look after the safety of that post, as Shelby was then making his raid north through Missouri, and it was thought that he might send a part of his force to attack the Federal stations along the line of Missouri and Kansas.

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## CHAPTER XV.

### OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AND SOUTHWEST MISSOURI AND NORTHWESTERN ARKANSAS.

FOR a period of a month or so after the Shelby raid and the Baxter Springs massacre there was less disturbance along the Border from Kansas City to Fort Smith than had been known to the people of that section since the beginning of the war. In marching south from the Missouri River, Quantrill took along with him most of the desperate characters of partisan bandits who had long infested the Border counties of Missouri, particularly those who had acted with him in his barbarous operations; and General Ewing's *Order Number Eleven*, removing the Southern families from and depopulating the Border counties of Missouri in his district, had the effect of leaving those counties in a condition to offer no encouragement to the bandits to remain in or return to them. It was known from remarks that Quantrill had made before he started south that he would not attempt to return to Missouri during the winter, because the removal of the Southern families from the territory in which he had from the first chiefly confined his operations would make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to maintain a force as large as that which he usually had under him, during the winter season in a climate as severe as that of Western Missouri. But there were other bandit leaders than Quantrill in Western Missouri

and Western Arkansas, who coöperated with Shelby more or less during his raid, but who, after Shelby was driven south of the Arkansas River in a demoralized condition, and with the loss of his artillery and trains, returned to their old haunts to continue their operations of robbing and plundering and murdering Union citizens. After Shelby's command was broken up at Marshall, a good many of his men, singly and in squads of two, three, or more, endeavored to get to their homes in Western Missouri to visit their families clandestinely, and were chased, picked up, or mistaken for bandits and overtaken and shot by the Union militia. While these Confederate soldiers were not generally active in committing depredations, their presence in any neighborhood, if known to the Unionists, produced in them a feeling of insecurity, for it was not easy for Union citizens, or even Union militia, to distinguish a Confederate soldier from a bandit, for the reason that they both wore the Federal uniform when they could get it. In fact, most of the bandit leaders were commissioned and their barbarous acts sanctioned by the Confederate authorities.

In the early part of November, a small party of bandits who had formerly belonged to Major Livingston's band in Jasper County, Missouri, under the leadership of Cy Gordon, marched up the Neosho River from near the southern line of Kansas to the neighborhood of Humboldt, burning the property of and committing depredations against the citizens of that section. A detachment of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, under Captain Charles Willetts, was sent out by Colonel Blair from Fort Scott to punish the marauders; but when he arrived in the disturbed locality, he ascertained that after plundering the Osage Mission they left that region and moved south into the Indian Territory. After the burning of Humboldt in the fall of 1861, a small force had been stationed at that place for the protection of the citizens of that

section, until the occupation of Fort Gibson and the Indian Territory by the Federal troops, when it was withdrawn.

About the time of these disturbances in the Neosho Valley, Lieutenant W. A. Johnson was sent into that section and beyond into the Verdigris Valley, with a detachment of the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry, to thoroughly scout that country for bandits, and found that near the southern line of the State, and near where Drum Creek empties into the Verdigris River, the Osage Indians, who were loyal to the Government, had captured and killed a party of twenty Confederate officers who were *en route* to Colorado and New Mexico to organize the Indians and white men of those Territories who could be won over to the Confederate cause, for the purpose of intercepting or destroying the Federal wagon trains hauling supplies for the Federal troops operating in that region. Lieutenant Johnson found on the scene of the recent conflict the mutilated corpses of the Confederate officers, and documents and papers giving their names and rank, and the service to which they had been assigned by the Confederate authorities. No report of the disaster which befell them is referred to in contemporaneous records of either side, for the reason that not one of the party escaped to tell the fate of his comrades, and for the further reason that Lieutenant Johnson's trunk, in which the documents were kept, giving the names and describing the duties to which these officers were assigned, was lost. The Lieutenant had their bodies buried, and stated that from such information as he was able to gather it appeared that these officers, in attempting to pass through the Osage Reservation on their way west, came upon a party of Osages and fired upon them, killing two and putting the others to flight; that in pursuing the Indians the Confederates were drawn into an ambuscade and surrounded by the bands of White Wing and Little Bear, and every one killed.

Several of the military stations in Southwest Missouri, which were evacuated by the State militia on the near approach of Shelby for the purpose of concentrating and joining in the pursuit of the enemy, were not immediately reoccupied by the State troops when the raid was over. It was the latter part of November when Captain Milton Burch was sent to Neosho with two companies of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry. Captain James J. Akard, of the same regiment, however, had entered the town on the 4th, and drove a party of bandits out, captured most of the plunder which they had taken from the citizens, and in the skirmish that took place, killed one of the bandits and had one of his own men killed. A few days after that he made a scout from Neosho to Butler's Creek, in McDonald County, taking thirty men of his own company, and forty men from Captain J. M. Richey's company of the Missouri Enrolled Militia, and struck a force of thirty bandits, killing eight on the ground and wounding some who escaped, without any loss in his command. He estimated, from the information obtained, that there were about two hundred bandits, scattered in small squads over that section, who had drifted in there after the raid, and were having a regular carnival of crime and lawlessness. As Neosho and Newtonia had been occupied as regular military stations for nearly a year prior to the raid, a good many Union citizens had returned to Newton County who had left there the first year of the war, while that section was occupied alternately by the Southern and Union forces. These citizens had re-fenced the farms and repaired the houses in the neighborhood of those stations and had raised fairly good crops during the past year, and would be obliged to move away again unless the loyal militia returned in a short time to give them protection. They were indeed gratified when Captains Burch and Ruark returned to Neosho with

their companies, for these officers and Lieutenant Kelso had distinguished themselves for the fearless and energetic manner in which they had hunted down the bandits, frequently penetrating their most secret hiding-places and engaging them in hand-to-hand conflicts.

About the 1st of November, Brigadier-General John B. Sanborn arrived at Springfield and assumed command of the District of Southwest Missouri, relieving General John McNeil, who had been assigned to the command of the District of the Frontier at Fort Smith. In administering the affairs of his new district, General Sanborn soon displayed qualities which showed him to be a careful and prudent commander, keenly alive to the interests of the loyal people of that section, and desirous of affording them every possible means of protection. After making a few new dispositions of the troops of his district he was occupied in directing their movements against the guerilla bands of that section and in protecting the supply trains between Springfield and Rolla and from Springfield to Fayetteville. He was obliged to furnish escorts to accompany the mail coaches carrying the mail between Springfield and Rolla, for the bandits were constantly making efforts to capture the mail and to rob the passengers, sometimes making their way to that line of communication through the country from Arkansas, upwards of a hundred miles, for that purpose. To protect the military telegraph, which had recently been constructed to Fayetteville, required detachments of his cavalry to constantly patrol the wire road, and even then the bandits sometimes cut the wire and carried off sections of it, or blockaded the road with it by stretching and fastening it to trees on either side.

Mounted details of half a dozen or so men, carrying the mail between Springfield and Fort Smith, were frequently fired upon by the bandits from ambush, the shots sometimes wounding and sometimes killing some

of the parties, so that the cavalry from the different stations on this road were kept busy scouting the country on either side of it, hunting down and bringing to punishment the outlaws.

In the early part of November, Brigadier-General C. B. Holland, commanding the Enrolled Militia in Southwest Missouri, made an expedition with four hundred men from Springfield to Southern Missouri and Northern Arkansas for the purpose of breaking up a camp of Confederates that were reported to be concentrating under Colonel Joseph Love below Salem, in Fulton County, Arkansas, with the view of making a raid into Missouri. General Holland met the Confederates, and in the sharp skirmish that took place, routed them, killing fourteen and taking six prisoners. In those mountainous counties of Southern Missouri the Unionists were decidedly in the ascendant from the beginning of the war, and had it not been for the fact that nearly all the able-bodied Union men of that section were in the Federal army serving in other parts of the country, could easily have held their ground against the Southern partisan bands. The expedition of General Holland not only had the effect of dispersing the Confederates and partisan bands who were preparing for a move into Missouri, but it brought to his attention the advisability of leaving a company of Enrolled Militia at each of several convenient points in Ozark and Taney Counties, Missouri, for the purpose of scouting and watching the movements of the enemy from the direction of the Arkansas line.

Captain J. H. Sallee, of Ozark County, who had served in Phelps' Six Months Regiment in the early part of the war, raised a company of Enrolled Militia, and, knowing all that region thoroughly, rendered effective service for the Union cause by his untiring energy in scouting and in chasing the bandits who came into that section to murder, rob, and plunder the Union people. But the

bandits who made raids into the southern counties of Missouri from Arkansas were not as much dreaded as some of the desperate characters, like Alf. Bolin, who had infested the mountainous regions of Taney and Ozark Counties from the early period of the war. This man was not only a Southern bandit who received aid and comfort from the Southern sympathizers of that section, but he was a cold-blooded assassin who shot from ambush the peaceable Union citizen while plowing in the field or riding along the road, going to or from the little water-power mill where his corn was ground into meal, with as little concern as he would shoot a deer or wild turkey. During the greater part of his bloody career he seems to have had no one associated with him in his desperate operations, and up to the time that he was killed, in the latter part of 1863, the Union citizens of that section could count up as many as a dozen Federal soldiers and militia and citizens who had fallen victims of his murderous hand. At last a reward of several thousand dollars was offered by the Federal authorities at Springfield for the body, dead or alive, of the noted bandit, and during very cold weather he was decoyed into the house of a Southern family and betrayed, and slain by an Iowa soldier named Thomas. Of course there were expressions of satisfaction among the Union people of that section when it was known that Bolin had met the death which he so justly deserved. Even Southern families in that section who were opposed to his methods were cautious about incurring his enmity for fear of falling victims to his revenge.

In about ten days after General Holland started on his scout into Southern Missouri southeast of Springfield, Major Austin King, Jr., was sent out from Springfield with two hundred men of his own regiment, the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and of the Eleventh Missouri Volunteer Cavalry, to scout the country south

into Arkansas and west of the section covered by General Holland's operations. In this scout of eight days, Major King marched through Forsyth to Carrollton, Berryville, Missouri, and vicinity of Huntsville, Arkansas, and then, turning northwest, crossed King's River and White River and marched up Roaring River, thence to the military or telegraph road, and to Cassville and Springfield. He dispersed several Southern partisan bands in Arkansas, killed one bandit and captured six prisoners on this expedition, without the loss of a man killed or wounded in his own command. His advance into Northern Arkansas had the effect of causing Brooks' Confederate command, which had been on Rolling Prairie, to move south across the mountains in the direction of the Arkansas River.

When a Federal scout passed through that section, the Confederate partisan bands disappeared in the mountainous regions of that country; but almost as soon as the scout had left, they came out from their hiding-places and were as bold as ever in annoying and plundering the families of Union men who were in the Federal service.

A few weeks after Major King's scout through the counties of Northern Arkansas, Captain John I. Worthington, First Arkansas Union Cavalry, was sent out by Colonel Harrison from Fayetteville on a scout through the counties of Carroll, Marion, and Searcy for the purpose of breaking up several camps of secessionists, who were reported by scouts to be collecting in considerable numbers in those counties, under Colonel Thomas R. Freeman, Major Gunning, and Captain Marshall. Captain Worthington had 112 men and one howitzer, and was out nearly two weeks, and had several sharp skirmishes with the enemy, sustaining a loss during the expedition of four men killed and six wounded. He reported the Confederate loss in the different actions with Major Gunning and Captain Marshall and partisan bandits at

thirty-four men killed, and number of wounded not known. A good many of the men belonging to the Partisan Rangers in that section were refugees from Missouri, and it was these men who were charged with plundering the families of the Union soldiers and causing so much disquietude. At the commencement of the war nearly one half the people of those counties were Unionists, and the able-bodied men among them being obliged to leave their homes, went into Missouri and enlisted into the Federal army at the first opportunity. In that part of the State the Department commander had not been able to establish a post or military station for the protection of the Unionists, although it was greatly needed. A small Federal force was stationed at Yellville for a short time, but the place was so isolated that it was impracticable to maintain troops there more than a few months at a time. While the country was occupied alternately by the Federal and Confederate troops and partisan bands, the people of both sides were kept in a state of constant agitation and insecurity as to their lives and property.

The latter part of December, Colonel Stand Watie, with a force of about five hundred Southern Cherokees, appeared in the northern part of the Indian Territory and in the southwest part of McDonald County, Missouri, causing some uneasiness and excitement at the military stations in Southwest Missouri, and as far north as Fort Scott, in Kansas. It was at first reported that Quantrill's bandits were with Colonel Watie, and that it was the intention of those leaders to make a rapid march from the northern line of the Indian Territory, surprise and attack Fort Scott, and destroy the large quantities of Government supplies at that post. Information of the presence of this force under Colonel Watie in the western part of McDonald County was immediately conveyed to Colonel John E. Phelps, Second Arkansas Union Cav-

alry, commanding the post of Cassville, in Barry County, who at once sent out a scout of fifty men, under Lieutenant A. J. Garner of his regiment, to reconnoitre and ascertain the movements and intentions of the enemy. When Lieutenant Garner arrived in the vicinity of Pineville, he found that Colonel Watie had left the day before, marching southwest in the direction of the Indian Territory. With the view of obtaining more definite information about the movements of the enemy, Lieutenant Garner soon struck their trail and followed it to the western line of the State, when he gave up the pursuit, finding that the Southern Indians were too far ahead of him to be overtaken. Near the head of Butler's Creek he found a cave which had recently been occupied by Southern bandits, and which had about one hundred bushels of corn stored in it, and also a blacksmith shop, all of which he destroyed. Continuing his march down the creek, for ten miles, he found another cave with three bandits in it, and in the skirmish that took place, killed one and wounded one, the other bandit making his escape. The early part of that winter was unusually severe for that section, and the caves of that hilly region made a comfortable abiding-place for the outlaws, who thought that their retreats would not likely be found by the Federal scouts.

On his march north through the Indian Territory, and only a few days before he came into McDonald County, Colonel Watie encountered on Barren Fork, Cherokee Nation, a force of 290 Federal Indians and one howitzer, under Captain A. C. Spillman, of Colonel Phillips' command at Fort Gibson, and after a fight of upwards of two hours, was driven from the field with a loss of several killed and wounded. In this action Captain Spillman reported Captain O. P. Willets, of his command, mortally wounded, and two enlisted men severely wounded. He was unable to ascertain the exact loss of the enemy, but

estimated it at twelve killed and as many wounded. His command being composed of dismounted men from the three Indian regiments, he was unable to pursue with any advantage the retreating Southern Indians, who were mounted; besides, he did not deem it advisable to pursue them, as he was under instructions to reinforce a detachment of Colonel Phillips' command at Rhea's Mills, in Arkansas, with as little delay as possible. An effort was made by Colonel Phillips to intercept the force under Colonel Watie on its return march south, but the Confederate leader was too well acquainted with the country to allow himself to be hemmed up in a position from which he could not extricate his command.

The latter part of November, the white and colored troops were ordered down from Fort Gibson and Webber's Falls to Fort Smith, leaving the Indian Brigade under Colonel Phillips to occupy Fort Gibson and the Indian Territory north of the Arkansas River. It was considered advisable to keep about one half of the Indian troops at Fort Gibson to hold that post, using the balance of them for scouting and affording protection to the loyal Indian families, and escorting trains. But as the Confederates now held no particular place in the Indian Territory, the Southern Indian troops could be used for raiding and threatening the Federal supply line, and could generally avoid fighting when the issue appeared doubtful.





## CHAPTER XVI.

### OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN TERRITORY—EXPEDITION TO OLD FORT ARBUCKLE—ACTION AT FLAT ROCK— ACTION AT CABIN CREEK AND CAPTURE OF FEDERAL TRAIN.

AFTER the Southern Indians and Texans were driven from the Arkansas Valley to the southern part of the Indian Territory, and their depots of supplies were destroyed by the Federal forces under General Blunt in the latter part of the summer and fall of 1863, there was a disposition on the part of some of the officers serving under Confederate General Steele, commanding the Confederate forces in the Indian Territory, to blame him for the disasters which had befallen their cause in that section. The Southern Indians had become so demoralized, and the opposition to General Steele so pronounced, that he requested to be relieved of his command, and was superseded in January, 1864, by Brigadier-General S. B. Maxey, of Texas. On assuming command of his new district, General Maxey at once set about to re-organize his Indian forces for more efficient service than was to be looked for under the conditions in which he found them. He also visited the Choctaw Council, and advised and urged that the Choctaw people remain at home and raise a crop the coming spring and summer, promising them that he would afford them protection and keep the Federal forces out of their country.

In the latter part of January, 1864, Brigadier-General John McNeil, commanding the District of the Frontier at Fort Smith, directed Colonel W. A. Phillips, commanding the Federal Indian Brigade at Fort Gibson, to take as many of his troops as could be spared from that point, and advance as far in the direction of Red River as practicable, for the purpose of preventing the reorganization of the Southern Indians; to disperse such bodies of them as were still holding together; and to distribute the President's proclamation offering peace and pardon to those who should immediately return to their treaty obligations.

After the necessary preparation, Colonel Phillips left Fort Gibson, on the 1st of February, on the proposed expedition, his command consisting of part of the First Indian Regiment, under Colonel S. H. Wattles; a battalion of the Third Indian, under a field-officer of that regiment; a battalion of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, under Major Charles Willetts, and a section of mounted howitzers, under Captain Sol. Kaufman—in all, about one thousand men. The frost was hardly out of the ground from the hard freezing of the past winter when he started, so that the road was very heavy for the train which he was obliged to take along carrying his subsistence and ammunition. He pushed forward in a southwest direction, and from the 5th to the 8th had skirmishes every day with the Southern Indians and Texans south of the Canadian River, dispersing and pursuing them until he arrived at Middle Boggy. At this place the Confederates made a stand, and, attacking them vigorously, he routed them after a sharp action of less than half an hour, and pursued them towards Red River. In this fight he reported forty-nine of the Confederate dead left on the field. In their flight towards Red River after the fight, they broke up into small detachments, and he was unable to overtake them. He

continued his march south, however, to the vicinity of old Fort Arbuckle, whence, after a short halt, he started on the return march to Fort Gibson. On this return march, he sent out his mounted force so as to sweep the country of small parties of Southern Indians for a distance of from fifty to sixty miles on either flank. He also improvised an ox train, and collected all the corn that could be found in the country, and brought it along with his other train, guarded by his infantry and artillery. He addressed a letter to the Governor of the Choctaw Nation, and a letter to each of the head men of the Chickasaw and Seminole Nations, reminding them of the terrible punishment he had just inflicted upon their forces; pointed out to them the folly and wickedness of their continued hostility to the Government, and warned them of the dire consequences that would certainly follow if they neglected to accept the President's offer of peace and pardon. His expedition certainly had the effect of producing consternation among the hostile Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles, and those who did not flee into the Wichita Mountains or to Red River declared that they would not again take up arms against the Federal Government. The expedition also had the effect of postponing the reorganization of the Southern Indian forces, which General Maxey desired should take place before his troops advanced north from the Red River Valley in the opening of the spring campaign.

On returning to Fort Gibson the latter part of February, from his expedition into the southern part of the Indian Territory, Colonel Phillips directed Major Willetts, commanding a battalion, Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, to relieve Major M. B. C. Wright, Third Indian Regiment, at Rhea's Mills, Arkansas, who had been at that place the past month, with a battalion of his regiment, collecting wheat and corn to make into flour and meal for the Indian command at Fort Gibson. The mounted

part of Major Wright's command was also kept busy in operating against the Southern partisan bands of that section, who had become quite bold under a leader known as Captain Buchanan. After dashing into the command at Rhea's Mills one night and wounding two men, the guerillas were pursued by a detachment of Federal Indians, under Sergeant Scraper, and overtaken on the side of a steep bluff in the mountains where they had halted to rest, and in the fight that took place, six of them were killed, including Captain Buchanan, and their arms and equipments and part of their stock captured and brought back to camp.

A part of the Second Indian Regiment, under Colonel John Ritchie, was stationed at Mackey's Salt Works, Cherokee Nation, about thirty miles northwest of Fort Smith on the north side of the Arkansas River, from the early part of March, 1864, to the latter part of the summer, manufacturing salt for the Indian Brigade, and watching the fords of the Arkansas River in that vicinity, to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side, and to protect the Cherokee people in making a crop. His position was not far from Webber's Falls, and his force was intended to guard the river above and below that point for some distance.

On the opening of spring, the Southern Indians, under the leadership of Colonels Watie and Adair, commenced showing a restlessness to return to their homes in the Cherokee Nation, and as early as the 1st of April, Colonel Watie arrived at the Starr place, near Briar Town, on the Canadian River, with about three hundred men, for the purpose of crossing to the north side of the Arkansas River at the first opportunity to make a raid to the northern part of the Cherokee Nation. The Arkansas River was fordable at several points between Fort Gibson and Webber's Falls, and in a few days he got most of his men over to the north side, under Colonel W. P. Adair, and they

immediately moved north in the direction of Park Hill and Maysville. At the same time that Watie's Southern Indians were entering the Cherokee Nation below Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips' scouts brought him information that eighty to one hundred white men, supposed to be under Quantrill, crossed the Arkansas River twenty-five miles above that place, killed five Union Indians, and then continued their march in the direction of Southwest Missouri and Southeastern Kansas.

As it was believed from the reports of deserters brought in that Quantrill was marching north with this body of men for the purpose of making a raid into Southern Kansas, Colonel Phillips immediately sent messengers to Fort Smith, the nearest telegraph station, with despatches to General Curtis, commanding the Department of Kansas, and to General Sanborn, commanding the District of Southwest Missouri, notifying them of the movements of the desperadoes, and of their probable intentions, so that Federal officers commanding detachments might be on the lookout for them. The force at Fort Gibson had been much depleted by details for bringing in forage for the stock and subsistence for the troops from distant points; but Colonel Phillips at once sent out as many of his mounted men as could be spared to march up the Arkansas to watch the movements of the bandits; and two companies of infantry were sent up Grand River to meet and reinforce the escort to the train which was coming down from Fort Scott with supplies for the army. As soon as some of his detachments came in, he also sent out Captain Anderson, of the Third Indian Regiment, with about one hundred mounted men, in pursuit of the Southern Indians, under Colonel Adair, who had gone into the northern part of the Cherokee Nation, and who had allowed a good many of his men to return to their homes. After three days' hard marching, Captain Anderson obtained information of the location of

the main body of the Confederate Indians, at Huff's Mills, ten miles west of Maysville, and pushed forward and attacked them vigorously on the 8th of May, routing them in a few minutes, killing six men and wounding as many more. He reported that he had two of his men badly wounded in the action. Immediately after this affair most of the Southern Indians left that section for the southern part of the Cherokee Nation, and soon crossed to the south side of the Arkansas River.

On the night of the 13th of May, Major Milton Burch, with twenty men of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, from Neosho, Missouri, found a camp of thirty men of Adair's Indians on Spavinaw Creek, south of Maysville, and surprised and attacked them, killing two men and capturing their horses, arms, and equipments. Exaggerated accounts of the strength of Colonel Adair's force in the vicinity of Cowskin Prairie and on Upper Grand River reached General Sanborn at Springfield, and the scout sent out under Major Burch was for the purpose of obtaining accurate information of the movements and position of the enemy.

Near Mackey's Salt Works, Colonel Ritchie's outposts captured seven Indians who claimed to be deserters from Adair's command, and they stated that he had upwards of three hundred mounted men, and intended to march through the Cherokee Nation to the neighborhood of Maysville, thence into Benton County, Arkansas, and as far north as Neosho or Newtonia. The rumors that he was coming to Neosho were so persistent that Major Burch's command prepared to fight him at that place a week before the Major started on the scout to Spavinaw.

With the small mounted force at his disposal, it was impossible for Colonel Phillips to operate as effectively against these Southern Indians as he desired. The latter part of the winter and early part of the spring the ponies of his Indian soldiers and their families had become so

poor in flesh that most of them were unfit for service. Some of the loyal Cherokees had raised crops of corn the past year; but they had not raised enough to spare very much for subsisting the troops and foraging the animals at Fort Gibson. Protection had been too uncertain to warrant any one to put up wild hay in that country for domestic use or for the use of the Federal troops.

On the 8th of August a train of two hundred wagons, which had just come down from Fort Scott with supplies for the troops at Fort Smith, after unloading, started back to Fort Scott, escorted by the Second Kansas Cavalry, under Colonel Cloud, who had recently been ordered up from Clarksville, Arkansas, with his regiment. His entire regiment did not go on through with the train to Fort Scott, but some of the companies were held at Fort Gibson in connection with guarding and putting up hay for the Government in the vicinity of that place. A large number of Union refugees, who had come into Fort Smith from different parts of Western Arkansas, accompanied the train to Kansas. These refugee families were nearly all very destitute, and as the Government had been furnishing them with subsistence, it was desirable that they should go north so that they could be taken care of without embarrassing the operations of the army by consuming the supplies which were needed by the troops.

General Cooper, commanding the Confederate forces in the field in the Indian Territory, was kept advised of the movements of the Federal trains arriving at and departing from Fort Smith, and of the strength of the Federal detachments at the different stations employed in guarding and putting up hay, and he determined to use his large mounted force to burn the hay, capture and break up the hay stations, and if possible capture or destroy some of the trains *en route* to or from Fort Scott to Fort Smith. It was now near the season of the year when there was usually a low stage of water in the

Arkansas River, and it was already fordable at several points above and below Fort Gibson, so that he could send his troops to the north side to strike some of the Federal hay camps or trains *en route* to or from Fort Scott. General Thayer, at Fort Smith, knew of the low stage of water in the river, and knew that it was the purpose of General Cooper, with his large mounted force of Texans and Indians, to attack the Federal supply line between Fort Smith and Fort Scott and the different hay camps at Cabin Creek and in the vicinity of Fort Gibson, and yet he permitted a large part of his infantry to be scattered in detachments of a hundred or so at the different hay camps, with no other barrier between them and the enemy than the Arkansas River.

The latter part of August, Captain John R. Graton, with five companies of the First Kansas Colored Infantry, escorted a train from Fort Smith to Fort Gibson *en route* to Fort Scott. From Fort Gibson detachments of the Second, Sixth, and Fourteenth Regiments Kansas Cavalry, and some Indian troops, escorted the train north, while four companies of the colored infantry were ordered to the hay camps near Fort Gibson and at Flat Rock, twelve miles above on the west side of Grand River. At these hay camps the colored infantry were employed in cutting and putting up the hay as well as in guarding it, and during the day were generally scattered over two or three miles of prairie. Captain E. A. Barker, Second Kansas Cavalry, with detachments of two companies of that regiment, was in command of the camp, and he had only 125 men in his entire force, including the colored infantry. His camp was nearly two miles from Grand River timber, on a prairie branch along which, every hundred yards or so, there were pools or lagoons from a few yards to fifty yards long, and in places perhaps two feet deep, and connected by narrow threads of water. The low banks of the lagoons were generally precipitous

or caving, with overhanging boughs of small willows. In some of them there were numerous water-lilies, with their large palm-like leaves floating on the surface.

From his mounted detachment, Captain Barker kept out scouting parties to the southwest, well in the direction of the fords on the Verdigris River. In the afternoon of the 16th of September, his scouts came in and reported that the enemy had crossed the Verdigris River in large force, and were advancing on his camp. As soon as he could collect his men together, he formed them on a ravine in the rear of his camp, and, taking a small mounted detachment, rode forward in the direction of the Verdigris about two miles to reconnoitre and ascertain the strength and designs of the enemy. On reaching a high ridge in the prairie, he saw the entire Confederate force of Generals Gano and Watie before him, advancing with six pieces of artillery. But before this, General Gano had ascended a high hill, from which he could plainly see with his field-glass the Federal camp, the hay-ricks, the mowing-machines, and the men at work upon the vast prairie. On descending to the foot of the hill, where his command had halted, he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Welch, with two Texas regiments, to his right, General Watie, with an Indian brigade, to the left, while he brought up his centre in his advance on the Federal camp. In falling back to his camp, Captain Barker was closely pursued by the enemy, and by the time he dismounted his detachment and formed the men on those already in line in the ravine, the Confederate Texans and Indians had approached within two hundred yards and commenced an attack from five different points. After fighting the Confederate forces for half an hour and repulsing three cavalry charges, he determined to mount all his men who had horses, make a desperate charge, and break through the weakest part of General Gano's line, leaving the colored infantry and dismounted cavalry

to fight their way to the Grand River timber if possible. He made the charge through General Watie's line, and got through with fifteen men, but the balance of his mounted detachment of about forty men were cut off and captured.

The colored soldiers now rallied under Lieutenant Thomas B. Sutherland, First Kansas Colored Infantry, and fought the Confederate forces for nearly two hours from the ravine, finding some shelter under its low caving banks. As the Confederates had not been giving any quarter to colored soldiers, the colored detachment considered it a struggle in which they proposed to sell their lives as dearly as possible. George W. Duval, an intelligent colored soldier of the detachment, stated that the only way he and his comrades could hold the Confederates off was to fire a volley into them when they came up within range, and then reload and be prepared for them when they came up again. The Confederates were held off in this manner until most of the colored soldiers expended their ammunition, and then Lieutenant Sutherland told them that they would have to do the best they could to save themselves. After this it was simply a massacre, for the colored soldiers were pursued and shot down without any demand for their surrender. About forty colored soldiers were killed, eight captured, and ten escaped.

It was near sunset when the fight ended, and to save themselves some of the colored soldiers had remarkably narrow escapes from their relentless foe. After his ammunition gave out, the soldier Duval secreted himself in a drift in the prairie branch, and when the Confederates put out their pickets that night, he crawled out between them, taking his gun with him. Another colored soldier jumped into a lagoon which was deep enough to conceal his body, and he managed by lying on his back to expose enough of his nose above the water under the overhanging willows to breathe freely. And another colored

soldier jumped into a lagoon deep enough to conceal his body, and, lying on his back, covered his nose, just out of the water enough to enable him to breathe, by the broad leaves of the water-lily. These soldiers who thus secreted themselves heard the Confederates all around them, frequently only a few yards distant, pursuing and shooting down their comrades in the most heartless manner. On completing his work of slaughter and burning the hay and mowing-machines at that point, General Gano encamped that night on the field, and the next morning marched north to meet the Federal supply train, which he was informed was *en route* from Fort Scott.

A supply train of 205 Government wagons left Fort Scott on the 12th of September, *en route* for Fort Gibson and Fort Smith, escorted by 260 men of the Second, Sixth, and Fourteenth Regiments Kansas Cavalry, under the command of Major Henry Hopkins, Second Kansas Cavalry. There were also ninety wagons loaded with sutler's supplies and four or five ambulances in the train. At Baxter Springs Major Hopkins received a reinforcement of one hundred Indians, under Lieutenant Waterhouse, from Fort Gibson. He also received a despatch from Colonel Blair, commanding the post at Fort Scott, that information had come to him that Price had crossed the Arkansas River at Dardanelle and was moving north. This despatch was immediately sent to Colonel Wattles, commanding the post at Fort Gibson, with the urgent request that he send up all the troops that could be spared from that post to strengthen the escort to the train, as an attack from a large force of the enemy was anticipated. In the meantime Colonel Wattles had heard of General Cooper's preparations for a hostile movement north of the Arkansas River, and sent forward two detachments of Cherokees, amounting to 310 men, under Lieutenants Whitlow and Palmer, to reinforce the escort to the train. On receiving further information of the

movements of the enemy, he sent a despatch to Major Hopkins, stating that the Confederates, twelve hundred to fifteen hundred strong, had crossed the Arkansas River and were moving north in the direction of Cabin Creek, and directing him to move with the train to that station, where there was a stockade, and where he would be joined by the detachments which were to reinforce him. The Major moved forward with the train and escort on the military road from the Neosho River, arriving at Cabin Creek at noon on the 18th of September, where he was joined by the Cherokees, making his entire force 670 men of white and Indian troops. He was informed that he would receive at this place another reinforcement of six companies of Indians and two howitzers from Fort Gibson.

The next day after the action at Flat Rock, General Gano marched north to Wolf Creek and encamped for the night, without obtaining any definite information in regard to the movements of the Federal train. Leaving General Watie in charge of his camp, he took four hundred men and two pieces of artillery and moved north on the morning of the 18th, until he came in sight of the Federal train at Cabin Creek. He then secreted his command in the timber and sent a courier back to General Watie to bring up the balance of his troops and the other four guns of his battery.

Directly after arriving at Cabin Creek that day, Major Hopkins took twenty-five men of the Second Kansas Cavalry and moved forward three miles south of the station for the purpose of ascertaining if possible the position and strength of the enemy in his front, and came upon the force under Gano, occupying a ravine in the prairie. He returned at once to the train; had it parked in close order in the rear of the stockade, strengthened his pickets, and formed his men in line for an attack.

It was nearly twelve o'clock that night when the bal-

ance of General Gano's force under General Watie came up. But the moon was shining bright, and he moved forward at once over the prairie to attack the Federal position in the edge of the timber on the south side of Cabin Creek. When within half a mile of the Federal camp, he deployed his troops in line of battle, his own brigade of Texans forming his right, and General Watie's Indian Brigade his left, with Howell's battery in position near his right centre, supported by three companies of Texans. He then advanced at two o'clock on the morning of the 19th up to within three hundred yards of the Federal line, when the troops under Major Hopkins opened fire upon him. Almost instantly his own troops replied with small-arms, and the six guns of his battery commenced playing upon the Federal position with shot and shell with demoralizing effects upon the teams of the large train, crowded as they were in as small a space as possible. Up to the opening of the fight, Major Hopkins was led to believe, from the information obtained, that the Confederate force in his front did not exceed eight hundred men, and was without artillery. When he found that the Confederates were supported by a battery, and saw their long double lines and was able to form something like a correct estimate of their numbers, he was satisfied that he could not hold his position very long after daylight. The firing was kept up at intervals on both sides until after daylight, when Gano moved a section of his battery to a position on his left, which enabled him to cross-fire the Federal camp at a range of less than two hundred yards.

In the early part of the action, when the shot and bursting shell from the Confederate battery came crashing through train and timber, a good many teamsters and wagon-masters became frightened, and cutting one or more mules loose from the teams, mounted them and rode off. Finding that his position was becoming untenable,

Major Hopkins endeavored to rally the teamsters and wagon-masters to remove the train to the north side of the creek on the road to Fort Scott; but before his efforts were successful, General Gano ordered two Indian regiments around the Federal right and rear to take possession of the road and prevent any of the teams or Federal troops escaping on the road to Fort Scott. After daylight an incessant storm of shot and bursting shell swept through the camp and train, killing and wounding many of the mules, stampeding the teams, and causing inextricable entanglement in the absence of the teamsters. The bluff that rose almost abruptly from the creek in the rear of the camp, the stockade, and a narrow ravine on the Federal right afforded much protection to the Federal soldiers during this terrible artillery fire. Where their line was exposed to this fire they were obliged to lie down prone upon the ground behind logs and felled trees, in depressions, or behind elevations of the ground, for shelter. Having gained a position on the Federal right and rear, General Gano commenced driving in the Federal skirmishers from that quarter, when suddenly they came to a stand. The General then ordered up Colonel Gurley's Texas Regiment, and led it in person in a charge to break the Federal line, which was formed with the ravine in its front, filled with Federal soldiers lying down. When the charging column approached within twenty-five yards of the ravine, these soldiers, who were lying down unseen by the enemy, arose from the ground and poured a terrible volley into the ranks of the Confederates, throwing them into confusion, and causing them to retire.

At the opening of the fight, the Federal line faced nearly south, but now that the right was driven back it faced nearly west. On being repulsed in front of the ravine, General Gano ordered parts of three Texas regiments still farther to the Federal right, flanking this new

position, and forcing Major Hopkins to evacuate his camp and retire through the timber along the creek east in the direction of Grand River. He encouraged his men to hold out as long as possible, hoping that the reinforcement of six companies of Indians and two howitzers from Fort Gibson would come up and attack the enemy in the rear. Even after evacuating his camp, he hoped to meet this reinforcement and to return and recapture at least a part of the train. He marched at once to Fort Gibson, fifty miles distant, without hearing from the reinforcement, which was marching on a road west of his line of march.

The entire train fell into the hands of the Confederates, but they were able to get away with only 130 wagons, owing to the fact that the teamsters and dismounted soldiers had cut so many mules out of the teams to ride off when it became evident that the train could not be saved. A large number of mules, too, were killed and wounded by the artillery fire; others were killed and disabled in stampeding and running over the bluff. This was the most serious disaster the Federal forces met with in the Indian Territory during the war. All the captured wagons and supplies that General Gano could not take away, he destroyed as far as practicable. He also burned two or three thousand tons of hay put up in ten large ricks. After fitting up as many captured teams as possible to take off the supplies, he started south and recrossed the Arkansas River about fifteen miles above Fort Gibson. The evening after the fight, he met, near Pryor's Creek, Colonel J. M. Williams, with a brigade consisting of parts of the First and Second Kansas Colored and the Eleventh United States Colored Infantry and a battery of Parrott guns, coming up from Fort Smith, and marching to the relief of the train. Colonel Williams fell back a short distance to a strong position convenient to water, and as soon as the enemy came up within range, opened

upon them with his Parrott guns and drove them back. The batteries of both sides kept up their fire at long range for an hour or so until nearly dark, when General Gano formed most of his troops in a long line on a high ridge in the prairie, making an immense display of force, to cover the captured train while it was being hurried forward to the southwest in the direction of the Verdigris. Colonel Williams had marched upwards of eighty miles in less than two days, and his men were so much worn out that he was unable to commence immediate pursuit. That night the Confederates built up fires along the ridge on which they formed, to keep up the appearance of their presence; but when the next morning came they were gone. This was the last and only successful expedition the Confederates made north of the Arkansas River in the Indian Territory after that section was occupied by the Federal forces in the spring of 1863.

General Gano reported the casualties of the Texas brigade at Cabin Creek at seven men killed and thirty-eight wounded, including four officers, one of whom was mortally wounded. General Watie reported one officer killed and four wounded in his brigade, but does not state how many enlisted men he had killed and wounded. As far as could be ascertained, Major Hopkins' casualties were seven men killed, six wounded, and twenty-four missing. The number of citizen teamsters killed and wounded does not appear to have been reported by the wagon-masters.





## CHAPTER XVII.

### THE CAMDEN EXPEDITION.

THE opening of the Mississippi River through the disturbed section, and the occupation of Little Rock and Fort Smith by the Federal forces, with the control of the Arkansas River from the head of navigation to its mouth, imposed upon the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the duty of deciding upon definite plans of further operations for an aggressive campaign early in the spring. In the early part of January, after obtaining the views of general officers who were familiar with military operations in the West, he determined to order the concentration of a large force on Red River for the defence of Northern and Western Louisiana, and for the purpose of operating against Texas, using the Red River as a base, with the coöperation of the navy. The troops selected for this movement were from the Department of the Gulf, under General Banks; a detachment of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps, under General A. J. Smith, from Vicksburg, and from the Department of Arkansas, under General F. Steele. In the plan of the campaign the troops of General Banks and General Smith, with the co-operation of the Mississippi Squadron, under Admiral Porter, were to concentrate at Alexandria, Louisiana, on Red River, by the middle of March, when General Banks would assume command of the land forces of the expedition. The next objective point of the campaign was

Shreveport, on Red River, where the combined forces, including the troops under General Steele, from Little Rock, were to concentrate by the 1st of May. On the 10th of March, the force of 9,200 men, under General Smith, left Vicksburg in a fleet of transports, and arrived at Alexandria on the 16th and 19th, being convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet from the mouth of Red River. A day or so afterwards, General Banks' troops, under the immediate command of General Franklin, commenced to arrive, and by the 26th had all got in. In a few days afterwards the movement of the troops in the direction of Shreveport was commenced, while the fleet of gunboats worked their way up Red River with some difficulty.

On the 23d of March, General Steele left Little Rock with two divisions of troops for Arkadelphia, about one hundred miles southwest, where Brigadier-General John M. Thayer was ordered to join him with the Frontier Division from Fort Smith. When General Thayer joined him he would have about twelve thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and with this force he proposed to push on and take Camden, a strongly fortified town on the Washita River, and then to march to Red River to join Banks. The next day after he left Little Rock a hard rain made the road very heavy, particularly in the creek and river bottoms, which rapidly exhausted the strength of the mules in the train and the artillery horses. The road across the bottoms of some of the streams was in such bad condition that it had to be corduroyed in places before all the train could get over. After leaving Benton, his advance skirmished with the enemy continually until he arrived at Arkadelphia on the 29th. On arriving at this place he was unable to hear anything about the movements of the Frontier Division after leaving Fort Smith, and couriers sent out to communicate with General Thayer returned without being able to find him. Having the longer march to make to form

a junction with Steele's forces at Arkadelphia, General Thayer left Fort Smith on the 21st, but on account of bad roads and the difficulty of getting forage for his transportation and artillery animals, he was obliged to abandon the route agreed upon and take another, presenting fewer difficulties, but less direct and requiring several days more than the estimated time for making the march. On leaving Fort Smith his command consisted of the Twelfth Kansas, the First and Second Kansas Colored Infantry, the Eighteenth Iowa, and the First and Second Arkansas Union Infantry; detachments of the Second, Sixth, and Fourteenth Regiments Kansas Cavalry; Rabb's Second Indiana Battery, Starks' Battery First Arkansas Light Artillery, and two twelve-pounder mountain howitzers attached to the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, the whole force of about five thousand men, with twelve field-guns and two howitzers, being divided into two brigades of infantry, commanded respectively by Colonel John Edwards, of the Eighteenth Iowa, and Colonel Charles W. Adams, Twelfth Kansas Infantry, and one cavalry brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Owen A. Bassett, Second Kansas Cavalry.

When Steele's forces left Little Rock and Fort Smith, the Confederate forces under General Sterling Price, commanding the District of Arkansas, consisted of three divisions of about twelve thousand men, occupying Arkadelphia, Washington, and Camden, the latter place being well fortified and a large depot for army supplies. Two or three days' marching brought General Thayer's command into a mountainous region. The recent rains having washed deep gullies in the road up and down the narrow valleys and carried away the soil, left the road in such a rough, rocky condition as to make it impassable in places for the heavy trains and artillery until it was repaired by the pioneer corps. However, he pushed forward, overcoming every obsta-

cle, and made the march in fairly good time. In passing through the mountains some part of his command was occasionally fired upon by guerillas, who did not generally venture near enough to do any damage to the troops on the march, or to the pickets after the command had gone into camp. The mountainous and wooded country marched over was infested with so many guerillas that Generals Steele and Thayer did not succeed in keeping each other advised of their respective movements by couriers and scouts after leaving Little Rock and Fort Smith.

A few days after General Thayer's command left Fort Smith, important despatches came to that post for him, and were sent forward by three scouts to overtake and deliver to him. While crossing the mountains the despatch bearers were fired upon by a party of guerillas and pursued several miles, and finally surrounded and captured, one of their horses having been killed in the last skirmish. As soon as the three men were captured, the guerillas took from them all the letters and despatches and newspapers in their possession; but in their eagerness to read the newspapers to find out what was going on in other parts of the country, laid the letters and despatches aside for a while. When they had finished reading the newspapers, the guerillas, claiming that they could not read writing very well, ordered one of the prisoners to read the letters and despatches, and warned him that if he did not read them correctly he would certainly be put to death the next day; and stated that they were going to a house the next morning where there was a woman who could read the letters without any trouble. In opening and reading the letters and despatches, the unimportant letters were put back in the envelope after reading, and some of the most important despatches put in with them without being read, and finally destroyed. Fearing that they would be killed,

the prisoners determined to escape during the night if possible. When darkness came on, the guerillas, with their prisoners, encamped on Reveille Creek, which empties into the Petit Jean, and soon made up a blazing fire, as the evening was chilly. After talking around the fire for a while, the men laid down upon their blankets on the ground, except two guerillas who were left as guards to prevent the escape of the prisoners.

In an hour or so the men who had laid down appeared to be sound asleep. But the prisoners were only feigning sleep, and about midnight, not having been relieved, the guards fell asleep. When satisfied that the guards were sound asleep, the prisoners cautiously crept away from their captors into the darkness, taking along several revolvers, and were soon wandering in the mountains, endeavoring to make their way to Little Rock, the nearest point occupied by Federal troops they could reach with safety.

The Frontier Division arrived at Rockport, on the Little Rock and Arkadelphia road, about a week after General Steele had passed that place, and then pushed forward as rapidly as the condition of the roads would permit to overtake him. After waiting several days at Arkadelphia for the Fort Smith troops, General Steele marched to Okolona, about twenty miles southwest, thinking that Thayer must have struck a route west of the one at first proposed. In making this movement his rear-guard, under Brigadier-General S. A. Rice, was attacked about twelve o'clock, April 2d, by General Shelby, with fifteen hundred men and two pieces of artillery, on Gentry Creek, a few miles east of Okolona. When the attack was made, Colonel Thomas H. Benton, Jr., Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry, was in command of the rear-guard, and immediately deployed his regiment in line, and ordered into position a section of Captain Voegele's battery. He repulsed the enemy after a few

volleys and then retired about half a mile to the ridge overlooking Terre Noir Creek and nearer the rear of the train, and formed in line again.

General Rice, commanding the brigade in charge of the supply, pontoon, and brigade trains, now came on the field and directed the movements of his troops. He soon ascertained that Shelby was preparing for another attack, and then ordered up the Fiftieth Indiana Infantry to reinforce the Twenty-ninth Iowa. The Fiftieth Indiana had just arrived on the ground when the firing commenced again with artillery and small-arms. The Confederate force being mounted, and by making a slight detour to the right, had taken possession of the ridge on the Federal left by the time the Federal line was fully formed. While his section of artillery kept up a hot fire on the Confederate battery, General Rice ordered his infantry to charge, and drove the enemy from their position at all points. The time consumed in the two actions had made quite an interval of space between his troops and the moving train, and as it was reported that the train was threatened by another force of the enemy, under General Cabell, moving from the south on the Washington road, General Rice withdrew his troops the moment the enemy were driven from the field and marched rapidly to overtake the train. In resuming the march, the Fiftieth Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel S. T. Wells, covered the rear, and for the next two miles and until he arrived at the junction of the Camden and Washington roads his command was constantly skirmishing with the enemy, who at times pressed forward with a good deal of determination.

Near the junction of the Camden and Washington roads, Colonel Wells' command was relieved by four companies of the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, under Colonel C. E. Salomon. This force, in retiring, continued to engage the Confederates for the next half-mile, when

Shelby dismounted part of his command and formed line of battle and placed his artillery in a favorable position for a desperate assault. In a few moments after the action commenced, General Rice arrived with the Fiftieth Indiana, and threw them into line on the right of the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, and formed the Twenty-ninth Iowa in line in reserve, with the section of the battery in the centre so that its fire would sweep the road. These dispositions were hardly completed when the enemy showed themselves in greater numbers, and the fire from their small-arms and artillery increased in intensity. After firing a few rounds, General Rice ordered his troops to charge the enemy, which they did in gallant style, again driving them from the field in disorder. The Federal troops again faced to the front and resumed the march, but had not advanced more than half a mile when Shelby rallied his men and moved forward to another attack. Colonel Wells and Colonel Salomon again changed front to rear, and, charging, drove the enemy off, and as darkness was approaching, they withdrew from the contest without getting a single team from the Federal trains. The cavalry under General Carr were several miles in advance of the army that day, so that the infantry were kept constantly in motion, marching, forming in line, and in protecting their flanks. They set the grass and leaves on fire in a number of places, which had the effect of annoying the Confederates a good deal with smoke and dust, and several times disarranged their advancing line. It was nearly ten o'clock when the Federal rear-guard got into camp near Okolona that night, and the men were so much exhausted from constant marching and fighting the last ten hours that food and rest were never more welcome. General Rice reported his loss during the day at eight killed and thirty-two wounded. The Confederate loss was perhaps somewhat heavier than the Federal loss from the fact that their attacks were made

upon infantry who were placed in defensive positions as far as practicable before opening fire upon their assailants.

It was the policy of the Confederate commander to use his numerous cavalry in making vigorous attacks on the Federal flanks, front, and rear, to impede the march of the Federal troops as much as possible until they arrived at the Little Missouri River, when he proposed to concentrate his scattered forces on the south side of that stream to oppose General Steele's crossing it. In accordance with this policy, General Shelby made an attack about nine o'clock on the morning of the 4th on the Federal picket about a mile north of camp on the Washington road. When the attack was made, Colonel Adolph Engelmann, who was under orders to march back to Hollywood, fourteen miles, with the Third Brigade, Third Division, and with a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Ritter, to find and establish communication with the Frontier Division, under General Thayer, was still in camp, and was just getting ready to move. He at once ordered Colonel Krez to reinforce the picket with two companies of the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin Infantry, in the absence of the cavalry, which was out on a reconnaissance on the Little Missouri River, and would not be due for several hours. In a short time the Confederates were attacking the reinforced picket with so much energy that Colonel Engelmann ordered forward Colonel Krez with the other companies of his regiment, with instructions to clear the woods of the enemy for two miles northeast of Okolona, if possible. Leaving one company in camp, and collecting the other companies of his regiment not already on the picket-line, Colonel Krez moved forward with his men deployed in line, and soon came in sight of the enemy, and opened fire upon them, and drove them from their position in a thicket to the opposite side of a clearing in the timber, where they made a stand and fired several rounds of grape and can-

ister from their two guns, and several shot and shell, into Colonel Engelmann's position in camp. A section of Vaughn's battery of Engelmann's brigade was brought out, and after throwing a few shells at the Confederate guns, caused them to change their position beyond the range of the pieces of the Federal batteries.

After the skirmishing had lasted an hour or so without any decided advantage to either side, General Shelby made a movement that threatened to flank Colonel Krez on his left. When advised of this movement, Colonel Engelmann sent two companies of the Seventy-seventh Ohio Infantry to form on the left of Colonel Krez, and two companies of the same regiment to form in his rear as a reserve. A severe rainstorm now came up, accompanied with heavy thunder and vivid flashes of lightning, which interrupted operations for a short time on both sides. Directly after the storm passed over, Colonel Krez got the separated companies of his regiment into position so that he could direct their movements to better advantage, and when he extended his line on his right and left and began to move forward, threatening to outflank them, the Confederates withdrew from his front, firing a few shots as they retired. At times the firing on the skirmish-line was quite animated, and during the day's operations Colonel Krez lost three men killed and three wounded. When the firing became heaviest along the picket-line, Colonel Engelmann ordered into line the troops of his brigade who had not been sent to the front. It did not, however, become necessary for them to move out. Only the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin, two companies of the Forty-third Illinois, two companies of the Fortieth Iowa, and two companies of the Seventy-seventh Ohio Infantry were engaged in the action on the picket-line that day. The Federal cavalry under Colonel Ritter did not arrive at Okolona from the Little Missouri River until two o'clock, too late to be employed in the pursuit

of the Confederates, who had just withdrawn from Colonel Engelmann's front. It was four o'clock when the Colonel had drawn in his pickets and had his troops in motion on the march back to Hollywood. When he arrived at the Washington and Arkadelphia road, darkness was coming on, and running into the Confederate pickets he bivouacked in line of battle until the next morning, when, finding that the Confederate pickets had been withdrawn, he resumed the march to Hollywood, arriving there at four o'clock. He sent out detachments of his cavalry beyond that point in the direction of Arkadelphia, and also on the Fort Smith road; but they all returned without being able to obtain any information of General Thayer's movements. After waiting until ten o'clock of the 5th for reports from his detachments of cavalry, he faced to the front again, and rejoined General Steele near Elkins' Ferry on the Little Missouri River that evening after dark, having made a hard day's march of twenty-two miles over bad roads, terribly cut up by the passage of the large trains.

On starting out from Little Rock, Brigadier-General E. A. Carr, commanding the cavalry division, led the advance of the army under General Steele, and had frequent skirmishes with the enemy on the flanks and in front. When the Federal forces arrived at Arkadelphia, the Confederate commander in front supposed that their next objective point would be either Camden or Washington, the two most important points held by the Confederates in the State.

The Confederate general officers understood the general plan of the campaign proposed by the Federal authorities, which was for the forces of Banks and Steele to unite at some point on Red River, perhaps at Shreveport. If General Steele desired to strike Red River at Fulton, the nearest point, Washington would be on his direct line of march from Arkadelphia; or if he desired

to strike Red River lower down, near Shreveport, still the route *via* Washington would be the nearest and most practicable. But his instructions were to reach Red River *via* Camden, which was the best fortified town in the State, as well as one of the most important, the Washita River being navigable to that point about two thirds of the year. And then it was not considered a good policy to leave such a strongly fortified place, provisioned and occupied by the enemy, in the Federal rear. General Steele determined, if practicable, to manœuvre the Confederate forces under Price out of Camden and occupy the place without a general battle. He was satisfied that if he marched from Arkadelphia directly towards Camden, Price would concentrate his forces from Washington and Camden to oppose him on that line; or if he marched towards Washington that Price would concentrate his forces to oppose him on that line. Camden was southeast of Arkadelphia and Washington southwest, and the three places were nearly equally distant from each other—about sixty miles. When General Steele marched out twenty miles southwest from Arkadelphia on the Washington road, the Confederate generals did not doubt but that his next objective point in the campaign was Washington, and at once commenced concentrating their forces on the military road near the Little Missouri River to oppose his crossing that stream. But about nine miles southwest of Hollywood there was a road leading off from the Arkadelphia and Washington road to the south, through Okolona to Elkins' Ferry on the Little Missouri River, and thence to Camden, which General Steele's forces took, except part of his cavalry that had been thrown forward on the Washington road to cover his movements. When he turned off on this road he directed General Carr, commanding the cavalry division, to move forward and occupy a position commanding the crossing at Elkins' Ford or Ferry.

General Carr arrived at the ford at three o'clock on the 2d, and, finding the river fordable, posted a mounted picket on the south side, placed his four howitzers in position on the north side to command the ford, and sent a message back to General Steele, describing the situation and suggesting that a regiment of infantry and a rifled battery be sent forward to strengthen the position. He found that a considerable force of the enemy had crossed the river at the ford that day, going south, and he skirmished with a small force south of the ford, and did not doubt but General Marmaduke would send a strong force there at the earliest practicable moment for the purpose of dislodging him if possible. The holding of the ford was considered so important that General Salomon while on the march in the afternoon of the 2d sent forward part of the Second Brigade of his division, under Colonel William E. McLean, Forty-third Indiana Infantry, who, by making a forced march, reached the ford and crossed to the south side of the river about nine o'clock that night, and went into camp near the ferry.

On April 3d, the balance of General Steele's army, except Colonel Engelmann's brigade, which had been sent back to Hollywood, moved forward from Okolona to Elkins' Ferry and went into camp on high ground on the north side of the Little Missouri River. In the early part of that day some of Marmaduke's mounted detachments discovered the Federal pickets near the ford, on the south side of the river, and a courier was hastily sent to him at the place on the military road a few miles south of the Little Missouri River where he was concentrating his forces, advising him of the situation. He at once ordered forward Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, with his regiment of Colonel Colton Greene's brigade, to make a reconnaissance and ascertain whether the main part of Steele's army had crossed to the south side of the river at Elkins' Ford. The Federal cavalry picket, about four miles

south of the ford on the Prairie d'Ane road, was encountered by Colonel Preston, and driven back nearly two miles upon the infantry outposts. Here, Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. Drake, of the Thirty-sixth Iowa Infantry, who had been sent forward with three companies of his own regiment and three companies of the Forty-third Indiana Infantry, arrived and deployed his men in line and checked the Confederates, who retired a few miles to await the arrival of the forces under General Marmaduke. The Federal and Confederate pickets had a skirmish south of the ford before the arrival of Colonel Preston, and in that skirmish Major W. W. Norris, of the Forty-third Indiana Infantry, came to the assistance of the cavalry picket with four companies of his regiment, and deploying them in line, soon routed the enemy, driving them some two miles and capturing sixteen Confederate soldiers.

In reconnoitring on the picket-line that evening, Colonel Drake became satisfied that the Confederates were directly in his front in strong force, preparing to make an attack that night or early the next morning, and so advised Colonel McLean, commanding the brigade. Colonel Drake was ordered to take command of all the troops at the front, deploy them on each side of the road, watch the movements of the enemy, if attacked, resist them as far as he might consider advisable, and to retire on his reserves if the enemy advanced in force. His cavalry picket consisted of two companies of the First Iowa Cavalry, with vedettes in advance. About two hundred yards in the rear of his cavalry, he deployed three companies of the Thirty-sixth Iowa Infantry on the right of the road, and three companies of the Forty-third Indiana Infantry on the left of the road, with an interval of one hundred yards between each company, with instructions for a few men of each company to keep vigilant watch while the others slept on their arms until

four o'clock next morning, when all should be aroused to breakfast from their haversacks. A section of the Second Missouri Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Charles Peetz, was posted about two hundred yards in the rear of his centre companies so as to sweep the approaches from the front and flanks as soon as the picket retired. In a few hours after sending forward the regiment under Colonel Preston, General Marmaduke followed him with the balance of Greene's brigade and General Cabell's brigade and four pieces of artillery, and bivouacked in line that night on the edge of the Little Missouri River bottom in front of the Federal pickets, prepared to attack the Federal position in the morning at daylight. When daylight came he moved forward his troops to the attack, Greene's brigade in advance, and part of Cabell's brigade being placed in position in reserve.

In a short time the Federal cavalry picket were driven in, firing upon the enemy as they fell back upon the infantry companies deployed by Colonel Drake. The Confederates continuing to advance, with most of their force dismounted, the firing became brisk along the skirmish-line. As soon as the Confederates came up within range, Lieutenant Peetz opened upon them with the section of his battery, checking them for a short time and until Marmaduke ordered his guns into position. The roar of artillery was then continuous for an hour, with very little intermission of firing between the opposing skirmish-lines. Early in the action the Confederates endeavored to flank the Federal skirmish-line on the left, but Colonel Drake extended his line in that direction and drove them back beyond the range of his small-arms. Colonel Greene then sent a mounted force against the Federal right, where his men were driven back by a detachment of the First Iowa Cavalry, with the assistance of Colonel Drake's infantry. He then advanced his skirmish-line, supported by three dismounted regiments, and forced Colonel

Drake's front line back about fifty yards, the firing from the opposing lines being quite heavy at times.

At this point in the action, General Marmaduke came onto the field to direct the operations of his troops in person, and brought with him Monroe's regiment and a section of a battery of Cabell's brigade, and placed them in position, the regiment on his right, and the two guns so as to cross-fire the Federal line. He then ordered his entire line forward, and in the charge forced Colonel Drake's line back upon the infantry reserves, two regiments of which had been brought over from the north side of the river under General Rice early in the action to strengthen Colonel McLean's brigade holding the advance. Colonel C. W. Kittredge, Thirty-sixth Iowa Infantry, had moved up with seven companies of his regiment to the rear of the skirmishers on the left of the road, and when he saw the left of Colonel Drake's line retiring across an open field in his front, he formed his companies in line behind a rise of ground on the left of the section of the battery, and ordered his men to lie down. The enemy were firing and advancing rapidly, and he was satisfied that they were charging the battery. When they advanced into the open ground and came up within range, he ordered his men to rise and fire, which had the effect of instantly checking the Confederate line. He then ordered his men to give the enemy a few well-directed volleys, which caused them to fall back as hastily as they had just advanced.

When that part of Colonel Drake's line on the left of the road fell back across the field, he retired with the companies on the right of the road, in good order, contesting every step of the ground, to a position nearly parallel with Colonel Kittredge's line, where he made a stand and repulsed the enemy on that part of the field. The section of the battery under Lieutenant Peetz, when it appeared to be endangered by the charge of the enemy,

was withdrawn across Howard's Creek, a short distance in the rear, and placed in a good position, where it continued to play upon the enemy's line until it fell back out of range. This repulse of the enemy ended the fight with the exception of a few rounds from their artillery, a grape shot from which slightly wounded General Rice just as he had come onto the field to make disposition of the two regiments which he had brought over from the north side of the river to the assistance of Colonel McLean, but which took no part in the action, the enemy having retired. After his repulse, General Marmaduke retreated to a strong position about four miles south of Elkins' Ferry, and felled trees to obstruct the Federal advance, and threw up temporary defences nearly three miles in length, made of logs and earth, but abandoned them the next morning, and fell back to the south side of Prairie d'Ane. When the fight was over and the enemy had retreated, General Steele strengthened his outposts south of the ferry, and moved his troops and trains which were encamped on the north side to the south side of the Little Missouri River on the 6th of April, and advanced to the high ground some three miles south of the ford. He waited in this position for several days for General Thayer's Frontier Division, which he did not hear from until the 7th, and which was at Rockport on the 5th, arriving at the Little Missouri River on the 9th. In the meantime a heavy rain had fallen, raising the Little Missouri about three feet, so that it covered the lower bottoms, making it necessary to lay down the pontoon bridge and to corduroy about three miles of road across the bottom, to get the troops and trains of the Frontier Division over to the south side.

On the 10th, having concentrated the three divisions of his army on the high ground south of the Little Missouri River, General Steele moved forward six miles south through pine forests to the northern edge of Prairie

d'Ane, where his advance, under Colonel Engelmann, about four o'clock encountered the Confederate skirmishers occupying a ridge at the edge of the prairie, running east and west, and covered with low brush thick enough in places to conceal them from the view of the advancing Federal line. The main Confederate force, under Generals Shelby, Dockery, and Greene, was formed in line on a ridge running parallel with the one on which their skirmishers had formed, about half a mile south of it. Colonel Engelmann ordered up Captain Vaughn's Battery A, Third Illinois Artillery, deployed the Forty-third Illinois Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Adolph Dengler, on the left, the Fortieth Iowa Infantry, under Colonel John A. Garrett, on the right, to support the battery, with the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin Infantry, under Colonel Conrad Krez, in reserve, and sent forward companies from his front line to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy.

When it was found that only the Confederate skirmishers occupied the nearest ridge, General Salomon came up and ordered Colonel Engelmann to deploy his two front regiments, under Colonels Garrett and Dengler, as skirmishers, and then to advance and drive the enemy from their position in the brush, which they did in gallant style, carrying the ridge in a few minutes. The day was now far advanced, and desiring to hold the position which had been gained at the point of the bayonet, General Salomon ordered forward the brigades of his division, Colonel Engelmann's brigade, with Vaughn's battery, forming his right, General Rice's brigade, with Voegele's battery, forming his left, with McLean's brigade in reserve. While Vaughn's battery and the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin Infantry, which was supporting it, were being placed in position on the summit of the ridge just gained, the Confederate battery from the ridge in front opened a hot fire upon the Federal troops. This battery, however,

was soon obliged to leave the position it occupied, for it had fired only a few rounds when it was receiving the concentrated fire of Vaughn's battery on the Federal right and of Voegle's battery on the Federal left. Having driven the Confederate battery from its position, General Salomon ordered another advance, and his troops from Rice's brigade on the left to Engelmann's in the centre and Caldwell's cavalry brigade on the extreme right moved forward and drove the Confederates steadily before them and from the second ridge which their main force occupied when the fight opened.

Night was now coming on, and it was too late to pursue the enemy, who retreated over the prairie and disappeared in the darkness in a southwest direction. The Federal troops bivouacked in line on the edge of the prairie, and as it was a cold, frosty night, they suffered much discomfort, being unable to have fire or shelter. They were kept standing in ranks or on the skirmish-line until nearly twelve o'clock that night, for General Shelby before nine o'clock posted two pieces of Collins' battery just behind the ridge in the prairie, about half a mile distant, and opened fire with shot and shell on the Federal position, lasting upwards of two hours. Vaughn's battery replied, sweeping the ridge around the Confederate guns with a storm of shot and shell. There was also some small-arms firing between the opposing skirmish-lines. The roar of the artillery in the stillness of the night, and the bursting of shells over the heads of the troops, made an impressive scene for the participants of both sides. About eleven o'clock that night, General Shelby formed a brigade of cavalry in line in a grove in front of the Federal right, and swept over the prairie in a charge on Vaughn's battery. When this charging force of cavalry came thundering over the prairie and within range of the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin and Fortieth Iowa Infantry, forming the front line of Colonel Engel-

mann's brigade, Colonels Krez and Garrett, commanding those regiments, ordered their men to open fire upon the enemy, which they did, giving them several effective volleys before they had passed out of range. Almost at the same instant that the infantry opened fire, the guns of Vaughn's battery belched forth in several volleys a perfect storm of canister into the charging cavalry, and sent them back over the prairie in so much disorder that they made no further demonstrations against the Federal front that night.

The next morning at daylight skirmishing commenced again between the outposts of the opposing forces, and in the afternoon General Steele ordered the Third Division in line of battle on the prairie, and it advanced to within a mile of the Confederate fortified position in the edge of the forest skirting the southwest part of Prairie d'Ane. General Price, who had concentrated his available forces behind his works, and who commanded in person, declined to be drawn outside of them to accept the gage of battle offered by General Steele. Part of General Rice's brigade drew the fire of the Confederate artillery; but after some movements on the field in front of the Confederate works, to ascertain their position, it was too late to make an assault that evening, and General Steele's troops were withdrawn after dark to very nearly the position they had occupied the night before. The Confederates had taken up a strong defensive position. They had rifle-pits nearly a mile in length, with positions for artillery, and on the flanks they had made breastworks of logs and felled trees nearly a mile in length, which would have been a great protection in an assault.

Having by his reconnoissance in force ascertained the position of the rifle-pits and breastworks behind which the Confederate troops had been forced to retire, General Steele ordered another advance of the three divisions of his army early on the morning of the 12th, with the view

of attacking Price in his works. In this movement, General Rice's brigade on the right, Colonel Engelmann's brigade on the left, with General Carr's cavalry on either flank, formed General Steele's line of battle. The Frontier Division, under General Thayer, formed the reserve of the army. With colors flying, and with the batteries of the different brigades in proper positions, the troops moved forward over the beautiful prairie, breathing valor all, with the determination of carrying the fortifications of the enemy by assault. When the movement commenced, a heavy line of skirmishers, consisting of one or two companies from each regiment, covered the advance of each brigade, and soon came upon the Confederate line of skirmishers and steadily drove them back to their intrenchments, when they disappeared. The Federal line continued to advance until the troops came in sight of the Confederate works, when General Steele, with Rice's brigade and a brigade of cavalry, turned Price's left flank, and without resistance he abandoned his fortifications and fell back to within eight miles of Washington. He was still under the impression that Steele desired to reach that point, and to conceal his real movement as long as possible, Steele sent part of his cavalry several miles in pursuit of the retreating Confederates, while with the rest of his army he turned to the left and marched for Camden as rapidly as practicable, General Carr, with a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Ritter, taking the advance.

The road General Steele was moving on intersected the Washington and Camden road on the prairie in front of the intrenchments, so that his troops and trains on coming to the junctions of those roads took the left-hand road to Camden, the head of his column encamping on Terre Rouge Creek that night. The recent heavy rains having made the road crossing the bottom of this stream impassable for the trains and artillery, the pioneer corps,

under Captain J. B. Wheeler, Chief Engineer, was sent forward with heavy details to repair it. As long stretches of the road had to be corduroyed and bridges repaired, much time was expended in collecting rails and timber for the purpose, so that the movement of the army was delayed until noon the next day. On the morning of the 13th, General Price was informed that, instead of pursuing him vigorously after he was manœuvred out of his intrenchments at Prairie d'Ane, the Federal forces had turned to the left and were marching rapidly for Camden. There were three roads leading from Washington to Camden, the most northern of which the Federal forces were marching on. When, therefore, Price found that he had been deceived as to the intentions of the Federal commander, he sent forward most of his cavalry and some light batteries, under General Marmaduke, on the middle Camden road, to get in front of the Federal forces and contest their advance on Camden, while he took the divisions of Maxey and Fagan and moved forward rapidly and attacked General Steele's rear under General Thayer, commanding the Frontier Division, near the little village of Moscow on the south side of Prairie d'Ane.

General Dockery came upon and attacked and drove in General Thayer's outposts about one o'clock on the 13th, while General Steele's Third Division was crossing the Terre Rouge Creek bottom. The Frontier Division had encamped in the timber near the prairie, and the teams of the trains were hitched up and the troops in readiness to move when the attack was made. The Confederates advanced over the prairie and deployed to the right and left of the road in such large numbers that General Thayer saw that he must make disposition of his troops at once for battle. He had hardly completed the formation of his line and placed his batteries in position, with his cavalry on his flanks, when Price opened with his artillery and threw forward a brigade under Dockery,

which made a furious charge in the direction of the Second Indiana Battery with the intention of taking it. When this charging force came up within range, the Federal infantry poured several volleys of musketry into their ranks, with fatal precision, and the twelve guns in the batteries of Thayer's division also swept their ranks and the field in front with a storm of grape and canister, causing them to retire hastily with a heavy loss of killed and wounded. There was an almost incessant roar from the artillery firing from one until five o'clock in the afternoon, with several sharp conflicts with small-arms between the opposing forces, when the Confederates were driven from the field and pursued about three miles. In this action the Second Indiana Battery fired 210 solid shot and shell, besides a number of rounds of grape and canister.

When General Thayer's troops returned from the pursuit that evening, his division resumed the march and marched all that night through the swamp and over the terrible road across the Terre Rouge bottom. Although the road had been repaired and corduroyed across most of this bottom, there were places in it where the rails and timber laid down had sunk out of sight in the mud from the weight of the loaded wagons of the trains and the artillery which had already passed over it. While the troops and trains of the Frontier Division were floundering in the swamps and mud of Terre Rouge bottom, General Steele's advance was delayed at Cypress Bayou until the pioneer corps could repair several bridges and corduroy the road in places across the low bottom-land of that stream. Having received information on the 14th that a large Confederate force of cavalry and artillery was marching on the middle Washington and Camden road to get in his front at the junction of that road with the one he was moving on, General Steele sent forward part of his cavalry under General Carr, and a brigade of

infantry and Battery E, Second Missouri Light Artillery, under General Rice, to reach the junction of the roads, fourteen miles northwest of Camden, if practicable, before the enemy. This force marched to White Oak Creek that evening and encamped that night. On arriving at that point, General Carr sent forward 250 cavalry to make a reconnaissance to the junction of the roads, four miles farther on, and 250 cavalry to make a reconnaissance to the middle Washington and Camden road by turning to the right on a cross-road a mile or so in advance. These detachments of Federal cavalry met and skirmished with the Confederate cavalry after dark, killing one and wounding and capturing two men who belonged to Marmaduke's command. From these prisoners it was ascertained that Shelby's and Greene's brigades had arrived at the junction of the northern and middle Washington and Camden roads that evening, and were prepared to oppose the Federal advance.


The next morning, the 15th, Steele's advance, under Generals Carr and Rice, marched only a few miles when they met the Confederate skirmishers near the junction of the northern and middle Washington and Camden roads, and drove them nearly two miles, when they joined Marmaduke, who had formed two brigades on each side of the road, and who at once had five pieces of his artillery open fire upon the Federal advance. General Carr had been using his mountain howitzers to drive the Confederate skirmishers from several positions, but when the Confederate field-guns opened upon him, Captain Stange's battery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Peetz of General Rice's brigade, was brought to the front, supported by the Twenty-ninth Iowa on the left, and Thirty-third Iowa Infantry on the right, and replied very effectively to the Confederate guns.

When the cannonading had lasted nearly two hours, with some skirmishing with small-arms, General Rice or-

dered Colonel Salomon, commanding the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, to turn the left flank of the enemy, the nature of the ground not admitting of the formation of cavalry on that part of the field. While this movement was being made, Marmaduke withdrew his battery and fell back in the direction of Camden, closely pursued by the Federal forces, making only a few feeble efforts to check their advance. He was pushed so closely by Generals Rice and Carr that when within three miles of Camden he turned to the right and moved over on to the lower Washington and Camden road, leaving one regiment under Colonel Lawther to skirmish with the Federal advance into the city. Generals Carr and Rice marched into Camden before dark, with their commands; but the last of the troops and the trains of the Third Division did not get in until nearly midnight, and General Thayer's Frontier Division did not enter the city until the next day.

At that time Camden was the second town in population and in importance in the State, and, until the near approach of General Steele's army, had been the headquarters of General Price, commanding the Confederate forces in the District of Arkansas. It was a beautiful little place, situated on high ground on the south bank of the Washita River, which was navigable for good-sized steam-boats to that point the greater part of the year. It had for several months been the base of supplies for the Southern forces in all that section, and the Confederate authorities had constructed nine forts for the defence of the place at a great cost of money and labor. General Steele had executed a brilliant movement, for in manœuvring Price out of his intrenchments at Prairie d'Ane, he also manœuvred him out of his strong fortifications at Camden, and took the place without a general battle. When Price saw that he had been outgeneralled, he made every possible effort, by attacking the Federal forces in rear and front, to detain them until he could hurry his

mounted infantry and artillery over the lower Washington and Camden road, and get to Camden and reoccupy the works before the arrival of his adversary. But his interposing force was unable to check the Federal advance more than a few hours.





## CHAPTER XVIII.

### THE BATTLE OF POISON SPRING, ARKANSAS.

ON General Steele's arrival at Camden, information had been received there by telegraphic despatches that General Banks had been defeated above Natchitoches and obliged to fall back in the direction of Grand Ecore and Alexandria. This information by telegraph, which had come through Southern sources, was soon confirmed by the return and report of one of General Steele's spies, who had been sent to communicate with General Banks. A day or so later an officer on the staff of General Banks arrived with despatches confirming the reports of his defeat, and that he was falling back to Alexandria. When it was definitely known that Banks had been defeated and was falling back, General Steele saw that it was useless for him to advance any farther in the direction of Red River. His column was a coöperating one, and the point upon which the several columns were converging was now a point from which the other columns were retreating. At that time there were twenty-four feet of water in the channel of the Washita River at Camden, and General Steele thought that he might make that place his base of supplies if he could get a gunboat to convoy steamers up the river. But a crisis was rapidly approaching when he must either get supplies up the Washita, or fall back with his army to Little Rock or Pine Bluff on the Arkansas River. Already there were

rumors that General E. Kirby Smith had promised to send General Price eight thousand infantry and the complement of artillery from the troops who had been operating against General Banks in Louisiana. In the march from Little Rock to Camden, General Steele found that the country had been nearly exhausted of supplies by the Confederate troops during the past winter and spring, and that they had destroyed all the forage on the Federal line of march, as far as practicable, which they could not use or take away. His troops had been on half rations of bread since he started out upon the expedition, and less than that proportion of the meat ration had been issued to them. His cavalry, artillery, and transportation animals, numbering as many as ten thousand, required a large amount of forage, and on account of the short ration and hard service imposed upon them, many of them were daily becoming unserviceable. Indeed, the bread ration was so nearly exhausted that a part of the corn ration for the animals was turned over to the commissary department to be ground into meal for the troops. As the Confederates were driven back they destroyed nearly all the best mills in that section, to prevent the Federal troops from using them, so that most of the meal made had to be ground by the soldiers with hand-mills. The large steamer *Homer*, with a cargo of four thousand bushels of corn, was captured by General Steele's cavalry, under Colonel Ritter, on the Washita, thirty miles below Camden, on the night of the 16th, and brought back up the river to the city and unloaded, and the corn issued to the army, relieving the present situation.

There were a few Union people in Camden, and they reported to Captain C. A. Henry, chief quartermaster of the expedition, how much corn they could spare, and he purchased it and paid them for it. He also ascertained that there were considerable quantities of corn at a number of plantations in the vicinity of Camden, and made

arrangements to secure it. In that section very few of the slaves had left their masters on the arrival of the Federal troops, and the last year the planters and small farmers had raised an increased acreage of corn, and a decreased acreage of cotton, for the demand for corn to supply subsistence and forage for the Southern army and for home consumption had increased, while the market for cotton had become more uncertain.

The Confederate officers had made it a point to use up and destroy the forage in the disputed territory occupied by the outposts of the two armies between Arkadelphia and Little Rock, up to the time General Steele's expedition started out, and had drawn as sparingly as possible on the supplies of the citizens in the vicinity of Camden. When the people found that the Confederates were burning the forage likely to fall into the hands of the Federal troops, a good many of them endeavored to secrete their corn. In the advance on Camden, Captain Henry had ascertained that there was a large amount of corn, estimated at from four to five thousand bushels, at several plantations near the road on which the Federal troops had passed, out about eighteen miles, and on the morning of the 17th made up a train of 198 wagons, and asked for an escort for it of a regiment each of cavalry and infantry, and a section of artillery, to send out and get this forage. General Thayer was instructed to detail troops from his division for the escort. He directed Colonel James M. Williams, First Kansas Colored Infantry, to take command of the escort, which consisted of the Colonel's own regiment, under Major Richard G. Ward, 195 cavalry of the Second, Sixth, and Fourteenth Kansas Regiments, and two pieces of the Second Indiana Battery, under Lieutenant William W. Haines—in all, 695 men. Although the road near which the forage would be found was the one over which the Federal troops had just passed, it was by no means the rear of

the army—was, in fact, as much the front as the rear. It was contrary to the general policy of military commanders to forage to the front. But in the face of this sound military maxim, the train and escort were sent out, and upwards of one hundred of the wagons loaded with corn that evening and during the early part of the night.

The next morning details were sent out with teams, and the empty wagons were to be loaded with forage from plantations on either flank, with instructions to join the loaded part of the train *en route* to Camden. The balance of the troops of the escort and the loaded part of the train were at once put in motion on the road to Camden, and about four miles east of the point where they had encamped during the night, near Poison Spring, met a reinforcement, under Captain William M. Duncan, of 383 men of the Eighteenth Iowa Infantry, 90 cavalry of the Second, Sixth, and Fourteenth Kansas Regiments, and two twelve-pounder mountain howitzers attached to the Sixth Kansas, under Lieutenant A. J. Walker of that regiment. This reinforcement halted until the train passed and then became a part of the rear-guard. About a mile east of this point the advance-guard came up to and fired upon the Confederate picket in the road and pursued it nearly a mile, when it joined the Confederate line of skirmishers which occupied a good position in the pine woods on each side of the Camden road.

When the Federal train and escort left Camden, General Price's headquarters were at Woodlawn, sixteen miles southwest, and about ten miles southeast of the place where Colonel Williams encamped that night. The Confederate scouts had watched the movement of the train and escort from the moment they left Camden until they went into camp that night, and knew the number of wagons in the train and approximately the number of troops in the escort, and reported all this to General Marmaduke near Woodlawn that evening. Later in

the evening these scouts also reported to General Marmaduke the advance of the troops under Captain Duncan which left Camden in the afternoon of the day the train and escort left there in the morning to reinforce Colonel Williams. With this information it was determined that night by General Marmaduke to make an effort to capture the train, and preparations were made to start early the next morning with picked men from three divisions—the divisions of Marmaduke, Cabell, and Maxey, with a four-gun battery to each division—the whole force of thirty-seven hundred men and twelve pieces of artillery to be under the command of General S. B. Maxey, the senior officer of the three brigadier-generals who were to direct the movements of the troops. In the plan of attack, Marmaduke's division was to form on the right, with a battery near his centre; Cabell's division in the centre, with a battery near his centre; and Maxey's division of Texans and Indians on the left of the Confederate line, with a battery near his centre. In taking their positions on the field, Marmaduke's and Cabell's lines faced west, covering the Federal front, and Maxey's line faced north, covering the Federal right.

Of course, when his advance-guard fired upon and drove in the Confederate picket, Colonel Williams knew nothing about these dispositions of the Confederate troops in his front and on his flanks, nor of the strength of the force confronting him. But from what he saw of the movements and boldness of the Confederate skirmish-line, he suspected that the situation might be a serious one, and one that demanded of him extreme caution. Up to that moment it was thought that if an attack should be made on the train, it would more likely be made on the rear than in front, and in consequence most of his troops who were not out with his forage details were in the rear of the train. He ordered the train halted and parked, and forming in line the small force of his cavalry advance,

directed Lieutenant Haines, commanding the section of the battery, to open fire upon the Confederate position for the purpose of ascertaining whether the enemy had artillery, and that the sound of the artillery firing might warn his forage details which were out to come in. The fire of his two guns did not have the effect of at once drawing a response from the Confederate artillery, but the Confederate skirmishers opened a brisk fire of musketry at long range, doing very little damage.

The moment the Confederate skirmish-line was observed, Colonel Williams ordered his colored infantry, under Major Ward, to the front. As they came up they formed in line on each side of the road at the top of a hill, the right of the line overlooking the north end of a field which was a hundred yards or so in front. The field may have had twenty to thirty acres in it, and the north end of it was about two hundred yards south of the Camden road. Nearly all the high ground in that section not in cultivation was covered with pine timber, and in some places with a young growth of pine, making it impossible to see objects more than a hundred yards or so in front.

While the Confederate commander was making disposition of his troops on his left, most of Colonel Williams' forage details which were out, on hearing the cannonading of the first skirmish, hastily came in, and Lieutenant Robert Henderson, of the Sixth Kansas, who had been out with a train of eighteen wagons, on returning turned them over to the quartermaster, and then marched to the front and reported. Colonel Williams had just noticed through openings in the pine woods a movement of Confederate infantry towards his right; but, still desiring to know the nature of the force in his front, sent forward from his right Lieutenants Henderson and Mitchell with their cavalry, with instructions to press the Confederate line, and if possible ascertain the position

and strength of the enemy. While moving along the north end of the field in the pine woods between the field and road, and just as it was nearing the northeast corner, this cavalry received a heavy volley of musketry from the enemy posted in the brush in front, wounding Lieutenant Henderson severely, who was held on his horse and taken to the rear. On returning the fire with their carbines this cavalry was driven back upon the line of colored infantry, and were then ordered to take a position on the extreme right of that regiment. On bringing up the colored infantry, a skirmish-line was thrown forward about a hundred yards in front, covering the left wing. This skirmish-line was kept out upwards of half an hour, exchanging shots with the Confederate skirmishers, and was called in only when it was evident that the Confederate infantry were on the point of advancing against the Federal right.

In a short time after the cavalry under Lieutenants Henderson and Mitchell were driven in on the Federal right, the batteries of Marmaduke's and Cabell's divisions in the Federal front, and the battery of Maxey's division on the right of the Federal position, opened a heavy cross-fire of shot and shell upon the Federal line, lasting perhaps for half an hour. During this heavy cannonade, Major Ward ordered his men to lie down on the ground just behind the crest of the hill, and though exposed to the storm of shot and shell from this terrible cross-fire, his line suffered very few casualties. This was due to the fact that the pine woods concealed the exact location of his line from the view of the Confederate artillery officers. In the course of this fierce artillery contest, a piece of shell struck one of the colored infantry between the shoulders, and he jumped up and spun around for a moment in great agony. A mounted Confederate officer near his battery in front, through an opening in the woods, saw the wounded soldier jump up, disclosing

the position of the Federal line, and at once turned his guns in that direction and swept nearly every foot of the ground a few paces in front of the colored infantry with a storm of shot and shell. Colonel Williams sat on his horse a few paces in the rear of his line with his field-glass in his hands, looking through it and carefully watching every movement of the enemy as far as could be seen through the openings in the woods, and while a storm of shot and bursting shell were flying thickly around him, cautioned his men to keep their eyes to the front. Even before the Confederate battery had opened fire on his right, he had noticed through openings in the pine forest heavy masses of Confederate infantry moving to his right, and, feeling satisfied that he would soon be attacked from that quarter, directed Major Ward to form the right wing of his regiment facing south. To guard against a flanking movement on his left front, Lieutenant Josephus Utt was posted on his extreme left, with seventy-five men of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry. Captain Duncan, commanding the rear-guard of the train, when it was found that the enemy were advancing against the Federal front and right flank, formed his men of the Eighteenth Iowa Infantry in line south of the road, facing southeast, with the section of howitzers, under Lieutenant Walker, and the cavalry, under Lieutenant R. L. Phillips, Sixth Kansas, on his right.

When the Confederate artillery ceased firing, the Confederate infantry advanced through the pine woods on the left and right of the road in front, through the field south of the road, and through the brush southwest of the field, and came up at a trail-arms within one hundred yards of the Federal line, when Major Ward gave the order and the colored infantry rose from the ground and commenced firing from the right of each wing, and then along the entire line, and kept it up, firing four or five volleys, using buck and ball, until the Confederates re-

tired out of range, having also fired several volleys. Generals Cabell and Marmaduke in front, and General Maxey on the Federal right, re-formed and reinforced their assaulting columns, and in a few moments moved forward in another charge, coming up within seventy-five yards of the line of colored infantry, when a fierce conflict with small-arms took place between the opposing lines, lasting perhaps twenty minutes, when the Confederates again retired out of range. In this second assault the men of the opposing lines were near enough to hear each other talking, and part of General Maxey's line on the Federal right introduced themselves as the Twenty-ninth Texas, and called out, "You First Nigger, now buck to the Twenty-ninth Texas." The Twenty-ninth Texas and the First Kansas Colored Infantry were opposed to each other in the battle of Honey Springs, Indian Territory, and in that fight the Texans were driven off the field in much confusion and with a heavy loss in killed and wounded. After the charge, Colonel Williams saw from the overwhelming forces hurled against him, supported by twelve pieces of artillery posted so as to cross-fire his position, that there was no reasonable prospect of defeating the enemy; but he determined to defend the train as long as possible, hoping that the roar of the battle would bring out reinforcements from Camden to his assistance. He kept the section of the Second Indiana Battery steadily at work on the Confederate positions in his front and on his right from the first skirmish, now nearly two hours, and he did not doubt but that this continuous cannonading would notify the officers and troops at Camden, ten miles distant, that he was heavily engaged.

In order to strengthen his left centre, which had twice been driven back, General Maxey ordered Greene's brigade of Marmaduke's division on the right to take position in the centre between Maxey's and Cabell's divisions, and

then the Confederate forces moved forward, four lines deep, in a third charge, their continuous shouting at times rising above the roar of musketry. They were permitted to approach within easy musket range, when Major Ward ordered his men to open fire upon them, to which the Confederates replied with vigor, but were again obliged to retire out of range after a sharp conflict of fifteen to twenty minutes. Every time the Confederate infantry retired out of range to lower ground, the Confederate batteries, from elevated positions, firing over their heads, cross-fired the Federal position with a perfect storm of shot and shell. Just at the close of the third assault the two pieces of the Second Indiana Battery having nearly exhausted their shell and canister, and nearly all the gunners of the right piece being wounded and disabled, Lieutenant Haines was ordered to report with that piece to Captain Duncan, commanding the rear-guard, and number one on the left was limbered towards the rear on the north side of the road.

In the three desperate assaults which the enemy had made on his lines, Colonel Williams saw that his right and front had suffered so heavily in killed and wounded that he could not sustain another charge, for which the Confederates were preparing, without too great a sacrifice, and started to ride to the rear to form the Eighteenth Iowa in a favorable position for the colored infantry to fall back upon, when his horse was shot under him. Major Ward immediately gave him his horse, and he mounted it and rode back and formed the Eighteenth Iowa in line facing in the direction from which the enemy were advancing; but he had hardly completed this duty when the Confederates made their fourth charge, forcing the line of colored infantry, which from the first assault had been a curved line, with the centre of the curve outward, back about one hundred yards, close upon the train. At this time the smoke was so dense along the line of

battle that the troops could see each other distinctly only a few yards distant, making it difficult to keep a perfect alignment. Two companies of the colored regiment which had at first formed the left of the left wing, under Lieutenant W. C. Gibbons, on the north side of the road, on retiring on that side of the road became separated from the other companies by the train, which was now between them. But as the Confederates were also pressing forward on the Federal left, Lieutenant Gibbons had all he could do to keep them off until his men joined their comrades north of the road near the rear of the train.

Early in the action Colonel Williams was convinced from the movements of the Confederates and from information obtained from a Confederate soldier, who rode into his line inquiring for Colonel De Morse, that their main attack was going to be directed against his front and right flank, and, to strengthen this part of his line, and to be prepared for the charge which he knew was coming, ordered up from the rear four companies of the Eighteenth Iowa. In the meantime Colonel Tandy Walker's Choctaw Indian Brigade had formed in line on General Maxey's left about half a mile south of the rear of the train, on Captain Duncan's right when his line faced east, but directly in his front when he changed his line facing south, and in view of the situation he sent a message to Colonel Williams, stating that he was so closely pressed by the enemy that he could not spare the men called for. Though Captain Duncan was threatened by this Indian brigade in his front while the desperate conflict was going on in front and on the right of the train, his command did not become heavily engaged until the line of colored infantry was broken, and the retreat had commenced. After the line of colored infantry was forced back in the fourth assault, the Confederate commander rapidly drew his lines closer around the Federal position, and his troops, seeing that success was assured,

went into the closing scenes of the fight with a wild hurrah, shooting down the colored wounded soldiers as they came upon any who were left on the field. With desperate valor and contesting every inch of ground, the colored infantry were forced from their position back to the rear of the train and formed on the left of the Eighteenth Iowa, pouring volley after volley into the lines of the exulting foe as they retired.

The Federal troops and train were now entirely surrounded, and the firing of small-arms and artillery, the crashing of shot and bursting shell in among the teams of the large train, the roar of the battle, and the shouting of the victorious Confederate troops soon caused a scene of great confusion. Colonel Williams now saw that it was impossible to save the train, and that it would require heroic courage to save his troops who were not already left on the field, killed and wounded. In a few moments after part of the colored infantry formed on the left of the Eighteenth Iowa, the united commands were compelled by overpowering numbers of the enemy to retire to the north side of the Camden road, where a stand was made for a short time to enable the section of the battery to move to the rear, which was then north of the road. When forced from this position the Federal troops retired through an open field, and in the timber on the north side of it formed in line again, and after a few volleys checked the Confederates, who were advancing with yells from the front and left and right flanks. In falling back to this position, this main part of the command was joined by quite a number of the colored soldiers who had fallen back from the front on the north side of the train under Lieutenant Gibbons, and by others who made their way between the teams to the north side of the road when Colonel Williams' front and right flank were forced back after the fourth charge. Of course it was now the purpose of the Federal troops to retreat to

Camden by the most direct route practicable. Closely pressed by the enemy from all sides, and retreating through timber and thick brush and over ground cut up by ravines, over which it was impracticable to move artillery, it became necessary to cut the horses loose from the two pieces of the Second Indiana Battery and the two howitzers of the Sixth Kansas, and abandon the guns.

Near the field north of the Camden road, Colonel Williams rallied part of his cavalry, under Lieutenant Phillips, Sixth Kansas, and held them in line long enough to enable his wounded colored soldiers who had fallen in the rear to come up and reach a swamp which lay in his front and get away. After leaving the position behind the field in the timber, the Confederate infantry did not again get up within range of the Federal troops; but the Confederate cavalry continued the pursuit about two miles, frequently pressing closely upon Colonel Williams' flanks and rear, so that his troops were obliged to form four or five times, face to the rear, and give the enemy a volley each time to hold them off. As General Maxey wished to secure the large train and the abandoned guns, and fearing that a large Federal force would come out from Camden and attack him, he very soon called off his troops from the pursuit and placed part of them in position on the Camden road east of the train. It was about two o'clock when the Confederate cavalry disappeared from the rear and flanks of the retreating Federal troops, after which, by toilsome marching through swamps and pine woods, they reached Camden that night about eight o'clock, without further interruption, in a nearly exhausted condition.

On account of the repeated threats which the Confederates had made that they would show no quarter to colored soldiers, and having that day seen the Confederates shooting and bayoneting the wounded colored soldiers where they had fallen, every colored soldier who was wounded in the fight and who could walk came off

the field with the troops in the retreat. Some who were too badly wounded to walk, lay on the field, and when the Confederates came near them, feigned being dead, and crawled off the field after dark, and endeavored to make their way back to camp, marching while they had strength and then lying down in the grass and weeds to rest. Several colored soldiers who were badly wounded, and who from weakness and loss of blood were obliged to march and rest at intervals, were bitten by poisonous snakes while lying down in the grass or weeds during the night, and when they got into camp the next day their bodies were horribly swollen from the effect of the poison which had spread through their systems. One of the colored soldiers who was wounded and lay on the field until night feigning death, and then crawled off and made his way into camp, stated that he saw the Confederates shooting the wounded colored soldiers who were left on the field, and that Confederate soldiers went over the field after the battle, calling out and answering each other, "Where is the First Nigger now?" "All cut to pieces and gone to hell by bad management."

The Federal loss in the battle was 122 men killed, 97 wounded, and 81 missing. In the fight and in the retreat, the colored regiment had 117 men and officers killed and 65 wounded. When separated from their command or cut off from it, the colored soldiers were shot down without mercy. General Cabell reported that one of his regiments, stationed east of the battle-field on the Camden road, killed at least 80 negroes.

General Maxey reported his loss, from incomplete returns of casualties in his different commands, at 17 men killed and 88 wounded. His officers reported only 4 colored men captured. Immediately after the fight was over he commenced removing the train, artillery, and captured property from the scene of the conflict to the Confederate camp near Woodlawn, the last of the troops not leaving the field until nearly dark.



## CHAPTER XIX.

### BATTLE OF JENKINS' FERRY.

IN all the movements of his troops up to the occupation of Camden General Steele had shown extreme caution against being drawn into a position from which he could not give blow for blow if attacked. He had kept out heavy cavalry reconnoissances miles in his front and on his flanks, with a strong infantry rear-guard. When the train left Camden he knew that all Price's forces were in his immediate vicinity, and if he did not know their exact position, a cavalry reconnaissance might have discovered it and prevented the Poison Spring disaster. In view of his habitual caution it seems probable that his attention was not called by his chief quartermaster to the distance and direction the forage he desired to secure was from Camden. When he heard of the disaster, he stated that he was opposed to foraging to the front. The loss of this large train and artillery was seriously felt by him, and would necessarily cripple his future operations, while the success of the Confederates in the enterprise would stimulate the leaders to still greater exertion to throw their forces upon his line of communication with his base of supplies at Little Rock and Pine Bluff. His hopes of getting the assistance of the gunboats on the Washita were dissipated by information brought to him by one of his messengers from General Banks that Red River had fallen so rapidly that part of the gunboats of Admiral Porter's

fleet had grounded, and that none of them would probably be able to get back over the falls above Alexandria. His troops had hardly got into camp at Camden from the field of Poison Spring, when his spies and scouts reported that General E. Kirby Smith had arrived at General Price's headquarters on the 19th, to direct in person the further operations of the Confederate forces, and that on the next and following days the divisions of Walker, Churchill, and Parsons, from Louisiana, numbering about eight thousand men and artillery, would be up.

A supply train of 150 wagons, loaded with commissary and ordnance stores, was due from Pine Bluff, and General Steele sent out a brigade of infantry, under Colonel Thomas H. Benton, Jr., Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry, to meet it and guard it into Camden. Colonel Benton met the train out about seventeen miles, and brought it in safely on the 20th, and half rations for ten days were issued to the troops. As soon as unloaded, the train was sent back to Pine Bluff for further supplies, guarded by a brigade of infantry, four hundred cavalry of the First Iowa, and four pieces of the Second Missouri Light Artillery, all under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Francis M. Drake, Thirty-sixth Iowa Infantry. To guard against a surprise, General Steele had sent out his cavalry, under General Carr, to scout the country for a distance of thirty miles below Camden and an equal distance above and in the direction of Pine Bluff and Little Rock, and before the train started back, his officers who had been on this scouting service reported that they could not hear of any Confederate force north of the Washita River.

On his arrival in the vicinity of Camden, and having assumed command of the Confederate forces in person, General Smith sent out an expedition, under General Fagan, of four thousand picked cavalry and several batteries of light artillery, with instructions to cross to the north side of the Washita River and destroy General

Steele's supplies at Little Rock and Pine Bluff, and then to make such disposition of his force as to effectually interrupt the communication of the Federal commander with those points. The expedition under General Fagan left the Confederate camp, a few miles south of Camden, on the 22d, the same day that the Federal supply train under Colonel Drake crossed to the north side of the Washita *en route* for Pine Bluff. To attract General Steele's attention from Fagan's movement, General Price moved up part of his troops and batteries and opened a heavy cannonade upon the Federal outposts at Camden, lasting several hours. General Fagan crossed the Washita thirty to forty miles below Camden, and by making a forced march got his troops in position to attack the escort to the train under Colonel Drake in front and rear at Marks' Mill, near the Moro Swamp, on the morning of the 25th.

After a desperate battle of nearly five hours, the Federal troops were overwhelmed and nearly all the infantry killed, wounded, and captured, Colonel Drake, the gallant commander, being severely wounded in the thigh and hip. The train of 211 wagons and the four pieces of artillery also fell into the hands of the Confederates. The Federal troops fought the battle under great disadvantages, the force in front being separated from the one in the rear by the length of the train, probably nearly two miles, besides being outnumbered as four to one by the enemy, who were stripped for the fight. General Fagan reported that his killed and severely wounded would not exceed 150 men. General Cabell, however, reported that his brigade alone had over 200 men wounded. In his report of the battle, Colonel Drake stated that his chief surgeon informed him that he had about 250 men killed and wounded. He also stated that after the fight that day it was estimated that there were 800 to 900 dead and wounded men on the battle-field;

that about one half of these were Confederates, and that a large proportion of the others were Arkansas refugees and negroes who were going along with the train to Pine Bluff, and who had been inhumanly murdered. A good many of the colored men, however, when they saw that the train was going to be captured, fled to the swamps and got away, and in a few days reached Pine Bluff and Little Rock. Very few of the cavalry were captured, and those who were in the rear of the train fell back in the direction of Camden, some of the men reaching that point early that night to inform General Steele of the disaster.


A council of war was held at General Steele's headquarters that night, and it was the opinion of nearly all the general officers present that the army should evacuate Camden and abandon the line of the Washita at once and fall back to Little Rock; that the supply line from Little Rock or Pine Bluff was too long to keep up in view of the fact that General Kirby Smith had brought large reinforcements from Louisiana and could pass to the Federal rear and cut the army off from its base of supplies. The greater part of Price's force was cavalry, or rather mounted infantry, and could be moved very rapidly to any given point to make an attack, and was very effective in operating against the Federal supply line.

On his arrival at Camden, General Steele had directed Captain Wheeler, his chief engineer, to lay down the pontoon bridge across the river opposite the city, connecting with the Pine Bluff road, so that it was ready for immediate use when it was determined to evacuate the place. The next day, the 26th, the baggage trains and artillery crossed the bridge over the river to the north side, the troops keeping their respective positions until an hour or so after dark, when they, too, were quietly withdrawn, without attracting the attention of the citizens, to the north side. When daylight came the next

morning the pontoon bridge had been taken up, and the Federal troops and trains were on the march to Little Rock by way of Princeton. In the movement of the troops, General Steele left Colonel William F. Cloud, Second Kansas Cavalry, commanding the cavalry brigade of the Frontier Division, in charge of the rear-guard. The steamer *Homer*, which the Federal cavalry had captured with a cargo of corn, was left in the river at the landing after the army had moved out, and it was with great reluctance that the Colonel did not destroy the boat, for he felt certain that it would be used by Generals Smith and Price on their arrival at Camden, to cross their troops and artillery over the Washita to take up the pursuit. But having special instructions from General Steele not to destroy it, he marched away leaving it uninjured, as far as he knew. It may, however, have been disabled for use by the removal of some parts of its machinery, for when the Confederate troops arrived in town the next day, a raft bridge was constructed to cross them and their artillery over the river at that point. As soon as they got their troops and artillery over the river at Camden, Generals Smith and Price pushed forward in pursuit of the retreating Federal army, marching day and night, with a few hours' intervals for rest, hoping to overtake it before it crossed the Saline River.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, General Steele's advance arrived at Jenkins' Ferry on the Saline River. That stream was too deep to ford, and the pontoon train was hurried up and the pontoon bridge laid in less than three hours. Nearly all the cavalry and part of the wagon trains crossed the river on the bridge that evening before dark, and the balance of the trains and artillery crossed over during the night and the next morning. There was a steady downpour of rain all the afternoon and nearly all night, so that the next morning the Saline River was out of its banks in places, and the low

bottom lands on each side of it for two miles covered with from two to three inches to nearly a foot of water, requiring the greatest efforts for troops and animals to pass over the ground after a few trains in advance had worked it into a deep mud. In the afternoon of the 29th,



BATTLE-FIELD OF JENKINS' FERRY, ARKANSAS.

Greene's brigade of Price's command came up with and attacked General Steele's rear-guard under Colonel Engelmann, bringing up a battery to rake the road on which the Federal troops were marching. The attacks of the Confederates were so persistent that Colonel Engelmann

formed part of his brigade in line facing to the rear, and, with a section of Vaughn's battery, skirmished with them until they retired out of range. When he resumed the march his rear was covered by two companies of the Fortieth Iowa Infantry, deployed as skirmishers, and he had no further annoyance from the enemy until his command arrived on the high ground overlooking Saline River Valley, about three miles from the ferry. At this point he was instructed to leave as a picket a regiment of infantry, two companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Captain John Rogers, and a section of Vaughn's battery, under Lieutenant C. W. Thomas.

Lieutenant-Colonel Adolph Dengler, Forty-third Illinois Infantry, had just formed the two battalions of his regiment, one on each side of the section of the battery, behind the crest of the hill, facing to the rear, with cavalry vedettes a short distance back on the road upon which the enemy were advancing, when the Confederates again came in sight and commenced using their artillery in throwing shot and shell. After a few rounds from the section of Vaughn's battery, the Confederate guns were limbered to the rear. The skirmish-line which Colonel Dengler sent forward, covering both wings of his regiment, and the detachment of cavalry on his flanks engaged the Confederates with small-arms until dark, when the firing ceased. While this skirmishing was going on, Colonel John A. Garrett, Fortieth Iowa Infantry, was ordered to march back and form his regiment a short distance in the rear of the Forty-third Illinois and to throw out skirmishers on his right and left flanks, and to use the utmost vigilance to guard against surprise.

As night was drawing a mantle of darkness over the wet, hungry, and tired troops and animals, the section of Vaughn's battery was withdrawn to a less exposed position. The Forty-third Illinois was also relieved from picket duty on the hill by the Thirty-third Iowa Infantry,

under Colonel C. H. Mackey, who kept his men standing in line in the rain until four o'clock the next morning. He then received orders to retire his regiment about three quarters of a mile in the direction of the river, so as to cover the crossing of the troops and trains on the pontoon bridge. He made this movement before it was fairly light, and took up a position a few yards west of the field south of the main road near the foot of the hill, where his skirmishers engaged the skirmish-line of Greene's brigade, composed of the same troops who had skirmished with the Federal rear-guard the previous evening. He held the Confederates in check for half an hour, when his regiment was relieved by the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin Infantry. His regiment and the men of several other regiments who had stood in line all night were marched to the second field south of the road nearest the crossing, where they were halted and made fires to prepare coffee for their breakfast, and if possible get a few moments of needed rest.

The demonstrations against his rear-guard up to dark on the 29th convinced General Salomon, whose division was in the rear, that an attack in force by the Confederates might be anticipated during the night or the next morning. His troops were therefore posted so as to be in readiness to meet an assault at any moment. But in the skirmishes his rear-guard had not captured any of the enemy from whom he could obtain information as to the strength of the forces in his rear, and who was in command of them. General Steele supposed that they were General Fagan's troops, who only a few days before had captured the Federal train at Marks' Mill, less than a day's march distant, and who that day had crossed the Federal line of march near Princeton only two or three hours before the Federal advance came along. The heavy rain nearly all night had made the crossing of the trains over the river on the pontoon bridge very slow

and tedious, and at daylight on the 30th there were still nearly two miles of trains and artillery on the west side to be crossed over. General Salomon, commanding the Third Division, was left on the west side to cover the crossing of these trains, and made such disposition of his troops as to withdraw them as rapidly as the trains moved forward on the road to the bridge. His picket had prevented the Confederates from posting artillery on the bluffs during the night within range of the Federal troops, and he now desired to retire his line far enough in the direction of the bridge so that it would still be out of range of batteries planted on the hills west of the Saline Valley. After his troops were withdrawn into the valley, his right flank was protected by a deep, narrow stream, or bayou, known as Toxie Creek, on the north side of the road, and that ran parallel with it and emptied into the Saline at Jenkins' Ferry, and on his left, when facing to the rear, south of the field nearest the ferry was a swamp in the heavy timber, covered with water by the incessant rains, and impassable for infantry, artillery, or cavalry.

While the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin and Fiftieth Indiana Infantry were holding the first line behind the field at the foot of the hill, after they had relieved the Thirty-third Iowa Infantry, General Rice formed a second line with the Twenty-ninth Iowa and Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, just east of that field, in the timber. When this line was completed, his first line was retired behind it. On the retiring of the first line, the Confederates under Greene again moved up and attacked the second Federal line, first driving in the skirmishers. In the meanwhile General Rice formed the Fiftieth Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wells, on his left, and sent the detachment of the Second Brigade and two companies of the Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry to the north side of Toxie Creek on his right to check a movement of the enemy on that part

of the field. At eight o'clock the Confederate division of General T. J. Churchill arrived on the field; his four brigades, under Brigadier-Generals Tappan, Hawthorn, and Dockery and Colonel Gause were deployed in line of battle, and with one regiment deployed as skirmishers and two regiments in reserve he moved forward and attacked the Federal position. In this movement part of Greene's brigade formed on the right of Churchill's division and part on the left.

On Churchill's division descending from the hill to the Saline bottom, Dockery's brigade was detached by General Smith to advance down on the north side of Toxie Creek and to attack any Federal troops posted on that side. The Confederate skirmish-line under General Tappan came upon the Federal skirmishers in the field nearest the river, and at once engaged them and drove them in upon the main Federal line posted in the timber east and south of the field. General Rice, commanding the advance Federal line, had posted his troops with excellent judgment, so that when the Confederates were crossing the field, which was about a quarter of a mile long and wide, and were nearing the eastern edge of it, his men poured a terribly destructive fire into their ranks from the front and from the southeast side of the field, suddenly checking their advance. General Tappan brought up his reserve regiments and threw them into action, but the volleys of the Federal musketry increased in intensity, and were wasting his ranks so rapidly that he called on General Churchill for reinforcements to enable him to hold his position. General Hawthorn's brigade was sent to his support and formed on his left, and then the roar of musketry that went up along the opposing lines was terrific. The Confederate attack which, up to this time, had been directed mainly against the Federal right and centre was now being directed against the Federal left and centre with great energy, and succeeded in forcing

back the Thirty-third Iowa, under Colonel Mackey, which had been brought up to the support of the Fiftieth Indiana on the extreme left of the line, about two hundred yards.

While the Thirty-third Iowa were retiring from their position, Colonel Garrett came up with four companies of his regiment, the Fortieth Iowa Infantry, from Colonel Engelmann's brigade, and formed his men a few paces to the left and in front of the position lately occupied by the Thirty-third Iowa, and opened fire upon the enemy. When he got his men in position he noticed that there was quite a gap between the right of his line and the left of the line of the troops on his right, which if not closed up at once might endanger his command. He therefore moved forward and to the right, firing as he advanced, until his right joined the left of the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin, which had also been sent forward by Colonel Engelmann, at the request of General Rice, to support the Thirty-third Iowa. The entire Federal line now advanced, driving the Confederates before it about a quarter of a mile, pouring volley after volley into them as they retired, and passing over their dead and wounded. The battle was now assuming such proportions that, at the request of General Salomon, General Steele sent back to him three regiments, the Twelfth Kansas Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Hayes, the Second Kansas Colored Infantry, under Colonel Samuel J. Crawford, and part of the First Arkansas Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Searle, from General Thayer's Frontier Division, which had not yet crossed the river. The Twelfth Kansas arrived on the field and formed on the left of Colonel Garrett on the extreme left of the Federal line in time to participate in the advance in which the Confederates were driven back across the field.

While the battle was thus raging with great fierceness in and around the field nearest the river on the south

side of Toxie Bayou, General Dockery's brigade of sharp-shooters had moved down on the north side of that bayou, accompanied by Lieutenant E. Cunningham, Aide-de-Camp on General Smith's staff, and attacked General Rice's extreme right on that side, consisting of the Forty-third Illinois, a detachment of the Second Brigade, two companies of the Twenty-ninth Iowa, two companies of the Fortieth Iowa Infantry, and two companies of the Second Kansas Colored Infantry. After the fighting on that side of the bayou had lasted upwards of an hour, the Confederates were driven back some distance, and then withdrew to the south side of the stream, but before retiring they advanced near the bank of the bayou and directed their fire against General Rice's right on the south side near the corner of the field. When the enemy were reported to have retired from the north side of the bayou, General Salomon ordered all his troops, except the two companies of the Twenty-ninth Iowa, from that to the south side, and they were obliged to again plunge in and wade the swollen stream waist deep. After Churchill's division had been driven off the field, a calm prevailed along the Federal front for nearly half an hour, during which time the troops who had been fighting in the front line, and who had expended nearly all their ammunition, replenished their cartridge-boxes from boxes brought up by mounted troops from the ordnance train across the river.

When Generals Smith and Price saw that Churchill's division had been repulsed with heavy loss, Parsons' division was hurried forward to his support. On coming to the strip of timber between the fields, General Parsons' First Brigade, under General Clark, was posted on the left of Churchill's reserve brigade under Gause, and his Second Brigade, under Colonel Burns, was posted on the right of Gause. When these dispositions had been made, this second line moved forward to the support of the two

brigades of Tappan and Hawthorn in the first line. In this order the whole force moved forward and again attacked the Federal position. To meet this assault, General Rice placed the Second Kansas Colored Infantry on his right, the right of the regiment resting on Toxie Bayou, or Creek, and the left joining the right of the Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry. The Ninth Wisconsin formed his right centre, and the Thirty-third Iowa Infantry his left centre. And the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin formed the right, four companies of the Fortieth Iowa the centre, and the Twelfth Kansas Infantry the left, of his left wing. His second line, naming the regiments from the left, consisted of part of the Second Arkansas, part of the Fortieth Iowa, the Forty-third Illinois, the Fiftieth Indiana Infantry, and a detachment of McLean's Second Brigade. The regiments of this line were near enough to support any part of the front line in a few minutes. The moment the heavy masses of the Confederates advanced within range of the Federal line, a sheet of flame burst forth along the entire length of the opposing lines with a terrific roar of musketry.

As General Rice knew every foot of the ground the Confederates would be obliged to pass over, his troops were posted so that their fire would be as effective as possible. His line was by no means straight, but parts of it stood at such angles as to enfilade and cross-fire the advancing Confederates. General Clark's brigade, in attempting to charge across the field, when they got about two thirds over met a terrific fire from the Second Kansas Colored and the Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry, which checked them and in a short time sent them back in some confusion into the timber to re-form. It was on this part of the field that a Confederate battery had taken position near the road and had commenced to furiously assail the Federal line, when Colonel Crawford requested permission of General Rice to charge it with

his regiment, the Second Kansas Colored Infantry. The request was granted, and Colonel Crawford ordered his men to fix bayonets, and they moved forward steadily with a cheer, firing as they advanced, and shooting down the artillery horses and part of the men of the battery before they could remove the guns, and they were captured and drawn off the field by the men with ropes. The lieutenant of the battery and most of his men were also captured. In the Federal centre the Ninth Wisconsin and Thirty-third Iowa Infantry were being hotly pressed by Gause's Confederate brigade; the Thirty-third Iowa had expended their ammunition and were relieved by the Forty-third Illinois Infantry from the second line, which moved forward under Colonel Dengler, firing as they advanced, and soon commenced driving the Confederates, and drove them almost to the foot of the bluff. The Forty-third Illinois then retired to their former position.

While the Federal right and centre were thus engaged, the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin, four companies of the Fortieth Iowa, and the Twelfth Kansas Infantry on the Federal left were having a fierce conflict with the Confederate brigades of Burns and Tappan opposed to them, and forced them to retire about the time the Confederate centre gave way.

The battle was not yet ended. Lieutenant-General Smith still had Major-General J. G. Walker's Texas division of infantry, which had just arrived, to place in action to dislodge or capture the Federal force opposed to him on the west side of the river. His advance brigade, under Brigadier-General Waul, had moved forward only a short distance, when Major-General Price was met bringing the Missouri and Arkansas divisions of Parsons and Churchill off the field in a demoralized condition. Proceeding to the field, General Walker formed his line of battle, General Waul's brigade on his left, and the

brigades of Brigadier-Generals Scurry and Randall in his centre and on his right. As he advanced to the scene of conflict, a heavy line of skirmishers was thrown forward, covering his entire front.

Having repulsed and driven the divisions of Churchill and Parsons from the field, General Rice made some changes in his line. The Second Kansas Colored Infantry, having expended their ammunition, had retired to replenish their cartridge-boxes, and were then placed in position in the centre of his front line, their right joining the left of the Ninth Wisconsin and their left connecting with the right of the Fiftieth Indiana Infantry, which had been brought up from the second line to relieve the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin. Farther to his left were the Thirty-third Iowa, four companies of the Fortieth Iowa, and the Twelfth Kansas Infantry, the last-named regiment on his extreme left. The attack of General Walker was directed mainly against the Federal centre and left, his troops moving forward with much steadiness. His left, under General Waul, came in sight of part of the Federal line as it was crossing the field and driving before it the last of the retreating troops of Churchill's and Parsons' divisions. The troops of the Federal line retired to their positions in the timber east and south of the field, and when General Waul's brigade had advanced about two thirds across the field, poured a terrific fire of musketry into it from the front and enfiladed his line from the direction of the bayou on his left, and from the south side of the field on his right. In a few moments more the other two brigades of Walker's division, which had come upon the field on a road from the southwest, attacked the Federal left, and then the devouring flames of the battle swept along the opposing lines with tremendous fury for more than three quarters of an hour.

An order had been given to charge the Federal line,

but while preparing the troops for its execution, Brigadier-Generals Scurry and Randall fell, mortally wounded, and General Waul was severely wounded. Colonel Watson, of the Eighteenth Texas Infantry, was also killed, and Colonel Overton Young, of the Eighth Texas Infantry, was severely wounded, besides a number of other officers. General Waul was able to stay in his saddle on the field for some time, but the loss of the other two brigade commanders and the heavy loss in regimental commanders soon caused great confusion among the troops of those brigades, who were still receiving a terrible fire from the Federal left, and the whole division was withdrawn from the field to the strip of timber between the two fields, where it occupied a defensive position until the Federal troops resumed the march. In the early part of this fight with Walker's division, General Rice received a wound in the foot while directing the movement of his troops on his left, which disabled him temporarily from active service. This attack on the Federal left was so determined that troops of the second line had to be ordered up to support those of the first line. Indeed, nothing could surpass the bravery and determination and deliberation with which the Federal troops delivered their volleys in resisting the three desperate assaults made upon their line.

After Generals Churchill and Parsons had taken their divisions out to the foot of the hill, collected their numerous stragglers, re-formed their lines, and supplied their troops with ammunition, they were ordered to return to the field to the support of Walker's division. But when they returned to the field they found that Walker's division had withdrawn from the conflict, his troops were in confusion, and the battle was over. The Federal troops were in no condition to follow up their success, for their rations were exhausted that morning, with no hope of getting supplies until they arrived at Little

Rock; and their artillery horses and train animals were starving for forage.

Having effectively repulsed every assault of the Confederates, and being in no condition to assume the offensive, General Steele withdrew his troops from the field, and crossed them over the river on the pontoon without interruption. As many of his severely wounded as he could furnish transportation for were gathered up from the field and brought along. Those who were too badly wounded to bring along with the army were taken up and removed to a house near the field, which was turned into a field hospital, and surgeons and attendants, with medical supplies, left with them to take care of them. The infantry as they passed over the bridge were formed on the east bank of the river, supported by artillery, to protect the rearmost troops in the event of pursuit by the enemy. It was about half-past twelve o'clock when General Walker's division withdrew from the fight, and shortly after two o'clock the last of the Federal troops, except the severely wounded, had crossed the bridge to the east side of the Saline.


The battle was fought almost entirely by infantry. Where the ground was not covered with water, it was so saturated with the continuous rain that it was almost impracticable to move artillery on any part of the field. Only a single section of the Federal batteries was left on the west side of the river during the battle, and it fired only a single shot to reassure the troops. Two Confederate batteries were brought on the field, one of which was captured a few minutes after its arrival, and the other was withdrawn before it had fired a dozen rounds. The Federal loss in the battle was 86 men killed, 500 wounded, and 61 missing. Lieutenant E. Cunningham, on General Smith's staff, stated that the Confederate loss was about 800 killed and wounded. Incomplete returns of casualties of Price's three divisions show a loss of 99 killed and

437 wounded. The loss in Walker's veteran division was probably nearly as large as in Price's three small divisions. On the Federal side there were only two officers, a captain and a lieutenant, killed. On the Confederate side there were two brigadier-generals, three colonels, and a large number of field and line officers killed. The Confederates had also two brigadier-generals, Waul and Clark, wounded. General Steele did not have more than 4000 men on the field, the balance of his troops having crossed to the east side of the river. General Smith had ten brigades, including Colonel Colton Greene's brigade of Marmaduke's division, in the fight, and estimating 1000 men to the brigade, which is a very low estimate, he must have had nearly 10,000 men in the battle.

The Federal troops occupied a good position in the timber, and they protected themselves as much as possible. The bayou on their right and the swamp on their left made it necessary for the enemy to approach their position across the open field. Every time the Confederates advanced to near the centre of the field, a sheet of flame burst from the east side and from the east halves of the north and south sides, which no troops could stand very long without being cut down almost to a man. As showing how busily employed the Federal troops were during the action, Colonel Garrett, who commanded part of his regiment on the left, stated that his men used sixty to one hundred rounds of cartridges each during the fight.

When the last of the Federal troops had passed over the pontoon bridge it was destroyed, the mules being so much weakened for want of forage that they were unable to draw the wagons over the terrible road across the bottom for upwards of two miles. It was necessary to double the teams to the artillery, to the wagons of the ammunition train, and to the wagons of all the trains that were brought through. For long stretches of the road across the bottom the wagon wheels sank to the

hubs in the mud, and the mules floundered and struggled in the mud without being able to touch solid ground for their feet. A large number of wagons, therefore, got hopelessly stuck in the mud and were abandoned. The



BATTLE OF JENKINS' FERRY, ARKANSAS.  
FIRST FEDERAL POSITION IN THE MORNING.

Confederates were in so much confusion that they did not venture to come to the river until an hour and a half after the Federal troops had crossed.

Nearly all General Steele's cavalry, under General Carr, crossed the river on the pontoon on the evening

and night of the 29th, with instructions to proceed to Little Rock by the most direct route practicable by rapid marches, to intercept a Confederate force under General Fagan, which was reported by prisoners just captured to be marching on that point, by way of Benton, to destroy the Federal supplies. But General Fagan was unable to cross the Saline above Jenkins' Ferry on account of high water, and returned and joined General Smith on the battle-field just as the battle was over. After crossing the Saline bottom, General Steele met with no further interruption in his march to Little Rock.





## CHAPTER XX.

### THE BUILDING OF THE RED RIVER DAM THAT SAVED THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON.

THE Red River campaign, the most disastrous to the Union cause of any campaign in the West during the war, was planned in Washington, a fact which appears to have been generally overlooked in the criticisms in regard to it. That the plan originated in Washington has certainly never been made prominent by those who have written upon that campaign, for, as it turned out a failure, General Banks was selected as a scapegoat and loaded down with the sins of those responsible for it. As every one knows who is familiar with the trans-Mississippi operations of that period, there were to be three converging columns upon Shreveport, Louisiana, the objective of the campaign, where they were to unite in the early part of May. These three columns were to start from points as distant from each other as New Orleans, Vicksburg, and Little Rock, the latter part of March, each column under an independent commander, until two or more columns united, when the senior officer would command. For the expedition, General Banks was to furnish about 17,000 men from the Department of the Gulf, General Sherman 10,000 men from the Army of the Tennessee, and General Steele 15,000 men from the Department of Arkansas, and the Mississippi Squadron under Admiral Porter was to coöperate in the

general movement. Banks' troops, under Major-General W. B. Franklin, were to concentrate at Franklin, on Bayou Teche, March 7th, and move to Red River and meet the detachment of Sherman's army, under General A. J. Smith, at Alexandria, Louisiana, on the 17th. Sherman's detachment, under General Smith, left Vicksburg, March 10th, in transports, was convoyed up Red River by Admiral Porter's gunboats, and arrived at Alexandria on the 18th, having *en route* assaulted and captured Fort De Russey, a strongly fortified position on Red River, with ten guns and several hundred prisoners.

All the concentrations of troops for the expedition, it will be observed, were to be in hostile territory, with many intervening obstacles to overcome. It was necessary to reduce Fort De Russey before concentration of the troops and fleet for the expedition at Alexandria. General Steele was to concentrate his troops from Little Rock and Fort Smith at Arkadelphia, a point in hostile territory, and then march to Shreveport *via* Camden, a town on the Washita River fortified by nine forts. It was impossible that there should have been unity of action of troops from such distant points, moving into a hostile country, every step of which presented obstacles to be overcome, and many of them of a very serious nature. General Steele, with two divisions of his army, left Little Rock, March 23d, for Arkadelphia, the first point of concentration, and General John M. Thayer, with the Frontier Division, Seventh Army Corps, to which the writer belonged, left Fort Smith, March 21st, for the same place, where he was to effect a junction with the troops from Little Rock on the 1st of April. But on account of the terrible condition of the roads over the mountains, the troops of this division did not join Steele until the 10th of April, on the Little Missouri River beyond Arkadelphia. We not only had continued skirmishing in front, on the flanks, and in the rear, but it was

with the greatest difficulty that we got our trains and artillery over the mountains. The roads up or down the deep hollows or gorges, leading to the mountain passes, were washed out by recent rains, and had to be repaired before the heavy trains and artillery could pass over them. When we joined Steele on the Little Missouri, and even before, the road across the swamps and low bottom-lands of all the bayous and rivers had to be corduroyed, in some places for miles, to enable the trains and artillery to pass over it.

At the time of this concentration of Steele's troops, Price had nearly as many men in our front and on our flanks and rear as we had, and as they were mostly mounted, they could be and were used as infantry to oppose our advance, or as cavalry to operate on our rear and to interrupt our communication with Little Rock. We knew that Arkadelphia and Washington were strongly fortified towns, and the Confederates also had extensive fortifications on the bluffs commanding the crossing of the Little Missouri River, and at Prairie d'Ane, a few miles beyond. General Steele drove the Confederates from and turned these positions, and then manœuvred Price out of Camden and took that strongly fortified city without a general battle.

After Steele left Little Rock, he had no direct and certain communication with the other columns *en route* to Shreveport, and he had no means of knowing where Banks was and what he was doing, and Banks had no means of knowing where Steele was and what he was doing until a week or more had elapsed. We with Steele first received the news of Banks' reverses at Sabine Cross Roads from Southern sources. The nearer the converging Federal columns approached Shreveport, the greater was the facility with which General Kirby Smith could throw his whole force against either column he might desire to attack. The detachment of General Sherman's

army, under General A. J. Smith, was loaned as a co-operating column against Shreveport for thirty days from March 10th, and the time for the return of the troops thus detached expired April 10th, the day after the battle of Pleasant Hill, and only a few days after the concentration of the troops and the vessels of the fleet at Alexandria. It was certainly a strange policy that could inaugurate such extensive operations and then order them brought to an end if not successful in ten to fifteen days. This was a different policy to that which proposed to "fight it out on this line if it took all summer."

The withdrawal of ten thousand veteran troops under one of the ablest commanders in the army only a few days after the opening of the campaign, and two days after the reverse of Banks' army at Sabine Cross Roads, made further aggressive operations on that line impracticable. Banks was unable to follow up his success after his victory over the Confederate forces at Pleasant Hill, on account of the loss of his trains at Sabine Cross Roads and separation from his supplies. He therefore retired to Grand Ecore, threw a pontoon across the river, intrenched his position, and proposed to advance again. But as the river was falling so that he could not have the coöperation of the navy, and as General A. J. Smith's troops were under orders to return to Vicksburg, Banks retired with the army to Alexandria, where he arrived, April 25th. On his arrival at Alexandria he was soon informed that the river had fallen so much that the vessels of the fleet would be unable to pass over the falls. He had been ordered to bring the campaign to a close and to evacuate the country, and now he was confronted with the prospect of being detained at that point for an indefinite time, or of being obliged to abandon the fleet. If the fleet was destroyed it would be a great loss to the Government, besides the loss of prestige to the Union cause, equivalent to the loss of a great battle; and if it fell into the hands

of the enemy it would be used in blockading the Mississippi, and probably in prolonging the war—in either event a great disaster to the country. Admiral Porter and nearly all his officers, and many officers of the army, believed that the fleet would have to be abandoned or destroyed.

When the Grecian hosts had been collected and embarked in a great fleet for the Trojan war, and was becalmed in the port of Aulis, Calchas, the seer, was sought to explain the displeasure of the gods, and informed Agamemnon that they would not give him favorable winds to sail out until he had sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia. But when our army was detained at Alexandria on account of the low stage of the water making it impossible for the fleet to pass over the rapids, our seer, Colonel Joseph Bailey, conceived the plan of raising the water on the rapids by constructing a dam across Red River at the foot of the falls to a sufficient depth to float the vessels over.

The building of the Red River dam above Alexandria, Louisiana, in May, 1864, by which the Mississippi Squadron under Admiral Porter was saved from destruction or capture, was a great work of engineering skill, and was not only one of the great achievements of the war, but was an achievement scarcely surpassed in military annals, when viewed in connection with the situation it relieved. There are one or two points in connection with that work, which directly saved the Government several millions of dollars in saving the fleet, and probably indirectly saved it many millions of dollars if the gunboats had fallen into the hands of the enemy, which have never been given the prominence they deserve. While it is generally known that Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, Fourth Wisconsin Cavalry, Acting Chief Engineer, Nineteenth Army Corps, afterwards Brigadier-General, was the originator of the plan of a single dam across Red River by which the

water on the falls was to be raised to a sufficient depth to float the vessels over, it is *not* generally known that Lieutenant-Colonel U. B. Pearsall, Fifth Engineers, Corps d'Afrique, afterwards Colonel Forty-Eighth Wisconsin Infantry, and Brevet Brigadier-General, first suggested the plan of two dams, a plan which was finally adopted in order to float all the vessels over the falls.

Of course it will not detract from the merit and genius of General Bailey to give General Pearsall due credit for the genius and skill he displayed in that great work, and to make more prominent that part of the work of which he was the originator.

It was a singular coincidence that these two distinguished men in one of the great events of the war should have drifted to places within a few miles of each other, to become practically neighbors, directly after the war. When I was discharged from the service in January, 1865, I returned to my home at Fort Scott, Kansas, where I enlisted, and was soon made chief clerk of the ordnance office at that post, and closed up the business of that large depot. In the latter part of the spring of 1865, General Pearsall was placed in command of the District of the Indian Territory and Southern Kansas, and I issued ordnance stores to his officers. After he was mustered out of the service the latter part of December, 1865, he settled down at Fort Scott, and I have known him since as a neighbor and fellow-townsman.

General Bailey came to that section directly after the war—in the early part of 1866—with his family, and purchased lands in Vernon County, Missouri, which is only four miles east of Fort Scott, and was elected sheriff of that county, and held the office up to the time he was assassinated in the spring of 1867 by some of the outlaws who had been followers of Quantrill and Jackman during the war, and whom he had arrested and was taking to Nevada, the county seat. At the suggestion of his

friends, his family permitted his remains to be interred in Evergreen Cemetery, Fort Scott, where a suitable monument now marks their resting-place. I was quite well acquainted with him, for he had been keeping his flags, medals, and swords in our vault for some time before his death. He was a man greatly beloved by those who knew him.

In all the operations pertaining to the construction of the dam to raise the water on the falls of Red River so that the vessels of the fleet could pass over them, Colonel Pearsall was Colonel Bailey's assistant, was frequently consulted by him, and had charge of the work on the south side of the river. While the skill and genius of Colonel Bailey in saving the fleet in this great emergency cannot be too highly commended, and while perhaps most of the officers of the army and navy believed that the plan was impracticable and would prove a failure, the fact may here be emphasized that there was at least one officer of the army under General Banks who had had practical experience in constructing such dams before the war, and who not only would have urged substantially the plan adopted by Colonel Bailey, when it was found that the water on the falls was of insufficient depth to float the vessels, but who actually suggested such a plan while the army and fleet were at Grand Ecore, should the river continue to fall. That officer was Colonel U. B. Pearsall. Colonel George D. Robinson, commanding the engineer brigade, in his report in regard to the building of the dam, and in referring to Colonel Pearsall, states that "the plan for building two dams across Red River, which from necessity was finally adopted, was originally proposed by him (Colonel Pearsall), and the success of the dam was, in my opinion, mainly due to his efforts. . . . If the thanks of Congress are due to any one for the final success of this dam, I believe they are due to him as much as to any one else."

Without dwelling upon the ill-conceived plan of the campaign, for which General Banks was not responsible, there was the fact that Red River was unusually low for that season of the year, while all the rivers in Arkansas were out of their banks the latter half of April from the constant rains. During our occupation of Camden under Steele from the 15th to the 27th of April, there were twenty-four feet of water in the channel of the Washita River at that point. But the Washita empties into Red River some distance below the Alexandria Falls, and of course could have no effect in relieving the fleet from its perilous situation.

After the first reverse of the army at Sabine Cross Roads, and before it had retired to Grand Ecore, Colonel Bailey had ascertained that Red River was falling, and as it seemed to him that the fleet under Admiral Porter would not likely be able to pass over the falls on account of the low stage of the water, he submitted a plan to General Franklin, proposing to raise the water on the falls to a sufficient depth to float the vessels over. The General expressed a favorable opinion of the plan, and shortly afterwards, on hearing of the sinking of the iron-clad *Eastport* below Grand Ecore, gave Colonel Bailey a letter of introduction to Admiral Porter, directing him to do all in his power to assist in raising the unfortunate vessel, and to communicate to the Admiral his plan for constructing a dam to float the vessels of the fleet over the falls. His offer to raise the *Eastport* was declined, and no action in regard to constructing the dam to float the fleet over the falls was taken until the army arrived at Alexandria. When Admiral Porter arrived at the head of the falls he saw that it was impossible to get his vessels over, and as the army was under orders to evacuate the country, the loss or destruction of his fleet seemed inevitable. But on the arrival of the army at Alexandria, Colonel Bailey examined the river and submitted to Gen-

eral Franklin additional details for the construction of the proposed dam.

The General approved the plan, and directed the Colonel "to see the Admiral and again urge upon him the necessity of prevailing upon General Banks to order the work to be commenced at once." In the interview with the Admiral, Colonel Bailey represented that General Franklin had full confidence in the success of the undertaking and might be relied upon to give it all the assistance in his power. The supplies of the army would soon be exhausted and something had to be done at once, or the fleet would have to be abandoned, so that Colonel Bailey was also directed to see Generals Banks and Hunter, and explain to them the details for the proposed dam, which he did. General Hunter, who had just arrived from Washington with positive orders from General Grant to General Banks to bring the expedition to an end, expressed little confidence in the plan of constructing the proposed dam, but was willing that the experiment might be tried, inasmuch as the plan was approved by General Franklin, who was a distinguished engineer. Finally, orders were issued by General Banks for details of troops and teams to report to Colonel Bailey to commence work on the dam, four or five days after the army arrived at Alexandria.

The surveys showed that the falls were over a mile in length, filled with rugged rocks, with a fall of nearly nine feet in that distance. When our army occupied Alexandria in 1863, complete surveys of the falls were captured from the Confederates and were in possession of the engineer officers of the army. These charts and some further surveys of the river made by Captain John C. Palfrey, United States Engineers, Acting Chief, Engineer Department of the Gulf, showed that the channel was narrow and tortuous and formed in solid rock or soapstone, so that it was impracticable to deepen it during the short

BUILDING THE "RED RIVER DAM"





time the army would remain at that point. Hence, the only possible way of relieving the fleet was by raising the water on the falls. Though Admiral Porter states that Colonel Bailey's proposition to construct a dam across the river to raise the water "looked like madness and the best engineers ridiculed it," it is certain that Captain Palfrey, of the Regular Army Engineers, believed it practicable.

The plan proposed and adopted was to construct a dam across the river at the foot of the falls, the river at that point being 758 feet wide. As *time* was the important element in the work, General Banks ordered about three thousand men and upwards of two hundred wagons and teams to report to Colonel Bailey. This large force was divided into working parties, cutting and hauling timber, quarrying and hauling rock, tearing down sugar-houses and mills in the vicinity of Alexandria and collecting and hauling the lumber, brick, and machinery from them, while other parties were employed in using the material collected in constructing the dam and trestles for runways on the south side, under the superintendence of Colonel Pearsall.

The work was commenced on the 30th of April, and from that time on until the completion of the dam, May 8th, there was everywhere, on the banks of the river, in the river, in the forests near by, and in and about the city, presented a busy scene, the soldiers working like beavers, singing and laughing and jolly, while on the banks of the river there were thousands of men, officers and soldiers, mounted and on foot, watching the progress of the work and making all kinds of suggestions and predictions as to their belief in the success or failure of the enterprise. The forests rang with the sound of axes in the hands of the details of soldiers felling trees and trimming them up for the cribs and tree-dam; and at other points were heard the sounds of axes and hammers in

hewing and fitting timbers for flatboats to be used in bringing material to points where it was required.

It will doubtless be interesting to some to glance at details of the work at its different stages. When the point for building the dam had been determined by Colonel Bailey, four large coal-barges, with a steam tug to handle them, were furnished him by the navy. Two of the barges were then hitched together end to end and taken to one side of the channel, and, as soon as placed in the desired position, scuttled by auger-holes made in the bottom of each. They were held in position by long iron rods passing through the auger-holes and then driven into the soapstone bed of the river. The upstream end of the upper barge was presented to the current, and to hold them in position as effectively as possible the tops of the iron rods leaned upstream at an angle of about forty-five degrees. The other two barges, also fastened together end to end, were taken to the other side of the channel, scuttled, and made secure to the bed of the river in the same manner as the first two barges, leaving a space of sixty-six feet in the centre of the channel between the barges. The barges, as now placed, formed two piers in the river. Having placed the barges in their proper positions, the next step in the work was to construct a crib-dam from the south bank to the barges on that side of the channel, and a tree-dam from the north bank to the barges on that side of the channel.

Leaving Colonel Pearsall in charge of the work on the south side of the river, Colonel Bailey went over to the north side to superintend the construction of the tree-dam from that bank to the nearest barges. The work of filling the four barges with stone, brick, and heavy material for weight, as well as the building and setting of the cribs, was therefore left to Colonel Pearsall. Before he could commence filling the barges, he was obliged to set his men to work to build a long, high trestle runway ex-

tending from the south bank to the farther barges, the runway being made wide enough for the working gangs to pass each other in going to and returning from the barges. Every wheelbarrow in and about Alexandria that could be found was pressed into use, and a good many barrows were made out of cracker-boxes, until enough were obtained to keep about six hundred men steadily employed in carrying material from the shore to the barges. To obtain lumber for making the trestle runway, sugar-houses were torn down, and the stone, brick, and machinery in them were used for weight. A large lot of railroad iron found at Alexandria was also used for weight in filling the barges and cribs.

After completing the trestle runway, and setting his men to work filling the barges, Colonel Pearsall went up the south bank of the river about half a mile and "selected a suitable place to build large skidways upon which to construct the log cribs" which were to be launched and floated to their proper places when completed and other parts of the work were ready for them. The building and launching of these cribs was a difficult and important part of the work, and required a large force of men to carry it forward with the expedition the situation demanded. Each of the cribs was 32 feet long by 12 feet wide and 12 feet deep. They were constructed on the principle of the ordinary log house, with the upper ends of the logs saddled and the under ends notched to fit on to the saddled ends. When thus fitted the timbers were fastened together by heavy iron spikes. After completion, joists were placed upright near the corners of each crib and bolted together. There was a pole floor running across the crib, the end of each pole resting on the lower log of each side, to hold the material for weight and for stopping the water.

While the work of filling the barges and building the cribs was in progress, Colonel Bailey, who had gone over

to the north side, was busy constructing the tree-dam from that bank to the barges on that side of the channel.

This dam was made of large trees, with the tops upstream and held down by brush weighted with stone brought down by flatboats, the butts resting on cross logs which raised them with a slope towards the tops. The butts of some of the trees were notched, and the cross logs rested in the notches to hold them in position. Just as soon as the tree-dam was completed above water from the north bank to the barges, Colonel Pearsall commenced closing the channel from the south bank to the nearest barges, using large ropes, which were furnished by the navy, to ease the cribs, after they were launched, downstream to their places. Each crib was placed in position with its upstream end to the current, so that twelve feet of the channel between the south bank and the barges were closed at a time. On floating each crib to its place, it was made secure by driving large iron rods, leaning upstream, through cracks between the pole floor into the soapstone bed of the river. When the cribs were brought down to their proper places and secured, the work of loading them with stone, iron, and débris was commenced by part of the working force which had been employed in filling the barges, and by such additional details of men as were required to carry on the work with the proper despatch. Of course when the channel was closed by the tree-dam from the north bank to the barges, and by the cribs from the south bank to the barges, a large amount of water still continued to flow through the spaces between the trunks of the trees and through the spaces between the logs of the cribs, so that it became necessary to tighten the dam on each side in order to force nearly all the water of the river through the opening of sixty-six feet between the barges. But even before work was commenced to tighten the dam on each side, the water was raised on the rapids above about three feet.

In tightening, brush and clay were used to stop the water from flowing through the spaces between the trunks of the trees and through the cracks between the logs of the cribs.

Even so accurate a writer as Colonel R. B. Irwin, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Gulf, was under the impression that "the space between the wing-dams was closed by sinking across it four of the large coal-barges belonging to the navy." This is an error. The space of sixty-six feet between the barges placed as described never was closed, and Colonel Bailey never intended to close the channel completely, but to force all the water through the opening of sixty-six feet, believing that this would raise the water above the dam to a sufficient depth to float the gunboats over the upper falls. On this point there was a difference of opinion between Colonel Bailey and Colonel Pearsall, the latter holding that narrowing the channel to sixty-six feet would not raise the water on the upper falls to a depth that would permit the vessels of the fleet to pass over.


To properly understand the difficulties encountered in building the dam, it must be borne in mind that the current of the river at that point was running like a mill-tail, at a velocity of nearly ten miles an hour. But by working day and night, in the scorching sun, and sometimes in water up to their necks, the soldiers of the army, without accident, on the 8th of May, completed the dam, which raised the water on the rapids five feet four and a half inches.

In the afternoon of that day the water had risen sufficiently on the upper falls to allow the three light-draught gunboats *Osage*, *Hindman*, and *Neosho* to get over at four o'clock, to be in readiness to pass the dam. General Banks, who from the beginning had watched the progress of the work with intense interest, and who had encouraged it with his presence every day, inspected it at

eleven o'clock on the evening of the 8th, with a member of his staff, and feeling that the pressure of the water was so great that the dam could not stand another day, rode at once up to the point where the fleet was anchored to ascertain whether the other vessels of the navy were in readiness to follow those which had already passed over the upper falls into the pond above the dam. When he arrived at the fleet about midnight he saw from the stillness that prevailed, and the few dim lights burning on the vessels, that no preparation had been made to take advantage of the rise of about five feet of water above the dam to get the balance of the fleet out at the earliest practicable moment. He addressed a note to Admiral Porter at one o'clock on the morning of the 9th, which was delivered to him by Colonel J. G. Wilson at two o'clock, stating his belief that the dam would not stand another day, and requesting that immediate measures be taken to put the balance of the fleet in readiness to pass the rapids early that morning. None of the heavier vessels of the fleet had had any of their heavy guns or armor removed to lighten their draught.

Shortly after five o'clock that morning the enormous pressure of the water swept away the two barges from the distal end of the crib-dam, sweeping them around to the north side of the chute just below the barges at the distal end of the tree-dam. The breaking away of the barges was considered by both Colonel Bailey and Colonel Pearsall as a fortunate occurrence, inasmuch as they in their new position tended to lengthen the chute and confine the water passing through the gap between them and the south bank to a point below a dangerous ledge of rocks. After the breaking away of the barges, the water above the dam fell six to eight inches. But work was at once commenced to narrow the channel to raise the water to its former height by putting in additional cribs and by tightening the dam. At the time the barges

GUNBOATS PASSING THROUGH "RED RIVER DAM."





were swept away, the gunboat *Lexington* was the only vessel of the fleet above the rapids ready to move. Admiral Porter galloped around to the upper falls and ordered her to run the rapids, and with a full head of steam she plunged into the turbulent, foaming waters, and passed the rapids and the dam also, watched with the deepest interest by the thousands of troops on the shore, and greeted by them with rousing cheers when she rode in safety in the smooth water below. In a short time she was followed by the *Hindman* and the light-draught monitors *Osage* and *Neosho*, which had passed over the upper falls and rapids the evening before and were waiting in the pond above the dam. It was asserted by General Banks and other officers of the army that had the other vessels of the fleet been in readiness to move they could have passed the rapids and the chute through the dam that morning. But the safe passage of four vessels of the fleet over the rapids and through the chute in the dam to the tranquil waters below showed that the plan of the dam for raising the water to float the vessels of the fleet over the falls was sound, and instead of Colonel Bailey being discouraged by the breaking away of the barges, he proposed to construct at once wing-dams from the north and south banks at the upper falls, extending a hundred or so feet into the river, and leaving a space wide enough between the distal ends of each dam for the vessels of the fleet to pass through the chute.

Leaving the work of repairing and tightening the lower dam under a proper officer, he rode to the upper falls on the south side to locate the points from which to build the wing-dams from each side. It was decided to make these dams of light log cribs, lashed together with ropes and filled with brush and brick. This part of the work was under the immediate supervision of Colonel Pearsall, who in a few hours had a large force of men employed in making and setting the cribs and filling them. By the

afternoon of the 10th this work was far enough advanced to raise the water on the upper falls fourteen inches. While the troops were constructing these wing-dams at the upper falls, the heavy guns and armor were removed from some of the vessels of the fleet above the rapids to lessen their draught and the depth of water necessary to float them, a precaution that should have been taken during the construction of the dam at the foot of the rapids. The heavy naval guns thus taken off the vessels were removed from the shore to a point below the dam, under the direction of Lieutenant Beebe, of the Ordnance Department, with details of soldiers from the army. Where the guns were not taken off a vessel they were moved towards the stern to keep the boat from diving after plunging through the chute of the lower dam. Before starting to run the rapids the port-holes of the vessels had to be closed and calked, for after passing the lower dam all the boats would dive and for a moment would be completely submerged. After making her plunge through the chute of the dam, it is stated that one of the gun-boats, perhaps the *Essex*, actually dipped water into her smoke-stacks.

On the 10th, before the wing-dams at the head of the falls were completed, the gunboat *Chillicothe* passed the rapids and through the chute of the lower dam in safety. In a short time afterwards the *Carondelet* was ordered to follow her, but in passing through the chute of the upper dam she was driven by the force of the strong current too far towards the north bank and grounded just below the distal end of the wing-dam extending from that bank, with her bow upstream, her position being diagonally across the channel. After it was found impossible to move her from this position and her loss appeared inevitable, the officers of the navy thought there was room enough for the other vessels of the fleet to pass alongside of her, and ordered the *Mound City* to try it. This vessel

met with no better success, and grounded abreast of the *Carondelet*. Here was a serious situation, for raising the water above the dam would not help these vessels in their present position, and there were still five ironclads above them.

In this perplexing situation, Colonel Bailey came to his assistant, Colonel Pearsall, and asked him what could be done to relieve the boats. In reply Colonel Pearsall proposed that if the matter was left to him to adopt a plan of his own, and if he could have the required men and material, he would agree to put a foot of water under the grounded vessels by the next evening. His proposition was accepted, and the pioneer corps of the Thirteenth Army Corps, under Captain J. B. Hutchins, was ordered to report to him that night on the south side of the river. Nothing, however, was done that night, as he was unable to get cutters from the navy to cross his working force over the river to the north bank to the point where he proposed to build a bracket-dam until daylight the next morning. When he reached the north bank the next morning and made an examination of the river, he determined to build a bracket-dam below the crib-dam from that bank, commencing at a point opposite the stern of the *Carondelet*, the distal end of the dam to extend close up to that vessel. In a few hours after he got over, lumber and material were arriving on the ground, and he set his men to work making A-shaped trestles to be used in building the dam.

This bracket-dam was made of logs with the up-stream ends resting on the bed of the river, and the lower ends raised on the A-shaped trestles. The logs were then covered with heavy plank, nailed down, and that fitted so closely as to make the space between them almost watertight, thus turning the water from that side of the river into the narrow channel and raising it fourteen inches by eleven o'clock that day, and enabling the grounded

vessels, the *Carondelet* and *Mound City*, to float off easily and pass the rapids and through the chute of the lower dam in safety. The wing-dams from the north and south banks were now also completed, and the remaining gun-boats passed through the chute, the rapids, and the chute of the lower dam on that and the following day, and thus were united in safety all the vessels of the Mississippi Squadron in Red River below the Alexandria Falls. It appears from the data furnished by Colonel Pearsall that the upper dam was located over two hundred feet above the crest of the soapstone ledge over which the water poured, so that while the water was raised to a sufficient depth for the vessels to enter the chute, "it expanded immediately below the dam and left the boats hard aground." Had Colonel Bailey been fully impressed with the fact that the water after passing through the opening in the dam would rapidly spread out on both sides, he would probably have located it near the brink of the ledge of rock. The water then forced through the opening would have poured directly into the deep water below, thus obviating the necessity of building the bracket-dam.





## CHAPTER XXI.

### OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN ARKANSAS.

THE Districts of Southwest Missouri and Northwest Arkansas in the month of January, 1864, were not seriously disturbed by incursions from the Southern partisan bands or guerillas. But in the latter part of the month, after the severe cold weather of the winter had passed off, General Sanborn, commanding that district, received information that the Confederate forces of Colonels Freeman, Love, and McRae were concentrating in Searcy and Newton Counties, in Northern Arkansas, twelve to fifteen hundred strong, for the purpose of making a raid into Missouri to capture the Federal trains between Rolla and Springfield, or between Springfield and Fayetteville. General Sanborn was soon convinced that the most effective way of preventing these hostile incursions was for the troops of his district to march into Arkansas and strike any Confederate force found north of the mountains. He determined, therefore, not to wait for the Confederates to move, but to concentrate a sufficient number of his own troops in the section occupied by them to strike them before they could get ready to start on the contemplated expedition. His troops were ordered to concentrate at Rolling Prairie, Boone County, Arkansas, January 23d. To coöperate in this movement, Captain W. C. Human, commanding a battalion of two hundred men of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, marched from

Ozark, Missouri, on the 18th; Colonel John E. Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, with two hundred men of his regiment, marched from Cassville, Missouri, on the 17th, and Major Charles Galloway, First Arkansas Cavalry, with 185 men of that regiment and one howitzer, marched from Fayetteville, Arkansas, a little earlier in the month, having been instructed to make a scout that would take him off the direct line of march. These forces formed a junction on Marshall's Prairie, in Searcy County, Arkansas, on the morning of the 22d, marched in the direction of Burrowsville, and had two sharp skirmishes with the enemy that day, who had taken up strong positions at the crossings of Clear Creek and Tomahawk.

The Confederates were driven from their positions with some loss, and the united Federal forces marched into Burrowsville the next day. At this point the Federal forces divided for the purpose of thoroughly scouting the adjoining counties, the command of Captain Human, Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, going as far south as Clinton, in Van Buren County, in pursuit of the fleeing partisan bands. While these forces were operating in that section a Confederate force of two or three hundred men passed to their rear and appeared in Carroll County a few miles from Berryville. On hearing of this movement General Sanborn sent General C. B. Holland, of the Missouri Enrolled Militia, with a battalion of the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry of two hundred men under Major George W. Murphy, and a section of the First Missouri Light Artillery under Lieutenant Stierlin, to the point of disturbance, and to assume command of the Federal forces in the field in Northern Arkansas. General Holland moved by way of Cassville, Missouri, and arrived at Berryville on the 29th, where he was detained a week by high water and for his supplies to come up. He then moved forward and formed a junction with the forces under Galloway, Phelps, and Human at Rolling

Prairie on February 8th. From this point he marched with his united forces to Yellville, in Marion County, where he captured eight Southern Partisan Rangers, some of whom were considered bad characters. After scouting the country in all directions for two or three days, and dispersing several bands of Partisan Rangers, he left Captain Human with his battalion of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry at Yellville, and with the battalion of the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry and the section of artillery he returned to Springfield. Colonel Phelps and Major Galloway, with their commands, returned to their respective stations at Cassville, Missouri, and Fayetteville, Arkansas. Major Galloway reported that in the different skirmishes and actions the Federal troops of the expedition killed one hundred of the enemy, with a loss of two killed and three wounded on the Federal side.

In connection with these operations, the heaviest loss on the Federal side fell on a detachment of twenty-four men, under Sergeant Isaac T. Jones, of the Eleventh Missouri Cavalry, who were sent out by General Sanborn from Springfield with despatches to Captain Human, commanding a battalion, Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry. On the 23d of January, while Sergeant Jones and his men were marching across Rolling Prairie, Arkansas, they were suddenly attacked and charged upon by some sixty guerillas, and in the fight that took place the Sergeant and six of his men were killed on the ground and five captured and afterwards shot; the despatches also falling into the hands of the enemy. On that same day a Federal force of two hundred men under Lieutenant-Colonel W. Baumer, First Nebraska Cavalry, and ninety-two men under Captain Samuel E. Turner, Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, attacked a Confederate force, under Colonel Thomas Freeman, of three hundred men, on Sylamore Creek, a day's march southeast of Rolling Prairie, killing and wounding 25 men, capturing

57 men, including 8 officers, besides all the Colonel's train, 125 horses and mules; and his trunk containing his private papers and commission.

Captain Human held the post of Yellville for a month or so, during which time his command was constantly employed in scouting, and had frequent conflicts with the guerilla bands of that section. A battalion of the First Arkansas Cavalry under Major Fitch also coöperated with Captain Human in endeavoring to restore quiet, and prevent incursions of bandits, Partisan Rangers, and Confederate recruiting parties. There was a strong Union sentiment throughout that section, and as nearly all the able-bodied Union men had enlisted in the loyal Arkansas regiments, it was desirable to protect their families as far as practicable from being robbed and plundered by the bandits and rangers infesting the country.

After the Second Arkansas Union Cavalry had completed its organization under Colonel John E. Phelps, it was kept in the field in the counties of Carroll, Newton, and Searcy, in Northern Arkansas, most of the time during the spring and summer of 1864, and had frequent conflicts with the bandits and rangers in the rough mountainous regions of that country. He not only had the Southern rangers and guerillas who lived in that country to contend with, but his troops sometimes met bands of desperate characters who had been driven out of Missouri and who were watching for favorable opportunities to return. The most serious loss he sustained during his operations in that section was in an action a detachment of one hundred of his regiment under Lieutenant Garner had with some two hundred bandits under the notorious Colonel S. D. Jackman, of Missouri, on Richland Creek, in Searcy County. This man Jackman appears to have been sometimes a bandit of the Quantrill type, and at other times to have commanded regular Confederate troops in the field.

On the 1st of May Colonel Phelps had a train of supplies detained a day or so on the north side of Buffalo River, in the western part of Searcy County, by high water. There being no rumors of a hostile force in that section, the escort and train under Lieutenant Garner crossed to the south side of Buffalo River, and were moving along leisurely, near the mouth of Richland Creek, when the advance-guard was fiercely attacked by Jackman and cut off from the main body of the escort. A force of the bandits was thrown in between the main part of the escort and train and rear-guard, so that in the defence of the train the Federal detachment was beaten in detail and terribly cut to pieces, Lieutenant Hester and thirty-seven men having fallen in the bloody massacre; besides, there were eleven men who were wounded. Colonel Phelps reported that his men had been slaughtered; in the fight Jackman had not taken any prisoners—all the Federal soldiers who fell into his hands were murdered. On hearing of the disaster from some of his men who had escaped from the bloody scene, Colonel Phelps hastily collected about one hundred soldiers of his regiment, and marching all night, some thirty miles, attacked Jackman in his camp on the morning of the 5th, and drove him out of it with some loss. The bandits attempted to rally near their camp, but Colonel Phelps charged them again and routed them, and would have pursued them more vigorously had his horses not been so much exhausted by the night's hard marching. In this fight Colonel Phelps had seven men wounded. He recovered part of the mules belonging to the train. The bandits had burned the train and shot some of the mules.

A short time before this affair, Colonel Phelps sent out Major James A. Melton, of his regiment, with two hundred men to find and attack and break up the guerilla command of Colonel Sissell, supposed to be in the southern part of Newton County. After several days' hard

marching, Major Melton ascertained that the enemy, 180 strong, were encamped in Limestone Valley, and timed his movements so as to attack them just after daybreak. He surprised them and charged into their camp, and routed them before they had time to form in line. He pursued the main body of them eight miles, and in the fight around camp and in the pursuit killed 30, and captured 9 men, 23 head of horses, and 25 stands of arms, without sustaining any loss in his command.

While the operations of the Second Arkansas Cavalry under Colonel Phelps were mostly confined to the counties of Carroll, Boone, Marion, Newton, and Searcy, the operations of the First Arkansas Cavalry under Colonel M. La Rue Harrison were confined mostly to the counties of Washington, Benton, Madison, and Crawford, Arkansas, and to the eastern part of the Cherokee Nation, with headquarters at Fayetteville. In those western counties of the State the Southern partisan bands were under the leadership of Captain Buck Brown, of Benton County. These bands, of a dozen up to fifty to one hundred men each, were scattered over those counties, and it was thought by the Federal officers at Fayetteville could be concentrated four or five hundred strong.

When the Southern Cherokees of Stand Watie's command were on a raid through the Indian Territory north of the Arkansas River, they sometimes coöperated with Brown's partisan bands when their united forces could act effectively against the Federal troops in that section. Colonel Harrison was unable to make his force at Fayetteville very effective against these guerillas during the spring and summer, on account of most of his men being dismounted, their horses having become unserviceable for want of forage. Most of the force he was able to keep mounted was constantly employed in escort duty, guarding trains to and from Springfield, and patrolling the wire road to keep the telegraph line in working order. There

were a good many Southern families in Fayetteville, and the guerilla leaders easily obtained information from them of the movements of the Federal troops from that post. The latter part of June, while most of Colonel Harrison's mounted force was on a scout into the Indian Territory, Buck Brown evaded the scout, got in its rear, and made a dash on the herd of the First Arkansas Cavalry grazing two or three miles from Fayetteville, and drove off upwards of two hundred mules and horses. A force from Fayetteville was immediately sent in pursuit of the guerillas, but as it was mostly dismounted it was unable to overtake them. Some of this stock was recaptured by a detachment of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry while carrying the mail to Fayetteville.

On the 10th of July, Colonel Harrison sent Major Galloway with a mounted force of two hundred men into the Indian Territory west of Fayetteville to find, attack, and disperse a force of two to three hundred Southern Indians reported to be on the waters of Flink Creek or Illinois River. After a day or so of hard marching, Major Galloway met detachments of the enemy and skirmished with them, and, driving them upon the main body, had a sharp fight lasting more than an hour. In this fight the Indians showed unusual stubbornness, but were finally routed with considerable loss in killed and wounded—Major J. F. Pickler and Captain Albertee, of Colonel Watie's command, being among the killed. In their flight the Indians also left thirty-five head of horses and mules and some arms to fall into the hands of Major Galloway's command. The Major Pickler who was killed had attained some prominence along the line of Arkansas and the Indian Territory, on account of his dashing operations in that section during the past spring.

In different parts of Northwestern Arkansas the Federal forces were employed in active operations against the Southern partisan bands during the summer and autumn.

The latter part of August, Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Bishop, First Arkansas Cavalry, with a detachment of his regiment and Captain Eli Hughes' company, Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, in all about three hundred men, made two successful scouts from Fayetteville through Washington and Benton Counties, Arkansas, dispersing Lieutenant Tuck Smith's band of guerillas, killing eight of the enemy, wounding nine, and capturing fifty horses and equipments. At Carrollton, in Carroll County, Lieutenant Halsey, with a detachment of eighteen Arkansas Union Militia, attacked Captain Wilson's company of guerillas, fifty strong, and killed four men, including Captain Wilson. On the 13th and 14th of September, Captain John I. Worthington, First Arkansas Union Cavalry, with ninety-nine men of that regiment, while escorting a train to Cassville and scouting on the flanks, attacked the partisan bands of Captains Carroll, Etter, and Raley, killing eight guerillas, wounding ten, killing eleven horses in the fights, and capturing thirty-five guns. Captain Worthington also captured Lieutenant Rogers, of the Eighth Missouri Confederate Infantry, carrying a mail from the troops of Price's army to their families and friends in Missouri. Some of the letters captured showed that a large part of Price's army was in the vicinity of Camden and Princeton, Arkansas, preparing to start immediately for the invasion of Missouri.

Directly after the Price Raid, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Cameron, Second Arkansas Cavalry, with 160 men of his regiment, made a scout from Cassville, Missouri, into Northern Arkansas, for the purpose of dispersing detachments of Jackman's and Schnable's regiments, which had recently gone into that section after leaving Price's army at Cane Hill. The men of these regiments were still greatly demoralized, and being scattered over the country in small parties many of them were ridden down by the Federal cavalry and killed or captured. On this

expedition Colonel Cameron wounded and captured Major Lauderdale of the Southern army, killed Lieutenant Hastings and captured Major Mooney of Schnable's regiment, and brought in a considerable number of other Confederate prisoners with the arms, horses, and equipments captured from them.

Major H. S. Greeno, with a detachment of 130 men of the Fourth Arkansas Union Cavalry, left De Vall's Bluff on the 8th of November on a scout northwest in the direction of Batesville, and found that McCray's brigade of three regiments had just returned from Price's army to that section, and was scattered over the country in small parties. From the statements of prisoners captured by Major Greeno, it appeared that there were a great many desertions from these Confederate regiments, and that many of the men had thrown away their arms, and expressed a determination not to go out into the service of the Confederacy again. If they could not stay at home, they preferred to surrender to the Federal authorities.





## CHAPTER XXII.

### OPERATIONS ON THE ARKANSAS RIVER.

GENERAL CARR, who was sent forward with his cavalry from Jenkins' Ferry on the night of April 29th to head off General Fagan in his march on Little Rock, reached that point on the morning of May 1st, and at once made arrangements and sent back a train of wagons loaded with rations for General Steele's troops, who were beginning to feel the pinch of hunger. Even after their supplies had been exhausted, the severest hardships were imposed upon the troops in repairing and corduroying the road for the trains to pass over. On the 3d of May, General Steele arrived at Little Rock with all his infantry and artillery, and at once set himself to work to make such dispositions of his forces as would enable him to hold that place and the line of the Arkansas River until he could assume the offensive again; for he felt certain that General Smith would push forward the Missouri Confederate forces as soon as they could cross the Saline River, for the purpose of preventing the navigation of the Arkansas, and also, perhaps, endeavor to throw a force to the north side of that river to interrupt railroad communication between Little Rock and De Vall's Bluff. The Frontier Division under General Thayer was ordered back to Fort Smith, and leaving Little Rock on the 6th, arrived at its destination on the 16th of May, having been since the 21st of March almost constantly moving. In the march of 180

miles up the river, the division encountered no opposition except that the cavalry had several skirmishes with Southern partisan bands, resulting in a small loss to each side.

On the evacuation of Camden by the Federal forces, General Smith sent General Maxey, with his division of Texas and Indian troops, back to the Indian Territory to enter upon an aggressive campaign. Immediately on his arrival at Fort Towson, Choctaw Nation, the headquarters of his district, a few miles from Red River, General Maxey ordered his troops under Generals Cooper, Gano, and Walker to be pushed north in the direction of the Arkansas River as rapidly as supplies could be obtained. Only a few days before the arrival of General Thayer, two Federal spies, who had been sent into Northern Texas and the Red River Valley to ascertain the strength and movements of the Confederate forces in the southern part of the Indian Territory, returned to Fort Smith and reported to Major T. J. Anderson, Assistant Adjutant-General, District of the Frontier, that the Southern forces were already on the march north and proposed to attack Fort Smith and Fort Gibson in a very short time. As many soldiers as could be spared from the troops stationed at Fort Smith had been employed during the spring in the construction of four forts in the south and southeast quarters of the town, commanding all the approaches from the south. To be prepared to meet the enemy, if they should make an attack before the arrival of General Thayer from Little Rock, a large number of citizens were called out to push forward the completion of the fortifications as rapidly as practicable, and guns were mounted so as to sweep the fronts and flanks of each of the forts on the advance of a hostile force. Nearly all the residents of the city were strong Southern sympathizers, and one or more members of many of the families were in the Southern army, so that a Confederate officer making a reconnoissance in the vicinity had no difficulty in obtaining very accurate informa-

tion of the number of Federal troops stationed there, and the number and position of the forts and the number of guns mounted.

The Arkansas River was in good navigable condition during the spring, and every few days boats came up from Little Rock loaded with supplies for the troops. It turned out that the Confederate force reported to be advancing was only a heavy scout sent out by General Maxey a short time after his return to Fort Towson with his division, for the purpose of ascertaining how far north he could safely establish his outposts. After the arrival of General Thayer there were no fears that the Confederate forces would attack Fort Smith or Fort Gibson; but there were very soon indications that their efforts were going to be directed to interrupting the navigation of the Arkansas River so as to cut off all supplies coming in to the Federal troops. All General Maxey's troops were mounted, and he had enough light artillery to make them very effective, in attacking boats, or Federal detachments stationed along the river for their protection. His advance of a regiment of Texas cavalry under Colonel Bell arrived at Northfork on the Canadian River on May 15th, where it was proposed to establish a camp, from which point General Cooper would direct the operations of the troops on his arrival with other regiments and batteries. This point was nearly equally distant from Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, and at either place the Federal troops were strong enough to check the operations of Cooper in the vicinity, but there was need of a Federal mounted force to operate against him.

After the failure of the Camden Expedition and the retreat of the Federal forces to the line of the Arkansas River, their further operations were of a defensive character. To keep the river open to navigation from Fort Smith to Dardanelle, eighty miles below, required all the troops General Thayer could spare from his division, and

to keep it open from that point to Little Rock and below required all the men General Steele could spare from Little Rock and Pine Bluff. General Thayer had Colonel Fuller, of one of the newly organized Arkansas Union regiments, stationed at Dardanelle; Lieutenant-Colonel Gideon M. Waugh, Second Arkansas Union Infantry, was stationed at Clarksville, and detachments of the Second and Sixth Regiments Kansas Cavalry were stationed at Roseville and Ozark, for the purpose of affording all the protection possible to boats passing up and down the river. At each of these stations there was a small mounted force used in scouting in all directions to break up bands of Partisan Rangers, and to ascertain as far as practicable the movement of any regular Confederate troops through the country. The force under Colonel Fuller at Dardanelle was attacked by General Shelby on the night of May 16th, and dispersed with some loss in killed and wounded, and several men drowned in attempting to cross the Arkansas River in a frail boat. At that point Shelby obtained two or three flatboats and crossed his brigade to the north side of the Arkansas, and then continued his march to White River, which is beyond the field of operations covered by this work. Colonel Waugh, with his loyal Arkansans, was so energetic and successful in hunting down and punishing the Southern bandits in the vicinity of Clarksville and for about forty miles north of that point, that thirty-five of the marauders were reported to have been killed that spring.

In the latter part of the winter and in the early part of the spring the Federal troops were on short rations most of the time, for the reason that supplies could not be brought up by boats, the Arkansas River being too low for navigation above Little Rock; and the great distance from Fort Smith to Fort Scott or Springfield, and the terrible condition of the roads in the spring season, made it extremely difficult to bring supplies from those points

by large wagon trains. A number of large trains came down from Fort Scott during the winter with supplies for the troops, and large escorts were required to accompany them both ways. But from the middle of April to the middle of June there was a good stage of water in the Arkansas River between Fort Smith and Little Rock, and boats were arriving and departing nearly every day until supplies were brought up for ten to twelve thousand men for six months. It took a boat about four days to come up from Little Rock to Fort Smith, and about two days to return with the rapid current of the river. This was a great improvement over wagon transportation, which had hitherto furnished the Army of the Frontier with its supplies, for a steamboat brought up an amount of supplies that would have required a train of two hundred wagons to haul them.

Even with the most energetic scouting of the Federal cavalry on both sides of the river, nearly every boat coming up from Little Rock or returning was fired upon by bandits, who approached the river and concealed themselves on the banks at points near which the boats were obliged to pass. But every boat had a detachment of infantry and generally a howitzer or two on board, and breastworks of boxes and sacks of corn or oats, or of cotton bales, were made for the protection of the soldiers and the crew. If the bandits were bold enough to show themselves they received volleys from the small-arms of the soldiers behind the breastworks, and grape and canister or shell from the howitzer, as the situation demanded. They were invariably driven off, and sometimes with loss. The pilot-house of each boat was protected—made bullet-proof—and several were struck by bullets fired by the bandits. Nearly every boat going down the river took on board a good many refugee families, white and colored, who were landed at Little Rock, Memphis, and points on the Mississippi River as high up as St. Louis, where they

could do something for themselves. Large numbers of these refugees also accompanied every wagon train that returned to Fort Scott, Kansas, from which point they scattered out to different parts of the State. They had nearly all been robbed and plundered and persecuted by the Southern partisan bands until they were in very destitute condition, and sought the friendly shelter, protection, and assistance of the Federal troops at Fort Smith. If the Federal authorities had not furnished these destitute people with rations, many of them would certainly have starved for want of food. Most of the Union men of these families enlisted in the Union Arkansas regiments then being organized, and took their rations home to be cooked and divided in some instances, which relieved the almost distressing situation in many cases. Even poor Southern families had to be fed at the expense of the Government they were endeavoring to destroy. As the problem of furnishing supplies for the large number of troops required at that point and in the vicinity was the most difficult one with which the Federal authorities had to contend, all destitute families were encouraged to go north by the boats or with the trains, where they could find opportunities of doing something for themselves, or where they could be more easily taken care of until the issues of the war were determined. This humane policy of the Government in providing for these destitute families until they found a friendly asylum in the loyal section of the country frequently embarrassed the Federal commanders in their military operations, for taking part of the ration of the soldier for these people impaired his efficiency, and was the cause of more or less complaint.

The past winter and spring the troops of the Indian Brigade under Colonel Phillips at Fort Gibson had been receiving their supplies by wagon trains from Fort Scott. They, too, had been on short rations most of the time, and the Colonel had been obliged to send part of his

command to Rhea's Mills and other points in Western Arkansas east of Fort Gibson, to secure as much wheat and corn as possible to grind into flour and meal for his men. A battalion of troops was required to collect the wheat and corn and guard the mill while grinding, and another battalion was generally employed in guarding trains on part of the route to and from Fort Scott—all of which weakened the efficiency of his command for operating south of the Arkansas River. In the recent change of Department lines, the Indian Territory fell in the Department of Arkansas, under General Steele, and it was desirable to furnish the troops at Fort Gibson with supplies from Fort Smith as far as practicable. A good navigable condition of the river at Fort Smith did not always enable boats to pass over Webber's Falls, about thirty-five miles above, which was necessary to reach Fort Gibson. But about the middle of June there was a rise in the Arkansas River of a sufficient volume of water to allow a light-draught steamer to pass over Webber's Falls and land at Fort Gibson. The steam ferryboat *J. R. Williams* was kept at Fort Smith for the purpose of ferrying troops and trains over the river at that point, and for the purpose of furnishing posts up and down the river with supplies. On the morning of June 15th, this steam ferryboat left Fort Smith loaded with supplies, mostly flour, for the Indian troops at Fort Gibson. The escort to the boat consisted of twenty-six men detailed from the Twelfth Kansas Infantry, under Lieutenant H. A. B. Cook. The boat's cargo of supplies was in charge of Lieutenant George W. Houston, Quartermaster Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry.

In a day or so after his return to Fort Smith from the Camden Expedition, General Thayer was informed by his scouts that a Confederate force upwards of a thousand strong, under General Cooper, had arrived at Northfork on the Canadian River, about fifty miles west. Though

this force fell back south on hearing of the return of the Frontier Division to Fort Smith, General Thayer was again informed on the 7th of June that General Maxey had probably by that time arrived at Perryville, Choctaw Nation, with several Texas regiments and six pieces of artillery, and was to be joined at that point by General Cooper with the Southern Indians. A heavy scout sent out by Colonel Phillips from Fort Gibson in the direction of Perryville captured three or four Confederate Indian soldiers, and these prisoners, who belonged to Maxey's command, confirmed his reported advance north. General Thayer sent out Major L. K. Thatcher, Ninth Kansas Cavalry, with four hundred men of that regiment and of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, to make a scout through the Choctaw Nation southwest of Fort Smith. On his return Major Thatcher reported that he obtained reliable information that there was a Confederate force of fifteen hundred men in the Upper Poteau Valley, about forty miles distant.

The Upper Poteau Valley is south of Fort Smith, and no Federal scout was sent out west in the direction of Northfork along the south bank of the Arkansas River. Nor when the boat left Fort Smith was any Federal cavalry sent out to keep in the neighborhood of it on the south side of the Arkansas for the purpose of notifying the officers in charge of it if the enemy should be discovered advancing in force. On leaving Fort Smith Lieutenant Cook cautioned his men to keep a sharp lookout, as they were liable to be fired upon at any moment by guerillas concealed at any of the favorable points along the river. His men realized the necessity for vigilance, and cheerfully held themselves in readiness to execute every order given. The boat steamed along up the river about fifty miles without any interruption until it came to a great bend in the river to the south, where the channel approached near the south bank. At this point,

which was about five miles below the mouth of the Canadian River, the Arkansas River was about 350 yards wide, and the boat could not pass it without passing near the south bank. Colonel Stand Watie, who commanded the Confederate Indians, had ascertained that the boat was coming up and selected this place, known as Pleasant Bluff, to make his attack upon it. He knew it was a good position to command the river with artillery, and had three pieces masked behind clusters of bushes, about one hundred yards apart, on the bluff overlooking the river. When the boat came up opposite the centre gun, the three pieces opened a direct and cross fire upon it, belching forth fire and smoke and shot and shell with a terrific roar. The Confederate Indians almost at the same instant also discharged a heavy volley of musketry from their concealed position on shore, not one of whom could be seen by the officers or soldiers on the boat.

The officers and men on the boat knew nothing of the presence of the enemy until they heard the roar of the artillery and musketry and saw the thick clouds of smoke arising from the discharge of the cannon and small-arms. In another moment a cannon-ball crashed into the boat, and then Lieutenant Cook ordered his men to take positions behind barrels and boxes and return the fire with as much precision as possible. While his firing did not likely do the Confederates much damage, it had the effect of keeping them back at long range and from showing themselves in force in the open ground. After getting the range of the boat almost every shot fired from the Confederate guns struck her, so that in a short time she was so badly disabled as to be unmanageable. One of the first shots fired by the hostile guns struck the smoke-stack about four feet above the cabin floor, and a second shot hit the pilot-house, knocking most of it away, and a third shot struck the boiler, or some of the steam pipes, which released the steam with an almost deafening sound. A

dense volume of steam instantly enveloped the boat so that those on board for a few moments could see nothing on deck or on shore. When the Confederates heard the explosion and saw the cloud of steam burst forth enveloping the boat, they at once rent the air with shouts along their line, but continued the artillery fire with greater energy, thinking that she would soon sink or surrender. While the boat was thus enveloped in steam and disabled, the soldiers on board could not keep up their fire with much advantage, and Lieutenant Cook went to the captain to ascertain the extent of the damage to her machinery, but he replied that he did not know. The Lieutenant then ordered the engineer to examine the machinery, and he did so and returned and reported her disabled. In the meanwhile, before her machinery stopped working, the pilot ran her on a sand bar near the north side of the river, within a few yards of the shore.

Finding that the boat could not be moved either up or down the river, Lieutenant Cook took his men off her and waded to the north shore, leaving Lieutenant Houston and the captain on board. Immediately after reaching the shore Lieutenant Cook formed his men behind a sand bar in such position as to command the boat should any of the enemy attempt to swim over to take it off or set it on fire. His plan of keeping the boat and her cargo from falling into the hands of the enemy was, however, soon defeated. To his great astonishment and mortification, in a few moments he saw Lieutenant Houston and the captain of the boat and one of her crew going over to the enemy in a yawl. Their conduct was unaccountable and reprehensible, and some of Lieutenant Cook's men thought it was due to cowardice or treachery. As he could now see no prospect of saving the boat, Lieutenant Cook, with some twenty of his men, started for Fort Smith, arriving at that place the next day. Three or four of his men who got separated from him went to

Mackey's Salt Works, in the Cherokee Nation, about ten miles distant, where Colonel John Ritchie was stationed with the Second Union Indian Regiment, and related to him what had taken place. The Colonel at once collected about two hundred warriors and hastened to the point where the boat was represented to have been left, with the view of holding it if it had not been taken to the south side before he arrived. But he did not reach the point where it was abandoned until the next morning, and he then found that it had been taken over to the south side of the river, and that the enemy were unloading it on a sand bar. He estimated that the boat and as much of her cargo as had been taken off and piled upon the sand bar were within range of some of his best small-arms, and he at once ordered his Indian soldiers to open fire upon the enemy along the opposite shore. Shortly after this the enemy set fire to the boat, and it floated off down the river enveloped in flames.

The river continued to rise until it covered the sand bar where the boat's cargo had been unloaded, and in a day or so barrels and boxes of commissary supplies were seen floating in the river past Fort Smith, the Confederates having been able to secure and carry off only a small part of the goods. They had no wagons along with the expedition, and took only so much of the supplies as they could carry off on their horses. There were some sutler's goods on the boat, however, which the Southern Indians took, and with which they almost loaded themselves down, and immediately started for their homes with their booty, almost breaking up Watie's command. Lieutenant Cook was blamed for not keeping his men together on shore within range of the boat, for if he had done so it was thought that he could have prevented the enemy from coming over to her by a well-directed fire upon any one attempting to approach her in the small boat which Lieutenant Houston and the captain had taken to the

south side when they went over. The Lieutenant reported that two of the crew and one of the engineers had been killed when he abandoned the boat. In the skirmish across the river after Colonel Ritchie came up that officer had one sergeant and three men wounded.

As soon as information reached Fort Smith of the attack on the boat, General Thayer sent out Colonel S. J. Crawford, Second Kansas Colored Infantry, with part of his own regiment and part of the Eleventh United States Colored Infantry, in all about seven hundred men, and a section of artillery, with instructions to march to the point where the boat was captured as rapidly as practicable, and if possible drive the enemy off before they could get away with the supplies. When the Colonel arrived in the vicinity where the boat was abandoned, he found that the enemy had left the river and fallen back a short distance. He then moved forward and came upon their picket at San Bois Creek, and chased them to Wire Bridge, where about 150 of Colonel Watie's men showed themselves as if they intended to contest his advance. As Colonel Crawford did not know the strength of the Confederate force, he formed his men in line of battle, sent forward his skirmishers, and opened fire with his artillery upon the enemy, who, after a few rounds, fled, having sustained a small loss of killed and wounded. It was impracticable to pursue to any advantage with his infantry the mounted force of the enemy, and Colonel Crawford returned to Fort Smith with his command. After the capture and burning of that boat, it was considered unsafe to attempt to ship supplies to the troops at Fort Gibson by steamboat, for in a short time the forces of Maxey and Cooper occupied the country south of the Arkansas River in the Indian Territory, pushing their outposts up to within a short distance of Fort Smith. General Thayer certainly did not display a very aggressive policy, for, by drawing in his troops from two or

three unimportant posts, he had enough men to march out and attack Maxey and Cooper, with a strong probability of success. Of course his general movements were directed by General Steele, the Department Commander, who was busy in looking after Shelby on the Upper White River, and Marmaduke on the Mississippi below the mouth of the Arkansas River. It was known that Generals Kirby Smith and Price had under consideration the question of making a campaign into Missouri; but the movements of their troops had not yet developed their plans. The efforts of Marmaduke to interrupt the navigation of the Mississippi, and the efforts of Shelby to interrupt the navigation of White River below De Vall's Bluff, having failed, the question that suggested itself to the observer of events in that section was, Would Price now concentrate his forces to attack Little Rock or Fort Smith, or to make an invasion of Missouri?





## CHAPTER XXIII.

### QUANTRILL'S BANDITS REPULSED BY UNION MILITIA AT LAMAR, MISSOURI, AND ACTION ON CENTRE CREEK.

IN the latter part of April and the early part of May, reports came to the Federal officers commanding posts in Southwest Missouri that a hostile force, estimated at seven hundred strong, under Colonel Adair, was on Grand River in the northern part of the Indian Territory. General Sanborn at Springfield received information that this force intended to attack the Federal troops at Neosho about the first of May. On account of disturbances in other parts of his district, he did not have troops to spare to send against the enemy at once. The first week in May, Major John Cosgrove, with a detachment of eighty-two men of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, made a scout from Springfield into Northwestern Arkansas and in the western part of McDonald County, Missouri, and skirmished with small parties of Adair's Indians, killing six, wounding two, and capturing three men and eight horses. When nearing the State line road, he was informed that the enemy had already started on the march to attack Major Burch's command at Neosho, and he at once pushed forward for that place. On his arrival at Cowskin Prairie, Missouri, he ascertained that the main body of the enemy had the day before been ordered to the west side of Grand River, but as his horses were much weakened from long and constant marching, he did not

attempt pursuit, and moved to Neosho, where the troops were preparing for an attack. The reports of a Southern force in the Cherokee Nation threatening a raid into Southwest Missouri were so persistent that Colonel John D. Allen, Seventh Missouri Provisional Militia, stationed at Mount Vernon, made a scout with a detachment of his regiment through Newton and Jasper Counties a week or so after Major Cosgrove had returned to Springfield. When he arrived in the neighborhood of Granby he was informed that a Confederate force of 80 to 160 men had passed that place on the 18th, the day before his arrival, going north. Captain James M. Ritchey, stationed at Newtonia with a company of Colonel Allen's regiment, had sent two scouts who saw the enemy going north, and made out the force one hundred strong.

After part of Quantrill's band of eighty men crossed the Arkansas River above Fort Gibson in April, moving northeast, nothing definite had been heard of them by the Federal officers in Northwest Arkansas and Southwest Missouri, until they passed between Neosho and Newtonia on the 18th of May. They had been in the northern part of the Cherokee Nation, resting and recruiting their horses and watching for trains from Fort Scott and Fort Gibson. In their march north they passed within two miles of Carthage, and sent word to Captain Philip Rohrer, commanding a company of Colonel Allen's regiment at that place, to come out and fight them. When the Captain had marched out with his company they were gone. They continued their march north, and at daylight on the morning of the 20th attacked a detachment of forty men of Captain E. J. Morris' company, Seventh Provisional Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia, under Lieutenant George N. Alder, stationed at Lamar. Captain Morris had been stationed at Greenfield for some time, but in May was sent with his company to Lamar with instructions to scout from that point through Barton and

adjoining counties for the purpose of intercepting, if practicable, small parties of guerillas who were reported every few days as endeavoring to make their way from Arkansas and the Indian Territory north to the Missouri River counties. He left Lamar on the 19th of May with one half of his company on a scout, leaving the other half of forty men under Lieutenant Alder to hold the town and protect his supplies. He had not heard of the enemy passing near Neosho, and no unusual precautions were imposed upon his men left at the station.

Lieutenant Alder had placed pickets on the different roads leading into town, some distance out; but the picket on the Carthage road either came in at daylight without orders, or was called in, so that the guerillas were in sight preparing to charge him before the Lieutenant knew of their presence. The attack was so sudden that most of his men, who had just got up and were feeding their horses or preparing their breakfasts, scattered in different directions, leaving their arms where they had disposed them. Some of them, however, who had good horses had time to mount them and escape to Greenfield and Fort Scott, while others, who were in the north part of town, escaped afoot to the thick timber on Muddy Creek, which came up to within half a mile of town on the west side, and made their way towards Fort Scott until they met reinforcements from that place. Orderly Sergeant Jeff. Cavender, with nine men, instantly took refuge behind the burnt walls of the brick courthouse, where their other comrades in town had disposed their arms when not on duty. The ammunition of the company had also been placed inside of these old walls, which were used on that occasion as an improvised fort, and the place had been designated as a rallying-point in the event of attack. On hastily taking refuge in this defensive position, Sergeant Cavender and his men not only found their own guns loaded and ready for use, but also

nearly all the guns of their comrades who were cut off from that place. The old burnt walls, being in the centre of a large square, made the place a good one for defence against an enemy supplied only with small-arms.

There was no fence around the court-house square, so that there was a perfectly open space on all sides of the old walls to the houses around the square, most of which had been burned by the guerillas in 1863 when they burned the court-house. As soon as the Federal detachment got into their defensive position they seized their guns and opened fire on their assailants, the foremost of whom had come up within perhaps fifty yards. The first volley of the detachment checked the advance of the enemy and caused them to fall back some distance under cover of buildings, but near enough to be heard plainly calling out for the men in the quasi-fort to surrender. Sergeant Montgomery of the detachment volunteered to get up on the wall and talk to them and hear their proposition while his comrades were reloading their guns.

The bandits made all sorts of promises of fair treatment if the Federal soldiers would surrender; but the besieged detachment thought the enemy belonged to Quantrill's band, as they did, and knew it would be death to surrender to them, and determined to fight to the last. After parleying a few moments, the enemy formed in line and charged again, coming up within thirty to fifty yards of the Federal detachment. In this charge the bandits brought up their entire available force, which the besieged estimated at one hundred men; but a second well-directed volley from Sergeant Cavender's men had the effect of instantly checking them and of dismounting several men, who were seriously wounded. But the bandits were still determined to capture the position, and in a short time commenced forming for another assault. The respite was welcome to the gallant little band of besieged, to enable them to reload their guns and prepare for the worst.

They were armed with the Springfield musket, and their ammunition for it was what was known as buck and ball, which consisted of one ball and three buckshot. Sergeant Cavender directed his men to load with buckshot, which they did by tearing off the ball and throwing it aside and ramming down the buckshot. By the time he was ready for them the enemy charged him again; but the volley from his men was so effective that the bandits hastily retired, and did not make another effort to capture the position. It was thought that they would have shown greater persistence had they known the small number of men they were fighting. The Federal detachment had port-holes through the old walls to fire from, and, as they knew that they were attacked by a superior force, they did not venture in the heat of the fight to put their heads above the walls to see what casualties they had made. They could see, however, that a number of men were dismounted by each of their volleys, and that the men were picked up and carried off by their comrades.

The bandits did not leave any of their killed or wounded in town, but two women who came in the day of the fight stated that they counted thirty of the guerillas, as they passed their houses, who had been killed and wounded. At that time the bandits were not in the habit of giving quarter to the Union militia or any Federal soldiers who fell into their hands, and of course rarely left any of their wounded to fall into the hands of the militia, but took them along and left them with their friends in the country on the line of march. In this fierce conflict Sergeant Cavender did not lose a man; but one of the Federal detachment, a Mr. Underwood, was killed on the street in the early part of the action before he could join his comrades within the fortified position.

In a short time after the bandits left town, the company bugler, who was one of the men under Sergeant Cavender, was directed to blow the assembly to recall the com-

rades who in the first attack had scattered and were thought to be within hearing of the call. Some of Lieutenant Alder's men who were cut off from the court-house position and still within hearing of the bugle-call, concealed in the thick brush and timber on Muddy Creek, ventured out to a house near by and got a woman to go into town to ascertain if the enemy had left, or whether they had captured the detachment under Sergeant Caver-  
der and compelled the bugler to sound the assembly to betray his comrades. When it was found that the detachment had held their position and that the enemy had left, the men who were cut off from that position in the early part of the fight returned to town. Immediately after Lieutenant Alder got his men together again, he commenced to strengthen his position by smoothing the tops of the old walls and placing heavy hewn timbers on them, and by making more port-holes for use should another attack be made. The citizens volunteered to assist him in the event of another attack, so that he had a force that evening of seventy-five men.

One of Lieutenant Alder's men, Jesse Sullinger, who was cut off from his comrades at the beginning of the fight, mounted his horse bareback and rode to Fort Scott, a distance of forty miles, by ten o'clock, and reported to Colonel Charles W. Blair, commanding the post, what he had seen, and that part of his comrades were surrounded within the old court-house walls and, as he supposed, all killed. In less than half an hour after receiving this information, Colonel Blair had two companies of cavalry on the road to Lamar, which arrived there about eight o'clock that night, accompanied by private Sullinger. The two companies from Fort Scott stayed in Lamar until day-break the next morning, and then started north on the trail of the guerillas, but were unable to overtake them.

While the fight was going on, there was a piece of heroism and devotion to the Government shown that de-

serves mention. There were two young women in Lamar, the Misses Harrington, who had a brother in the Union service, and who was at home on furlough that day. When the bandits came charging into town, the brother of these women hurriedly left home, leaving his arms behind him. Directly after the fight opened, and as soon as the guerillas were driven off to the south side of town, one of the young women gathered up her brother's arms and delivered them to the men holding the position behind the old walls. In a short time after this the young women each carried a bucket of water to the soldiers, so that they would not suffer from thirst in the event that the siege should last during the day. Most of the horses of Lieutenant Alder's detachment had stampeded during the fight, and many of them were not recovered for several days afterwards, some of them having returned to Greenfield, where the company had been stationed.

In a day or so after the fight Captain Morris returned to Lamar with his detachment, evacuated the place, and returned to Greenfield with his company, where he was employed in scouting from that point for some time. His leaving Lamar brought out a complaint from the loyal citizens, for at two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, only a few days after he left, the guerilla bands of Captains Taylor and Marchbanks entered the town and burned nearly all the houses and most of the county records.

In the destruction of the town, the loyal people were able to save very little of their household goods, and the loss of the county records was certain to cause great inconvenience when the time came for reorganizing the county. When the militia occupied the place, quite a number of loyal citizens returned to their homes, to be bitterly disappointed by being left unprotected and obliged to witness the destruction of their homes. Perhaps nearly nine tenths of the loyal people in the county outside of Lamar had moved into Kansas or into the counties

east of Barton since the war, and as there was a much greater proportion of loyal people in those counties than in the Border tier of counties, there was, of course, a strong demand for troops for their protection. All the towns of importance in the counties east of the Border tier had militia stationed in them, and most of the people in the country, secessionists as well as Unionists, remained on their farms. Of course nearly all the able-bodied men of military age were in the Federal or Confederate army, or in the brush as bandits.

### *Action on Centre Creek.*

When Price's army was driven south through the western counties of the State during his raid in the fall of 1864, the detachments of the loyal State militia stationed in the county towns were obliged to be withdrawn to prevent their capture by the enemy. Very soon, however, after the Southern forces passed beyond the limits of the State, the commanding officers of detachments of militia were directed to return to their former stations, for the purpose of giving protection to the people and keeping down bandit depredations. Although most of the bandit outlaws of the State joined Price's army and were driven south with it, they soon commenced returning to the southwestern counties in small squads to renew their plundering and murdering operations. Their presence in any locality was generally soon made known by the loyal people to the commanding officer of the nearest military post, who lost no time in sending a detachment of mounted troops against them. The officer intended, as far as his information justified him, to always send out a force sufficient to rout them and drive them out of the locality. But, knowing the vigilance of the militia, the outlaws did not usually remain long in any one place.

On the 19th of February, 1865, Major Milton Burch,

commanding the post of Neosho, Missouri, received information from a reliable source that there was a party of bandit outlaws operating in the neighborhood of Centre Creek in the southwestern part of Jasper County, some twenty-five miles distant. The Major had been known in Southwest Missouri, since the early part of the war, as a brave and energetic officer in breaking up and dispersing the bands of guerillas operating within the limits of his territory. Probably no Federal officer operating in Southwest Missouri was so much dreaded by the bandit outlaws of that section as Major Burch and his captains, Kelso and Ruark, for the weather was never too inclement and no night too dark and stormy for them to venture out, and no spot too inaccessible for them to find the foe and engage him in hand-to-hand encounters.

Determined to break up the band of outlaws on Centre Creek, on the 19th of February Major Burch sent out a detachment of twenty-five mounted men under Lieutenant John M. Baxter, of his battalion of the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, in search of the enemy. The detachment left Neosho in the morning with several days' rations in their haversacks, and marched north that day down Shoal Creek and across the prairies to the timber on Centre Creek, where, late in the evening, Lieutenant Baxter received definite information of the place where the bandits were stopping. It was then too late to reach the place and attack them that evening, and the detachment, finding a secluded spot where their presence would not likely be observed, encamped for the night. Early the next morning the Lieutenant resumed the march to the point where the outlaws were reported to be located. It was soon understood among the men of the Federal detachment that the bandits were occupying a house, and were less than a dozen in number, but probably well armed for a desperate fight. When Lieutenant Baxter came up within a quarter of a mile of the house he

ordered a charge with drawn revolvers, and when he approached within a few yards of the building the outlaws ran out of it, both parties at the same moment opening a deadly fire upon each other. Private Dodson Britton, one of Lieutenant Baxter's detachment, being a few yards in advance of his comrades, shot down one of the bandits directly after he ran out of the house. Though the outlaw was mortally wounded, he at once rose to his feet and came forward a few steps, seized Britton's horse by the bridle-reins, and shot its rider through the heart, and he fell off dead upon his antagonist. In another moment Lieutenant Baxter rode along over the ground where the desperate struggle took place, and the dying bandit raised himself upon his elbow and shot the Lieutenant off his horse, mortally wounded. In this short, decisive action three of the outlaws were killed, and of the Federal detachment one was killed and five wounded. Lieutenant Baxter died on the return of the detachment to Neosho that day. A more experienced officer would have displayed greater caution than the Lieutenant in attacking a desperate foe who had all the advantages of position for making a good fight.

The father and mother of young Britton resided at Neosho at the time, and when the lifeless form of their son was brought home that evening, a sacrifice to the cause of the Union, their grief was almost unsupportable. They had borne with patience the loss of property through the enemy from time to time since the first year of the war, but the loss of this son seemed to almost fill their cup of bitterness. Of their three sons who had enlisted in the Union army, two had now fallen in action with the enemy, leaving the surviving son, the author of this work, to pay this slight tribute to their devotion to the Union.



## CHAPTER XXIV.

### MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WESTERN MISSOURI.

CENTRAL and Western Missouri during the winter of 1863-64 were little disturbed by guerilla depredations. Those bandits who did not go south with Quantrill in October had kept very quiet in their retreats in the deep recesses of the rough and thickly wooded regions of Jackson, Lafayette, and Johnson Counties, and were extremely cautious in communicating with their friends. It became known to the Federal officers at Lexington and Warrensburg that a Captain Blunt, the leader of some twenty bandits, did not go south with Quantrill, but had undertaken to stay during the winter in the almost inaccessible regions of the counties above mentioned. Colonel James McFerran had sent out frequent scouts in search of their camp, but they were unable to find it or their trail until February 22d, when Lieutenant W. B. Hamilton, Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, found the bandits in the brush, twelve miles northwest of Warrensburg on Blackwater Creek, and attacked them, wounding one of them and receiving a severe wound himself. The next day after this skirmish, Captain Milton Burris, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, with nineteen men, ambuscaded and mortally wounded two of the same band of guerillas in the western part of Lafayette County. In the latter part of March, Major A. W. Mullins, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and Captain Burris scouted for ten days

through the eastern part of Jackson and the western part of Lafayette Counties, broke up a number of guerilla camps, wounded several bandits, and captured a few horses and arms. The troops left the roads entirely, and part of the country over which they scouted was covered with almost impenetrable thickets and brush, so that the officers commanding detachments were frequently obliged to dismount part of their men to advance on foot while the balance of the men of the detachment, also dismounted, led their horses a short distance in the rear.

Information was received by General E. B. Brown, commanding the District of Central Missouri, that a considerable number of guerillas on the north side of the river were preparing to enter the eastern part of Jackson County, and this scout, under Major Mullins, was intended to check the movement and prevent their concentration. The General had under his command in the western part of his district in the spring and summer of 1864, the Second Colorado Cavalry, Colonel James H. Ford commanding, headquarters at Kansas City; the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under Colonel James McFerran, headquarters at Warrensburg; besides the Enrolled Missouri Militia of the district, part of which was in active service most of the time. This force was stationed at the county-seat towns and at all other important towns in the counties, and detachments from the different stations constantly kept out scouting. But in the face of the activity and vigilance of the troops, as spring advanced the guerillas increased in numbers and boldness, having made their way into that section in small parties from the south. Many of them were dressed in the Federal uniform, and easily deceived the people as to their true characters as they marched north.

The latter part of March, Captain J. H. Little, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding the station at Germantown, in the southwest part of Henry County,

received information late at night that a party of bandits a few miles from his post were robbing and plundering the citizens and threatening the lives of those who served in the Enrolled Militia at the station when called upon. He at once sent out Sergeant John W. Barkley, of his company, with a detachment of men, in pursuit of the marauders, the citizen who brought in the report accompanying the soldiers. At one place where the bandits were attempting to rob and plunder, they were fired upon by a citizen and one of them severely wounded, and in being taken off by his comrades the party was so much delayed that they were overtaken by Sergeant Barkley, where they had taken refuge in the house of a friend, about one o'clock in the morning. The Sergeant ordered them to surrender, and they replied with a volley. In a short time other bandits who were plundering in the neighborhood came to the assistance of their besieged friends and fired upon the Federal detachment, and called to those in the house to come out. They attempted to escape, but were driven back by a volley from the Federal detachment, and the guerillas who had come to their aid were driven off. Sergeant Barkley covered his men from the fire of the bandits, and kept up the fight until daylight, when, seeing no possibility of escape and after some discussion as to their treatment, they surrendered, and the three men, including the wounded bandit, were taken back to Germantown. They were identified by the citizens as the men who had been committing the robberies; part of the stolen property was found in their possession; and the two who were not wounded were tried by a military court, found guilty, and executed. The wounded bandit was sent to Clinton to be treated and to await the result of his wound. One of the bandits who was executed, when informed of the sentence that was to be imposed, stated that "he had paid for his life nine times." When they found that they were go-

ing to be executed and that their fictitious names were no longer of any use to them, they gave their true names, were identified, and permitted to write to their friends. They were each wearing a Federal overcoat when captured, which fact justified their execution under general orders.

The Federal officers serving in Western Missouri looked for Quantrill's bandits to return to the Missouri River counties on the opening of spring, and the distribution of the troops was made with the view of rendering the former haunts of the marauders as nearly untenable as possible. At no time since the war had Federal camps and stations been established in the very heart of the region in which Quantrill had formerly made his retreat when not on some desperate foray. As no large body of bandits had appeared in that section in the early part of the spring, the Federal scouting parties sent out were usually small, from fifteen or twenty to fifty men. Should Quantrill's bandits return to that section, no one knew whether they would come in small parties or in two or more large detachments. As there were Federal troops stationed at all the important points in Southwest Missouri and in Southern Kansas, it did not seem likely that as large a body of guerillas as nearly a hundred men would be able to advance as far north as Johnson or Jackson County without their march being interrupted or their presence in the section through which they passed being known. But the western Border counties from the Missouri River to the Arkansas line were nearly depopulated, except a few towns in some of them.

Nearly one hundred guerillas did march over this desolated region of nearly two hundred miles unobserved and surprise and attack Lieutenant James E. Couch, with a small detachment of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, near Chapel Hill, killing the Lieutenant and two of his men, on the 28th of April. Most of the bandits were

wearing the Federal uniform, and when seen by citizens on the march were probably thought to be Federal soldiers. They crossed Grand River near Dayton, in the southeast part of Cass County, at three o'clock P.M. on the 27th, and took Sergeant P. Russell, Second Colorado Cavalry, commanding the station, a prisoner. Information of their passing Dayton, marching north, was conveyed to Major J. L. Pritchard, Second Colorado Cavalry, commanding post at Harrisonville, that evening, who at once sent a messenger to Pleasant Hill, notifying the commanding officer at that place of the movement of the guerillas. He also hastily collected such men as could be spared from the nearest station and marched the next morning at daylight for Rose Hill, where he struck the trail of the bandits and followed it to Holden, and ascertained that they had passed that place early that morning. A heavy rain had fallen during the night, making their trail easily followed, until he arrived in the neighborhood of Chapel Hill, where he lost it, it being broken up by the trail of other Federal troops crossing and recrossing it. After the disaster to Lieutenant Couch, another detachment of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry had come up with and attacked the bandits and dispersed them and pursued them until night, capturing from them a flag of an Indiana regiment. The next day Major Pritchard marched from Chapel Hill to Lone Jack, where he met Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore H. Dodd, with six companies of the Second Colorado Cavalry. From that point the united commands marched north, scouting the Sni Hills section almost to Napoleon, on the Missouri River, finding only a few trails and a small party of ten bandits, who escaped into the thick brush that covered many square miles of that region. The main force of the bandits had broken up into small parties and scattered out into adjoining counties, some of them making their way to the north side of the river,

where they visited their friends clandestinely, and were soon causing a disturbance in that section.

After the breaking up of the guerillas into small parties, the Federal troops who had participated in the pursuit returned to their several stations and resumed the work of scouting, and as far as practicable keeping advised of the movements of bandits in the different localities. The vigilance of the troops prevented any important outbreak of the marauders for upwards of three weeks, when Colonel McFerran, at Warrensburg, received a despatch from Lieutenant William L. Hardesty, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, stationed at Germantown, dated May 21st, stating that one hundred guerillas had crossed the Osage River at Taberville, and were marching north. This force was a part of Quantrill's command that had attacked the Union militia at Lamar on the 20th and were driven off. Some of the Federal troops from Clinton who saw the bandits when they passed several miles west of that place estimated that they were more than one hundred strong.

While at Holden on the evening of the 23d, Colonel McFerran received a message from Captain John Taggart, commanding a company of Union militia a few miles south of town, that Quantrill, with two hundred men, was near at hand, marching in the direction of Holden. The appearance of the bandits was so sudden and in such force that the Captain was unable to get his company together in time to make a fight, so that those who had reported were obliged to take to the brush to save themselves. On receipt of Captain Taggart's message, Colonel McFerran sent messengers to Kingsville for his men at that station to join him that night *en route* to Hopewell, in Lafayette County, which they did, together with fifteen citizen guards under Captain Jones. With this force of fifty-seven men the Colonel arrived at Hopewell the next morning at daylight, where he was soon joined by sixty-

five men, under Captain Burris, of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry. He then returned to Holden that day, but soon ascertained that the outlaws had marched north the night before, without coming into collision with any detachments of Federal troops. As the bandits were a day and a night's march ahead of him, Colonel McFerran did not attempt to follow their trail, but sent the troops which he had concentrated to their several stations, and returned to his headquarters at Warrensburg.

It was now known to General Brown and his officers commanding sub-districts that at least two hundred desperate bandits had entered that section within the last month, and that they were determined to commit a series of desperate and atrocious acts during the summer. While the dispositions of the Federal troops in that section were made with good judgment with the view of giving the bandits no rest, the numerous stations had to be supplied with subsistence for the men and forage for the animals. This was no small task, and required the almost constant moving of a train and escort from one station to another. During the winter, when there were only a few bandits in the country, the teams hauling subsistence and forage for the troops at the stations were generally accompanied by escorts of fifteen to twenty men. The large number of guerillas known to be in that section should have suggested to officers sending out teams thoughts of caution about exposing small escorts to possible slaughter. But of course there were many contingencies to be considered before an officer could be justly blamed for a seeming fault.

At most of the stations the troops had adopted plans of operations against the bandits which the latter dreaded and which often proved disastrous to them. Small scouts of twenty to thirty men under a competent officer or non-commissioned officer would leave the stations afoot after dark, with five to ten days' rations, and each day while

they were out scout through the thick brush on each side of the streams, and of nights watch the roads or paths along which the bandits would likely pass to visit their friends to get supplies and information of the movements of the Federal troops. The success of these scouts depended upon the movements of the men being guarded with the utmost secrecy, for they would be placed at a great disadvantage if the neighborhoods they intended visiting should become known to the guerillas. A small scout, mounted or dismounted, leaving camp in the day-time, might be watched by the Southern sympathizers, and information of the direction it was marching conveyed to the bandits. To scout the woods by day and watch the roads and paths by night was full of danger to the scouting detachments from the stations, for the outlaws neither expected nor gave quarter.

While these scouts were generally successful in inflicting punishment upon the guerillas, a serious disaster befell one sent out from Holden by Captain John Wyckoff, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, on the 11th of June, under Sergeant J. V. Parman of his company. At nine o'clock on that day Sergeant Parman left Holden, with fourteen men and one day's rations, with instructions to scout the country north of Kingsville and along Crawford's Fork and to return to camp the next day. His march that day was mainly in the brush. He found one fresh trail of guerillas, and followed it until they separated. He then returned to a point three miles west of Kingsville and encamped part of the night near a farmhouse. The next morning, directly after he started out from the place where he had camped, he noticed a body of forty to fifty cavalry in Federal uniforms a short distance in his rear, rapidly advancing upon him. He instantly formed his detachment in line, and ordered his men to fire upon the enemy, who were then within easy range and fast closing around him. The fight was short

and desperate, and five of his men fell where he formed, and seven others a short distance from them near the brush after he attempted to retreat. The guerillas, under Captains Yeager and Bill Anderson, had flanked him on the right and left before coming up in sight in his rear, and he estimated that altogether they had at least eighty men. It was with the greatest difficulty that he and two of his comrades made their escape by using their revolvers in firing upon the bandits who were in their front and on their right and left. The Sergeant made a serious mistake in attempting to fight so large a force with his small detachment. As he was near the brush when the enemy were seen in his rear, by hastily retreating he could probably have escaped with very little loss. He reported that he was satisfied that the bandits had been advised of his position and strength; that they had marched from the north—from the direction of the Sni Hills—during the night, and that after the fight they returned in the direction from whence they had marched. Whether they were informed of his movements after leaving Holden by some of their friends, or whether information of his presence near the farmhouse was conveyed to them, could not be determined. In a short time information of the disaster reached Kingsville and Holden, and in a few hours Captains Wyckoff and J. D. Eads had all their available men on the trail and in pursuit of the outlaws, coming up with them just at dark as they were entering the Sni Hills, and mortally wounded one of them in the skirmish that took place. Directly after this skirmish Captain Wyckoff was joined by forty men of the Second Colorado Cavalry from Pleasant Hill, who stayed with him nearly all night in the cautious pursuit and search for the bandits. But they soon scattered in small parties, and the Federal troops were unable to bring them to a stand.

Only two days after the disaster to Sergeant Parman's detachment, Sergeant Shackleford, commanding a de-


tachment of thirty men of Captain Burris' company, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was attacked by one hundred guerillas, twelve miles from Lexington, while guarding a train of two wagons hauling rations for the troops at one of the stations, and had eight of his men killed and one mortally wounded and fifteen mules killed. The Sergeant made a gallant fight with his men and repulsed three charges of the bandits, when they flanked him, nearly surrounded him, and cut him off from the brush, making it necessary for him to abandon the teams and retreat to save the balance of his command from being overpowered and killed. He was unable to ascertain the loss he inflicted on the guerillas in the fight, but thought that they must have had a number of men killed and wounded. These disasters were the most serious the Federal troops sustained in Central and Western Missouri during the war. No impartial observer could doubt but that such disasters might be looked for as long as the policy of the Government allowed Southern families to remain in the country as spies and informers for the bandits. But severe as were the Federal losses in these two instances, General Brown reported that while he lost in the various operations in his district during the month of June, twenty-three men killed, reports from his officers from different stations showed that his troops had killed eleven and mortally wounded sixteen bandits. The system of sending out foot scouts at night from the different stations in his district had proved very successful in increasing the mortality among the guerillas.


Directly after receiving information of the disasters to the Federal detachments near Kingsville and Lexington, General Rosecrans telegraphed General Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, that the guerillas were reported concentrating in the Sni Hills on the line of Jackson and Lafayette Counties for an important movement, and arrangements were at once perfected for the coöperation

of the Federal troops of the two Departments against the outlaws. On the morning of June 15th one company of the Fifth and parts of the Eleventh and Fifteenth Regiments Kansas Cavalry were concentrated at Aubrey, Johnson County, Kansas, under Colonel Thomas Moonlight, from the troops in the District of Southern Kansas, Brigadier-General Thomas J. McKean commanding, for the purpose of making an expedition into Missouri, in coöperation with Colonel Ford, Second Colorado Cavalry, commanding the western counties of General Brown's district, in a movement against the guerillas. The Kansas troops left Aubrey on the 16th, in two columns of four squadrons each; one column under Lieutenant-Colonel George H. Hoyt, Fifteenth Kansas, moving down the Big Blue, thoroughly scouting the timber on each side of that stream, and the other column under Colonel Moonlight marching up Grand River in the direction of Pleasant Hill, scouting the brush on each side. As a part of the expedition, some of the troops marched on the high ground between the streams and in the open prairies to watch for and intercept any bandits who might be run out of the brush. At Pleasant Hill, Colonel Moonlight met Colonel Ford with part of the Second Colorado Cavalry, and they proceeded together to Lone Jack and thence to the Sni Hills to thoroughly scout all that region. In accordance with prearranged plans, the several columns met after dark on the 18th, a few miles from Sibley on the Missouri River, having that day come upon one band of fifteen and another of fifty guerillas, who were so wild that the troops could not get near enough to get any fight out of them. In the chase after them, however, the troops captured a few horses, mules, and blankets which they left in their flight. It was the opinion of the officers of the expedition that the scout had had the effect of driving the bandits out of the Border counties into Johnson and Lafayette Counties and to the north side of the Missouri

River, and prevented the concentration for which they were preparing.

Having accomplished all that was possible, the Kansas troops under Colonel Moonlight returned to Aubrey, from whence they were sent to their several stations along the State line. On returning to Kansas they scouted the thickly wooded regions along some of the small streams which had not been thoroughly searched the first two days out, but did not find any of the marauders, or any recent signs of them. Very few of the Southern families who had been required to leave their homes under General Ewing's *Order Number Eleven* had returned, except in the towns, so that the bandits found no encouragement to make their hiding-places in the depopulated section. But this fact did not make the Kansas troops the less vigilant, for if the guerillas could concentrate in Johnson or Lafayette County, they might, by making a night march and evading Federal scouting parties, get into Kansas unobserved. The militia in the eastern Border counties in Kansas had been organized, and the people in the towns were armed and better prepared to meet an invading force of bandits than in 1863. Even during the temporary absence of the troops from their stations in the expedition under Colonel Moonlight, the Kansas militia were called out to guard the towns.





## CHAPTER XXV.

### THE CENTRALIA MASSACRE.

IN the summer and autumn of 1864, Brigadier-General Clinton B. Fisk was in command of the Union forces in the District of North Missouri, operating against the guerilla bands of Perkins, Threlkill, Todd, Anderson, Holtzclaw, Davis, and other guerilla leaders in that section. The General's headquarters were at St. Joseph, from which point he directed the movements of the troops of his district. His principal subordinate commanders were Brigadier-Generals James Craig and J. B. Douglass. General Craig's sub-district embraced Northwest Missouri, and General Douglass commanded in Central Missouri, north of the river. In directing their operations against the Southern guerillas, these officers had the State militia, the Enrolled Militia, and some companies of Volunteer cavalry, a total force of two or three thousand men. But this force was distributed over such a large territory that it was generally divided into detachments of one, two, or three hundred men, or even smaller numbers. As the guerillas made no pretensions to holding any place, their leaders could divide up their forces into squads of a dozen or so men, up to a hundred or more, and when they desired could concentrate the men of different leaders so as to bring five or six hundred together in a very short time. In nearly all the Missouri River counties above Boonville the Southern sympathiz-

ers and open secessionists were as numerous if not indeed more numerous than the Unionists; so that the bandits could conceal themselves in considerable force in many neighborhoods for days without the Union people or loyal militia knowing their positions. As the non-combatant Southern sympathizers were allowed their freedom to go and come almost as they pleased, they frequently gave information of the movements of Federal troops to the bandits that enabled them to make a dash upon or waylay some Federal detachment and cut it to pieces. In spite of the vigilance of the loyal militia officers, they were sometimes drawn into ambush and roughly handled by the guerillas.

In the early part of August, 1864, Major John Grimes, commanding the Fifty-first Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia, received information that Bill Anderson, with a force of about one hundred guerillas, was in Ray County murdering loyal men, committing depredations against their property, and generally creating a state of terror among the people. The Major at once ordered Captain Patton Colley, of his regiment, to take position with his company at Fredericksburg, in Ray County; and Captain M. T. Reed, of the same regiment, was directed to move with part of his company to Pleasant View, Ray County, with instructions for these officers to coöperate with each other in keeping the country bordering upon the line of Clay and Ray Counties from being disturbed or menaced by the bandits as far as practicable. In a few days after arriving at his station, Captain Colley was informed on the night of August 12th by his pickets that a considerable body of guerillas was in the immediate vicinity of his camp. He took twenty men and started in pursuit of the bandits immediately, and, when about four miles south of his station, was drawn into an ambuscade, and after a desperate conflict he and four of his men were killed and the balance of his command dispersed. Im-

mediately after the fight in which Captain Colley and his comrades were killed, Anderson and his bandits started east, and in the afternoon of the next day had reached a point forty miles east on the Missouri River at the mouth of the Wakenda in Carroll County. On this march Anderson captured two militiamen, Samuel Foreseen and Daniel Vansant, who were carrying despatches to Major Grimes at Richmond, and killed both these men, cutting Foreseen's throat from ear to ear and then scalping him. These bandits also killed James Maupin, a citizen militiaman, shooting him in his wagon. Mr. Asa Brookover, a Union man who resided near Wakenda, in Carroll County, was able in his lifetime to point out where Anderson's men had shot down and murdered in cold blood five Union men and discharged Union soldiers who were at home. These five men were killed about a mile below Wakenda. Anderson had been on the south side of the Missouri River murdering and robbing the people, but desiring to return to the north side, which appears to have been his special field of operations, seized a flatboat with which to take his men with their arms and equipments over. His men then held their horses by the halter-straps and let them swim the Missouri River behind the boat as it was ferried over. By crossing the Missouri River in this manner the bandits were able to surprise the people, and no Union man or Federal soldier found at home was allowed to escape their fiendish hands if they could help it.

Mrs. Brookover, relating the narrow escape of her husband from the outlaws on one occasion, and as showing the desperate character of Anderson's men, stated that a youth who came with the bandits to her house one night, and who appeared to be not over fifteen or sixteen years of age, had the ears which he had cut off of murdered Union men and Federal soldiers strung on a string and hung around his neck. She also stated that this youth had each side of the brow-band of his bridle ornamented

with the scalps of Union men or Federal soldiers whom the desperadoes had murdered.

Another illustration may be given of the fiendish character of that band of desperate outlaws. It is furnished by Dr. J. P. Logan, an old and respected citizen of De-witt, in Carroll County. A man who lived about ten miles north of Dewitt, whose wife had been confined, was flooding, and in a dangerous condition, came after the doctor and desired him to go at once to her relief. The doctor had heard that the desperadoes were in the country and told the gentleman that he had some fears of falling into their hands if he went out that evening. He told the man, however, that he would send out by him medicines for the relief of his wife, and promised to go out the next morning to see the sick woman, which he did. On arriving at the house of his patient, he found her husband dead at the corner of the house with a bullet-hole in his head. He also found a neighbor a few yards from the house shot dead, and up the road a few hundred yards there were two other neighbors who had been shot to death by the bandits, and lay across the road a short distance apart. The fiends shot a woman in the same county. They were so utterly devoid of the manly instinct and sympathy that they brought the husband of the lady attended by Dr. Logan in before her and seemed about to kill him in her presence. She asked them what they were going to do with him, and they replied, "Shoot him." She then begged them not to kill him in her presence, so they took him out near the corner of the house, and she heard the report of a gun and knew that her husband had fallen dead.

Immediately after the Fredericksburg affair, Major Grimes ordered Captain Clayton Tiffin and Lieutenant Baker, of the Ray County militia, to join their forces and pursue the bandits vigorously, and if possible overtake and punish them. These officers soon struck the trail of

the marauders and pursued them into Carroll County, when the Carroll County militia united with Captain Tiffin's command, swelling it to about 250 men. He now continued the pursuit on a fresh trail, and about twelve o'clock on Sunday, August 14th, found the guerillas on the east side of Wakenda Prairie, where they had determined to make a stand in a dense body of timber and underbrush. Captain Tiffin at once commenced an attack on the bandits, and after a sharp conflict of about thirty minutes they were driven from their position and continued their retreat to Grand River, which they crossed at Rocky Ford. In this action Captain Tiffin reported a loss of four men killed and six wounded. As the bandits carried off their killed and wounded he was unable to ascertain their loss, but was informed that it was fully as great as his own, including their leader, Thraillkill, who was reported seriously wounded.

The guerillas of Bill Anderson and Quantrill were guilty of many fiendish acts that have never been described, for the victims of their bloody hands were often despatched in lonely places where no friendly eye or ear could see or hear what was done and said. These fiends frequently boasted that their victims numbered 'way up in the hundreds in the counties north of the Missouri River and in Central and Western Missouri. Any one who mingled with and heard the stories or experiences of the surviving inhabitants of the sections where those desperate outlaws operated would certainly have been convinced that their bloody boasts were not exaggerated. Of all their bloody and atrocious acts, the Centralia massacre was the most extensive and barbarous in all its details. The people of the less disturbed sections of the country have never realized what desperate characters the loyal people of Missouri had to contend with in their bitter struggle for the Union.

Early in September, 1864, all North Missouri, and in fact

the loyal people all over the State, were greatly agitated on account of the stirring reports in the newspapers that General Sterling Price had crossed the Arkansas River with a large army of 12,000 to 16,000 men, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and was marching rapidly north to invade Missouri. It was given out by the Southern sympathizers that their hero would capture St. Louis, Jefferson City, and other important towns in the State, and receive large accessions to his ranks from Illinois.

After the Confederate forces were driven from the State, it had been noticeable that when there was a threatened invasion or raid, the guerilla bands in every section where they operated became unusually active and bold. Bill Anderson had already become notorious in North Missouri on account of his many bloody acts in that section. Every few miles of his recent march through Ray, Carroll, Chariton, and Howard Counties was marked with the mutilated corpses of his murdered victims. In a drunken frenzy on this march he attacked a detachment of thirty men of the Ninth Missouri State Militia Cavalry under Lieutenants Joseph M. Street and Thomas H. H. Smith at Fayette, in Howard County, October 23d, who, after a gallant defence, drove him off after he made three charges, killing thirteen of his men and wounding many others. The Federal detachment was posted in log huts, and had three men killed and five wounded. Anderson then marched off in a northeast direction into Randolph and Monroe Counties. His presence in the neighborhood of Paris aroused the Federal officers commanding detachments in that section to great activity and a determination to attack and disperse his band as promptly as possible. While they knew his force was heavily armed with the best arms in use and mounted upon the best horses the country afforded, they could not ascertain with certainty the exact number of his followers. The presence of such a desperate band in any given locality gave rise to all

kinds of reports as to its strength and the bloody character of its acts. To the different posts, therefore, where the loyal militia were stationed, the loyal people fled for protection on the approach of the bandits. Some of these frightened citizens who saw them estimated their strength as they were passing as high as five or six hundred men, and others estimated their number as low as one hundred men. When the bands of Anderson, Gordon, Todd, Bryson, and Jones were united there were probably between four and five hundred men.

The various conflicts with the guerillas had taught the Federal officers who had been in the service since early in the war to use great caution in pursuing or attacking them, for more than once Federal detachments had been drawn into ambuscade, attacked, and cut to pieces by reason of underestimating the strength of the bandits. If any of the detachments holding towns or stations of importance in the different counties were much reduced in strength at any time for scouting purposes, the guerillas were certain to find it out very soon afterwards through their friends, and to fall upon the weakened detachment with sufficient force to overpower it or drive it into its blockhouse, if it had one. The militia were generally vigilant, and perhaps at most of their stations had defensive quarters, blockhouses, or court-houses, and the attacks of the bandits were not by any means always successful. There was also a commendable pride among most of the militia officers, which extended even to the ranks, in gaining a reputation for successfully dealing with the guerillas, so that they were led sometimes to take undue risks on insufficient information, in pursuing or attacking them.

But now that Anderson had reached the neighborhood of Paris unresisted, it fell to Major A. V. E. Johnston, Thirty-ninth Missouri Infantry, a regiment recently organized and composed mostly of men who had not seen service, to take such force as he could mount to check the

further progress of the outlaws. On the morning of the 26th of September, Major Johnston left Paris with a detachment of 140 men of his regiment, partly mounted upon horses pressed into service for the scout, and marched in a southeast direction with the expectation of soon ascertaining definite information of the exact location of the guerillas, and of their strength and intentions. The Federal detachment marched all of the 26th, and the next morning at daylight struck the trail of the bandits near Long Branch, between Paris and Mexico. At Long Branch he sent back to Paris all his dismounted men. He then pushed on, and about sunrise, just after he had halted his command for breakfast and to feed, some of his men who were in advance came in sight of the guerillas, who were perhaps two or three miles distant over the prairie. Major Johnston, Adjutant Thomas C. Tripler, Captain Adam Theis, and Sergeant-Major Hiram Haines looked at the bandits through a field-glass, saw that they were dismounted, and were satisfied that they belonged to Anderson's band. Most of the observers with the glass, after estimating the strength of the guerillas as well as they could, expressed themselves as satisfied that they were too strong for the Federal detachment to attack single-handed, incompletely armed as they were. Major Johnston ordered a picket guard thrown out to watch the movements of the bandits while the balance of his men refreshed themselves with food and rest for a short time.

The Federal detachment and the guerillas resumed the march about the same time, the advance-guard of Major Johnston frequently being in sight of the rear-guard of the outlaws for the next two or three hours. Then the bandits passed into the timber and the Federal force lost sight of them, but continued the pursuit by following their trail. When Major Johnston arrived at Centralia about four o'clock, he found that the guerillas had been

there only an hour or so before him and captured and burned the passenger train on the North Missouri Railroad, and taken from it and shot down in the most atrocious manner twenty-four Federal soldiers, who were mostly unarmed and returning home discharged. The blood was still oozing from the wounds of the murdered soldiers, and in some instances their clothing was still burning and their bodies scorched to a crisp. In their death struggles, the bandits had plunged sharp knives through the bodies of their victims with demon-like ferocity. After viewing the horrible sight for a few moments and gathering such information as was possible in regard to the strength and movements of the outlaws, Major Johnston directed Sergeant Haines to count off sixty men from the right, and remarked, "We will go out and feel of them," leaving the left wing of his command in town under Captain Adam Theis.

The town of Centralia is in the prairie, but there was a body of timber about one and a half miles southeast, and it was soon ascertained from citizens on the ground that the guerillas had marched off in the direction of the timber. On leaving town or on the march to the timber the Federal soldiers were unable to see the bandits in ambush, but the bandits were posted so that they could see the Federal force marching out and count the number of men in it, and make full preparation to meet it. In hastily preparing for the reconnaissance, Major Johnston neglected to leave his reserve force in a defensive position, or to suggest any provision for making a stand in the event of being driven back and pursued by the guerillas. Leaving town, the Federal detachment marched out across the prairie until it came to a depression two or three hundred yards from the timber. Here Major Johnston ordered his men into line, and as they were ascending the opposite side of the depression they saw the bandits coming out of the timber on a full charge, estimated at

least four hundred strong, yelling like fiends, with their bridle-reins in their teeth and a revolver in each hand. In another moment the opposing forces were within fifty yards of each other and Major Johnston ordered his men to halt and open fire, which they did. The volley from his men was quickly followed by a volley from the outlaws. Major Johnston and Captain James A. Smith fell in this first action, and as the guerillas were closing in rapidly on their men, they soon broke and commenced retreating back to Centralia to join the detachment left there under Captain Theis. Only three men of the reconnoitring force—Lieutenant Josiah Gill, Sergeant Haines, and a private—escaped, the others being overtaken and shot down before reaching their comrades. The whole band of guerillas were in town almost as soon as these three survivors, so that the men left behind under Captain Theis, having heard nothing of the disaster until the bandits were upon them, had no time to prepare for action, but at once commenced a hasty retreat towards Sturgeon. They were quickly pursued by the guerillas, who were generally mounted upon better horses, and overtaken, and the entire detachment, except eighteen men, killed before reaching the stockade at Sturgeon. Some of the bandits came up in sight of the stockade at Sturgeon, but then turned back upon the road and shot to death all the Federal soldiers who had fallen wounded, except Frank Barnes, who had eight flesh wounds, and James Cummings, who was wounded through the lungs; the latter hid in a cornfield, and at night managed to crawl into Sturgeon, a distance of four miles. The bodies of Captain Smith and several of his men who fell in the disastrous affair were shamefully mutilated by the guerillas before leaving the scene of their bloody work. That evening, that night, and part of the following day the outlaws rode over that section in small squads, looking for those of the Federal force who had been cut off from

Sturgeon and who fled in other directions, shooting down any they found wearing the Federal uniform. Sergeant Hiram Haines, one of the survivors who was cut off from Sturgeon and pursued by the bandits, and from whom the particulars of the disaster were obtained, had an exciting experience in making his escape to Paris, where part of his regiment was stationed. He managed to get into the timber before being overtaken, and night coming on he was able to elude the squad pursuing him. After wandering in the woods and over the prairies nearly two days and nights he made his way to Paris, where he joined his comrades in nearly an exhausted condition.

When the bandits attacked the passenger train at Centralia, they caused it to be understood that if the Federal soldiers on it would surrender without resistance they would be paroled. Captain Samuel E. Turner, Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and one or two soldiers who instantly took in the situation, quickly exchanged their military uniforms for citizen suits, and thus escaped death, which would have otherwise befallen them. Hon. James S. Rollins, of Columbia, Missouri, who was also on the train, came near being identified, and as he was a prominent Union man it would probably have cost him his life. He had been a candidate for Governor of Missouri on the Free Soil ticket in 1858, and made a strong canvass.

In the daily St. Louis papers which he took from the passengers of the train, Anderson saw that General Price was at that moment marching north through Arkansas, if he had not already entered Missouri, with a large Confederate force, and might be expected in Central Missouri in a few weeks, if not at an earlier date. After completing his bloody work, therefore, the guerilla chieftain turned his face south to join Price, whose first objective point was then reported to be St. Louis. It was several days after the Centralia massacre before the loyal militia in North Missouri were able to concentrate at different

points in sufficient force to commence active operations against the bandits again. And no sooner were they in condition to move against the outlaws than they were ordered south of the Missouri River to operate against Price's larger force, which was marching north almost without opposition.

In this terrible massacre, Major Johnston's command sustained a loss of 2 officers and 120 enlisted men killed and 2 enlisted men wounded, and there were 24 men taken from the passenger train and shot down, making a total loss of 146 officers and men killed. The loss of the guerillas was insignificant—probably not more than 6 to 8 men killed and wounded.

To understand how Major Johnston's command was so utterly destroyed without inflicting more serious loss upon the bandits is not easy without some explanation in regard to the equipment of the two forces. But a moment's consideration of the situation will show that after Major Johnston got into the fight his men could not have done otherwise than retreat after he fell. His men were mounted upon horses recently pressed into service and untractable under fire, and they were armed with muskets, which were no better than clubs against a charging foe after firing a single round. On the other hand, the guerillas were armed with a carbine and two, four, and six revolvers each, so that the Federal soldiers were entirely at their mercy after firing a single round. It was a terrible and fatal mistake for the commanding officer of an inferior force, having several miles of open prairie in his rear, to march up and attack, or even to reconnoitre, the position of a superior force posted in the timber as the guerillas were. In marching out to the timber from Centralia, Major Johnston's mind appears to have been so much absorbed with the horrible sight he had just witnessed that he did not deliberately consider the movement he was making, and that he was marching to even greater disaster than that which had taken place in town.



## CHAPTER XXVI.

### THE PRICE RAID IN MISSOURI—BATTLE OF PILOT KNOB, MISSOURI.

AFTER the several divisions of his army returned from the Camden Expedition to Little Rock and Fort Smith, General Steele was unable to resume offensive operations against the Confederate forces in Arkansas that spring or summer. Indeed, it was as much as he could do to hold on to the positions he occupied before he started for Camden. In a short time after the battle of Jenkins' Ferry, Price detached Shelby with about two thousand mounted men to cross to the north side of the Arkansas River for the purpose of blockading White River and interrupting communication by railroad between Little Rock and De Vall's Bluff. About the same time General Marmaduke was detached with part of his division and artillery to the west bank of the Mississippi River to blockade that river below the mouth of the Arkansas, if practicable. An attack on Little Rock or Pine Bluff was threatened by Kirby Smith's other disposable forces in Arkansas under Price; the forces of Maxey and Cooper in Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory were besieging General Thayer at Fort Smith, and by the latter part of July the Arkansas River between Fort Smith and Little Rock was closed to navigation. The ill-conceived and disastrous Red River campaign had thus turned Steele's victorious and aggressive army into a defensive one shut up in two

or three fortified positions. Though this army had suffered heavily in men and transportation by having detachments from it overwhelmed at Poison Spring and Marks' Mills, it had in the only decisive battle of the campaign beaten the Confederate forces under the eyes of General Kirby Smith at Jenkins' Ferry and driven them from the field. Its retreat from Camden to the line of the Arkansas River and defensive attitude were not due to defeat, but to the withdrawal from the campaign of the other coöperating columns for service in other Departments. Until the results of the campaigns in Departments east of the Mississippi River were determined, General Steele could not hope to receive sufficient reinforcements to commence aggressive operations again. Of course the troops of his Department were actively and constantly employed against Shelby on White River in Northeastern Arkansas and against the forces of Maxey and Cooper in Western Arkansas and the Indian Territory; but as the Confederate troops were nearly all cavalry and mounted infantry, a fact already noticed, he did not have sufficient cavalry to make the movements of his columns as effective as desirable.

In sending Shelby north of the Arkansas River there was foreshadowed a determination of the Confederate leaders from Missouri to make a raid into that State in the early autumn. General Price, commanding the District of Arkansas, and who was a Missourian, knew that such a movement would be popular among his Missouri troops and could be counted upon to urge its importance upon General Kirby Smith. Such a movement was also foreshadowed by information obtained from Confederate prisoners and recruiting officers who had returned from the South to different parts of Missouri in the early part of the summer. There was little attention paid to the reports thus obtained, for the reason that the Southern sympathizers were frequently predicting the return of the

Southern forces to the State. In his frequent reports to General Price from the White River country, General Shelby represented his command as capturing gunboats, riding down brigades of Federal infantry, killing and capturing Federal troops by hundreds, of neither giving nor asking quarter if they had the audacity to show too much resistance and hurt some of his men, and that a raid into Missouri would be simply a picnic excursion. All these wonderful achievements in overthrowing and punishing his pygmean foes cost him insignificant losses. It is true that he surprised and captured a few Federal detachments that were employed in cutting, baling, and putting up hay on the prairie near De Vall's Bluff for the army, and that he tore up a few miles of railroad, and with his artillery blockaded White River at one or two points for a few days; but he was invariably driven by the Federal troops sent against him.

No doubt other Confederate general officers on hearing of such great achievements were anxious to make a campaign into a section where military laurels were to be won with so much ease, and where their enemies, always superior in numbers and equipment, were so easily killed, captured, or put to flight. How far General Price was influenced by these exaggerated reports is not positively known. But it was known that after he had an interview and conference with General Kirby Smith at Shreveport, the Commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department on the 4th of August directed him to make immediate arrangements for a campaign into Missouri, St. Louis to be the objective, and placed under his command the entire cavalry force of the District of Arkansas. There was some delay in receiving from Shreveport the necessary ordnance stores for the expedition, and he did not arrive at Princeton, where the divisions of Generals Fagan and Marmaduke were concentrated, until the 29th of August.

On his arrival he assumed command, and the next day

left that place at the head of twelve thousand veteran cavalry and mounted infantry and fourteen pieces of artillery for the invasion of Missouri. He had intended to cross the Arkansas River between Little Rock and Pine Bluff; but thinking that General Steele had become advised of his intended movement, and taking into consideration the question of obtaining subsistence and forage for his troops and animals, he determined to cross the river above Little Rock at Dardanelle, and at once directed his march to that point. He arrived at that place on the 6th of September, and, finding the river fordable, on the 7th crossed his trains and entire force to the north side. From this point he marched in a north-east direction by way of Dover, Clinton, Batesville, Powhatan, and Pocahontas, where he arrived on the 16th of September, having in the meantime been joined by Shelby, who had been operating on White River during the past summer, with ten thousand men and four pieces of artillery. At Pocahontas he reorganized his army in three grand divisions for the purpose of invading Missouri in three columns. The three columns were to form a junction at Fredericktown, Missouri, about the 24th of September. In this movement the central division, under Fagan, marched as direct as practicable to Fredericktown, while the divisions of Marmaduke on the right and Shelby on the left marched for the vicinity of the same place on roads varying from ten to twenty miles from the central column. In the march of the Confederate columns from the Arkansas River to the northern line of the State, Federal detachments of recently organized Union regiments were now and then encountered, who, on finding themselves confronted with superior numbers, retired to the mountains and hills or thickly wooded regions of the country with little loss.

On entering Missouri the Confederate column under Shelby came upon and surrounded at Ponder's Mill, on

Little Black River, between Doniphan and Patterson, a detachment of eighty men under Lieutenant Erich Pape, Third Missouri State Militia Cavalry, which had been sent out by Major James Wilson of that regiment to make a reconnoissance, in view of the excited rumors of the advance of a great army of invasion. Lieutenant Pape gallantly cut his way through the Confederate line, with the loss of Lieutenant W. M. Brawner mortally wounded and five or six enlisted men killed and wounded, and inflicting a loss on the enemy of two men killed and five wounded. This skirmish on the 18th developed the fact that the Confederates under Price were advancing in large numbers, and Major Wilson, commanding that sub-district, rapidly drew into Pilot Knob his detachments from different points under instructions from General Thomas Ewing, Jr., commanding the District of St. Louis, with trifling loss of men and material.

In the early part of September, General W. S. Rosecrans, commanding the Department of the Missouri, received information that General Shelby, who had been operating in Northeastern Arkansas during the summer, would soon be joined by a large Confederate force under Price at Batesville, on the Upper White River in Arkansas, for the invasion of Missouri. The objective of Price's campaign was not yet known to Rosecrans. He thought it would be developed directly after the concentration of the Confederate forces at Batesville. From that point Price could push forward his columns by way of Pilot Knob towards St. Louis, or to Jefferson City and Central Missouri by way of Springfield or Rolla, with about equal facility. The two last-named places were large depots for furnishing the Federal troops in Southern and Southwest Missouri and in Northern and Northwest Arkansas with supplies, and would doubtless be regarded as a valuable prize by the Confederates, who, after their long march, would likely be in great need of such supplies.

Until he could ascertain what important point Price intended to strike, General Rosecrans ordered the concentration of the troops of the different districts of his Department, to be held in readiness for movement at a moment's notice to the threatened point. All the troops that could be spared from stations in Southwest Missouri were concentrated at Springfield under Brigadier-General John B. Sanborn, with instructions to throw out scouting detachments in a southeast direction as far as West Plains and Gainesville, and beyond if practicable. The troops of the District of Rolla were concentrated at that place under General John McNeil; and the troops of the Districts of Central and North Missouri were concentrated at Jefferson City for the defence of the capital of the State under Generals E. B. Brown and Clinton B. Fisk, and work at once commenced to strengthen the defences by throwing up earthworks.

Reports of the impending invasion were so persistent that when, on the 6th of September, General A. J. Smith was passing Cairo with a division of infantry for General Sherman, General Rosecrans telegraphed General Halleck the situation, and requested orders for the division to be halted at that point until the intentions of the Confederate commander could be ascertained. The request was granted, and General Smith received orders to operate against Price, and at once moved his division up to within a few miles of St. Louis, so that he could move by rail or river against the enemy as soon as his designs were developed.

On the 20th of September Major Wilson reported to General Ewing the result of the scout sent out under Lieutenant Pape in the direction of Doniphan—that the Lieutenant reported 4000 or 5000 men in the Confederate force that engaged him; and that information was obtained from a wounded Confederate soldier left on the field when Lieutenant Pape drove the Confederate

advance out of Doniphan on the 17th, that Price was at Pocahontas, but that the Lieutenant had no confidence in the report. Later Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Hiller, Second Missouri State Militia Cavalry, reported to General Ewing from Cape Girardeau, September 22d, that Captain Lewis Sells of his regiment, who had been sent with his company to reinforce two companies at Bloomfield, was attacked two or three times that morning near Sikeston by a Confederate force of 1500 men under Colonel W. L. Jeffers, sustaining a loss of 3 men killed and 7 wounded, and that Captain Sells reported that the enemy, 6000 strong, were marching north from the direction of Chalk Bluff. Though General Rosecrans had been informed that there was a large Confederate force of 5000 or 6000 men in Southeast Missouri on the 20th, he did not receive positive information that Price had crossed the Arkansas River with two divisions of mounted troops, with artillery and trains, and was on White River at or in the vicinity of Batesville, until the 23d of September. The next day he received despatches that Shelby was south of Pilot Knob with 5000 men and 4 pieces of artillery, moving in the direction of Farmington. He did not yet feel certain that this force under Shelby was not thrown forward for the purpose of attracting the attention of the troops in the vicinity of St. Louis, while the main Southern army under Price passed into Central Missouri by way of West Plains and Springfield, or West Plains and Rolla. He was therefore still unable to determine at what point he should concentrate the troops of his Department.

The presence of this large force under Shelby near Farmington required the immediate attention of General Rosecrans, and on the night of the 24th he directed General Ewing to take a brigade of General Smith's division of the Sixteenth Army Corps, then at Jefferson Barracks, near St. Louis, to garrison and patrol the Iron Mountain

Railroad, and to concentrate all the troops of the southern part of his district at Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau. Leaving at De Soto for the further orders of General Smith all the brigade except the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, he took this regiment and went on, strengthening the garrisons at all the bridges as far south as Mineral Point, where he established temporary headquarters. He sent out mounted scouting parties from several stations to the south and east, and they returned on the morning of the 26th and reported no Confederate force north of Fredericktown. They obtained information, however, which they considered reliable, that Price had arrived at Fredericktown with all his army. On receipt of these reports General Ewing took a battalion of five companies of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry under Captain W. J. Campbell and boarded a train for Pilot Knob, arriving there at twelve o'clock. Major Wilson, commanding that sub-district, had collected at that post all his available troops except bridge guards, and had sent out mounted scouting detachments on all the roads leading into that place.

General Ewing was instructed to hold Pilot Knob if practicable until he could find out whether more than Shelby's division was in that section. He had for the defence of the place six companies of the Forty-seventh Missouri Infantry, under Colonel Thomas C. Fletcher, and one company of the Fiftieth Missouri Infantry, under Captain Robert L. Lindsay, an effective force of 489 officers and men, recently organized and that had seen little service. In addition to this force he had of troops who had seen service six companies Third Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under Major James Wilson; one company Second Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under Captain A. P. Wright; one company Missouri State Militia Infantry, under Lieutenant John Fessler; Captain William C. F. Montgomery's battery Second Missouri Light Artillery, and the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa Infan-

try—in all, 562 men. He had of raw troops and troops who had been in service for some time a total of 1051 men and officers. A company of about 100 citizens of Ironton and Pilot Knob, including some of the leading Union men of that section, hastily organized, and were commanded by Captain P. F. Lonergan, First Missouri State Militia Infantry, for the defence. To assist in the defence a company of negroes was also organized and commanded by a colored man named Charles Thurston.

Pilot Knob during the war was the terminus of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad, eighty-six miles south of St. Louis. A mile south of the village was the town of Ironton, the county seat, and a mile south of that the village of Arcadia, well known before and during the war in all that section for its flourishing academy for young ladies.

The region around the villages was noted for its picturesqueness. The road from Pilot Knob to Ironton passed through a gap between Shepherd's Mountain on the west and Pilot Knob Mountain on the east. Ironton was on a high plateau about half a mile south of the entrance to the gap, and at the foot of the hill just south of town the road to Arcadia crossed a small creek that flowed off in a southeast direction into the beautiful valley of Arcadia. A small run from the north entered this creek just east of town, and others from the southwest and the north entered it a short distance west of town. A hundred yards or so north of Arcadia, and just east of the road from Ironton to Arcadia, and north of the Arcadia and Fredericktown road, on an elevated position, there was an old, unfinished earthwork called Fort Curtis. This position had an elevation of about fifty feet above the road, and commanded the Arcadia and Fredericktown road. But the principal work for the defence of the position at Pilot Knob was Fort Davidson, which was located three hundred yards northwest of the

base of Pilot Knob, about the same distance north of the base of Shepherd's Mountain, and one thousand yards nearly north of the gap between the mountains.

The village of Pilot Knob was about four hundred yards east and northeast of the fort, and near the southern entrance to the gap between Rock and Cedar mountains. The fort was an irregular hexagonal work, each of the six faces being somewhat over one hundred feet, with bomb-proof magazine. The ditch around it was ten feet wide and six feet four inches deep. Its armament consisted of four 32-pounder siege-guns, three 24-pounder howitzers mounted *en barbette*, four 6-inch Coehorn mortars, and four steel 2-pounder skirmish-guns, with a sufficient supply of ammunition. Competent engineers who had examined the fort regarded it as indefensible against a large force having a few good batteries of artillery. But General Ewing had it put in a good state of defence, and added two rifle-pits, each 175 yards in length, one extending from the north side and the other from the south side, commanding the approaches from those quarters. He had also ordered the nearest hillsides cleared of timber and obstructed the roads leading up the hills.

After the report of Lieutenant Pape's skirmish at and near Doniphan on the 18th, and of a large Confederate force advancing north, General Ewing ordered Captain Montgomery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, to report to Major Wilson at Pilot Knob with his battery of six guns. Captain Montgomery left St. Louis on the evening of the 21st and arrived at Pilot Knob the next morning. That day all reports from the southern part of the State indicated the approaching storm—the advance of the Confederate army under Price—and on the evening of the 23d he was ordered by Major Wilson to have his battery ready for action at a moment's warning. As the reports of Union citizens fleeing before the invading wave, which


had spread out upwards of forty miles wide, continued to come in, and as the situation hourly became more threatening, he kept the horses of his battery harnessed and hitched and the drivers and cannoneers at their posts the two following nights. In the excited state of the public mind there were some false alarms; but Major Wilson had kept out scouting detachments on all the roads south and east leading into Arcadia and Ironton, and on Monday morning, the 26th, the detachment on the Fredericktown road met a small force of the enemy, which had been thrown forward by General Fagan, advancing on that road near Shut-in Gap, about two miles east of Arcadia.

General Ewing having arrived and assumed command of the Federal forces at Pilot Knob, at once sent out two companies of cavalry to make a thorough reconnaissance in the direction of Fredericktown. This cavalry soon met the Confederate advance in Arcadia Valley near Shut-in Gap, and retired skirmishing to Ironton, where, with Captain Franz Dinger's company, Forty-seventh Missouri Infantry, a stand was made until reinforcements arrived under Major Wilson. This gallant officer, with all General Ewing's available cavalry and a section of Captain Montgomery's battery under Lieutenant Morgan Simonton, attacked the enemy fiercely and drove them back to Shut-in Gap; but as Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisions were rapidly coming up from Fredericktown, he was gradually forced back. He made a stand at Fort Curtis, near Arcadia, and held that position until night, and then a rain-storm suspended operations. At ten o'clock that night he sent the section of the battery back to the fort, but held Arcadia until the next morning, when he was forced from it by the enemy, whose encampment had filled Arcadia Valley during the night.

The sounds of the rumbling trains and of the thousands of mounted troops descending into the plain were heard

by the Federal outposts, and General Ewing was satisfied that a fierce struggle was at hand—that the enemy would make a desperate effort to capture his position the next day. He at once commenced to strip for the fight. That night he sent up the railroad within General Smith's line all the commissary and quartermaster stores not required in the fort, and all the rolling-stock of the road. He detailed for duty on his staff as aide-de-camp, Captain David Murphy, Forty-seventh Missouri Infantry, an experienced artillery officer, and gave him control of the artillery. The Captain at once set details to work constructing platforms for the guns of the field battery so that they could fire over the parapet, and two sections were brought into the fort and mounted ready for action that night. At three o'clock in the morning of the 27th, Lieutenant Simonton was sent to the front with his section of the battery and reported to Major Wilson, who was holding Arcadia with his cavalry posted at Fort Curtis. Before it was fairly daylight, General Fagan, commanding the advance division of Price's army, threw forward a strong skirmish-line, supported by the brigades of his division, dismounted, and attacked Major Wilson and soon forced him from his position.

The Major retired slowly to Ironton, contesting every inch of ground, and with the assistance of the section of the battery under Lieutenant Simonton, and the skill with which he handled his small force, delayed the Confederate advance for several hours, making every step of it a costly one. He was here joined by Captain Campbell with four companies of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, but was soon forced back in the direction of Pilot Knob. He was then directed by General Ewing to form his infantry under Campbell on the east end of Shepherd's Mountain, and his cavalry on the west side of Pilot Knob, so as to command the gap from both sides, and so as to leave a clear range for his artillery in the fort to sweep



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the pass. These dispositions were scarcely completed when General Fagan's division moved forward to force the passage of the gap, but were met by such a destructive fire from the troops under Major Wilson and the artillery from the fort under the immediate direction of Captain Murphy that they were soon driven back with heavy loss. Shortly after this attack Major Wilson sent word to General Ewing that the enemy were displaying a flag of truce; but being satisfied that the display of the flag was simply a trick for the purpose of gaining time and allowing the Confederate troops to safely effect the "passage of the gap while parleying about a surrender," he ordered the Major to renew the fight immediately.

A determined effort was now made by the Confederates to force the pass, precipitating a fierce conflict in which they lost heavily without gaining any advantage. The volleys from the small-arms of the troops under Major Wilson on the sides of Shepherd's Mountain and Pilot Knob, the storms of shot and shell from the seven heavy guns of the fort, from the two sections of the field battery, mounted, and from the section under Lieutenant Simonton just north of the fort, swept the pass like devouring flames, causing the Confederate line to waver and then to retire to shelter behind a projecting spur of the mountain.

While these operations were taking place in Pilot Knob Gap, Marmaduke's division was moving into position on Shepherd's Mountain, except one brigade that was sent around to the west side of that mountain to attack the fort from that quarter. When these movements were discovered, General Ewing ordered Captain Campbell with his companies of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry to the summit of Shepherd's Mountain, which was five or six hundred feet above the valley around the fort, the north side of the mountain being very steep. The Captain soon became engaged in a sharp skirmish with Gen-

eral Clark's brigade, and as the Confederate commander with superior numbers attempted to flank his position, he was obliged to fall back to the rifle-pits of the fort. Only a few moments after he had retired from his position, it was reoccupied by Captain T. J. Mackey, Chief Engineer on the staff of General Price, who made a reconnoissance with a party of officers to the crest of the mountain to make observations of the character of the fort, its armament, and its command above the plain, with the view of formulating a definite plan for its attack, reduction, and capture. The fort was enveloped in a thick smoke from the recent heavy firing, obscuring some of the details; but he came to the conclusion that it could be reduced and the garrison shelled out by bombardment in a short time, by placing eight guns in battery on the crest of the mountain.

After the unsuccessful attempts of Fagan's division to force Pilot Knob pass, and the failure of the ruse to gain advantage by displaying the flag of truce, the firing along the fronts of the opposing lines ceased for nearly an hour, General Price having called a council of war to consider the situation. At the council of war Captain Mackey stated the result of his reconnoissance, and advised that the fort be reduced by bombardment from the crest of Shepherd's Mountain. His views were concurred in by General Price, who had previously consulted a map of the situation made by the engineers of General Hardee while he was serving in Southeast Missouri in the early part of the war. But as it was currently reported among the Confederate officers that a large part of the Federal garrison was colored soldiers under Colonel Fletcher, who was then the Republican candidate for Governor of Missouri, and as there was a disposition on the part of some of the Confederate officers to avenge the alleged wrongs by General Ewing in removing Southern families from his district under his famous *General Order Number Eleven*

after the Lawrence massacre, in the latter part of the summer of 1863, it was decided by the council of war that an immediate assault should be made on the fort. Before forming the lines for the assault, it was considered desirable by Price and his generals to drive the Federal troops from their positions commanding Pilot Knob pass, and for this purpose Fagan's division advanced again and made a vigorous attack. In a short time the troops under Major Wilson were driven from their positions and followed by the Confederates in strong force along the sides of the mountains. The movement was watched by General Ewing with intense interest, and as soon as the enemy advanced far enough into the gap to come within easy range of his artillery, he directed Captain Murphy to open fire upon them with all the guns of the fort. Again the storm of shot and shell burst forth from the guns of the fort, sweeping the pass and sides of the mountains and driving the Confederates back out of range, so that the troops under Major Wilson retook the gap.

In a few moments the Confederates rallied and drove him from the position, and in turn were driven back by the artillery fire from the fort. In one of the last actions on the side of Pilot Knob, while bravely and skilfully defending the pass, Major Wilson was wounded in the shoulder and fell into the hands of the enemy. About this time the Confederates brought up and placed in position two field-pieces on the east end of Shepherd's Mountain, and for the first time opened fire on the fort with artillery. Captain Murphy turned part of the guns of the fort upon the hostile pieces and endeavored to silence them and prevent the Confederates from forming line just behind them on the eastern slope of the mountain. In the meantime Captain Campbell had, under orders of General Ewing, occupied the north side of Shepherd's Mountain with his companies of Iowa infantry, while the troops of Major Wilson still held that part of

the west side of Pilot Knob not raked by the Confederate artillery.

The telegraph line to St. Louis had been cut by Shelby's force at eleven o'clock that day, interrupting communication with General Smith, and as there were no prospects of receiving reinforcements, General Ewing had no alternative but to fight or surrender. He resolved to defend his position as long as possible and thus delay the advance northward of the invading army. After the Confederates were driven from Pilot Knob the last time by the artillery fire from the fort, they made no further active demonstration for nearly an hour, except the firing from their battery on the east side of Shepherd's Mountain. Generals Fagan and Marmaduke were arranging their lines and getting their troops in position for the assault which General Price had ordered. This silence was considered ominous by General Ewing, and he ordered everything about the fort put in complete readiness to meet the impending struggle. To prevent the escape of the Federal garrison on the Potosi road, General Price sent a mounted brigade of fifteen hundred men under Colonel Dobbin to take up a position about a mile to the north and rear of the fort. This force was in its assigned position nearly an hour before the assaulting columns were ready to move. At two o'clock two field-pieces were hauled up by hand to the summit of Shepherd's Mountain, and when placed in position three shots were fired by them at the fort as signals for the advance of the assaulting columns. The guns of the fort were then turned on the hostile pieces and played on them with shot and shell to silence them. In a few moments after the signal shots were fired, the lines of the assaulting columns were seen by General Ewing and his troops emerging from the timber into the open spaces near the summits of Shepherd's Mountain and Pilot Knob, moving down.

At the moment the guns of the fort were about to open

fire on the advancing lines, one of a group of Southern officers displayed another white flag from a projecting rock near the summit of Shepherd's Mountain. This trick did not deceive General Ewing and cause him to suspend the firing so that the Confederate troops could move up near the fort undisturbed, but he directed Captain Murphy to turn his guns on the group of officers, and only a few shots were fired when the flag quickly came down. Finding it impossible to gain the desired advantage by the trick of displaying the white flag, the Confederate commander ordered that the two guns on the top of Shepherd's Mountain and the two guns on the east end of that mountain open fire on the fort, both batteries soon getting the range very accurately, being posted not more than seven or eight hundred yards distant. The moment the Confederate guns opened fire on the fort, Marmaduke's division on the left moved rapidly down the north side of Shepherd's Mountain, and Fagan's division on his right moved rapidly over and down the west side of Pilot Knob and through Pilot Knob Gap to the assault, sweeping before them the detachments of Major Wilson and Captain Campbell which had been holding the pass and the sides of the mountain. In descending the steep side of Shepherd's Mountain, the troops of Marmaduke's division were confronted at every step with fallen trees, huge projecting rocks, and deep narrow ravines, difficult to pass, while the heavy guns of the fort were all the time playing upon their broken ranks with shell with great accuracy.

The assaulting lines of General Fagan's division were also considerably broken at the base of Pilot Knob by the houses and fences of the village that intersected the line of movement, but were quickly re-formed by the brigade commanders, and, yelling wildly, the troops dashed forward upon the plain at a double-quick in the direction of the fort. Captain Murphy not only turned his artillery

upon the advancing lines, but he also played with shot and shell upon the two hostile guns on the summit and on the east end of Shepherd's Mountain, and while he was unable to silence them—they were so well covered—he neutralized the effect of their fire. When the charging lines descended half-way down the mountain sides, the troops of the fort opened fire upon them with small-arms from the ramparts and rifle-pits, and with artillery, using canister double charge. A sheet of flame burst from the south and east sides of the fort, and at every step from about six hundred yards up to within a few yards of the ditch the advancing lines were met with a constant steady stream of iron and leaden hail, breaking and shattering their ranks. Of the five thousand six hundred men in that desperate charge, scarcely one third arrived within fifty yards of the ditch, the others having fallen upon the plain or mountain sides, or having taken refuge in the dry bed of the creek on the south and southeast sides of the fort. Only a small part of the two divisions reached the ditch, at which, it appearing to them impassable, they hesitated, recoiled, and then fled in confusion, many of them being swept down by the artillery and small-arms of the fort before they could find shelter in the bed of the creek or get out of range by retreating through the pass. Their casualties were so great that General Ewing reported that those who escaped appeared to have left nearly one half their comrades dead or wounded on the plain.

Lieutenant Simonton, who was posted on rising ground just north of the fort with his section of artillery, held his position, keeping up a hot fire on the advancing lines until they came up within sixty yards of the fort, when he was ordered inside. He quickly limbered up and started into the fort, when the two horses of the lead team of the right piece were shot down just as they were entering the gate and blocked up the way so that the section could not then be brought inside. As they

would be cut off in another moment the men were ordered to take care of themselves, and all came in except one, who fell into the hands of the enemy. In the midst of the excitement of the fierce conflict and of the roar of artillery and small-arms, the other horses to the pieces and gun-carriages began to stampede, when Captain Montgomery ordered his men to shoot them to prevent them from getting away with any of the carriages. The two pieces, however, were under the fire of the fort, and were brought inside after the fight was over, together with all the horses that were not disabled.

A short time after the Federal forces had repulsed the last assault in front, Colonel Dobbin's brigade, which had been posted on the Potosi road in the rear of the fort, moved along the base of Cedar Mountain in a threatening attitude.

General Ewing, observing the movement, ordered a sortie from the north ditch, and routed them with some loss. After some further firing with small-arms and artillery between the troops of the fort and the assaulting troops of Marmaduke's division, who had taken shelter behind the banks of the creek, the approach of night put an end to further operations. After dark all the Confederate troops who had sought shelter lying down in the bed of the creek were quietly withdrawn to their encampment near Ironton. The repulse was so complete and the demoralization of the Confederate troops so great that General Price in person was unable to rally them. If he accepted the defeat and made no further effort to take the Federal position, he knew that the loss of prestige to his army would be so great that the thirty thousand men of the Order of American Knights, an organization of Southern sympathizers throughout the State which had been promised him, would not so zealously flock to his standard. He determined therefore to renew the assault the next morning and at once commenced preparations

for it. When at Fredericktown he had directed General Shelby to march from that place by way of Farmington and strike the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad near Mineral Point and destroy several railroad bridges in that vicinity to prevent General A. J. Smith from reinforcing the garrison at Pilot Knob, and then to rejoin the invading army before Pilot Knob. In the evening he despatched a second courier to Shelby, informing him of the repulse and of his intention of renewing the attack the next morning, and directing him to rejoin the army as early as practicable, to participate in the proposed operations.

That evening after the action had ended, General Ewing ascertained from prisoners taken that day that Price was there with the two divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke and ten pieces of artillery, and that Shelby with his division and four pieces of artillery had been sent north of Pilot Knob to tear up the railroad track and destroy bridges. The Federal troops had lost fully two hundred men in killed, wounded, and missing during the last two days' operations, and with the most careful handling of his men General Ewing had found himself unable to hold the mountain sides and prevent the enemy from planting their batteries on the mountain commanding his position. As the Confederates were in possession of the summits of the mountains, he was convinced that they would bring up all the guns of their batteries during the night and place them in position so as to completely command the fort and make it untenable when they renewed the attack next morning. In view of the situation as thus presented, he deemed it a useless sacrifice of life to attempt further defence of the position against such overwhelming forces, supported by superior field artillery advantageously posted. He determined therefore to evacuate the fort that night and blow up the magazine so as to destroy all the ammunition and public property

he could not take along. The valley around the fort was lighted up nearly all night by burning buildings of the village and by the flames from a large quantity of charcoal which had been set on fire at the base of Pilot Knob, so that the movements of the Federal garrison could be easily observed by the enemy from the nearest mountain sides. There was danger that the preparations for evacuation would be observed and communicated to some of the Confederate commanders, who would throw a strong force across the Federal line of retreat and cut the troops to pieces in their attempt to escape. During the night General Ewing had sent out a sufficient force to take possession of the village of Pilot Knob and the valley around the fort to the base of the hills and to observe any hostile movement. He ascertained that a strong Confederate force was stationed just north of Pilot Knob on the Mineral Point road, and that the Potosi road was the only one not guarded and by which he could hope to get out with his command unobserved by the enemy.

At midnight preparations for the evacuation were commenced. With as little stir as possible the troops were aroused, knapsacks packed, haversacks and cartridge-boxes well supplied, artillery horses harnessed and hitched to the pieces, and the limber chests filled with ammunition. When everything was in readiness, at three o'clock, Colonel Fletcher moved out noiselessly with the infantry and formed them in column near the end of the rifle-pits extending from the north face of the fort. He was soon followed by the cavalry and battery, which passed out over the drawbridge, that had tents spread upon it to muffle the sound. The whole force then moved forward in column with instructions to make as little noise as possible, and soon struck the Potosi road, passing very near a Confederate force on the right and another on the left without attracting the attention of either. A good many Union refugees of that section,

men, women, and children, white and black, who had flocked into Pilot Knob when the Confederates arrived in Arcadia Valley, went along with the Federal troops and were destined to embarrass their movements.

The main part of the Confederate army which had encamped around Ironton that night, and the brigades which had been assigned to the duty of watching the Federal garrison, did not know anything of the evacuation until they heard the explosion of the magazine that shook the surrounding hills an hour or so after General Ewing left. The retreating column met with no opposition until nearing Caledonia, when at sunrise the advance-guard attacked and routed at that place twenty-five mounted men of Shelby's command, killing one man. At that point General Ewing ascertained that Shelby had taken Potosi the evening before, that the men just routed were his advance, and that his division was only two miles in the Federal front. This skirmish and the information obtained induced General Ewing to change his line of march by taking the road to Webster, nearly due west in the direction of Rolla, thus avoiding Shelby, who held his division in line of battle several hours and until he received orders from General Price to join with Marmaduke in the pursuit. Having made disposition of the troops and artillery for another attack on the fort on the morning of the evacuation, some time was lost in making new disposition for the pursuit, so that Marmaduke did not leave Pilot Knob until about eight o'clock that morning with his division. This delay of about five hours gave General Ewing a good start, and he marched all that day undisturbed, arriving at Webster, a distance of thirty-one miles, at sundown, where he rested until midnight. He then resumed the march, taking the road to Leasburg, a station on the Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad; but the night was so dark and stormy that he made little progress until daylight. His decision to take

the Leasburg instead of the Rolla road was a wise one, for nearly all the way it ran along a narrow ridge separating the waters of the Courtois and Huzza and on each side of it there were frequent precipitous bluffs.

A pursuing cavalry force would have little opportunity of making detours to operate on his flanks, and if they advanced directly upon his rear, he could use the guns of his battery in sweeping them down with grape and canister. Marmaduke and Shelby did not leave Caledonia with their divisions until late in the afternoon, but marching all night, overtook and vigorously charged Ewing's rear-guard the next morning at eight o'clock just as he reached the ridge which he hoped would protect him from flank movements. Dispositions were at once made for defending his rear by placing three companies of the Third Missouri State Militia Cavalry, the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, one company of the Forty-seventh Missouri Infantry, and Lieutenant Smiley's section of Captain Montgomery's battery, under Major H. H. Williams, Tenth Kansas Infantry, Aide-de-Camp on the staff of the General. Marmaduke's division led the advance in the pursuit until late in the afternoon, making frequent charges on the Federal rear-guard. As the Confederate officers could not deploy their troops so as to present a very extended line on the narrow ridge, their attacks were easily repulsed by a volley or so from the Federal rear-guard, or a few rounds of grape and canister from the section of the battery. If they came up in strong force and dismounted and attempted to deploy and advance on foot, the section of artillery limbered up and the rear-guard faced about and moved on to overtake the column. At a distance of three or four miles of Leasburg the narrow ridge terminated and the road passed over a section less broken and more favorable for the movement of mounted troops.

At this point Shelby's division was given the advance

and pushed forward and attacked General Ewing's force on the flanks and in front and rear with a good deal of energy. It required the liberal use of grape and canister from the sections of artillery and frequent volleys from different detachments of the Federal troops to hold the enemy off until the little command, worn out from marching and fighting, could reach the station. It was after dark when General Ewing arrived at the station, and his artillery had barely time to unlimber and his troops to form line, when the Confederates under Shelby made a charge. A detachment of Colonel J. S. Warmouth's regiment of Enrolled Militia, which had recently evacuated the place, had made breastworks of railroad ties. Hastily occupying these rude defences, the Federal troops opened fire on the enemy and soon repulsed their attack. When Shelby made his first attack a few miles out from the station, the Union refugees who had accompanied General Ewing from Pilot Knob became excited, and by their panics came near seriously embarrassing the operations of the troops.

About nine o'clock that night a train arrived from St. Louis with supplies for the troops at Rolla, thirty-five miles distant. If he remained at Leasburg during the night, General Ewing was convinced that the enemy would be up in force the next morning to renew the attack, and as there was no hope of receiving reinforcements, he determined to put his command aboard the train and start for St. Louis. When everything was in readiness and the train was about to start, the lights of burning buildings were noticed at the nearest stations north and south of Leasburg. As the enemy evidently had possession of the railroad at those points, the troops were taken off the cars and spent the night in fortifying, remounting the guns of the battery which had been taken off the carriages, and otherwise preparing for an attack the next morning. The next morning the Confederates ap-

peared in force and drove in the Federal outposts, and there was some sharp skirmishing during the day in which Ewing's artillery fired several rounds; but after thoroughly reconnoitring the position, Marmaduke and Shelby decided that it would cost too great a sacrifice of life to make an assault, and withdrew their forces and marched off to Sullivan station in the direction of St. Louis. After the enemy withdrew, General Ewing marched for Rolla with his command, except one hundred men left to hold the station, and on arriving at St. James, twelve miles from Rolla, sent forward his infantry by railroad. On Monday, October 3d, he turned over the command which he had brought out from Pilot Knob, to General John McNeil at Rolla, and with a small escort and his staff returned to St. Louis.

The battle of Pilot Knob was an important event in Price's expedition. The punishment Ewing inflicted on Marmaduke's and Fagan's divisions in that battle was so severe that the officers and men of those divisions did not recover their martial spirit—*élan*—during the rest of the campaign. General Ewing reported his loss in the battle of Pilot Knob in defending the passes and in his retreat to Leasburg at 200 men killed, wounded, and missing. He estimated that at least 50 men of this number were of the missing, some of whom were cut off and afterwards returned to their commands, and the others men who were captured and paroled. He reported the Confederate losses at Pilot Knob and in forcing the passes at 1500 men killed and wounded. General Price never made any report of his casualties in the series of actions during the two days' operations around Pilot Knob, including the assaults on Fort Davidson, but Captain T. J. Mackey, Chief Engineer on his staff, states that "in twenty minutes we lost 1164 officers and men killed and wounded, which, added to those who fell in forcing the passes on the previous day, made our casualties aggregate not less than 1500 of our

best troops placed hors de combat since we entered the valley of Arcadia." \*

It would be difficult to persuade the impartial observer of the events of that period that General Price was not responsible for the desperate and bloody acts of the Southern partisan bandits whom he commissioned. And it may surprise some to know that he permitted and sanctioned acts scarcely less atrocious by the officers and soldiers under his immediate control. Of the numerous bloody acts charged against him and that must forever detract from his name as an officer and man of noble instincts, none perhaps stands out more conspicuously than the murder, by his order or permission, of Major James Wilson, Third Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and six of his men, who were captured on Pilot Knob, September 27th, while defending the pass. This gallant officer, who had skilfully and resolutely defended the passes for nearly two days and with his small force contested every step of the advance of the Southern army, was held with six of his men a week after capture, and then brutally murdered by a detachment led by a field officer of Marmaduke's division. The Major was hung and his men were shot down and their bodies left by the roadside. When General Rosecrans was informed of the fate of Major Wilson and his men, he at once retaliated by directing his provost-marshal to order out from among the Confederate prisoners a major and six enlisted men for execution, in reprisal for the prisoners who had been wantonly murdered.

\* See article of Captain T. J. Mackey, Engineer C. S. A., in *Monthly Illustrator*, New York, 1896.



## CHAPTER XXVII.

### DEFENCE OF ST. LOUIS AND JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI.

WHEN General Rosecrans obtained satisfactory information that Price with two divisions was investing Pilot Knob and had sent another division to cut the railroad north of that point, he commenced concentrating his troops for the defence of St. Louis and Jefferson City. On the approach of Shelby's division to Mineral Point and Big River Bridge, General Smith's advance occupying those points retired to De Soto, where his main command was in position. After Ewing evacuated Pilot Knob and Price moved north to Potosi and Richwoods, General Smith retired with his division from De Soto to Jefferson Barracks and points on the north side of the Meramec covering St. Louis. Under instructions from State headquarters, dated September 25th, the Enrolled Militia of the St. Louis District were called out for active service, forming a division of four thousand five hundred men, consisting of three brigades commanded by Brigadier-General E. C. Pike. The three brigades were commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Madison Miller, C. D. Wolff, and George F. Meyers, who were at once sent forward under instructions from General Smith to guard the fords and bridges of the Meramec and to occupy some of the forts which had been constructed for the defence of the city.

The troops of the expedition—consisting of detachments of the First and Second Divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps under Major-General J. A. Mower—which had been sent from Memphis into Northeast Arkansas to operate against Shelby, on finding that Shelby had marched to join Price for the invasion of Missouri, were ordered to Cape Girardeau, Missouri; the cavalry, artillery, and infantry arriving at that point October 5th. On the 7th and 8th of October these troops embarked on steamboats and transports for St. Louis and Jefferson City, but did not arrive at either place until Price had passed.

General Rosecrans also had report to him for the defence of the city five regiments of Illinois One Hundred Days' Volunteers whose terms of service had expired and who were returning home to be mustered out. These troops got in on September 30th and October 1st, and formed a brigade under Colonel Hugo Wangelin, Twelfth Missouri Infantry. They were relieved, however, in a few days, as Price turned west about the time of their arrival in St. Louis. After his severe repulse at Pilot Knob, and on receiving information that St. Louis was defended by a force superior to his own, behind strong fortifications, General Price determined to make no further demonstrations in that direction, but to move as rapidly as practicable upon Jefferson City, which he hoped to capture with its troops and supplies. In Price's march from Richwoods to St. Claire, General Rosecrans thought his movements indicated that he was concentrating his forces in the hills between Big River and the Meramec for a demonstration against the city, and in order to meet a movement from that quarter, directed General Smith to send part of his division to Kirkwood, twelve miles west of St. Louis, to occupy a position commanding the crossing of the Meramec and the Richwoods road. Colonel Lewis Merrill, Second Missouri Cavalry,

who had been sent out with his available mounted force to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Richwoods, reported on the evening of the 30th that a brigade of the enemy had burned the Moselle Bridge over the Meramec and were advancing north in the direction of Franklin. On the morning of October 1st General Smith sent the Third Brigade of his division under Colonel Edward H. Wolfe, Fifty-second Indiana Infantry, on a train to Franklin to reinforce the cavalry, and on arriving at that point about ten o'clock, Colonel Wolfe soon became engaged in a sharp skirmish with a brigade of the enemy under General Cabell, driving them from the town, but not until they had burned the station. As Price's army appeared to be moving west of St. Louis, on the 2d of October the First Brigade of General Smith's command marched from Jefferson Barracks to Gray's Summit, five miles from and within easy supporting distance of Colonel Wolfe's brigade.

On the 2d General Price's forces advanced to Union, General Clark's brigade going as far north as Washington on the Missouri River, to tear up the railroad and burn the stations. Finding that the enemy had moved to the west of St. Louis, General Rosecrans on the 4th advanced the three brigades of the Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, about four thousand five hundred men, to Gray's Summit, and General Pike's division of Enrolled Militia, of about four thousand five hundred men, to Franklin. These troops under General A. J. Smith were put in motion in pursuit of the enemy as soon as it was ascertained that Price was moving west in the direction of Jefferson City.

When it appeared certain that the invading army would not strike west of Rolla, General Rosecrans ordered General Sanborn by telegraph to march with his available cavalry to Rolla, leaving a sufficient force at Springfield to hold the place against any attack likely to be made

against it. Having concentrated his troops at Springfield, General Sanborn left that place on the morning of September 27th, with fifteen hundred cavalry, and arrived at Rolla at three o'clock in the afternoon of September 29th, having marched a distance of 120 miles in less than two days and a half. After resting at Rolla one day, he moved forward to St. James, twelve miles, to support, if necessary, Colonel John L. Beveridge, Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, who had been sent by General McNeil from Rolla to Leasburg to the assistance of General Ewing, who was reported to have retreated to that point from Pilot Knob, to be short of ammunition and supplies, and closely pressed by the enemy. But as Marmaduke and Shelby had decided not to make an assault on Ewing's fortified position and withdrew their forces about the time of the approach of Colonel Beveridge, General Sanborn did not find it necessary to advance any farther east along the railroad than Cuba. He obtained information from Colonel John E. Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, who had been sent forward to make a reconnaissance, that the Confederate forces had crossed the railroad at Sullivan station, moving in a northwest direction, probably for Jefferson City. He communicated his information and intentions to General McNeil and it was arranged that they should unite their commands at Vienna *en route* to Jefferson City the next evening, October 4th. When their forces formed a junction that evening they had an effective strength of two thousand eight hundred men, six field-pieces, and two mountain howitzers. After halting a short time to rest and feed they resumed the march and arrived at Jefferson City the next evening, passing the fords of the Osage only a few hours in advance of the enemy. In fact, General Sanborn received information just after crossing the Osage that the enemy had crossed that stream at points several miles below and were advancing to the Moreau. He therefore removed his bri-

gade to the threatened point and encamped for the night, throwing forward a picket in the direction of the Osage.

The troops, artillery, and train from the District of Rolla under General McNeil moved on into Jefferson City that evening and reported to General E. B. Brown, commanding the District of Central Missouri. There was now concentrated at Jefferson City for the defence of the capital of the State, seven thousand two hundred men, including Enrolled Militia recently called out. On the first reports of the invading army entering Southeast Missouri, General Brown set a large force of men to work under competent engineers to repair the forts which had already been commenced, and to construct new forts and rifle-pits and other works necessary to put the place in a complete state of defence. When he received information that the Confederate forces were moving west in the direction of Jefferson City, he ordered Colonel J. F. Philips, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, forward with eight hundred mounted men of his own regiment and of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and a section of artillery, to resolutely resist the advance of the enemy. For several days this force was employed south and east of the Osage, scouting and getting all the information possible of the movements of the Confederate forces. On the 5th Colonel Philips retired to the north and west side of the Osage, and that evening part of Shelby's division destroyed the Osage Bridge and captured at the east end of it in a blockhouse a detachment of Enrolled Militia under Lieutenant Berger. The next morning the Confederates appeared in large numbers on the east side of the Osage for the purpose of forcing a passage of the river at several points, so that Colonel Philips was obliged to divide his command into several detachments to guard these crossings. There was hot skirmishing at some of the fords that day, and under cover of their artillery the Con-

federates forced a passage of the river at and below Castle Rock.

On hearing artillery firing at a ford below Castle Rock, Colonel Philips ordered Major A. W. Mullins, commanding a battalion of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, to move forward to the threatened point and attack the enemy vigorously and if possible regain possession of the ford. The Major had advanced only a short distance when he met a Confederate force, and after a sharp fight drove it back, mortally wounding Colonel Shanks, a brigade commander of Shelby's division. In a short time the Confederates rallied and came forward with increased numbers, and attacking him in front and on the flanks, compelled Major Mullins to retire with some loss. The Confederates, having crossed the Osage at several fords that afternoon, attacked General Sanborn's pickets, consisting of parts of the Sixth and Eighth Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry under Major William Plumb and Colonel J. J. Gravely, posted south of the Moreau and nearly south of Jefferson City, but were held in check until night. General Sanborn's brigade encamped on the Moreau that night, but early the next morning all his command, except the Sixth and Eighth Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry under Colonel Gravely, and a detachment of the Seventh Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia under Major W. B. Mitchell, was ordered into Jefferson City. The Confederate forces all crossed to the north side of the Osage on the 6th, and early on the morning of the 7th attacked the Federal detachments guarding the fords of the Moreau. Colonel Gravely made such disposition of his force as to annoy the enemy as much as possible and delay their advance. He formed his own regiment, the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, so as to repulse two severe attacks, and was forced from his position only when the Confederates brought artillery into use against him. When the enemy

dislodged him from his position with artillery, they at once pressed his front and flanks with so much vigor that he was obliged to retire to the north side of the Moreau. To cover this movement he directed Major Plumb to form the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry on the north bank of the creek so as to protect the crossing. Major Murphy, of the Sixth, was assigned to this duty, and hastily constructed temporary breastworks on the bank that made a good defence.

When the Eighth Missouri retired, contesting every inch of ground, Major Murphy opened a destructive fire from his defensive position upon the enemy the moment they came within range, instantly checking their advance. In a few moments, however, the Confederates deployed to the right and left and after crossing the stream were about to flank Major Plumb, when he was directed by Colonel Gravely to fall back to a position on a ridge near the Fair Grounds where the Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry had again been formed to resist the advance of the enemy. This position was held by Colonel Gravely about an hour, engaging the Confederate cavalry, when he was ordered into the city. While his cavalry was still engaging the enemy, a section of Sutter's battery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, and two companies of the Forty-fifth Missouri Infantry under Adjutant W. H. Hill of that regiment as a support to the artillery were sent out to his assistance. On the two companies reaching the scene of action, General Sanborn seems to have thought that this small force was intended to relieve his line under Colonel Gravely, then closely pressed, and ordered Lieutenant Hill to deploy one of his companies as skirmishers, which he did. He was soon ordered to send the other company, which was being held in reserve, to the flank to prevent a flank movement. The enemy were by this time already on the Federal flank, and as the cavalry retired leaving him un-

supported, Lieutenant Hill was obliged to give the order for his detachment to fall back, having sustained a loss of three men killed and nine wounded in the movement. In another moment Captain Sutter opened fire with his section of 12-pounder guns on the advancing columns of the enemy and soon checked and drove them back out of range. At one o'clock the Federal forces which had been opposing the advance of the enemy retired within the fortifications at Jefferson City, and were assigned to their proper positions to meet the assault which it was thought Price would soon make with his combined forces. His moving columns and long line of battle, about a mile and a quarter beyond the outer intrenchments, were plainly seen by many of the Federal troops from the positions they occupied, and everything indicated that an attack was imminent.

While Fagan's division occupied a wooded height to the left of the Fair Grounds, a Confederate battery from that position opened fire on the Federal line of intrenchments, which soon brought into action Thurber's battery on the Federal left and Sutter's battery in the Federal centre. In a very short time these batteries were pouring such a storm of shot and shell around the hostile guns that they were quickly withdrawn. General Fisk, who had just assumed command of the Federal forces at Jefferson City, in making disposition of his troops within his fortified lines to meet a general attack, assigned General Brown with his brigade to the left; General Sanborn with his brigade to the centre; and General McNeil with his brigade to the right, which was on the west side of the city. Late in the afternoon Shelby's division marched around and invested the city on the west and northwest in front of General McNeil's position. But no attack was made that day, and at dark General Price withdrew his troops and encamped that night two miles south of the city. He had received information of the arrival of Gen-

erals Sanborn and McNeil with twenty-eight hundred men and eight pieces of artillery ; his emissaries reported to him the strength of the Federal force at Jefferson City as being much greater than it really was, and the defences as formidable. The heavy loss he sustained in his repulse at Pilot Knob was fresh in his mind, and his officers and troops were not manifesting an eagerness to assault the works in his front. At a conference with his general officers that night it was decided not to make an attack on the Federal defences, but to move the next morning to Boonville and thence to Kansas. In anticipation of an attack the next morning, the Federal troops had worked all night in strengthening their defences, particularly on the right.

Early on the morning of the 8th, Price moved southwest to Russellville, leaving a force from Fagan's and Shelby's divisions in line in front of Sanborn's and McNeil's positions. General Sanborn was satisfied that the enemy had retreated and that the force in sight was simply the rear-guard left to watch the movements of the Federal troops. He therefore ordered Colonel Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, to take a battalion of his regiment and attack the enemy vigorously, to test the strength of their line and to ascertain their intentions. After skirmishing with part of his force dismounted for a short time, Colonel Phelps ordered two of his squadrons to charge the enemy, which they did, putting them to flight and pursuing them for nearly two miles. Of course it was now known that Price had retreated with his army and given up all hopes of capturing the capital of the State. General Fisk immediately ordered all his mounted troops in pursuit, with instructions to attack and annoy the rear of the enemy as much as possible. The pursuing troops had been in motion only a few hours when Major-General Alfred Pleasonton arrived from St. Louis with instructions from General Rosecrans, the Department

commander, to assume command of all the Federal forces at Jefferson City. The cavalry, consisting of three brigades, was organized into a division of forty-one hundred men, and General Sanborn placed in command.

The First Brigade, Colonel John F. Philips, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding, consisted of the First, Fourth, and Seventh Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry and the First Iowa Cavalry. The Second Brigade, Colonel J. L. Beveridge, Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, commanding, consisted of parts of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry, part of the Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, with a section of mountain howitzers. The Third Brigade, Colonel J. J. Gravely, Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanding, consisted of detachments of the Sixth and Eighth Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry, Sixth and Seventh Provisional Regiments Enrolled Missouri Militia, and six companies Second Arkansas Union Cavalry.

Captain Thurber's battery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, and a section of Captain Montgomery's battery of the same regiment under Lieutenant Smiley were attached to this cavalry command.

The cavalry which General Fisk had sent out in the morning under Colonel Philips soon came up with Price's rear-guard and skirmished with it to a point where the Springfield road crosses Moreau Creek, eight miles southwest of Jefferson City. Here the Confederates made a stand, taking up a strong position on the west side of the stream and bringing into use their artillery. On making a reconnaissance Colonel Philips sent a message to General Sanborn stating that artillery was needed to aid him in dislodging the enemy. The General, who had been detained at Jefferson City until the afternoon on account of the reorganization of the troops, on hearing the artillery firing ordered Colonel Phelps, with the Second Arkansas

Cavalry, to reinforce Colonel Philips, and directly afterwards the balance of the Third Brigade, Colonel Gravely commanding, and a section of Thurber's battery which were moving to the right on the California road were ordered to the same point. But before the arrival of these reinforcements the Confederates retired from the Moreau in the direction of Russellville, with a small loss in killed and wounded and abandoned horses.

Night coming on suspended further operations, and the First and Third Brigades of Sanborn's division bivouacked on the Springfield road near the Moreau, and the Second Brigade of that division and three sections of artillery encamped several miles north on the California road. The Confederate army encamped at Russellville that night, some of the camps extending as much as two miles east of that point. General Sanborn's cavalry moved forward at daylight the next morning, the Third Brigade in advance, on the Springfield road. After marching about two miles his advance under Major W. B. Mitchell, Seventh Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, encountered the Confederate pickets and drove them in upon a heavy line of dismounted skirmishers formed in the timber east of Russellville. As the regiments of the brigade came up they were formed in line and a line of skirmishers of dismounted men thrown forward, who engaged the enemy. In a short time the Third Brigade was supported by the Second Brigade, which had marched over from the California road that morning. Colonel Colton Green, commanding a brigade in Marmaduke's division, was in charge of Price's rear-guard, and made such disposition of his command as to hold in check the Federal skirmishers for some time. To drive the Confederates from their sheltered position, General Sanborn determined to charge with a mounted force through Green's line of skirmishers and attack his line of battle. This charge was gallantly

led by Lieutenant R. B. Riggs, with a detachment of the Sixth Missouri State Militia, who passed through the Confederate line of skirmishers and fell mortally wounded a short distance beyond. The other regiments of the Third Brigade were deployed and followed up the movement, clearing the road and driving the Confederates out of the timber into the prairie, where they endeavored to make a stand. Here General Sanborn ordered up a section of the Second Missouri Light Artillery under Lieutenant Smiley, that opened fire on the Confederate line, causing it to retire through Russellville and thence southwest several miles on the Versailles road.

From the first skirmish in the timber east of Russellville to a mile or so west of that place, Colonel Gravely's brigade kept up a continuous fire of small-arms and artillery on the retreating rear-guard of the enemy, and drove it back upon Price's main column. Up to this time Price appeared to be moving to Versailles with his entire army. Should he turn north in the direction of Boonville, General Sanborn determined to strike him in flank at California, and discontinuing the attack on his rear, marched northwest by the nearest practicable route to that place, the First Brigade, Colonel Philips commanding, in the advance. When the Federal troops passed through the timber and came out upon the open prairie about a mile southeast of California, they saw a large part of Price's army in town, some of his brigades being formed in line of battle, while a large force of men was employed in tearing up the track of the Pacific Railroad.

A section of artillery of Marmaduke's division commenced shelling the Federal advance when it came up within range and just as it was about to enter a narrow lane which was the principal approach to the town. Colonel Philips ordered the Fourth Missouri State Militia, which was in advance, to dismount and deploy to the

right; the Seventh Missouri State Militia to dismount and deploy to the left; and the First Missouri State Militia to dismount and move forward to the centre and fill up the gap between the Fourth and Seventh Regiments. In a few moments the First Iowa Cavalry was up and was held as a mounted reserve on the extreme left of the line. General Sanborn still had the Second and Third Brigades in reserve. He selected a position for the section of Captain Thurber's battery about seven hundred yards from the hostile guns, and it immediately went into action. His dispositions being complete, he directed Colonel Philips to advance his line, and in a very short time his left wing was moving at a double-quick and sweeping back the Confederate skirmishers so suddenly as to cause General Clark's right to retire to the north side of the railroad in some confusion. In this movement the Confederate guns, being left without support, were quickly limbered up and moved to the rear. Colonel Philips' line continued to advance and the section of Thurber's battery continued to pour a well-directed fire of shells into the ranks of the Confederates until they were driven beyond and some distance north of town, and night suspended the pursuit.

Shelby's division, which had entered California that morning, moved on to Boonville, and in the evening captured a company of Cooper County Enrolled Militia, Captain H. Shoemaker commanding. In the interview with Shelby's officers under a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of his force, Captain Shoemaker was promised for himself and men the protection accorded to prisoners of war. Yet in the face of this solemn promise he was given over to Southern men who were destitute of that chivalry of which they had talked so much, and brutally murdered without any form of trial whatever.

On the morning of the 10th, at daylight, General Sanborn marched west from California along the line of the

Pacific Railroad to Tipton and then turned north on the road to Boonville, bivouacking that night within ten miles of that place, without having encountered the enemy that day. With the divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke, General Price marched that day from his encampment on the Moniteau, near Pisgah on the California and Boonville road, into Boonville, where he remained two days, recruiting, receiving such bandit leaders as Quantrill and Bill Anderson, and distributing the property of various kinds of which his army had plundered the Union citizens since entering the State.

Having received information that Price had entered Boonville with his army, General Sanborn moved forward the next morning, the 11th, for the purpose of observing the movements and annoying the enemy as much as possible. He directed Colonel John F. McMahan, commanding the Sixth Provisional Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia, to move to the right until he struck the road leading from Pisgah to Boonville, and to advance on that road and drive in the pickets or any force he might encounter. About the same time Colonel James McFerran, commanding the First Missouri State Militia, was directed to move to the left with his regiment until he struck the Bellair and Boonville road and if practicable to pass from that road over to the road leading from Georgetown to Boonville, and ascertain whether the enemy were passing west on either of those roads. In the afternoon of that day Colonel Philips was directed to move with the balance of the First Brigade over to the Georgetown and Boonville road, and if the trains of the Southern army had not passed west, to advance on that road as near to the town as practicable, attacking and driving in any hostile force or pickets he might meet. In the order described General Sanborn's force moved forward until the Confederate pickets were met and driven in on the different roads leading into Boonville. His right under Colonel

McMahan was the first to strike the Confederate pickets and drive them in upon a line of skirmishers about three miles south of town. Here Colonel McMahan halted and awaited the arrival of the other regiments of the brigade under Colonel Gravely, who would direct the further movement of his command in person. The Sixth Provisional Militia under Colonel McMahan were dismounted and deployed as skirmishers, and on their right three companies of the Second Arkansas Cavalry under Colonel Phelps were deployed as mounted skirmishers. Colonel Phelps also brought up four companies of his regiment for support. The skirmish-line thus formed moved forward and drove the Confederate skirmishers from the brush back upon their main line nearly to the city limits and under the protection of their batteries.

While Colonels McMahan and Phelps with their commands were engaging the enemy near the city, drawn up in long line of battle, a Confederate force moved around their right flank upon their rear. This force was vigorously attacked by Major Plumb, commanding the Sixth Missouri State Militia, then in reserve, and driven off with some loss. The demonstration of the Federal force having developed a line of battle of two divisions of Price's army, Colonel Gravely retired his skirmish-line upon his reserve. In an hour or so General Sanborn ordered the line forward again and it advanced firing to within musket-range of Price's line of battle, drawing the fire from his small-arms and artillery, after which it soon retired to its former position. As the shades of night were now descending, the Federal troops on that part of the field were withdrawn to the south side of Saline Creek and went into bivouac.

While these operations of the Third Brigade were in progress on the Federal right, Colonel Philips with the First Brigade moved forward on the Georgetown and Boonville road and drove the Confederate pickets on that

road back upon a strong force occupying a position from which he was unable to dislodge it in the darkness of the night. He moved two battalions of the Fourth Missouri State Militia to the front to keep up a harassing fire on the Confederate line during part of the night, and with the balance of the brigade bivouacked a short distance in the rear. He marched the next morning before day-break and joined General Sanborn on the Tipton and Boonville road, leaving the Fourth Missouri State Militia in position to cover his movement.

On the morning of the 12th, just before daybreak, Colonel J. A. Eppstein was directed to move with his regiment, the Fifth Missouri State Militia, to the left over on the Bellair and Boonville road, and to advance in the direction of Boonville as far as practicable on that road. When he reached that road and crossed over the bridge to the north side of Saline Creek at daylight, he met the Confederate advance, consisting of a regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols of Jackman's brigade, Shelby's division. In a moment Major Kaiser, commanding the Federal advance of two companies, dismounted his men and formed a line of skirmishers on each side of the road, opened fire on the enemy and drove them back nearly a mile, when they were reinforced by Colonel D. C. Hunter's regiment and made a stand behind rail fences and barns and stables. At this juncture Colonel Eppstein reinforced his advance under Major Kaiser with two additional companies, and with the assistance of two mountain howitzers, supported by two hundred men, drove the Confederates from their position and pursued them about a mile, when they were reinforced by Lieutenant-Colonel Schnable's regiment and two pieces of artillery and made another stand at the junction of the east and west roads leading from Tipton to Boonville. As Colonel Eppstein could plainly see that the Confederates largely outnumbered his own force, and

as there were no reinforcements in sight to cover his rear, he did not consider it advisable to press the fight so hotly as to carry the position as he had done in his first and second attacks that morning. He reported the situation to Colonel Beveridge, commanding the brigade, and was ordered to retire, and soon joined the other brigades of the division on the return march to California for rations, of which the troops had exhausted their haversacks. In the several skirmishes that morning Colonel Eppstein reported his casualties two men killed and four wounded. Colonel Jackman reported the loss in his brigade at four men killed and twenty wounded, and having his own horse shot under him.

While General Sanborn with his division of cavalry was thus observing and keeping the Southern army together in constant expectation of a general attack, General Rosecrans was pushing forward the troops of the divisions of Generals Smith and Mower of the Sixteenth Army Corps as rapidly as practicable, by transports up the Missouri River, by railroad, and by forced marches by land. When the danger of an attack on St. Louis had passed and the Regular troops were being pushed forward to operate against the Southern army in Central and Western Missouri, General Pike with his division of Enrolled Militia was charged with guarding the line of communication between Jefferson City and St. Louis and of occupying the principal towns on the line of the railroad between those points. The advance infantry brigade of General Smith's command of the Sixteenth Army Corps, and also a brigade of fifteen hundred veteran cavalry under Colonel Catherwood, Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry, arrived at California on the 12th.


A force of men was at once put to work repairing the railroad track to Lamine Bridge, and on the 15th the infantry brigades of the First Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps, which had been brought up to Jefferson

City on transports, commenced to arrive on the cars. By the 19th all the infantry of the First and Third Divisions, Sixteenth Army Corps, under General A. J. Smith had passed west of Lamine Bridge, marching *via* Sedalia to Lexington. On the 19th General Pleasonton arrived at Dunksburg, sixteen miles northwest of Sedalia, and assumed command of the Provisional Cavalry Division just organized, consisting of the three brigades of cavalry under General Sanborn and a brigade from the cavalry division of the Sixteenth Army Corps under Colonel E. F. Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, which had marched from St. Louis and Jefferson City.

Having been joined by Colonel Catherwood's brigade, and having supplied his command with four days' rations at California, General Sanborn returned to Boonville on the morning of the 13th, Catherwood's brigade leading the advance. He soon ascertained that Price's army had left during the night and early that morning, marching west in the direction of Lexington. He immediately started in pursuit, marching on roads in the rear and to the left and south of the Southern forces, so that he could observe well their movements; for he desired to hold them in Saline County in the Great Bend of the Missouri River until the infantry and artillery under General Smith and a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Winslow should come up, and to give time to General Curtis, commanding the Department of Kansas, to organize and concentrate his troops and the Kansas militia on the Border.

The night he left Boonville General Price received information that there were several thousand stands of small-arms stored in the city hall at Glasgow on the east bank of the Missouri River, guarded by a small Federal force, and as he wished the arms to put into the hands of his numerous recruits, he directed General Clark to proceed with his brigade, a section of artillery, and five hundred men of Jackman's brigade, cross the river at

Arrow Rock, and attack and capture the garrison at Glasgow, with all the arms and military supplies at that post. This movement, though successful to the extent of capturing the garrison of 550 men and their arms and the destruction of some property, detained Price's army in the vicinity of Marshall upwards of three days, thus enabling General Smith to bring up his infantry and artillery within supporting distance of the cavalry under General Pleasonton, then at Dunksburg and Cook's Store.





## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### ORGANIZATION OF THE KANSAS FORCES—MOBILIZING THE MILITIA—SKIRMISHES AT LEXINGTON, LITTLE BLUE, AND INDEPENDENCE.

THE latter part of the summer of 1864, General Curtis, commanding the Department of Kansas, had a large part of his troops under Major-General Blunt employed against hostile Indians on the Upper Arkansas in the western part of the State. Major-General George Sykes commanded the District of South Kansas, which included the eastern Border counties of the State. Brigadier-General E. B. Brown commanded the District of Central Missouri, and Brigadier-General John B. Sanborn commanded the District of Southwest Missouri, and the western limits of their districts included the western Border counties of Missouri. There was a hearty coöperation between the district commanders on both sides of the line, and active operations were conducted against the Southern partisan bandits, frequently striking them hard and allowing them little rest. On returning to his headquarters at Fort Leavenworth on the 17th of September, General Curtis found despatches awaiting him from General Thayer, commanding the District of the Frontier, Fort Smith, Arkansas, stating that Price had crossed the Arkansas River at Dardanelle with two divisions of mounted troops and a complement of artillery and was advancing north to invade Missouri. He at once telegraphed this information to General Halleck, Washington, to General Rose-

crans, commanding the Department of Missouri, and to Governor Carney, of Kansas, and suggested to the Governor that the situation might become so menacing as to require the calling out of the militia of the State to aid in checking the movements of the enemy. Closely following the reports of the advance of Price north of the Arkansas River, came information that a force of two or three thousand men under Generals Gano and Stand Watie had crossed the Arkansas River above Fort Gibson and was moving up through the Indian Territory to make a raid into Southern Kansas to destroy if possible the large supply depot at Fort Scott.

Each day brought additional information of the approaching storm, and on the 20th of September General Curtis received a despatch from Colonel Blair, commanding at Fort Scott, that the Confederate force under General Gano, advancing north through the Indian Territory, had captured a large Federal supply train of upwards of two hundred wagons at Cabin Creek and had retired to the south side of the Arkansas River. For nearly two weeks after Price crossed to the north side of the Arkansas River no certain information could be obtained whether his invading columns would enter Southwest or Southeast Missouri, so that General Curtis, like General Rosecrans, was at first unable to determine at what point he should concentrate his troops. He was satisfied that if the Southern forces entered Southwest Missouri they would swing around through the eastern Border counties of Kansas, and that if they entered Southeastern Missouri, they would be driven west into Kansas by the troops in the Department of Missouri, if they did not meet with determined resistance. To prepare for the coming struggle he ordered General Blunt, commanding the District of the Upper Arkansas, to stop his pursuit of the hostile Indians and to move with such troops as could be spared from that district to Council Grove, thence to

Olathe, near the eastern line of the State. In view of the fact that large Confederate raiding forces had twice within the last two years advanced through the western counties of Missouri to the Missouri River, the Department commander of Kansas deemed it advisable to construct fortifications of considerable strength at Fort Scott, Paola, and Lawrence and to mount siege-guns, with a sufficient force to man them, for the protection of those places. In addition to the rifle-pits, there were three detached bastions for the four 24-pounder siege-guns mounted at Fort Scott. On account of the large quantities of army supplies kept at that post, there were nearly always from five hundred to one thousand troops stationed there, together with some field artillery.

When it was satisfactorily ascertained that the large Confederate force in Southeast Missouri was Price's army, General Curtis was kept constantly advised of its progress north to the vicinity of St. Louis and to the Missouri River by General Rosecrans. As soon as it was known that Price had given up his intention of attacking or investing St. Louis, and after striking the Missouri River at Washington had turned west in the direction of Jefferson City, General Curtis was satisfied that the next objective of the Southern forces was the invasion of Kansas for plunder and revenge, and on the 5th of October wrote Governor Carney urging him to call out the Kansas militia immediately, equipped for service for thirty days. The Governor did not at once issue his proclamation calling out the militia, for he argued that the forces of General Rosecrans would probably overtake and strike Price such a blow that he would be unable to reach Kansas. An election for State officers and Presidential electors would take place next month, and as the people were in the midst of a heated political canvass, the Governor was anxious that the expense and necessity of calling out the citizens for military service, even for a

short period, might be averted. When the newspapers first discussed the probability or possibility of the Governor's calling out the militia, those who were opposed to the friends of the National Administration charged that the scheme for the call was for political effect, and denouncing it aroused some opposition. There were few telegraph lines in the State, and outside of three or four cities the great mass of the people were not advised of the position or of any given movement of the enemy until a week or more had elapsed.

After Price struck the Pacific Railroad, interrupting communication between St. Louis and Jefferson City, Generals Brown and Fisk at the latter place kept General Curtis advised by telegraph of the movements west of the hostile forces until they appeared before the State capital on the 7th. But as Price concluded not to attack Jefferson City and passed it on his flank with some skirmishing, General Curtis saw that no time should be lost in organizing and concentrating his forces in the neighborhood of Kansas City and Olathe, Kansas, at the earliest practicable moment, and on the 8th wrote Governor Carney again urging him to issue his proclamation calling out the militia. In response to the General's request the Governor issued his proclamation on the 8th, calling out the people for the defence of the State against the threatened invasion, and directed the suspension of all business until the crisis had passed.

Major-General George W. Deitzler, who as colonel had gallantly led the First Kansas Infantry at the battle of Wilson Creek until he was severely wounded, was by the Governor placed in command of the Kansas militia and charged with their immediate organization for service on the Border. He at once issued orders to his brigade commanders to concentrate their regiments and detachments at designated places, prepared for active service for thirty days, unless sooner discharged, and to see that each man

was supplied with two blankets, haversack, and some of the conveniences for preparing, cooking, and eating his food. The men were also to bring such small-arms as they had, with supply of ammunition. On receipt of these orders the brigadier-generals of districts forthwith notified their regimental commanders to order into the field every man liable to duty and then to march with their respective regiments to the places designated for concentration. To secure prompt and efficient military organization and action, General Curtis issued an order declaring martial law throughout the State of Kansas, and requiring all men subject to military duty to attach themselves to some of the organizations of troops which were being raised in every locality to oppose the approaching hostile forces. On assuming command of the militia, General Deitzler designated Olathe as the headquarters of the State forces and the point of general concentration of the different organizations at the earliest practicable moment. That the people might understand and appreciate the imminent danger, General Curtis gave out to the press for publication the latest despatches announcing the movements and rapid approach of the enemy, so that intense interest and excitement were aroused, which rapidly spread to the remotest districts, causing a suspension of business on the farms, in the shops, and by all classes throughout the State.

In less than four days after General Deitzler issued his orders mobilizing the militia, organizations were marching from all parts of the State in the direction of the point of concentration at Olathe. Several regiments arrived at that place on the evening of October 12th, but as General Curtis had already arrived and found wood and water scarce, he determined to take a more advanced position, at Shawneetown, about half-way between Olathe and Kansas City, and so advised General Deitzler. The regiments which had arrived and all other militia organizations

as they came up were directed to proceed to the new rendezvous at Shawneetown, where they were immediately armed and equipped for the field. Of the twenty-four regiments of Kansas militia mobilized under the Governor's proclamation, all had arrived at the encampment at Shawneetown by the 16th except those ordered to rendezvous at Atchison and Leavenworth and some detachments left to hold the posts at Paola and Mound City.

As soon as General Blunt arrived from the District of the Upper Arkansas, he was directed to proceed to Paola and relieve Major-General George Sykes of the command of the District of South Kansas. On assuming command of his new district on the 10th, General Blunt at once commenced to put his troops in condition for active service against the approaching foe. The militia and troops thus collected and organized formed two divisions, which General Curtis called "The Army of the Border." The First Division, Major-General Blunt commanding, consisted of four brigades and seventeen pieces of artillery, mostly 12-pounder mountain howitzers. The Second Division, Major-General Deitzler commanding, consisted of about eight thousand Kansas militia and some artillery, and at first formed the left wing of the Army of the Border, the First Division forming the right wing.

On the 13th General Blunt was directed to move to Hickman's Mills, in the southern part of Jackson County, Missouri, with his mounted force and artillery, and to send a scout far enough east to ascertain whether Price had moved south. Most of the Kansas militia were opposed to crossing the State line into Missouri, and were posted along Turkey Creek from Shawneetown to the vicinity of Kansas City. The slow advance of the Confederate forces and the conflicting reports as to their position caused the militia to become impatient, and

murmurs of discontent were heard in their camps, bordering almost on insubordination. This mutinous spirit was encouraged by some of the Kansas newspapers denouncing the mobilization of the militia as a fraud and asserting that Price was not marching in the direction of Kansas, but had moved south from Central Missouri. A few of the militia actually started home; but they were brought back, and by the tact and firmness displayed by General Curtis, and by giving publicity to the latest movements of the advancing foe, the gravity of the situation received more serious and thoughtful consideration.

As soon as his Regular and militia forces were organized and equipped, General Curtis was desirous of advancing the Army of the Border as far east into Missouri as Lone Jack and Pleasant Hill, in accordance with his own views and with suggestions from General Rosecrans, but was obliged to content himself with establishing his main line on the Big Blue, where he proposed to endeavor to check the Confederate advance, in consequence of the aversion of many of the Kansas militia to crossing the State line. The Second Colorado Cavalry, Colonel J. H. Ford commanding, which was serving in the western part of the Central District of Missouri, was ordered by General Rosecrans to report to General Curtis on the 29th of September. Colonel Ford was ordered to concentrate his regiment at Pleasant Hill, but on the 14th of October he was instructed to change his headquarters to Independence and to scout to the front in the direction of Lexington. General Blunt, who had arrived at Hickman's Mills with the First Division, was ordered to move with all his mounted force to Pleasant Hill and reconnoitre in the direction of Warrensburg.

When General Brown was ordered to concentrate his forces at Jefferson City for the defence of the capital, the Second Colorado Cavalry and a few companies of Enrolled Militia were the only troops left to occupy some of the

important towns and to scout the country and operate against the bandits in the western part of his district. He was obliged to evacuate the important post of Warrensburg, which was then the terminus of the Pacific Railroad and the headquarters of the Central District of Missouri, and remove the public property as far as practicable to Jefferson City. Before leaving, however, he had a conference with Major Emory S. Foster, who had recently resigned from the Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, on account of wounds received in action, and with Captain George S. Grover, who had been in active service in Central and Western Missouri from the beginning of the war up to a short time prior to that date, and asked them whether they would undertake the task of raising several companies to hold the post, with such stores as could not be taken away, against any irregular force of Southern partisan bands which might make an attack upon it. These gentlemen agreed to re-enter the service and to do all in their power to recruit as many men as possible to meet the emergency. Nearly all the men of that section who were subject to military duty, and even some who were not, had seen military service in some of the militia or volunteer organizations of the State since the beginning of the war, so that in four days Major Foster and Captain Grover had raised four full companies of mounted men. The organization was at first known as "Johnson County Citizen Guards," but subsequently, when the companies were mustered into service and received their arms and equipments, the designation was changed to "Foster's Cavalry Battalion, Missouri Volunteers." With this force Major Foster held the post upwards of two weeks, keeping part of his men scouting in all directions to guard against a surprise and to keep him advised of any movement of the enemy threatening his position. He was informed of the movements of the invading army until Price passed Jefferson City, when the

railroad and telegraph line were cut, interrupting communication with that point. A small detachment of his command, under Lieutenant A. L. Reavis, which had been sent to Sedalia in connection with establishing communication with headquarters, was captured at that place in the afternoon of the 15th by Brigadier-General Jeff. Thompson, who made a dash on the Federal detachment there with a brigade and a section of artillery of Shelby's division. The defences of the place consisted of two redoubts with a continuous line of rifle-pits extending around them, and were held by about six hundred Home Guards and citizens under Colonel J. D. Crawford of the Enrolled Militia. But having observed the movement of the Confederates as they advanced over the wide expanse of prairie north of town, and knowing that his own men were poorly armed and disciplined and unprepared to stand a bombardment, Colonel Crawford decided to evacuate the place without making a fight.

General Thompson remained in Sedalia only a few hours, and then marched northwest to rejoin Price in the vicinity of Marshall, passing only a few miles from General Sanborn's right flank, which had that evening arrived at Dunksburg.

General Rosecrans now considered it desirable to establish communication between his forces and those of General Curtis, and Major Foster was directed to move west with his command from Warrensburg until he met General Blunt with part of his division of Kansas troops moving east from Pleasant Hill. There was very little time lost in getting his command in motion, and after an all-night's march the Major met General Blunt the next morning, October 17th, at Big Creek, east of Pleasant Hill, and reported to him the positions of General Rosecrans' troops as far as he had been advised. General Blunt continued to advance east that day to Holden, where he halted and directed Major Foster to return with a detach-

ment of his command and a telegraph operator to Warrensburg to make a reconnaissance. That evening the Major telegraphed General Blunt the movements and positions of General Rosecrans' forces as far as could be ascertained, which determined Blunt to move at once for Lexington. In this movement the main part of Foster's battalion, which remained with the Kansas troops, fell under command of Captain Grover, the senior captain, and was assigned to Colonel Jennison's First Brigade, Army of the Border, and being armed with Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles, a very superior arm that discharged sixteen shots without reloading, was constantly kept to the front and on the skirmish-line.

All General Blunt's command, consisting of the First and Second Brigades of his division under Colonels Jennison and Moonlight, respectively, arrived at Lexington in the afternoon of the 18th, and finding no force of the enemy there except a few guerillas, of whom several were killed and captured, went into camp near the Fair Grounds and College for the night. Having obtained reliable information of the positions of General Rosecrans' forces, General Blunt before leaving Holden sent couriers with despatches stating his position and movements to General Sanborn and urging upon him the propriety of at once uniting their forces for an offensive movement against the Southern army. He also sent a despatch by telegraph to General Curtis to order forward on the Independence and Lexington road to reinforce him part of the Third Brigade of his division under Colonel Blair, consisting of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry and Second Colorado Cavalry. On the arrival of these reinforcements he proposed to make such disposition of his force as to hold the Confederate army if possible until Sanborn could come up and strike it in the flank. But he was obliged to abandon his plans, for General Curtis was embarrassed by most of the Kansas militia refusing to go out of the State, and he did

not send him the reinforcements asked for, nor did the couriers from General Sanborn reach him. General Blunt received reliable information directly after entering Lexington that the advance of Price's army, under Shelby, was at Waverly, twenty miles below on the Missouri River, and would probably come up the next day. The next morning, the 19th, he ordered scouting detachments from his two brigades sent out on all the roads leading into Lexington from the east and southeast, with instructions to report the moment the Confederate advance came in sight.

On leaving Waverly at daylight on the morning of the 19th, Shelby's division led the advance of Price's army on Lexington. After crossing Tebo Creek, Price made a flank movement to the left, part of his force going as far south as the Sedalia and Lexington road, to prevent the uniting of the forces of Sanborn and A. J. Smith, which were then on Blackwater, with those of General Blunt, which he had heard was contemplated. He had called in his detachments; he had received a great many recruits, and some arms at the capture of Glasgow; and most of his army having rested several days he was prepared to enter upon the struggle which would determine the success or failure of his campaign. In his movement from Waverly he approached Lexington in three columns, his advance on the Dover road driving in the Federal pickets and scouts about one o'clock. General Blunt promptly reinforced his outposts, with instructions to commanding officers to resist the advance of the enemy. He then ordered his command to a position in line of battle southeast of the city, where the open and undulating nature of the ground enabled him to observe the movements of the enemy a mile or so in his front. His outposts, which were deployed as skirmishers, soon became warmly engaged with the enemy three or four miles from the main line, but were gradually forced back upon it, as the Confeder-

ates continued to increase in numbers and soon brought into use their artillery. As he had no field artillery with his division, his short-range howitzers could not reply effectively to the long-range rifled guns which Shelby brought into action. But he held his position until nearly sundown—until he was convinced that Price's army was in his immediate front, and until the Confederates commenced to flank him on the right and left in large numbers, when he gave the order to retire on the road to Independence.

On seeing the Federal troops retiring from the field, the Confederates under General Jeff. Thompson at once pressed forward with a good deal of energy to overwhelm General Blunt's rear. Colonel Moonlight, commanding the Second Brigade, with the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry and four howitzers, covered the retreat, and he was so hotly pressed for two or three miles that he was several times obliged to make a stand and put his men and howitzers into action to check the enemy. Darkness then suspended further operations, and the Federal troops marched all night in a chilly rain, arriving at the Little Blue River the next morning at daylight, where General Blunt determined to make a stand. The Confederate troops under General Thompson who were thrown forward several miles in the pursuit marched back to Lexington that night and went into camp. In this skirmish at Lexington, if General Blunt had been supplied with a field battery of rifled guns he could have made a more effective showing in resisting and punishing the enemy than he did.

On arriving at the Little Blue and crossing to the west side of that stream, General Blunt took up a good defensive position along the bluffs, and sent to Independence, eight miles distant, for rations for his troops, and a despatch to General Curtis, whose headquarters were then at that place, requesting him to send forward the Sixteenth Kan-

sas Cavalry, the Second Colorado Cavalry, and Captain McLain's Colorado battery of five 3-inch rifled guns. But as the Kansas militia were unwilling to move forward, and as General Curtis had decided to make the Big Blue his line of defence, he directed General Blunt to leave a strong outpost on the Little Blue and to bring the balance of his troops on to Independence. Leaving Colonel Moonlight with the Second Brigade as an outpost to guard the bridge over the Little Blue and the fords of the stream above and below, with instructions to burn the bridge if the enemy advanced on that road, General Blunt, with Jennison's brigade and Captain Grover's battalion, Missouri Volunteers, marched to Independence and went into camp there that night, giving his men and animals needed rest and food. As the advance of the enemy was expected at any moment, Colonel Moonlight directed Major Martin Anderson, of the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry, to take two companies of his regiment and guard the bridge until the enemy were reported advancing in force and then to burn it. A picket was posted a mile or so east of the bridge on the Lexington road, to give notice of the approach of the enemy.

While General Blunt was retreating to the Little Blue during the night of the 19th, General Price's army had gone into camp at Lexington and three miles south of the city. The next day the Confederate army resumed the march west on the Independence road, encamping that night at Fire Prairie, some six miles east of the Little Blue, having met with no opposition. But in his further movements Price suddenly found that he must encounter very determined opposition at every step, and that the Federal troops had been collected in such numbers in his front and on his flank as to give him blow for blow in the impending struggle. On the morning of the 21st, the Federal picket posted east of the Little Blue galloped in and reported to Major Anderson the advance of the

enemy in sight, at which the Major immediately fired the bridge over the stream. When the flames had made such progress as to make the destruction of the bridge certain, the Major fell back with his companies to the hill, and with other troops under Colonel Moonlight opened fire upon the enemy as soon as they came up within range. General Clark's brigade of Marmaduke's division was in advance. On coming up and finding the bridge burned, the General sent a regiment under Colonel Preston to secure the ford about a mile above the bridge, and another regiment under Colonel Lawther to secure a ford half a mile below the bridge. Colonel Moonlight had not disposed his command so as to defend either of these fords with much tenacity, and they were soon forced and Clark's brigade crossed over to the west side of the stream. Colonel Lawther crossing the stream first, pressed forward and attacked Moonlight, who had taken up a good position behind a stone fence running at right angles to the road, and not only repulsed the assault, but in turn assailed the Confederates and drove them back in confusion almost to the river, until the latter were reinforced by the other regiments of Clark's brigade and the other brigades of Marmaduke's division. Indeed, he so much demoralized Lawther's regiment and some supporting detachments, that Shelby's division was hurried to the front, and his men, except one regiment, dismounting on the east bank of the Little Blue, waded the stream and formed on the west side, on the left of Marmaduke's division.

This temporary check enabled General Price to close up with his trains and to bring forward Fagan's division to the support of Marmaduke and Shelby. After some discussion of the situation with his principal officers and with Senator J. H. Lane, of Kansas, who was a volunteer aide-de-camp on his staff, General Curtis decided to order General Blunt with the brigades of Colonels Jennison and

Ford, and McLain's Colorado battery, to the support of Colonel Moonlight, holding the position on the Little Blue. This force, including Captain Grover's Missouri battalion, had just moved out when General Blunt received a despatch from Colonel Moonlight stating that the enemy were advancing in force and that he was then engaging their advance.

General Curtis, with members of his staff and escort, quickly followed General Blunt's column, and on arriving upon the field directed the movements of troops and the placing of batteries in position in person. He did not desire to bring on a general engagement, but he wished to delay by this demonstration of his small force the movements of the invading army, knowing that every moment it was held would bring Rosecrans' forces nearer to his support. When General Blunt met Colonel Moonlight and saw that he had lost the strong position along the bluffs west of the Little Blue, he felt that a mistake had been made in not promptly sending to his support the day before all the troops and field artillery that could have been spared from Kansas City and Independence. Although Marmaduke's and Shelby's divisions had crossed to the west side of the stream and deployed in line of battle, General Blunt determined to make an effort to drive them back and retake the position from which Colonel Moonlight had been forced by superior numbers. On arriving upon the field and making a hasty examination of the situation, he dismounted his troops, except some detachments to operate on his flanks, and commenced making his dispositions for battle. He placed Colonel Ford's Fourth Brigade in his centre, Colonel Jennison's First Brigade on his right, and Colonel Moonlight's Second Brigade on his left, with the Colorado battery near the centre of his line, supported by part of Captain Grover's Missouri battalion, dismounted and lying down just in front of it with a full supply of ammu-

nition for their Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles. It was now eleven o'clock and in a short time his entire line became engaged in a fierce conflict with the enemy in the timber along the bluffs west of Little Blue, and succeeded in driving them back some distance, perhaps half a mile. While his troops were thus engaged, his Colorado battery under the direction of Major R. H. Hunt, Chief of Artillery on the staff of General Curtis, played upon the Confederate lines and position with good effect. The mountain howitzers of the First and Second Brigades also did good service, frequently using canister and spherical case when the enemy came up within range.

As soon as Marmaduke and Shelby got their artillery over the river, they, too, opened fire from their batteries on the Federal lines; but the shot and shell from their guns flew high over the heads of the Federal troops, doing very little damage. For hours the fight went on without decided advantage to either side, when Price pushed forward Fagan's division to the support of Shelby and Marmaduke, thus enabling them to extend their lines and with their mounted troops to flank the Federal position on the right and left. Having no reserves to support his troops thus engaged, and finding both of his flanks threatened by a superior force, General Curtis, who was present on the field directing the general movements of his forces, ordered General Blunt to retire his command on the road to Independence.


In the retreat of the Federal troops from the field, Colonel Ford, Second Colorado Cavalry, commanded the rear-guard, and was obliged to form part of his force at nearly every elevated position on the road and bring into use artillery and engage the enemy while the other half of his command formed at another favorable position. Thus the enemy were held in check until the command arrived near Independence, when General Blunt formed a new line of battle on the east side of that place. At

this point there was some skirmishing, but as the Confederates did not immediately appear in force, General Blunt retreated through Independence to the main camp of the Kansas militia on the west side of the Big Blue, where General Curtis' engineer officers had been employed for several days in constructing defensive works. While General Blunt's skirmish-line was engaging the enemy east of town, the Twelfth Kansas State Militia, Colonel L. S. Treat commanding, and some Missouri Enrolled Militia, who had been left at Independence to hold the place and guard public property, fell back on the Kansas City road to the west side of Big Blue. The moment General Blunt commenced to withdraw his troops from his position east of town, the Confederates of Shelby's division renewed the attack, the opposing forces fighting through the streets of Independence just at dark. It was in this last struggle of the day that the notorious Captain George Todd of Quantrill's bandit command was killed by the Federal rear-guard; and it was here, too, that Captain Grover's Missouri battalion with their repeating rifles did good service in checking the advance of the enemy.

In the early part of the fight on the Little Blue in the morning, Major J. N. Smith, commanding the Second Colorado Cavalry, was shot through the head and instantly killed while gallantly leading his regiment against the foe. In his service on the Border, extending back upwards of a year, he had on all occasions shown himself to be a prudent and efficient officer, and only a few days before this fight had made a scout to Lexington to obtain information of the movements and position of the Confederate forces, then reported to be advancing westward.

The latest despatches General Curtis had from General Rosecrans showed that his cavalry under Pleasonton and his infantry under A. J. Smith should be close upon the rear of Price's army, and the sound of Federal

artillery in that direction was eagerly expected all day long by the troops of the Army of the Border. After driving the forces of General Curtis from the Little Blue back upon their main line of defence on the Big Blue, Price's army with its large trains moved forward and encamped that night in and about Independence, with heavy outposts thrown forward in the direction of the Federal position on Big Blue, and with a strong rear-guard left on the west side of the Little Blue to watch for the approach of Rosecrans' forces.





## CHAPTER XXIX.

### CAPTURE OF GLASGOW, PARIS, AND CARROLLTON, MISSOURI.

IN the spring and summer of 1864 the Federal arms met with several serious reverses west of the Mississippi River—not in the loss of battles, but in the loss of transportation, crippling the operations of the army by interrupting its communication with its base of supplies. The latter part of September, General W. S. Rosecrans, commanding the Department of the Missouri, received definite information that General Price was marching north through Arkansas with an army of twelve to fifteen thousand men, and a few days later that he had entered Southeast Missouri and was marching upon Pilot Knob *en route* to St. Louis and Jefferson City. To oppose the invading army and to strengthen the points which it was thought Price would make the most determined efforts to capture, General Rosecrans was obliged to concentrate as rapidly as practicable at St. Louis and Jefferson City all his available troops in the State, leaving the Missouri Enrolled Militia to hold the stations from which his other troops were withdrawn. Among the troops thus ordered to the defence of the capital of the State was the Forty-third Missouri Infantry under Colonel Chester Harding, Jr., which had completed its organization at St. Joseph in September. Most of the officers and men of the regiment had seen service in the militia organizations of the State since the beginning of the war. In compliance

with instructions six companies of the regiment embarked on the steamer *West Wind*, October 9th, for Jefferson City. The Missouri River was very low at the time, and the progress down-stream was frequently interrupted by the boat running on to sand bars, generally requiring hours to get it off. About fifteen miles above Brunswick a man on the south side signalled the boat and she steamed to shore and took him on board. He was a Union man, and reported that Bill Anderson's guerillas, two hundred strong, were in the bend of the river at a point where the channel approached near the south bank, waiting to attack the boat.

On nearing the point where the guerillas were supposed to be concealed, Colonel Harding ordered that a few shots be thrown into the brush from the 6-pounder field-piece which he had on board. The soldiers on the boat were lying down and could not be seen from shore, and in passing the threatened point fired some shots into the woods to draw the fire of the bandits, but without success. It was also ascertained from the man taken on board that the guerillas had a little stockade on the hill north of Brunswick about a mile from the channel of the river. On approaching town the soldiers on the boat again lay down and concealed themselves so that they could not be seen from shore, and soon saw some thirty to forty of the guerillas, mounted, coming down in the direction of the landing to see what the boat had on board. Before they had come up within rifle-range they suddenly turned and galloped back to town as if they had received a signal of danger from the boat. The pilot had been in the Southern army and was known to be a Southern sympathizer and some of the officers accused him of having signalled the bandits of danger. Captain Oscar Kirkham, who was officer of the day, and who had watched the movements of the guerillas, was strongly of the opinion that the pilot of the boat had given a signal

which they understood. He protested his innocence, but claimed that if the guerillas caught him in that service they would kill him.

Colonel Harding landed his command at Brunswick, sent forward his skirmishers under Lieutenant Simmonds to attack the enemy, and encamped there and picketed the town that night. He pressed horses into the service to mount about fifty of his men, and then sent a scout into the country four or five miles, but it was unable to come up with the bandits who were in town on his approach. He boarded the boat with his troops again the next day and arrived at Glasgow about three o'clock in the afternoon, and landed and went into camp, having heard that Price had passed Jefferson City and was advancing west up the river. He also soon heard of the fight at Boonville, and was informed that the enemy was in the vicinity, but no word had yet reached him that a large Confederate force had crossed or was preparing to cross to the north side of the river. When he landed he found at Glasgow the companies of Captain James A. Adams and Captain S. A. Hunter, of the Ninth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, some twenty men of the Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry under Captain J. E. Mayo, Captain Steinmetz's company of Citizen Guards, and Captain Bingham's Company Saline County militia. The loyal militia who had been stationed there had thrown up breastworks of earth around a square about as large as the usual courthouse square, on a high point in town, and it would have served as an excellent defence against an enemy not supplied with artillery. Colonel Harding was the senior officer, and on assuming command of the post sent out scouts from the mounted militia and had infantry pickets posted around town guarding all the approaches. Late in the afternoon of the 14th, reports came in that a Confederate force was crossing to the north side of the river at Arrow Rock, about sixteen miles be-

low, for the purpose of marching up on that side to attack him.

During the night a cavalry scout returned and reported that a large Confederate force had crossed to the north side of the river, was advancing under General Clark, and that an attack might be expected the next morning. At Glasgow the Missouri River turns nearly due south for several miles. In the plan of attack it had been arranged that General Shelby should march up and open fire with his artillery on the Federal position from the west side of the river, while General Clark, who had crossed to the north side, should attack the Federal force with small-arms and three pieces of artillery on the south, east, and north. Shelby marched during the night and arrived in front of Glasgow and posted a battery on a sand bar, and at sunrise on the morning of the 15th the roar of his artillery was heard from across the river and the shot and shell from his guns were flying through town, causing a good deal of excitement among the people. While General Shelby was cannonading the town and Federal camp, Colonel Harding was preparing to meet the Confederate force advancing under General Clark. He posted the six companies of his own regiment and one company of militia, dismounted, on the south and east sides of town, and the two companies of Captains Adams and Hunter, of the Ninth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, on the north side of town. Captain Mayo with twenty men of the Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry and some sixty men of Saline County militia were sent out to hold a bridge over the creek on the Boonville road, south of town. Having made these dispositions of his troops, Colonel Harding was informed about nine o'clock by some detachments of cavalry which he sent out south of town that the Confederate advance was coming up in sight.

Very soon after this the Federal outposts were driven in and General Clark took up a position on high ground

facing the creek on the south side of town, overlooking the ground occupied by the Federal troops, with Jackman's brigade on the left, Green's brigade in the centre, and Lawther's regiment on the right of the Confederate line. The opposing forces were now about half a mile apart, separated by a creek that empties into the Missouri River below town. It was nearly an hour after he took up his first position before General Clark commenced to extend his line entirely around the town. When fully extended the Federal officers thought that his line was upwards of a mile in length. Even before there had been any heavy skirmishing he sent in under a flag of truce a demand for Colonel Harding to surrender, which was declined. When Colonel Harding's reply was returned, about eleven o'clock, refusing to surrender, General Clark opened fire along his line with small-arms and with three pieces of artillery, but without doing much damage to the Federal troops, the range being too great. About twelve o'clock he commenced to advance his sharpshooters and skirmish-lines and to extend his main line around the Federal position. In this advance he was met by a determined resistance from the Federal sharpshooters and skirmishers, who were posted in buildings and behind fences and trees, and who did effective work in holding back the enemy for nearly two hours. Part of the Federal troops also occupied and kept up a hot fire from the brick buildings of Lewis Brothers' Tobacco Works in the northeast part of town.

When the Federal detachments on the right and left of these buildings were driven back, leaving them outside the Federal line, they were abandoned by the men posted in them, and shortly afterwards occupied by the Confederates. General Clark now extended his lines around the Federal position from the river below to the river above, and pushed the investment with so much persistence that Colonel Harding was obliged to draw his troops

within the fortifications. The force under Captain Mayo which had been sent out to hold a bridge over the creek on the Boonville road, after repulsing several charges of the enemy, was compelled by overwhelming numbers to abandon the position and fall back upon Colonel Harding's main line. At half-past twelve o'clock, after Colonel Harding had retired to his fortifications, General Clark sent in to him another demand to surrender, and threatened that if his demand was not complied with, Anderson's guerillas would be turned loose upon him. Colonel Harding again declined to yield and resented the threat, and the fight was resumed with sharp firing on both sides for about an hour, when General Clark sent another demand for the surrender of the Federal force. This command was not coupled with any dire threats in the event of refusal, and the proposition was entertained and terms soon agreed upon. The ammunition of the Federal troops was nearly exhausted; the fire of General Clark's three guns was concentrated upon them; they were surrounded on three sides by the Confederate forces, and on the other side was the river, which was commanded by Shelby's artillery on the west side, and there was no hope of reinforcements coming to their assistance.

In the terms of surrender the Federal officers were permitted to retain their side-arms and Colonel Harding was to have an escort for his officers and men to the Federal lines. The Federal troops then marched out of their fortifications to an open space and stacked their arms and surrendered. They were then paroled, but were obliged to stay in Glasgow that night under guard; they were, however, well treated by the Confederate officers and men. The next day, with an escort for protection, they started for Boonville. It was estimated by Captain Kirkham, from whom this account of the fight is taken, and other Federal officers, that General Clark had from 5000 to 7000 men on the field that day, while

the troops under Colonel Harding, including the militia, did not exceed 750 men.

In his report of this action Colonel Harding stated his casualties at 11 men killed and 32 wounded. Captain Steinmetz, of the Citizen Guards, was killed at the head of his company, and Lieutenant George F. Simmonds, Sixty-second United States Colored Infantry, who was on sick-leave and who reported to Colonel Harding for duty, was shot and instantly killed while leading a detachment of soldiers to a favorable position for sharp-shooting. Colonel Colton Greene, commanding a brigade of the Confederate force, reported his loss at 7 men killed and 46 wounded, including 2 officers killed. The loss in Jackman's brigade is not reported.

On entering Boonville Price's army captured a steam ferryboat, which was used in crossing and recrossing his troops and recruits over the river at that and other points above. When Colonel Harding assumed command of the Federal forces at Glasgow, telegraphic communication with St. Louis had just been interrupted, and he did not know that Price was prepared to throw a large force with artillery to the north side of the river at his pleasure. An attack by the guerilla forces of Anderson, Quantrill, and Todd and by the Confederate recruits of Threlkill and other recruiting officers from Price's army was considered probable; but Colonel Harding believed that with his Regular troops and the militia, posted behind the rifle-pits and in one or two brick houses, he could hold the place against all these hostile forces.

The surrender of Glasgow and the report of a large Confederate force with artillery north of the Missouri River made the Enrolled Missouri Militia on that side of the river very cautious about encountering the Southern troops. As Price marched up the south side of the river, having the use of a steam ferryboat, he sent over to the north side large recruiting parties under energetic


officers, who were sometimes successful in their movements against the detachments of Enrolled Militia stationed in the different towns. This militia had rendered very effective service in the various operations against the guerilla bands of that section; but they were not prepared to engage regular Confederate forces, supplied with artillery, and they were constantly impressed with the exaggerated number of men in every detachment of the enemy. They saw from published reports and were told by Southern sympathizers that Price's army was upwards of thirty thousand strong and was steadily advancing in spite of every effort of all the Federal forces of the Department to check him. As nearly all the Federal troops were south of the Missouri River and moving on the left flank of Price to keep him in near the river, his detachments were able to overrun the counties north of the river with very little opposition—with such opposition only as the Enrolled Militia were able to offer.

On the same day that Glasgow surrendered, a Confederate force, more than three hundred strong, attacked Captain William E. Fowkes' company, Seventieth Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, stationed at Paris, in Monroe County, and after some resistance compelled him to surrender. Two days later a Confederate force of about six hundred men under Major Jerry C. Cravens and Captain Williams surprised Major George Deagle, commanding the post of Carrollton, with 160 men of the Sixty-fifth Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, and demanded the immediate surrender of his command, stating that if the demand was not complied with in fifteen minutes they had their artillery planted and would shell the place.

After some parleying as to terms Major Deagle surrendered his command, and his men were taken to the south side of the Missouri River and paroled near Waverly, except six men who were turned over to Anderson's bandits and brutally murdered—shot down and their

bodies left by the roadside. The murdered men were charged with being connected with the killing of Colonel William F. Peery and two other Confederate recruiting officers near Carrollton the latter part of September while operating in Carroll County as guerillas. At the time these men were captured Price's invading wave had reached the flood mark and was receding, and intelligent officers like General Shelby and Major Cravens should have known that such atrocious acts would certainly soon bring upon their own people the severest retaliation. Many Southern sympathizers were so much elated by Price's advance that they hastened to join some of the organizations of his army, without stopping to think that his victorious hosts might in a few days become a panic-stricken, demoralized, and starving mob. These misguided men, who had so often regarded the leniency of the Government as a weakness, were deceiving themselves in thinking that the preparations of the Federal forces to strike were due to weakness and fear. For several weeks the operations of Price's army in chasing the Enrolled Militia, sacking towns, and the bringing of trains loaded with spoils into the camps of his troops appeared to the Southern sympathizers as a merry war in which they would like to participate. But the picture was not so fascinating when they came to face the hardships and realities of war—when they were chased day and night by the Federal cavalry, and were obliged to live on corn or meat without salt. In many instances they abandoned their colors and dropped out of ranks on the march at night and endeavored to work their way back to their homes. They generally fled from the sight of Federal cavalry and were pursued and shot down or captured. Most of those captured claimed that they had been conscripted and taken off by the Southern army. There were probably a few men conscripted, but nearly all the men who went off with Price were Southern sym-

pathizers or belonged to the Order of American Knights, a disloyal organization that had a large membership in the State. Before the end of December the prisons at the military posts of the State were filled with prisoners who had been picked up by the Federal cavalry, or who had surrendered to the Federal authorities, without arms, claiming that they had been conscripted by certain Confederate recruiting officers, and had deserted at the first opportunity.





## CHAPTER XXX.

### BATTLES OF INDEPENDENCE AND BIG BLUE, MISSOURI.

ON the 19th of October Major-General Pleasonton, under orders from Department Headquarters, assumed command of the Provisional Cavalry Division in person at Dunksburg, relieving Brigadier-General John B. Sanborn, who up to that time had been in command of the cavalry in the field operating against Price. In the re-organization that took place, Brigadier-General E. B. Brown was assigned to the command of the First Brigade, relieving Colonel John F. Philips, Seventh Missouri State Militia; Brigadier-General John McNeil was assigned to the command of the Second Brigade, relieving Colonel J. L. Beveridge, Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry; and Brigadier-General John B. Sanborn was assigned to the command of the Third Brigade, relieving Colonel J. J. Gravely, Eighth Missouri State Militia Cavalry. The brigade commanders thus relieved resumed command of their respective regiments. The Fourth Brigade, Colonel E. F. Winslow commanding, joined General Pleasonton at once from Sedalia. Colonel Catherwood's Thirteenth Missouri Veteran Cavalry, and the Seventh Kansas Cavalry under Major Francis M. Malone, were assigned to General McNeil's brigade. A section of 3-inch rifled guns was attached to each brigade. With the cavalry thus organized, and General Smith's infantry and artillery within supporting distance, the troops of General Rose-

crans' Department were for the first time since the opening of the campaign prepared for active aggressive operations against the invading army. To defend St. Louis and Jefferson City separately General Rosecrans had been obliged to concentrate all the available troops of his Department at those places, and when the danger of attack upon those points had passed, some time was necessarily lost in repairing the railroad and bridges and in waiting for General Mower's division of infantry from Arkansas to come up.

It was perhaps a fortunate circumstance for the Federal forces that Price was kept in Saline County nearly four days waiting for the return of the troops which he had despatched under Clark and Thompson for the capture of Glasgow and Sedalia. During this interval General Rosecrans was able to repair the railroad, forward supplies to Sedalia for his troops, and push forward his infantry to the support of his cavalry at Dunksburg and Cook's Store, to engage Price if he attempted to pass out south from Saline County, or to move upon his rear if he marched west in the direction of Kansas. Before the arrival of General Pleasonton at Dunksburg General Sanborn received reports indicating that Price was about to counter-march his army from near Marshall so as to strike the railroad east of Sedalia and again threaten Jefferson City, or pass out south by way of Springfield. With the view of obtaining reliable information of Price's movements, General Sanborn sent out a reconnaissance on the night of the 19th under Colonel Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, consisting of his own regiment and two squadrons of the Sixth Missouri State Militia under Major Plumb, with instructions to move north until he struck the Southern army or reached the Missouri River at Dover. Moving forward rapidly, Colonel Phelps received reliable information several miles south of Dover that the Southern army had been moving west through that place all

the afternoon and evening of the 19th, and that late in the evening artillery firing had been heard in the direction of Lexington. He immediately sent a messenger to General Sanborn with the information thus obtained, and then continued his march north, entering Dover on a charge at sunrise on the morning of the 20th, routing and driving out a Confederate force of about five hundred men, killing four men and capturing four officers and ten enlisted men. On receipt of this information that morning General Rosecrans ordered Pleasonton to push forward his cavalry to Lexington, with instructions to General Smith to support the movement with his infantry and artillery.

General McNeil's Second Brigade, in the advance, entered Lexington the night of the 20th, and was fired upon by two parties of Confederates who had been left by Price in his rear to observe the movements of the Federal troops. In the skirmish that ensued in the darkness the Fifth Missouri State Militia, in the advance, drove the Confederates, about two hundred strong, out of town, capturing seven men. From Lexington Pleasonton's cavalry moved forward on the 21st on the road to Independence, his advance under McNeil encamping that night about ten miles east of Little Blue. Resuming the march early on the morning of the 22d, McNeil's brigade arrived at Little Blue about ten o'clock, and finding the bridge over the stream destroyed, crossed it at a ford below, and immediately attacked Price's rear-guard, consisting of two brigades of Fagan's division. As the ford was considered impracticable for crossing the trains and artillery, a temporary bridge was hastily constructed for the purpose, and a section of Captain Montgomery's battery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, was got over, and moving to the front at a gallop soon came up with General McNeil's brigade, which was deployed and steadily driving the enemy under General Cabell back upon Independence.

In his efforts to check the Federal advance General Cabell very soon brought into use a section of artillery. But the Federal troops pushed forward with such determination that he was obliged in every instance to withdraw his guns after firing two or three rounds. Thus the fight continued over the ground over which General Curtis had retreated fighting, the evening before, until nearing Independence, when General Cabell determined to make a stand at the eastern limits of the city and to bring into action all of Fagan's division. Directly after getting his troops and artillery in position the Federal advance came in sight and his battery opened fire upon it. General Pleasonton, who was at the front with his leading brigade directing the movements of his forces, at once commenced making his dispositions for battle. McNeil's Second Brigade, which had been advancing for several miles dismounted, on coming up was ordered into action, supported by a section of the Second Missouri Light Artillery under Captain Montgomery and two 12-pounder mountain howitzers attached to the Fifth Missouri State Militia under Lieutenant A. Hillerich. In a short time Sanborn's Third Brigade came up at a gallop, and, dismounting under a hot fire from the Confederate artillery, formed on the right of McNeil and immediately advanced against Cabell's left. Closely following Sanborn's brigade, Captain Thurber's battery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, came upon the field, and being placed in position by Colonel Nelson Cole, Chief of Artillery on the staff of General Pleasonton, immediately went into action, firing thirty rounds into the Confederate lines, causing a good deal of damage and demoralization.

The troops of McNeil and Sanborn now pressed forward, firing as they advanced, while the Federal batteries played upon the Confederate position with a storm of shot and shell. This vigorous attack soon caused Cabell's line to give way and fall back through Independence. At this

moment General Pleasonton ordered McNeil to mount his command and charge the enemy in retreat. His regiments were mounted as quickly as practicable, and Colonel Catherwood, Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry, was ordered to lead the charge with his regiment, using the sabre, which they did most gallantly. His bugles sounded and he dashed forward at the head of his regiment, sweeping everything before him and capturing two guns of the Confederate battery and four hundred prisoners on the west side of town. Generals Marmaduke and Cabell, who were in town, barely escaped falling into his hands. He was supported in this movement by the Seventeenth Illinois, the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, and the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Regiments Missouri State Militia. At the same time the troops of General Sanborn's brigade on the right, dismounted, were gallantly performing their duty, moving through the north part of town, crossing fences and yards and keeping almost abreast of the charging column, and giving the enemy no time to form line. Indeed, General Cabell was pressed so closely on his left by Sanborn's troops that Colonel Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, captured his sword and an officer on his staff.

When the fight opened that morning on Little Blue, General Marmaduke's division was encamped along Rock Creek about two miles west of Independence. Reports of the Federal advance upon the Confederate rear were immediately sent in to Generals Fagan and Marmaduke, and when the sound of the artillery firing was getting nearer and nearer, showing that the Federal forces were steadily approaching and the Confederates retiring, Marmaduke's division was formed in line facing east to support Fagan if necessary. This disposition of the supporting troops enabled Fagan, after his division had been driven back through Independence in confusion and with heavy loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and guns,

to pass to the rear of Marmaduke and rally his men and re-form his lines. Meanwhile, Pleasonton had handled his troops so as to use them as effectively as possible in the operations of the day. Most of McNeil's brigade, which had been dismounted near Little Blue to press the Confederates back upon their position where they made a stand east of Independence, had become greatly exhausted in marching to the right and to the left to pass hedges and inclosures and in crossing ravines or hollows, and his men were anxious enough to be relieved of further exertion of that kind when the order was given to remount and make the charge that was led by Colonel Catherwood. Up to this time Sanborn's brigade, which had been marching mounted all day, was in good condition to be dismounted to advance on foot on the right of the Federal line. But the ground just east of Independence is broken by steep hollows, and in the general movement when the charge was ordered these dismounted troops of Sanborn's brigade were required to advance at a double-quick. In crossing the hollows and in passing around houses, fences, and obstructions in town, Sanborn had been unable to keep a perfect alignment of his men, and it became necessary to re-form his lines when the charge was over resulting in the capture of the guns and prisoners. It was now about four o'clock, and by the time McNeil and Sanborn had re-formed their brigades, now much in need of food and a respite from their exertions, the First Brigade under General Brown and the Fourth Brigade under Colonel Winslow came up and were pushed to the front to renew the attack on the Confederate forces on the Westport road—Brown in advance, supported by Winslow.

In this movement Colonel McFerran, with the First Missouri State Militia, advanced to the front at a gallop, and about a mile or so west of town encountered General Clark's skirmish-line in a skirt of timber east of Rock

Creek. He quickly dismounted his regiment, except one company held in reserve, and deploying his dismounted men, opened fire on the Confederates. By some mistake the Fourth and Seventh Regiments Missouri State Militia, also of the First Brigade, had been halted in town, leaving Colonel McFerran with his single regiment for nearly an hour to contend with a superior force of the enemy, which was rapidly flanking him on the right and left when the other two regiments of the brigade came up to his assistance. A battery of Marmaduke's division which had already commenced shelling the Federal line was soon effectively replied to by a section of Thurber's battery which was sent to the front by Colonel Cole. General Brown now came up and renewed the attack and after severe fighting drove the Confederate line back about two miles on the Westport road, close upon the rear of Price's train. His troops had now been engaging the enemy for two hours, it was getting dark, and two of his regiments reported that they had nearly expended their supply of ammunition, so he requested Colonel Winslow to take the advance with his brigade, consisting of the Third and Fourth Regiments Iowa Cavalry, and detachments of the Fourth and Tenth Regiments Missouri Cavalry.

With the view of relieving General Curtis, who had been obliged to fall back from Independence to Big Blue, thence to Westport and Kansas City, General Pleasonton determined to push the Confederate force in his front all night, and ordered Colonel Winslow to dismount his brigade and keep up a vigorous attack. Though the night was intensely dark, Colonel Winslow cautiously moved forward. The silence and the stillness that prevailed were now and then broken by the sharp volleys of musketry of the opposing forces, and the flashes of the guns at each volley momentarily lighted up the deep gloom of the forest. These attacks were kept up by

Winslow's brigade, closely supported by Brown's brigade, until nearly eleven o'clock that night, driving Marmaduke's division back within a mile or so of the Big Blue, when the Federal troops were ordered to bivouac in line.

Shelby's division having forced a crossing of the Big Blue at several points early in the day by driving back General Curtis' forces guarding the fords, Price's trains crossed to the west side of the stream by night and started south on the road to Little Santa Fé. Fagan's division, which was driven in confusion through Independence by Pleasonton, after passing to the rear of Marmaduke crossed to the west side of the Big Blue that evening to support Shelby and protect the train. After ordering up his ammunition and supply trains from the rear, General Pleasonton directed McNeil to move with his brigade at twelve o'clock that night on the road southwest to Little Santa Fé, and to be at that point at daylight the next morning to intercept Price's trains moving south. Before marching, a battalion of the Third Missouri State Militia, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Matthews, which had participated in all the operations of the campaign up to that time, was detached from the brigade and left to garrison Independence.

Having made the necessary preparations, General Pleasonton determined to move forward before daybreak the next morning and renew the attack upon the Confederate force in his front, and ordered Colonel Winslow, whose brigade had bivouacked in advance, to continue in advance until daylight, when he would be relieved by General Brown, commanding the First Brigade. At four o'clock that morning Winslow's brigade was in motion and soon came upon part of Marmaduke's division, which was driven back after some skirmishing to the west side of Big Blue. Here the First Brigade, Colonel Philips commanding, relieved the Fourth Brigade under Colonel Winslow of the advance. On coming to the front that

morning, General Pleasonton thought that General Brown had not relieved Winslow's brigade of the advance as promptly as he should have done and arrested him and sent him to the rear, and directed Colonel Philips, Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry, to take command of the First Brigade. Colonel McFerran, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was also arrested, and Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Lazear ordered to take command of that regiment. Passing to the front and finding a strong Confederate force posted on the west side of the Big Blue to contest the crossing of the ford, Colonel Philips ordered Lieutenant-Colonel T. T. Crittenden, commanding the Seventh Missouri State Militia, to dismount his men, deploy them to the left of the road, and engage the enemy on the opposite bank of the stream.

The Fourth Missouri State Militia under Major G. W. Kelley and the First Missouri State Militia under Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear, the other two regiments of his brigade, were pushed forward mounted across the stream in the face of a hot fire of bursting shell from Marmaduke's battery, placed in position to sweep the ford and approaches. The bend in the river above the ford enabled Colonel Crittenden to attack the enemy in the right flank and rear, and driving them from their position in front of the ford, he crossed his men to the west side of the stream. He then moved to the right far enough for the cavalry which had crossed over to form in his rear. In the further dispositions which were made, Colonel Crittenden advanced on the left of the road with his dismounted men, and Major Kelley on the right with his mounted men, supported by Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear with the First Missouri State Militia, driving the Confederates perhaps a quarter of a mile to the bluffs which rise from the valley. To carry this strong position of the enemy required a severe struggle. Finding the nature of the ground such that it was impracticable to advance

against the position with mounted troops except in columns of fours, Major Kelley was allowed to dismount his command and form on the right of Crittenden.

A Confederate battery was posted on the crest of the hill so as to sweep the road and the approaches in front with shell and canister, making it impossible for cavalry to advance on the narrow road in columns of fours without suffering a terrible loss. In the face of this situation there was a determination to charge the position with cavalry and, under instructions, Colonel Philips ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear to move forward with the First Missouri State Militia. After two gallant charges made by Colonel Lazear the effort to carry the position failed. It was now decided to dismount the entire brigade to make the attack, and in a few moments Colonel Philips advanced with his three regiments and drove the Confederates from their position back across a field to the woods on the west side where the main part of Marmaduke's division was formed in line of battle. In falling back from this position on the hill across the field to the timber, the Confederates fiercely contested every step of the ground fought over, leaving their numerous dead and wounded where they fell. At this point in the fight, Colonel Winslow's Fourth Brigade came up on the right and Sanborn's Third Brigade on the left of Philips' First Brigade, and assisted in driving the Confederates from their position in the timber to the prairie about two miles beyond, where Marmaduke again formed line of battle. In this fight in the timber Colonel Winslow received a severe wound in the leg with a musket-ball and turned the command of the Fourth Brigade over to Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Benteen, Tenth Missouri Cavalry. But up to this time the main part of the fighting on the Federal side had been done by the First Brigade, composed of Missouri State Militia, one regiment, the Fourth, under Major Kelley, having that morning sustained a

loss of two officers and seven enlisted men killed and three officers and forty-four enlisted men wounded, a loss much heavier than was sustained by the entire Fourth Brigade since leaving Independence, including the night fighting.

In dislodging the Confederates from their several positions that morning, and in effectively replying to their guns, Captain Thurber's battery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, and a section of Captain Montgomery's battery of the same regiment under Lieutenant Smiley, all under the direction of Colonel Cole, Chief of Artillery, rendered effective and efficient service, using shell and grape and canister from every position where they could go into action. Having forced Marmaduke's division from the line of the Big Blue back two or three miles to the southwest on the Harrisonville road, General Pleasonton ordered the regiments of his brigades which had been dismounted to remount at once for a cavalry charge against Fagan's division and Jackman's brigade, Shelby's division, which had come up on the prairie. The horses were quickly brought up from the rear, when the troops remounted and moved in a gallant charge against the enemy, striking them, breaking their lines, throwing them into the greatest confusion, and causing them to burn a large number of wagons and to abandon a large amount of artillery ammunition. This movement of Pleasonton in forcing Marmaduke's and Fagan's divisions south to protect the Confederate trains, uncovered and exposed to his attack the right flank and rear of Shelby's division, then engaging General Curtis' forces under Blunt on Brush Creek near Westport. In fact the Southern army was now completely severed, and Price pushed to the front with his escort to form his recruits and recall his advance-guard for the protection of his train, which was now threatened by General McNeil, who had been sent out from Independence the previous night to attack it.


On seeing the situation rapidly developing, Price sent orders to Shelby and Fagan to fall back and rejoin him as quickly as practicable. In withdrawing their troops from the conflict with Curtis' forces and facing south, they soon saw in their new front the prairie covered with Pleasonton's cavalry. It was now perhaps one o'clock when Pleasonton recalled his troops from the pursuit after dispersing and scattering Fagan's division and Jackman's brigade, and before he had completely re-formed his brigades the head of Shelby's division was seen advancing from the direction of Westport. Both sides prepared for immediate action. Shelby commenced the fight by ordering a charge of a brigade against the left of the Federal line, striking Sanborn's brigade and causing it to yield a little. Colonel Cole had eight pieces of artillery up within easy range, and double-charging them with grape and canister, opened a terribly destructive fire upon the Confederate line, causing almost instant demoralization.

General Pleasonton now ordered his cavalry to charge, which they did, breaking the Confederate lines and destroying all organization of the enemy. It was now a run for life with the Confederates, and they were pursued, shot down, and captured by the Federal cavalry, who were close upon their heels until near the village of Little Santa Fé, when they struck the brush and timber of Indian Creek and most of them escaped. It was a sight for the mirth of gods and men to see the officers and soldiers of that division, who had dubbed themselves "the avengers of blood," throwing the dust from their heels into the eyes of their pursuers and suddenly losing their appetite for blood—for they had often told with boastful swagger of riding down Federal detachments and companies of loyal militia armed with worthless guns. McNeil's brigade, which was sent out from Independence on the night of the 22d to reach Little Santa Fé at daylight

to intercept and attack Price's train, did not arrive at the designated point at the appointed time and failed to accomplish the object for which it was detached. When Price was informed of the position of this Federal force, he immediately ordered up Marmaduke's division to protect the left flank of his train against the threatened attack, and Fagan's division to protect his rear. About two o'clock that day General McNeil's line of march intersected the road on which the Confederate forces and trains were passing. He immediately formed his brigade in line of battle, advanced his skirmish-line of two companies Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry under Captain John F. Austin, and directed Captain Montgomery to shell the Confederate column with a section of his battery. But in a short time the Confederate forces commenced coming up in such numbers as to threaten to flank him on the right, and he withdrew his command to another position where he could make a better defence. A small force of Confederates was left to attract his attention until nearly night, while the main part of the Confederate army and train were moving rapidly south. His movement in this instance was so barren of expected results as to incur General Pleasonton's decided disapprobation.

But Pleasonton, too, made a mistake, even more serious than that made by McNeil. The night he was fighting Marmaduke's division west of Independence, he sent a despatch to General Rosecrans to order General Smith's infantry corps of about nine thousand men to Independence, as there was a prospect of getting a fight out of Price. Feeling certain that Price would turn south when he struck Curtis' force, General Rosecrans had ordered General Smith, who was coming up on the Lexington and Independence road, to march across the country by way of Chapel Hill to Hickman's Mills and Little Santa Fé to intercept the Southern army. General Smith had reached Chapel Hill when he received instructions to march to

Independence. It was nearer to Hickman's Mills than it was to Independence, and had he marched to the former place, Price's army would probably have been crushed and his entire train captured or destroyed.





## CHAPTER XXXI.

### SKIRMISH ON THE BIG BLUE AND BATTLE OF WESTPORT, MISSOURI.

AFTER being forced back from the Little Blue through Independence to the west side of the Big Blue, on the evening of the 21st, General Curtis was confident that this line of defence had been so strengthened that he would be able to check the further advance of the Southern forces, and so advised General Rosecrans by telegraph. When General Curtis decided to make the Big Blue his main line of defence, Captain George T. Robinson, Chief Engineer on his staff, made a survey of the stream from the Missouri River to a point three or four miles above its junction with Indian Creek, a distance of about fifteen miles, and determined the points to be fortified so as to command the fords and approaches. He also directed the felling of timber to obstruct the passage of the fords and the different fordable places in the stream, and to form abatis in front of the different field-works to be constructed. A large force of Kansas militia was employed under the direction of Major-General Deitzler, Kansas State Militia, and Colonel C. W. Blair, Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, to push forward this work as rapidly as practicable a day or so before the other troops fell back from the Little Blue. A force of colored volunteers, organized by Captain R. J. Hinton, an aide-de-camp on General Blunt's staff, was also employed on these de-

fensive works until they were ordered to take position in line of battle. On the 21st, finding that the Confederate forces were certainly advancing and pushing back upon Independence the troops under General Blunt from the Little Blue, General Curtis directed General Deitzler to order up all the Kansas militia who were encamped in the vicinity of Shawneetown and Shawnee Mission, in Kansas, to positions on the Big Blue.

Retiring with his troops that evening after the fight near Independence, General Curtis made his headquarters a short distance west of the Big Blue on the main road from Independence to Kansas City, thus selecting a central position from which he could conveniently direct the further operations of his forces. As the invading army was directly in his front, he lost no time in making dispositions of his troops for the struggle the next day. Major-General Blunt was assigned to the command of his right wing, extending south of the Independence and Kansas City road to near Hickman's Mills, and Major-General Deitzler was assigned to the command of his left wing, extending north of the Independence road to the Missouri River.

In the left wing there was only the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Blair, and some unassigned regiments of Kansas State Militia. The Third Brigade consisted of Colonel William D. McCain's Fourth, Colonel G. A. Colton's Fifth, Colonel James Montgomery's Sixth, and Colonel William Pennock's Tenth Regiment Kansas State Militia Cavalry; Lieutenant-Colonel George P. Eve's battalion Bourbon County (Kansas) Militia; Lieutenant W. B. Clark's detachment Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry; Lieutenant D. C. Knowles' section Second Kansas Battery; and Captain James H. Dodge's Ninth Wisconsin Battery, six guns.

In the right wing there were the First, Second, and Fourth Brigades, commanded respectively by Colonels

Jennison, Moonlight, and Ford, besides a brigade of Kansas State Militia Cavalry under Brigadier-General M. S. Grant, which had taken position on the Big Blue above its junction with Indian Creek. Captain McLain's Colorado battery was assigned to the right wing in addition to the mountain howitzers attached to each brigade. There were also some unassigned Kansas militia under Colonel George W. Veale, of the Shawnee County regiment, in the right wing, who were guarding the upper fords of the Big Blue when General Blunt's command fell back from Independence on the night of the 21st. The banks on both sides of the Big Blue from its junction with Indian Creek to its mouth were generally steep and precipitous, with very few good fords for the passage of trains and artillery. Of the four or five fords above the crossing of the Independence and Kansas City road, General Curtis knew not at which one Price would make the most determined effort to force a passage. It was therefore impracticable to post the Federal troops so as to effectually check the Confederates and prevent them from crossing the stream at whatever point they might select. There was heavy timber or brush woods on both sides of the river, extending out a mile or so except where cleared farms came up to the banks, so that it was difficult for the Federal signal officers to observe the early movements of the Confederates when making a demonstration against any particular point.

On the morning of the 22d, General Blunt directed Colonel Ford to send six companies of the Second Colorado Cavalry forward on the Independence and Kansas City road east of the Big Blue to skirmish with the enemy and observe their movements from that quarter. This force engaged Jackman's brigade for several hours, when Shelby withdrew his troops from that part of the field and concentrated them five or six miles south of that point to force a passage of the Big Blue at Byram's Ford.

This movement of Shelby towards the Federal right was immediately reported to General Curtis by Captain E. I. Meeker, his chief signal officer, who had early that morning sent out his assistants to make observations from favorable positions of the movements of the Confederate forces, with instructions to report every thirty minutes. As soon as General Blunt was informed of this movement being made against his right, he sent Colonel Jennison with the First Brigade to defend Byram's Ford, and Colonel Moonlight with the Second Brigade to hold Simmons' Ford and two other fords between that point and the mouth of Brush Creek. Colonel Ford, of the Fourth Brigade, formed on the left of Colonel Moonlight with six companies Second Colorado Cavalry and the Twelfth Kansas State Militia, having already sent the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Walker to the assistance of Colonel Jennison at Byram's Ford.

The Fourth Kansas State Militia under Colonel McCain was also sent to reinforce Colonel Jennison. That morning the advance of Price's army moved forward from Independence, and at eleven o'clock Thompson's brigade of Shelby's division appeared in front of Jennison at Byram's Ford, making an attack upon his outposts and endeavoring to force a passage of the stream. The entrance to and exit from the ford were obstructed by trees which had been felled across the road. Trees had also been felled so as to form breastworks near the ford, behind which Colonel Jennison posted a strong line of skirmishers, and with the aid of a section of howitzers repulsed every attack the Confederates made in front. After skirmishing had been kept up for several hours between the opposing forces at and near the ford, General Thompson dismounted a part of his brigade and ordered his men to wade the river and effect a lodgment on the west side. As soon as this was accomplished the rest of

his brigade at once crossed over, when he attacked Jennison and drove him back nearly to Westport. On hearing cannonading at one o'clock some distance to his right, General Blunt despatched a courier to Colonel Moonlight, commanding the Second Brigade, with an order to move at once to the assistance of Colonel Jennison at Byram's Ford. Captain Grover, with his Missouri battalion, holding a ford near the mouth of Brush Creek, on hearing the cannonading galloped to the assistance of Colonel Jennison and participated in the action at the ford and on the retreat. But as the First Brigade had commenced falling back from Byram's Ford before Colonel Moonlight received the order to reinforce it, he moved back by Westport, and two or three miles southwest of that place on the State line joined Colonel Jennison.

The two brigades now formed line of battle facing east, threw out a strong skirmish-line, and advancing, soon engaged the Confederates, who, after making slight resistance, fell back about two miles.

Shortly after Shelby's division had forced Jennison from Byram's Ford, flanking the Federal position on the right, Generals Blunt and Deitzler commenced to withdraw their forces from the line of the Big Blue and to fall back upon Kansas City. Captain Grover's Missouri battalion, which had been taking an active part in all the operations on the Big Blue, was in the evening detached as an escort to accompany Governor Carney, of Kansas, who had that day been to the front with the troops, back to Kansas City. Directly after Moonlight left his position on the Big Blue, Colonel Ford, who was formed on his left with part of the Fourth Brigade, was ordered to Westport, and reached that place about four o'clock that afternoon and formed his command a short distance north of town, with McLain's battery, covering the approaches to Kansas City from that direction.

The movement of Shelby in severing the Federal line

at Byram's Ford cut off the Kansas militia under General Grant at Hickman's Mills, and prevented them from forming a junction with General Curtis' forces north of that ford. After crossing the Big Blue General Shelby detached Gordon's regiment from Thompson's brigade to observe the movements of the Federal forces on his left in the direction of Hickman's Mills. This regiment soon became engaged with Colonel Sandy Lowe's Twenty-first Regiment Kansas Militia, which formed a part of General Grant's militia force then guarding the fords of the Big Blue below Hickman's Mills. In the first skirmish the Confederates were driven back some distance, but were soon reinforced by Jackman's brigade, when General Shelby ordered his entire force to charge the militia. In this charge the line of the militia was broken, the men thrown into some confusion, and a howitzer captured from them. The militia under Colonel Veale lost in this affair and in the pursuit by Jackman after their line was broken, thirty-six men killed, forty-three wounded, and one hundred taken prisoners. General Grant reported that the disaster was due to the bad conduct of Major Laing, Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry, who with a battalion of that regiment was a short distance in his rear and failed to support him after he was requested to do so. As he was unable to join the forces of General Curtis at and near Kansas City, General Grant retired with his command to Olathe, Kansas, that night. After the skirmish on the prairie south of Westport, Colonel Moonlight, with the Second Brigade and a regiment of Kansas militia under Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, fell back to the Shawnee Mission, a mile or so into Kansas, and encamped for the night, and Colonel Jennison with the First Brigade fell back to Westport at dark and encamped between that place and Kansas City, near Colonel Ford's command of the Fourth Brigade. The Kansas militia and the batteries of artillery were that evening ordered within the

fortified lines of Kansas City, and the early part of the night was spent in making extensive preparations for an attack early the next morning. Having during the day shown much less energy and perseverance in pushing the foe than on other occasions, Generals Curtis, Blunt, and Deitzler also moved their headquarters into the city that night. Though General Curtis was at the front all day and occupied suitable positions for directing the movements of his forces and of keeping advised of the movements of the enemy, his field batteries, some of which consisted of excellent rifled guns, did not fire a single shot at the foe, nor did his troops make a single charge to resist the Confederate advance.

General Pleasonton with his Missouri forces had that morning at ten o'clock attacked a brigade of Price's rear-guard at the Little Blue, drove it back upon Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisions at Independence, charged and routed these divisions, capturing two guns and four hundred prisoners, and before night drove them back upon the Big Blue. In the fighting during the day both sides used their artillery freely, and the booming of cannon, five to six miles distant, was certainly within hearing of General Curtis' troops nearly all the afternoon. While the Army of the Border that night was being placed behind the lines of fortified works of Kansas City, General Pleasonton's forces were rushing upon the Confederates "with a reckless fierceness," as General Clark characterized the attack, in almost impenetrable darkness, and until nearly eleven o'clock.

When it appeared certain that Price would endeavor to come to Kansas City, Colonel Kersey Coates, commanding a brigade of Missouri Enrolled Militia and Home Guards, commenced fortifying and erecting field-works south and southeast of the city so as to command the approaches from those quarters. As the Southern army continued to advance, and as the danger became more

imminent, the citizens were called out to work in the trenches, so that when the Army of the Border fell back within the fortified lines the city was in a good defensive condition. Directly after General Curtis moved his headquarters into Kansas City that evening he received information that General Pleasonton had arrived at Independence and had attacked and driven Price's forces from that place back upon the Big Blue. This information, and perhaps consciousness of the fact that his troops could hardly have been less effectively handled that day, determined General Curtis to act with greater firmness and resolution, and to order Generals Blunt and Deitzler to have their mounted forces and light batteries in motion at three o'clock the next morning, *en route* to the front to attack at daylight the enemy who were in their encampment on the prairie about two miles southeast of Westport and south of Brush Creek. That night and the next morning up to the time that he started to the front, General Curtis had an unreasonable fear that Price's army was trying to get into Kansas City, and left behind three or four thousand Kansas and Missouri militia and some of his heavy guns, mounted, under General Deitzler and Colonel Coates, to occupy the fortifications and to resist any attack of the Confederates in the event they should make a flank movement or kill or capture or disperse the force of seven or eight thousand men sent forward under General Blunt early that morning.

After General Pleasonton's forces attacked and drove Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisions from Independence, Price had no further thought of coming to Kansas City, but turned his attention to making such disposition of his troops as to secure the safety of his train. At daylight on the morning of the 23d, the First, Second, and Fourth Brigades under General Blunt marched in column through Westport south, and crossing to the south side of Brush Creek, deployed in line of battle in the timber along that

stream. In the formation of the line, Colonel Ford's Fourth Brigade occupied the extreme left, east of the road; Colonel Jennison's First Brigade, including Captain Grover's Missouri battalion, which had just come up from escort duty, the centre, on the right of the road; and Colonel Moonlight's Second Brigade the extreme right, extending nearly to the State line. A section of McLain's Colorado battery was unlimbered in the road near the left centre and soon became engaged in a hot contest with Collins' battery of rifled guns of Shelby's division. In front of Jennison there was a large field inclosed with stone and rail fences, affording an excellent shelter for his dismounted skirmishers, who were thrown forward covering his main line.

These dispositions were just completed when Shelby's division, reinforced by two brigades of Fagan's division, advanced to the attack, so that the entire Federal line immediately became engaged in a fierce conflict. General Thompson's brigade coming up, it was ordered to charge the Federal centre. His men moved forward with steadiness, but they were soon repulsed by a heavy fire from Jennison's men posted behind the stone fence. In a few moments part of Jackman's brigade made a charge to carry the Federal position, but his men, too, were driven back in confusion. The Arkansas troops coming up, they were put into action by General Shelby and ordered to charge in column up the road to take the guns of McLain's Colorado battery. This charge was led by Colonel James McGhee, of Dobbin's brigade Arkansas Cavalry, and resulted disastrously to him and his command. He was assailed on the Federal right by the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Hoyt, and in front by the Second Colorado Cavalry, supporting the section of the battery, and in the hand-to-hand conflict that took place he encountered Captain Curtis Johnson, Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry, both firing with their

revolvers near each other, he receiving a mortal wound and Captain Johnson a severe wound in the arm.

When the Confederate charging column was thrown into confusion, the Sixteenth Kansas and Second Colorado Cavalry were pushed forward in a counter-charge, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Walker of the latter regiment, in which he received a gunshot wound in the foot. In this conflict the Confederates sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded and about one hundred prisoners. After several ineffectual efforts to dislodge the Federal troops from their position, General Shelby pushed a force to occupy a thick wood on Colonel Ford's right. In gaining this position the Confederates were not only able to flank Colonel Jennison's men behind the stone fence and force them to fall back, but they were also able to open a flank fire on Colonel Ford's command and compel him to retire to the north side of Brush Creek. While the Federal left and centre under Colonels Ford and Jennison were thus engaging the Confederate forces, Colonel Moonlight's Second Brigade on the right advanced, driving Shelby's left back nearly a mile after considerable resistance. But in this movement Colonel Moonlight did not look out for his left flank, and a Confederate force coming up on that flank gave him an enfilading fire, doing some damage. He immediately ordered two companies on the left of the line to wheel to the left and return the fire. This movement had the effect of checking the enemy, and his command fell back in good order to Westport, his right flank being protected by Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Woodworth with part of the Twelfth Kansas State Militia.

The entire Federal line had now fallen back to the north side of Brush Creek, and most of it to the suburbs of Westport, to await the arrival of Colonel Blair's brigade of Kansas militia from Kansas City, which had been detained at that place until its horses were brought back

from Wyandotte, they having through mistake been sent over to that city the early part of the night. At this time General Shelby was not prepared to push the retiring Federal line, for most of his troops had so nearly expended their ammunition that he was obliged to halt on the prairie and in the edge of the timber south of Brush Creek to await a supply. To occupy the attention of the Federal forces until his troops could replenish their cartridge-boxes with ammunition, Collins' battery was ordered up to a position recently vacated by the section of McLain's Colorado battery; on opening fire one of his rifled guns burst at the first round.

On the arrival of Colonel Blair's brigade and other regiments of Kansas militia at Westport, General Curtis, who had also come to the front, rapidly re-formed his lines, brought up additional field batteries, and made preparations for a decisive movement against the foe, whose lines on the prairie south of Brush Creek could be plainly seen from the roof of the Harris House in Westport. Up to this time only a single section of the field batteries and about an equal number of mountain howitzers had been put into action on the Federal side. But now, as the Federal line was about to advance again, McLain's Colorado battery was placed in position on the brow of the hill north of Brush Creek towards the Federal left, and Captain Dodge's Ninth Wisconsin Battery, six guns, was placed a short distance to the right of McLain near the road, and both batteries opened a vigorous fire of shot and shell on the Confederate line on the high ground south of the creek. In making new dispositions of the Federal forces, Colonel Moonlight's Second Brigade was sent around on the Federal right to keep the enemy out of Kansas, which Price was anxious to visit with desolation and ruin. Colonel Blair's Third Brigade was pushed to the front, south of Westport, and, dismounting, formed on the bluff north of Brush Creek, with

Colonel Ford's Fourth Brigade on his left and Colonel Jennison's First Brigade on his right.

The Fifth and Nineteenth Regiments Kansas Militia, commanded respectively by Colonels Colton and Hogan, were dismounted to support McLain's and Dodge's batteries. General Curtis now came upon the field and ordered his entire line to advance to the attack. As the ground on the south side of the creek extending for half a mile back was covered with thick brush and unsuitable for manœuvring cavalry, his heavy skirmish-lines were dismounted to engage the enemy from the timber. On the left Colonel Ford dismounted part of the Second Colorado Cavalry and part of the Twelfth Kansas Militia to advance against the Confederate skirmishers and force them back upon their main line. After dismounting his brigade Colonel Blair pushed his men forward across the creek and through the timber and underbrush up to the north side of a field, when he came in sight of a Confederate force posted behind a stone fence on the opposite side of the field. He held his position behind a rail fence, keeping up a hot fire on the enemy for half an hour, when he was ordered to retire to the north bank of the creek. Still farther to the right Colonel Jennison's First Brigade was engaging the Confederates, and on his right Major-General Deitzler was bringing up several regiments of Kansas militia and placing them in position to coöperate in the general advance. About the time General Curtis had fairly commenced his general advance, Shelby received orders from Price to fall back and join the other divisions of the Confederate army, from which he was now cut off by Pleasonton's cavalry, which had just routed Fagan and Jackman, who were covering Shelby's rear.

Finding that his rear was completely in the possession of Pleasonton's command, Shelby cautiously withdrew from before Curtis and quickly prepared to make a desperate charge to break through the line that separated

him from the other divisions of the Southern army. Had General Curtis known the desperate situation in which the Confederates were placed, he would probably have pressed the attack with greater energy than that which characterized his movements when he first came on to the field. His information led him to overestimate the strength of the Confederate forces and perhaps made him overcautious in his movements. But he was always to the front, sharing the hardships and fatigues of the field like the humblest soldier, and his presence was an inspiration to his troops. Directly after coming on to the field, he thought that his artillery could be more effectively employed, and took Captain Dodge's battery to his right to cross to the south side of the creek to take up a position from which an enfilading fire could be opened upon the Confederate line. But thick brush and a rough road made it impracticable to get the battery into position without loss of time, and he moved to the left and ordered part of his cavalry of Jennison's and Ford's brigades to charge the Confederate line. The charge was made, the enemy gave way, and then it was soon discovered that the entire Confederate line was retreating from the field, with a heavy skirmish-line to protect the rear of the column. The dismounted troops of Ford's Fourth Brigade on the left and of Blair's Third Brigade of Kansas militia on the right continued to advance through the thickets and timber on Brush Creek until they came out upon the open prairie and into the fields south of that stream, when they were halted until their horses were brought up from the rear. They then remounted and moved forward; but meanwhile Shelby had struck Pleasonton's command, which gave him such a shaking-up that he was unable to get his men together in the semblance of organization until late that evening.

When General Curtis found that the enemy were falling back from his front he ordered up his artillery, drew in

his troops from his flanks, and commenced immediate pursuit on the road south to Little Santa Fé. He knew from the sound of artillery firing and reports made to him by signal officers and aides-de-camp that Pleasonton's forces had all the morning been engaging the Confederates on his left front, and at half-past two o'clock he overtook Pleasonton, who had halted with his staff and escort to wait for him at Indian Creek, ten miles south of Westport. They held a consultation in regard to uniting their forces for a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, and moved south to Little Santa Fé, where headquarters were made that night and near which place most of their troops encamped. At Indian Creek General Curtis issued an order relieving all that part of Kansas north of the Kansas River of the operation of martial law, and discharged the Kansas militia living north of that point, as they were anxious to return to their homes.

Major-General Deitzler, who commanded the Kansas militia in the operations described, in his official report commended the officers and men for their zeal and valor in defending their State against invasion. Colonel George W. Veale's Shawnee County Regiment suffered the heaviest loss of any of the Kansas militia in the operations on the Big Blue and about Westport. General Deitzler warmly praised the gallantry of the members of his staff, particularly Lieutenant-Colonel John J. Ingalls, his Judge-Advocate General, who bore himself with conspicuous bravery on every part of the field where duty called him. The militia from Southern Kansas continued to operate with the volunteer forces of General Curtis until the invading army passed beyond the limit of threatened danger to the State, and then they, too, were disbanded. Having shared with the volunteer forces the dangers and hardships of the campaign, they returned to their homes conscious of having rendered material assistance in preventing the enemy from desolating their State.



## CHAPTER XXXII.

### BATTLES OF MINE CREEK AND LITTLE OSAGE.

WHEN the Federal forces of Missouri and Kansas united at Indian Creek, General Curtis, being the senior officer present, assumed command and directed their further movements, designating General Pleasonton's command as the Second Division, Army of the Border. The two divisions were ordered to march at four o'clock the next morning in pursuit of Price, the First Division under General Blunt to take the advance. Colonel Moonlight with the Second Brigade was ordered to march south through Kansas and to keep on the right flank of Price near the State line to prevent his marauding detachments from entering the State to pillage, plunder, and destroy the property of the citizens. After the defeat and rout of every division of his army on the Big Blue and south of Westport, General Price retreated rapidly south, almost in a reckless flight, encamping for a few hours late that night on the Middle Fork of Grand River between Pleasant Hill and the State line to feed and rest and await the arrival of his rearmost troops. The Federal forces failing to follow up their advantage, marching only three or four miles to Little Santa Fé after three o'clock that day, the march of the Confederate army the next day was orderly and undisturbed, so that the different divisions went into camp that night on the Marais des Cygnes near the village of Tradingpost, in Kansas. All day long the 24th, the

troops of Curtis and Pleasonton marched steadily forward on the trail of Price's retreating army, and at eight o'clock that night, at Westpoint, Pleasonton's division was given the advance, with instructions to keep in motion until the Confederate pickets were encountered and driven in. On this night march General Sanborn's brigade led the advance, and shortly before ten o'clock came upon the Confederate pickets north of Tradingpost near the Marais des Cygnes River. It was then very dark and raining hard. Here General Sanborn ordered Colonel Gravely, of the Eighth Missouri State Militia, to take his own regiment and the Sixth Missouri State Militia and move forward cautiously until he found the enemy in force. The Colonel soon found the Confederate army encamped at Tradingpost on the Marais des Cygnes, sent a message back to General Sanborn of the fact, and halted his command until three o'clock in the morning of the 25th for further instructions.

A short distance north of the Marais des Cygnes at Tradingpost, the old military road to Fort Scott on which the army was moving passed through a gap between two high mounds, each perhaps somewhat over half a mile in length. In the reconnaissance made by Colonel Gravely he found that the Confederates occupied the sides and summits of the mounds and the gap between them, and were disposed to dispute the approaches. He skirmished with the enemy until towards daybreak, when, with the assistance of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry under Major A. R. Pierce, which had been directed to report to him, he was ordered by General Sanborn to advance and drive the Confederates from the mounds in his front and take possession of their summits and the gap between them. The possession of the mound on the right of the road was secured by the Fourth Iowa without much fighting; but the one on the left of the road was defended by a line of Confederates formed along its crest

nearly its entire length who were not disposed to yield without a severe struggle. To carry this position the Sixth and Eighth Regiments Missouri Militia were dismounted. Though it was still quite dark, they advanced steadily and soon commenced to ascend the mound, which was so steep that it was with difficulty they could keep their footing. In a few moments more the loud cheers of the ascending line of troops, followed by several sharp volleys from their carbines, announced that they had gained the heights and that the enemy had been driven in rapid flight down the southern slope of the mound towards the river. To aid in making the attack effective, the batteries of Captains Montgomery and Thurber, Second Missouri Light Artillery, were ordered up, and by elevating their guns to a sufficient angle they were able to sweep the west end of the mound and the gap with a storm of shot and shell.

At early dawn and just as Sanborn had driven the enemy from the mounds to the south side of the river, General Pleasonton came to the front and directed the further movements of his division. He directed General Sanborn with his brigade to immediately force a crossing of the stream, which the Confederates were holding with a strong force and endeavoring to obstruct by felling trees across the road at its exit from the ford. General Sanborn dismounted Major Mitchell's battalion Seventh Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, as skirmishers to advance on his right, cross the river about a quarter of a mile above the ford, move down on the south side, and drive the Confederates from the brush and timber.

On the left of Major Mitchell, the Sixth Provisional Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia under Colonel McMahan was also deployed as skirmishers, and assisted in driving the Confederates from their position along the south side of the river bank. After some supporting movements, Colonel Phelps, with the Second Arkansas

Cavalry, was directed to take the advance and cross the river at the main ford, which he did, passing the obstructions on the south side in the face of a heavy fire of musketry from the Confederates formed in line a short distance in his front. He was supported in this charge by the Sixth and Eighth Regiments Missouri State Militia, dismounted, the Fourth Iowa Cavalry of the Fourth Brigade, and three companies of the Second Colorado Cavalry which had come to the front that morning from General Blunt's division in the rear. On being driven from the timber along the river bottom, the Confederates formed line on the prairie about half a mile south of the ford, supported by a section of artillery. As soon as he reached the open ground south of the ford, Colonel Phelps fronted his brigade into line, and advancing, charged the Confederate line of skirmishers and drove them back upon their main line, from which the section of artillery opened fire upon him. The other regiments of the Third Brigade, having been dismounted to force the passage of the river and to clear the brush and timber of the enemy, were unable to keep up with his rapid movement, and he was obliged to fall back upon their line when he found himself unsupported by other mounted troops. At the moment of the charge General Sanborn had returned to the ford to bring up artillery and other troops. General Pleasonton was there, superintending the removal of obstructions, getting his troops and artillery over, and pushing them to the front as rapidly as possible.

General Sanborn had just returned to the front with a section of artillery, had opened fire upon the enemy, and was mounting the regiments of his brigade, when Colonel Philips with the First Brigade came forward at a gallop and advanced against the Confederate left. He was soon followed by Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen with the Fourth Brigade at a gallop, who bore to his left. By this time General Sanborn had mounted his brigade, and

bearing still farther to the Federal left, advanced against the Confederate right. But before these three brigades, which were advancing in columns of squadrons and of regiments, deployed in line of battle, General Marmaduke, who was in command of the Confederate rear that day, withdrew his line and fell back. From the Marais des Cygnes to Mine Creek, a distance of four miles, the road passed over a broad, smooth prairie and a few undulating ridges. As it did not seem likely that the Confederates would make another stand immediately, General Sanborn's brigade was permitted to drop to the rear to rest and feed for a few moments. His regiments had been on duty all night in the rain and all the morning up to ten o'clock, fighting and skirmishing, and as his men and horses had been without anything to eat, their powers of endurance were put to the severest test. Meanwhile Philips' brigade, followed by Benteen's brigade, kept up the pursuit over the broad prairie at a trot and a gallop and forced Marmaduke's and Fagan's divisions into line of battle about one hundred yards north of Mine Creek. This small stream, with precipitous banks and lightly wooded, had no good wagon fords in the immediate vicinity of the main crossing, which was now blocked by the Confederate train, which had been brought to a halt by some accident.

On being informed that Marmaduke was closely pressed, General Fagan halted his division to support him, and placed in position all the artillery of Price's army, except the three guns of Shelby's division, to check the Federal advance. In the rapid pursuit over the prairie, Philips' advance regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear, First Missouri State Militia, had kept so close upon Marmaduke—within five or six hundred yards of his line—that when he was brought to a halt by the train obstructing the road at the crossing of the creek he was obliged to make the most hurried dispositions for battle. In his hasty con-

sultation with Generals Fagan, Clark, and Cabell, it was decided that the situation was so critical that it would be unsafe to attempt to dismount their troops and send their horses to the rear so as to make the fight on foot. Many of their troops were armed with infantry rifles, which, after being once discharged, could not easily be reloaded on horseback, and were therefore very ineffective in a cavalry fight. In coming upon the field Colonel Philips deployed the regiments of his brigade in line at a gallop, placing Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear with the First Missouri State Militia on his left, Lieutenant-Colonel Crittenden with the Seventh Missouri State Militia in the centre, and Major Kelley with the Fourth Missouri State Militia on his right. He saw at once from the high ground of his position overlooking the valley of Mine Creek two divisions of the Confederate army drawn up in line of battle in his immediate front, supported by eight guns, and most of the Confederate train south of the creek was plainly seen making desperate efforts to get away. He sent an aid to General Pleasonton to lay before him the situation and to request immediate assistance. As the long lines of Marmaduke and Fagan threatened to flank him on the right and left, he was obliged to extend his line to the right. The Confederate batteries had commenced to play upon his position and he saw that the Confederate officers were preparing to charge him by advancing in double columns. He knew that it was of the utmost importance to strike the Confederates before they commenced to advance, and at the moment of his supreme anxiety he was delighted to see Colonel Benteen's brigade coming up on his left. Lieutenant Smiley, with a section of Captain Montgomery's battery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, having been sent forward by Colonel Cole, came up at a gallop, and unlimbering, went into action, using double charges of canister within easy range.

As soon as the advance regiment of the Fourth Brigade

aligned with the left of the First Brigade, Colonel Philips ordered the charge and then the two brigades were quickly hurled against the Confederate line with such terrific energy that it almost instantly gave way in the wildest confusion. The giving way of the Confederate lines was immediately followed by the triumphant shouts of the Federal soldiers that rose above the clamor of the conflict. A large number of Confederate soldiers, consisting of several regiments, who were armed with long infantry guns, on discharging them wheeled their horses and turned to flight, and running over broke the lines formed in their rear. In another moment the troops of the charging columns, drawing their sabres and revolvers, were bearing down upon and mingling with this demoralized and panic-stricken mass of the enemy, cutting and shooting them down and making fearful havoc. Confederate officers rode hurriedly to and fro making every effort to rally their men, to check the swelling tide of disaster; but all their appeals and threats were ineffectual, for Philips' brigade sweeping over the field broke their left and centre, cutting off and capturing Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, several colonels, a number of line officers, upwards of four hundred enlisted men, four pieces of artillery, and one battle flag, besides killing and wounding a large number of men in the general fight that took place.

Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen's brigade swept forward on the Federal left with almost equal success, breaking the Confederate right and capturing four pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners, including several colonels and line officers, and two stands of colors. Without stopping to look after the prisoners and captured artillery, a part each of the First and Fourth Brigades crossed to the south side of the creek and took up the pursuit of the broken and demoralized Confederate troops, who in reckless flight were endeavoring to escape from

the scene of their disaster. In this pursuit the Federal soldiers used their revolvers and sabres freely, increasing the consternation among the Confederates and causing them to throw away their arms and equipments and everything that impeded their flight. Colonel Colton Greene, commanding a brigade in Marmaduke's division, reported that over two thirds of his men threw away or lost their arms in this disastrous rout.

General Price, who was riding in his carriage in the rear of Shelby's division several miles in advance and in front of his train, on receiving a note from General Marmaduke that the Federal troops were advancing in force, mounted his white horse and rode towards his rear until he met the men of Marmaduke's and Fagan's divisions—all who had escaped from the scene of the recent disaster—retreating in the wildest confusion. With some of his officers he endeavored to rally them; but all his efforts in that direction were ineffective, for in their mad flight they paid very little attention to entreaties or commands.

After making some details to take charge of the prisoners and captured artillery on the field, General Pleasonton pushed forward Philips' and Benteen's brigades in pursuit of the enemy, and sent his aids back to bring up the Second and Third Brigades of his division. General Sanborn, who had halted his brigade to rest and feed behind a ridge in the prairie about a mile from the battle-field, on hearing the roar of the artillery and small-arms immediately mounted his command without waiting for orders and rode to the front at a gallop, arriving there just as the fight was over. He then pushed forward, and about three miles south of Mine Creek relieved Philips' First Brigade of the advance. His line of march was now over a wide expanse of prairie to the timber skirting the valley of the Little Osage River, a distance of eight miles. In passing over this prairie his advance was almost constantly in sight of the Confederates of the two broken

divisions and he twice formed his brigade in line to engage them, but they showed no disposition to make a stand. On approaching the Little Osage, he came in sight of part of Shelby's division under General Thompson and Colonel Slayback drawn up in line of battle to cover the retreat of the demoralized troops of Marmaduke's and Fagan's divisions. He at once threw his brigade into line and commenced to advance, when Shelby withdrew his troops to the timber along the Little Osage without making a fight. The Federal line, however, continued to advance, and when nearing the timber General Sanborn received the order to charge, which his troops received with eagerness and pushed forward, driving the Confederates from the brush and timber and across the stream to a ridge a mile beyond, when he halted to reform his line. Here General Pleasonton succeeded in getting General McNeil's Second Brigade to the front, about two o'clock, with instructions to form on the left of Sanborn. His First and Fourth Brigades were closed up to support his advance line, and he now had his entire division on the field under his immediate direction.

General Shelby had taken up a strong position, formed his troops in three lines, part of them being protected behind the fences of a cornfield, and he was determined to make a desperate struggle before yielding. His division up to this time in the campaign had fought the Federal forces more successfully than the other divisions of Price's army, giving it a prestige that enabled him to hold his men under fire with great steadiness. There was skirmishing between the opposing forces for perhaps half an hour before General Pleasonton ordered his troops to the charge.

McNeil's brigade had been brought forward at a gallop for ten miles, and on reaching the front his command was much scattered and the horses of many of his men so nearly exhausted that it was with difficulty they could be

moved to a trot. The horses of Sanborn's brigade were also much worn out, having been on duty all night and all day and having been frequently urged to the gallop in advancing or taking position in line. As soon as the rearmost regiment of McNeil's brigade had closed up and Colonel Cole had brought forward the artillery of the division, General Pleasonton ordered the Second and Third Brigades to advance to the attack. Colonel Eppstein, with the Fifth Missouri State Militia dismounted, charged through the cornfield, driving the Confederates before him, while the other regiments of the Second Brigade charged mounted to his right around the field, forcing the Confederates from their position in that quarter. Still farther on the Federal right the regiments of Sanborn's brigade were charging and driving the enemy before them with steadiness and courage. In the pursuit of the next four miles over the prairie there were a succession of charges made by the regiments of McNeil's and Sanborn's brigades whenever the Confederates attempted to make a stand.

About eight miles north of Fort Scott Sanborn's brigade halted for a short rest, the horses of his command being so nearly exhausted that they could not be urged to move out of a walk. They had had only a few hours' rest and very little feed since the brigade encamped at Little Santa Fé, eighty miles in the rear, on the night of the 23d. General McNeil, with the Second Brigade, continued the pursuit, and was soon joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen with the Fourth Brigade, when they advanced, and in a short time came upon Price's entire army on Shiloh Creek about six miles northeast of Fort Scott. At this place Generals Fagan and Clark had rallied the troops of the routed divisions and formed them, including those who had thrown away their arms in their flight, with the other troops of Price's army, who were drawn up in quadruple line of battle, making an im-

posing appearance by their immense numbers. Shelby's division formed the front line of this great display of force—the only troops to be depended upon in making the fight, except perhaps Tyler's brigade of recruits, who had not yet been much demoralized in the operations of the day. Colonel Cole, Chief of Artillery, brought up the batteries of the division as rapidly as his worn-out horses could be urged forward, and placing his guns in position, commenced shelling the great masses of the enemy directly in his front. His batteries expended in this and in the other actions of the day 220 rounds of shell and canister. In making this last attack General Pleasonton ordered McNeil to form the Second and Fourth Brigades into double line of battle and advance and charge the enemy. The charge was made, but it was made at a walk, for it was impossible to urge the horses forward at a more rapid gait, they were so much worn out by the exertions of the day and the continuous hard service of the campaign. In their steady advance the two brigades soon encountered Shelby's division, when a fierce conflict took place in which the Confederates were driven back a short distance.

Shelby then brought to his front line other brigades of his division, and with the rallied troops of the routed divisions the Confederate line was extended, threatening to outflank McNeil. At this moment Colonel Cole turned the rifled guns of his batteries on the Confederate flanks, using shell and canister, and drove them back in confusion. He then concentrated the fire of his ten guns on the Confederate centre and soon broke that part of Price's line, and at sundown the Southern forces moved off in rapid retreat to the crossing of the Marmiton River ten miles east of Fort Scott. In this fight the three remaining guns of Price's army were not brought into action, so that Colonel Cole was able to use all the guns of his batteries in sweeping the Confederate lines with shell and canister on every part of the field where he found them

most dense and accessible. It appears that the entire Southern army now became seized with panic, losing all regimental and brigade organization. The Confederate train had been sent on to the Marmiton River under heavy escort while the fight was going on. It was near midnight when the last of the Confederate troops crossed that stream. A halt of an hour or so was made to close up the demoralized troops, destroy the train, and blow up the artillery ammunition of the lost guns, when the retreat was commenced and continued without interruption to Carthage, a distance of sixty miles. Shortly after midnight the loud explosions from the blowing up of the Confederate ammunition train were distinctly heard at Fort Scott.

From the Marmiton River, where Price ordered his train burned, back to Mine Creek, a distance of upwards of twenty miles, the route over which the Confederate army retreated was strewn with arms, equipments, abandoned wagons and teams, and the débris of a routed army. In all the operations of the day, General Pleasonton had displayed energy and good judgment, and when night came he could view with satisfaction what he had accomplished. At dark he took Philips' First Brigade and Sanborn's Third Brigade and his artillery and marched into Fort Scott to obtain rations for his men and feed for his horses, of which they were in great need, leaving the Second and Fourth Brigades under General McNeil to bivouac on the field. On leaving the field he saw the advance of the Kansas troops under General Curtis coming in sight and he was soon overtaken by General Curtis, who protested against taking his troops to Fort Scott for supplies. General Curtis expressed some anxiety about leaving General McNeil with two brigades to bivouac on the field; but the Kansas troops under the immediate command of General Blunt coming up, they, too, bore to the right and moved into Fort Scott for

supplies, thereby losing a golden opportunity of securing laurels which might have been easily won. These troops having rested all night and a good part of the day and coming up fresh were in good condition to continue the pursuit of the enemy then scarcely out of sight. Had General Curtis led his troops in a night attack on the Confederate forces, supported by the two brigades under McNeil, he might have secured Price's train before it was destroyed, and captured most of his men. On this day he did not display his usual energy and good judgment in handling his troops; nor were all his actions consistent.

When General Sanborn, who was commanding the advance, came up within shelling distance of Price's encampment on the Marais des Cygnes about midnight and reported the fact, General Curtis sent an aid to him ordering him to open fire with his batteries at once on the Confederate camp. It was intensely dark and raining, and as he knew nothing about the topographical features of the locality, Sanborn declined to take the responsibility of making the attack until towards daybreak. Had it not been for his good judgment in declining to take the responsibility of making the attack as directed, Price's army would unquestionably have got away without disaster, for he certainly would have retreated in great haste had the heavy field batteries of Pleasonton opened upon his camp at that time of the night. It was the purpose of General Curtis thus to keep Price moving south by firing artillery in his rear, but General Pleasonton proposed to overtake the Confederate army and crush it. After Pleasonton had been busy all day in destroying Price's army and capturing his generals and troops and artillery and trains, General Curtis suddenly became seized with a desire to complete the destruction of the enemy, but did not propose to do it with his own troops. He weakened his effective force by sending one of his veteran brigades off on a flank movement to keep Price's foraging

detachments out of Kansas, when his numerous Kansas militia regiments would have been ample for that purpose. He permitted some of his numerous aids to embarrass the operations of Pleasonton's troops by their officious and offensive bearing in giving and countermanding orders in his name instead of devoting their energies to bringing his own troops on to the field. Indeed General Pleasonton was obliged to arrest at least one of these officious aids, Colonel Ritchie.

While Pleasonton was at the front fighting Price from daybreak until dark, General Curtis came up and ordered his own provost-marshal to take charge of the prisoners, captured artillery, and property, and when he got to Fort Scott that night directed that these trophies of the campaign be sent to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He thus proposed to deprive the Missouri troops of their justly won trophies and to bestow them upon the Kansas troops, who were not entitled to them, nor to the prestige such an act would tend to give, by being bruited to the world. Even before the prisoners and captured artillery arrived at Fort Scott, Major Suess and Captain Yates of General Pleasonton's staff claimed them from General Curtis' provost-marshal as trophies of the Missouri troops, and on his refusal to give them up hot words passed between the staff-officers of the two generals about the matter. Of course when General Pleasonton saw that it was proposed to take his hard-earned trophies from him and not permit him to convey them back into his own Department, he was greatly angered and declined to take further part in the campaign by his presence at the front; but ordered nearly three brigades of his command to report to General Curtis to continue the pursuit of Price's demoralized army. Colonel Philips, being disabled by having received a serious injury in his right eye in the charge at Mine Creek, either from an exploded cap near him or from a sliver from a flying missile, was taken to the hotel at Fort Scott the night of the arrival of part of General

Pleasonton's command at that place, and suffered intense agony all night. Though suffering from his wound, as soon as two regiments of his brigade were furnished with subsistence and his horses' shoes reset, which occupied about six hours, he resumed the pursuit south after Price's fleeing army, travelling himself in an ambulance. The morning of the second day of this march he received a countermanding order from General Pleasonton, and returned with his command to the military post at Warrensburg, Missouri. In recognition of his gallantry in the campaign he was soon afterwards placed in command of the Central District of Missouri, by order of General Rosecrans, commanding the Department.

After seeing his detached brigades supplied with subsistence and forage, and resting a day at Fort Scott, General Pleasonton, with part of Philips' brigade, took the prisoners and captured artillery and marched to Warrensburg, arriving at that place on the last day of October. It was hardly generous of General Curtis and his friends to censure General Pleasonton for withdrawing from the campaign at that point, in view of the fact that two splendid opportunities were given Curtis that day to place his troops in positions where they might have won glorious results. They were not so far in the rear when the fight opened at the Marais des Cygnes but what they could have been brought up on the right flank of the enemy, and after the battle of Mine Creek they might have cut off and captured the routed troops of Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisions who were escaping from the field. The country was open prairie, the streams were easily forded by mounted troops, and the Kansas forces could have marched on a road parallel with Pleasonton's command and coöperated with it at any point in the operations of that day.

At Fort Scott Captain Grover was ordered by General Pleasonton to return with his battalion of Missouri cavalry to Warrensburg, Missouri. The Captain marched back

to his station *via* Hickman's Mills and Pleasant Hill. Near this latter place he ran into and engaged in a sharp skirmish part of Quantrill's bandits, who had attacked a company of the Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry under Captain M. W. Foster, who was escorting Governor W. P. Hall, of Missouri, to Warrensburg. The Governor had been with the army under Rosecrans operating against Price and was returning to Warrensburg when attacked. Captain Grover came up just in time to save the Governor and his escort from possible disaster, and joined in the chase of the bandits until late that night.

LIST OF CASUALTIES IN GENERAL PLEASONTON'S CAVALRY DIVISION DURING THE PRICE RAID IN OCTOBER, 1864.

Command.	Killed.		Wound-ed.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
<i>First Brigade, Col. J. F. Philips, Commanding.</i>							
First Missouri State Militia, Lieut.-Col. B. F. Lazeer, commanding...	1	10	1	42		1	55
Fourth Missouri State Militia, Maj. G. W. Kelley, commanding .....	2	8	3	47		2	62
Seventh Missouri State Militia, Lieut.-Col. T. T. Crittenden, commanding.	2	3	4	17			26
Total .....	5	21	8	106		3	143
<i>Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John McNeil, Commanding.</i>							
Second Missouri Cavalry, Capt. Geo. M. Houston, commanding.....				5	19		24
Third Missouri State Militia, Lieut.-Col. H. M. Matthews, commanding.	2	21				6	29
Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry, Col. E. C. Catherwood, commanding .....		2	4	17		2	25
Ninth Missouri State Militia, Lieut.-Col. D. M. Draper, commanding..		1					1
Fifth Missouri State Militia, Lieut.-Col. J. A. Eppstein, commanding..		4		5		4	13
Seventh Kansas Cavalry, Maj. F. M. Malone, commanding.....				1			1
Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, Col. John L. Beveridge, commanding..				2			2
Total .....	2	28	4	30		31	95

Command.	Killed.		Wound-ed.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
<i>Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John B. Sanborn, Commanding.</i>							
Sixth Missouri State Militia, Maj. William Plumb, commanding.....	I	7	I	15			24
Eighth Missouri State Militia, Col. J. Gravely, commanding.....		2	2	25			29
Sixth Provisional Missouri State Militia, Col. John F. McMahon, commanding .....		5		29			34
Seventh Provisional Missouri State Militia, Maj. W. B. Mitchell, commanding .....	I	I		2			4
Second Arkansas Cavalry, Col. John E. Phelps, commanding.....		I		II			13
Total.....	2	16	3	82			103
<i>Fourth Brigade, Col. E. F. Winslow, Commanding.</i>							
Fourth Missouri Cavalry, Capt. Chas. P. Knispel, commanding.....		7	I	10			18
Tenth Missouri Cavalry, Lieut.-Col. F. W. Benteen, commanding.....		I	I	18		I	21
Third Iowa Cavalry, Maj. B. S. Jones, commanding.....		3		42			45
Fourth Iowa Cavalry, Maj. A. R. Pierce, commanding.....	I	3		6		2	12
Seventh Indiana Cavalry, Maj. S. E. W. Simonson, commanding.....				6			6
Total.....	I	14	2	82		3	102

## RECAPITULATION.

First Brigade, Col. J. F. Philips.....	5	21	8	106	.....	3	143
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John Mc-Neil.....	2	28	4	30	.....	31	95
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John B. Sanborn.....	2	16	3	82	.....		103
Fourth Brigade, Col. E. F. Winslow.....	I	14	2	82	.....	3	102
Grand total casualties.....	10	79	17	300	.....	37	443



## CHAPTER XXXIII.

### BATTLE OF NEWTONIA—SIEGE OF FAYETTEVILLE RAISED—CONCLUSION OF THE PRICE RAID.

THE gallant conduct of the Missouri forces under Pleasonton in engaging Price's army in close conflict every opportunity and in capturing from it in the last four days eleven pieces of artillery, two generals, and nearly two thousand prisoners, appears to have impressed General Curtis that he would have to adopt a more vigorous policy to secure any substantial honors for his own troops in the campaign now drawing to a close. And yet his policy was lacking of that vigor which would likely secure any decisive results. His troops had marched one hundred miles without engaging the enemy, and he permitted them to remain in Fort Scott all night and until noon the next day before commencing the pursuit, by which time Price's army had got from thirty to forty miles the start of him. There was no necessity for his command to halt to draw ammunition, for it had expended none since leaving Westport. But leaving Fort Scott on the 26th, with the First, Second, and Fourth Brigades of his command under General Blunt, he marched about twenty miles in a southeast direction and encamped on the south side of Big Dry Wood, in Vernon County, Missouri, having at that point struck the trail of Price's army. He was followed in the further pursuit by the brigades of McNeil, Sanborn, and Benteen of Pleasonton.

ton's division as rapidly as their horses could be urged forward. After making his extraordinary march from the Marmiton to Carthage, on Spring River, and no Federal forces appearing in his rear, General Price halted his army to give his troops a night's rest. He then continued the retreat south by easy marches, and passing through Newtonia about noon on the 28th, encamped in the timber three miles south of that place. Before all the troops of his rear-guard had crossed Shoal Creek north of Granby, they were overtaken by General Curtis' advance under Colonel Ford, Second Colorado Cavalry, and rapidly driven in upon Shelby's division, which had just gone into camp in the edge of the timber south of Newtonia in the rear of the other divisions of the Southern army. Having rested and passed two days and nights without being disturbed by the Federal forces after the headlong flight from Mine Creek and Marmiton River, the morale of the Confederate troops had considerably improved when the advance of General Curtis appeared on the prairie northwest of Newtonia. But as they had destroyed and abandoned most of their train, with the camp equipage, cooking utensils, and supplies and plunder with which it was loaded, and as they had taken no time the last two days to collect subsistence from the desolate section over which they had rapidly retreated, many of them were suffering from the pangs of hunger.

The loyal militia stationed at Neosho and Newtonia that year had given the citizens the best possible protection, so that those who had returned to their homes raised fairly good crops in that section. It was therefore Price's intention to stop a day or two near Newtonia to collect supplies for his army from these loyal citizens who were struggling so hard to reestablish themselves in their homes. When General Sanborn collected his forces in Southwest Missouri at Springfield in September, to

March to Rolla and Jefferson City, he left two companies of the Eighth Missouri State Militia under Major Milton Burch at Neosho, and two companies of the Seventh Provisional Militia under Captain J. M. Ritchey at Newtonia, to operate against the Southern bandits in the absence of the troops withdrawn from the district. These officers kept themselves advised of the movements of the Confederate army, and when informed that it was rapidly retreating down the Border, sent out their scouts to watch all the approaches from the north. When their scouts returned and reported the rapid advance of the enemy, they had just barely time to evacuate their posts without loss of men or property and retire in the direction of Springfield. A part of General Thompson's brigade endeavored to intercept and cut them off, and in the skirmish that took place in the edge of the timber east of Newtonia, Lieutenant R. H. Christian and one enlisted man of Captain Ritchey's company were killed.

On driving in the Confederate rear-guard through Granby and the prairie northwest of Newtonia, General Blunt, who was at the front, ordered Colonel Ford to form the Second Colorado and Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry of his brigade in line on the high ridge northwest of the village, and as soon as the two sections of Captain McLain's Colorado battery came up commenced shelling the Confederate position in the edge of the timber about a mile south. As soon as he saw the Fifteenth Kansas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hoyt, and a detachment of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, under Lieutenant J. B. Pond, coming up at a gallop, he led Colonel Ford's two regiments in a charge across the prairie with skirmish-line deployed, under cover of the fire of his battery, up to within musket-range of Shelby's position behind a fence on the south side of a field.

To meet the Federal attack, General Shelby dismounted the troops of his division, with Jackman's bri-

gade on his right and Thompson's brigade and Slayback's command on his left, and a mounted force to watch each of his flanks. He then brought up two guns of Collins' battery and opened fire on the advancing Federal troops, when the roar of artillery and small-arms announced that the opposing forces had joined in fierce conflict. Jennison's First Brigade coming up, formed on the right of Colonel Ford, both commands taking position behind the fence on the north side of the field, which they held for some time under a hot fire. But they were finally obliged to fall back from this position about a mile under a heavy fire from the Confederates, who advanced through the field and into the prairie on the north side of it until they were checked by the rapid discharges of canister from the Colorado battery.

With his superior numbers General Shelby commenced at once to press his advantage by pushing forward his dismounted troops in his centre and his cavalry on his flanks, a movement which so seriously threatened the safety of the Colorado battery that it was ordered to fall back. As his command was dismounted, except some cavalry on his flanks, he could not effectively charge Blunt's mounted troops, and was obliged to content himself with steadily driving them back as far as seemed desirable. The situation was by no means encouraging to General Blunt. His line was gradually retiring, his battery in danger of capture, and stragglers from his command were moving to the rear. Were the recent successes at Mine Creek and Little Osage to be followed so soon by disaster by his rashness? He not only had another brigade of his own division with which he could have made the attack, but the three brigades of Pleasonton's division, now under the orders of General Curtis, could have been brought up to his support. His act of rushing ahead with two small brigades of less than two regiments in numbers to attack the Confederate army

after it had rested and to some extent reorganized would hardly have been excusable in a captain commanding a company, much less in a major-general commanding a division. He knew that morning that Price's army was in his immediate front, and yet he allowed his Second Brigade to halt and feed ten to fifteen miles from the scene of conflict, with the three brigades of Pleasonton's division still in the rear and unable to make a rapid march to the front in consequence of their horses being so badly worn out by the hard service of the campaign. But shortly before sundown most welcome assistance came up to his support. General Sanborn, with his brigade of four regiments of Missouri State Militia and the Second Arkansas Cavalry, left Fort Scott the morning of the 27th, and after one short halt to feed and rest made the march to Newtonia, a distance of ninety-five miles, in a day and a half, and reporting to General Blunt, immediately went into action on the Federal left.

As the horses of his brigade were in no condition to execute any rapid movements, and as the Confederates occupied fields in his front which were inclosed and intersected with stone and rail fences, he dismounted the regiments of his command and ordered them forward to drive the enemy from the fields. He also ordered into action the section of Captain Montgomery's battery, Second Missouri Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Smiley, which he brought along, and it fired twenty-two rounds of shell and canister into the Confederate line with good effect. The steady advance of his dismounted troops soon brought them within range of the enemy, and after two or three volleys the cheers that went up from his line announced that the Confederates were leaving the field and retreating. He pursued the retiring foe about three miles into the timber, when darkness and the exhaustion of his men suspended further operations. His brigade remained at the extreme front until nine

o'clock that night, when he received orders to return to Newtonia, where there was plenty of water and some forage, and where the other brigades, under General Curtis, which had not participated in the fight, had arrived and gone into camp.

Leaving a regiment near the scene of the conflict to watch the movements of the Federal forces, General Shelby that night at twelve o'clock retired with his division in the rear of Price's army, on the road to Pineville. Had General Curtis not stopped—stopped to feed the horses of a part of his command a few hours after breaking camp at Carthage—he could have put four of his brigades into action at Newtonia by the middle of the afternoon, and by the time they got fairly to work the brigades of Sanborn and Benteen could have been brought up to support him. After the troops of his Department had marched two hundred miles down the Border, a small fraction of them pushed forward and engaged the enemy, but with such ill-conceived judgment that they were soon driven from the field and would certainly have suffered disaster had it not been for the timely arrival of Sanborn's brigade.

On driving the Confederates from the field and pursuing them until dark, General Curtis returned to Newtonia to rest until morning, when he proposed to renew the pursuit vigorously with the hope of being able to destroy Price's demoralized army. To his great disappointment a messenger arrived from Fort Scott during the night with a despatch from General Pleasonton, notifying him that General Rosecrans had ordered Generals Sanborn and McNeil to return with their troops to the headquarters of their respective districts at Springfield and Rolla. On the withdrawal of these troops from the pursuit the next morning, General Curtis was obliged to give up the chase, and marched to Neosho, twelve miles, on his return to Kansas. His unfortunate determination

to keep the trophies captured by Pleasonton's division at Mine Creek in the Department of Kansas produced such a feeling of resentment among officers commanding Missouri troops that they did not desire to serve under him any longer than was absolutely necessary to drive Price's forces out of the State. They very naturally held that if they coöperated with his command in the further prosecution of the campaign and captured other trophies, they would not be allowed to take them back to their own Department. Of course those who had no interest in the question as to the disposition of the trophies won in the campaign would like to have seen the united forces of the two Departments harmoniously coöperating for the capture or complete destruction of the Confederate army, then rapidly disintegrating from the severe blows which had been given it.

A few more days would have determined whether General Curtis was to achieve any important results. Even if he did nothing more than keep Price moving, this would have had the effect of driving the Confederate forces into a region where it was impossible to obtain sufficient supplies for themselves and their animals. Before leaving Newtonia on the 29th, he sent a despatch over to Cassville, twenty-five miles distant, the nearest telegraph station, to be telegraphed to General Halleck, Washington, stating that he was obliged to abandon the pursuit of Price on account of the Missouri troops having been ordered to return to their respective stations. General Halleck had already telegraphed him and General Rosecrans that General Grant desired that Price be pursued to the Arkansas River, or until he encountered the forces of Steele or Reynolds, the despatch reaching General Curtis at Neosho that night. He took a very liberal view of the meaning of the despatch and got up in the middle of the night and issued orders and sent them out by his couriers to overtake the commanding officers of

Rosecrans' troops, directing them to report to him immediately at Cassville.

The messengers, however, did not overtake Sanborn and McNeil until they arrived near Springfield, and in the meantime General Sanborn received a telegraphic order from General Rosecrans placing him in command of the troops of the Department of Missouri in Southwest Missouri, with instructions to pursue Price to the Arkansas River. These instructions of course made Sanborn's command independent of Curtis. Benteen's brigade of Sanborn's command, which had halted a day in the vicinity of Newtonia to rest, joined Curtis at once and was permitted to remain with him to the close of the campaign. After a loss of nearly two days' time, instead of following directly on Price's trail by way of Pineville, General Curtis returned from Neosho to Newtonia and then deflected his march still farther to the southeast by way of Cassville and Cross Hollows, thereby losing upwards of sixty miles before he could again strike the trail of the Southern army. When he struck the Springfield and Fayetteville road he moved forward by easy marches, expecting the troops of the Department of the Missouri under General Sanborn to overtake him, and on the night of November 3d encamped at Cross Hollows, in Arkansas. That night he received a despatch from Colonel M. La Rue Harrison, First Arkansas Union Cavalry, commanding the post of Fayetteville, that he was besieged by Colonel Brooks' Confederate command and Fagan's division of Price's army, with two pieces of artillery, and was in great need of reinforcements. During the past month, while Price's army was moving through Missouri, the Southern partisan bands had become more numerous and bold in Northwestern Arkansas and gave Colonel Harrison a good deal of trouble by their frequent efforts to interrupt his communication with Springfield and Fort Smith. They cut and destroyed the telegraph line be-

tween his post and those places, attacked his foraging parties, and it was with much difficulty that he was able to get his supply trains through from Cassville.

When it became known that Price's army was rapidly retreating south from the Missouri River, Colonel Brooks collected all the Southern partisan bands in Northwestern Arkansas, to the number of about twelve hundred men, to attack Fayetteville. He first invested the place on the 26th of October, and on the morning of the 28th attacked the outworks with his main force from East Mountain, a little later sending Major Brown with about six hundred men to make an attack from the west side. These attacks were repulsed by noon, and Brooks and Brown retreated out of sight, leaving their killed and wounded on the ground. In the spring of 1863 fortifications of considerable strength were erected by the Federal troops at Fayetteville, and by some additional work on them Colonel Harrison soon had the place in a fairly good defensive condition against attack from a superior force.

After the action at Newtonia General Price retreated south as rapidly as his half-starved and broken-down men and animals could travel until he arrived at Cane Hill, Arkansas, November 1st, where he halted to rest and collect supplies. At this place he received a report from Colonel Brooks, commanding the Confederate forces in Northwestern Arkansas, stating that he was investing Fayetteville and needed assistance to enable him to capture the garrison with its supplies and public property.

General Fagan at his own solicitation was detailed with his division and 500 men and two pieces of artillery from Shelby's division to aid Brooks in making the attack. He formed a junction with Brooks *en route*, and arriving before Fayetteville on the morning of November 3d with upwards of 6000 men, immediately commenced bombarding the town and Federal garrison. To meet the attack, Colonel Harrison had a force of 1128 men, consisting of

the First Arkansas Cavalry and nearly 200 militia, all of whom were well supplied with ammunition and subsistence for a ten days' siege. With only two guns General Fagan could not do much damage to the Federal works and garrison, and his men were still so much demoralized that he could not push them forward to make a vigorous assault. In his eagerness to capture the place he ordered three charges during the day, but his troops were each time repulsed with heavy loss by the destructive fire from the Federal small-arms. His two guns kept up their fire on the Federal works until towards sunset, when, hearing of the approach of General Curtis' command, he raised the siege and fell back to Cane Hill with part of his troops and the section of artillery, leaving about 600 men until the next morning to cover his retreat.

On receipt of Colonel Harrison's despatch stating that he was besieged, General Curtis moved forward from Cross Hollows early in the morning of November 4th, and arrived at Fayetteville about eleven o'clock, only a few hours after Fagan's rear-guard had left. There were large numbers of desertions from Price's army before he reached Newtonia, but when he arrived at Cane Hill the disintegration was much more rapid, entire regiments and brigades being disbanded, particularly among the Arkansas troops who had entered the service north of the Arkansas River. Large bodies of these troops were reported retreating on all the roads east and southeast of Fayetteville, so that General Curtis was detained a day at that post before he could ascertain in what direction the main force under Price had retreated. He finally received information that Price with the Missouri troops and recruits who had not left him, with a small part of Fagan's division, had retreated south from Cane Hill, with the intention of crossing the Arkansas River above Fort Smith. Leaving Captain Dodge's Ninth Wisconsin Battery at Fayetteville and taking Colonel Harrison with part of

his command along with him, General Curtis moved forward again and encamped on the night of the 5th at Prairie Grove, after making a march of twelve miles. Resuming the march the next morning, he soon came to Price's smouldering camp-fires in and about Cane Hill, captured and paroled quite a number of sick and worn-out Confederate soldiers, skirmished with and killed some of the Confederate scouts and rear-guard, and encamped that night on Sallisaw Creek, Cherokee Nation, on the trail of the Southern army. He continued the pursuit on the trail to a point on the Arkansas River known as Pheasant Ford, arriving there at noon on the 8th, more than twenty-four hours after Price had crossed over ahead of him. A small force of the Confederate rear-guard was in sight on the south side of the river and General Curtis gave them a parting salute of several rounds from McLain's Colorado battery—and thus terminated the campaign of the Army of the Border against Price in his great raid through Missouri in the autumn of 1864. Here General Curtis issued his congratulatory order to his troops, commending them for their gallantry, devotion, and perseverance in the campaign, and here he dissolved the organization of the Army of the Border and directed his troops to return to the Department of Kansas by the most direct and practicable route. Colonel Benteen's brigade from the Department of Missouri, which constituted the largest part of his command, was relieved and the Colonel directed to return to his proper Department.

On the last day's march General Curtis reported that his command captured a cannon which the Confederate forces abandoned in their flight. Along the trail of Price's army from Cane Hill to the Arkansas River, broken-down wagons, dead and broken-down horses and mules, and scattered and abandoned plunder, which could not be taken along, plainly told of the desperate straits to which his forces were reduced. General Curtis was cer-

tainly entitled to commendation for his zeal and untiring efforts in the prosecution of the campaign, and if his judgment was sometimes in error, there were doubtless extenuating conditions. After passing below Newtonia he changed his mind in regard to the disposition of prisoners, for in picking up some of Price's stragglers he sent them to General Rosecrans, St. Louis, instead of to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in his own Department. But this conciliatory act came too late to secure the hearty co-operation of the Missouri troops in the closing operations of the campaign; besides, General Rosecrans did not ask for any trophies not captured by the troops of his own Department. General Sanborn did not rejoin Curtis after the action at Newtonia and probably had no intention of doing so, for his instructions allowed him to act independently. The policy of General Curtis would have kept Price moving, but would not have seriously hurt him, while the policy of Pleasonton, if kept up, would have captured his last gun and most of his troops before he got to Newtonia.

General Price's proud veteran army that had entered Missouri a little over a month ago feasting and boasting, plundering and murdering, and chasing detachments of loyal militia from their stations, was now leaving the State in a most distressing condition. Large numbers of his troops of the routed divisions had thrown away their arms and equipments and the spoils with which they were loaded down, in their terrified flight after the battle of Mine Creek. Nearly all his train, loaded with ill-gotten plunder and necessary supplies, he had been obliged to abandon and destroy, so that after he passed south of Missouri he was unable to obtain any bread for his troops. In his march from Newtonia to the Arkansas River, subsistence was so scarce that his commissary and foraging parties were unable to obtain even enough corn to supply his troops with rations, and men who were so fortunate

as to have an ear of corn each were begged by their hungry and starving comrades for a few grains. The horses of his troops were giving out by hundreds for want of forage and on account of the constant hard service of the campaign, thus adding to his embarrassment in collecting supplies off the country. While encamped at Cane Hill two or three days his foragers collected upwards of a hundred head of cattle and slaughtered them and distributed the meat among his troops who in many cases cooked and ate it without salt. And when he passed to the south side of the Arkansas River he had still greater difficulty in obtaining beef for his multitude, and some of his men were obliged to live for several days on horse flesh and elm bark. The weather commenced getting inclement at Cane Hill, and for the next ten days rain and snow added to the discomfort, hardships, and suffering of his half-starved men in their toilsome march south through the Cherokee and Choctaw Nations. A day or so after crossing the Arkansas River the rest of the Arkansas troops of Fagan's division were furloughed or disbanded to return to their homes, and the Missouri troops and recruits continued the march to Red River, which they crossed on the 22d of November, entering Texas, where they soon commenced to receive full rations of subsistence and forage.





## CHAPTER XXXIV.

ATROCIOUS ACTS OF BANDITS—ACTIONS AT ROSEVILLE,  
STONE'S FARM, LEE'S CREEK, AND MASSARD PRAIRIE—DEMONSTRATION AGAINST FORT SMITH.

WHEN General Thayer left Fort Smith to join General Steele at Arkadelphia on the Camden Expedition, he took with him nearly all the effective troops of the District of the Frontier, leaving only a few detachments under Colonel W. R. Judson, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, to hold the posts of Fort Smith, Van Buren, Roseville, and Clarksville on the Arkansas River. Of course General Steele supposed, when his troops advanced from Little Rock and Fort Smith in the direction of Camden, that General Price, commanding the Confederate forces in the District of Arkansas, would concentrate all his available troops in the Federal front, to check if possible the advance of the Federal commander. While it was the policy of the Confederate commander to concentrate as large a force as practicable to oppose the advancing Federal columns, it was also his desire to detach as many troops as could be spared to operate in the Federal rear and against posts with small garrisons guarding public property. Though he was unable to spare many of his Regular troops for this service while the Federal forces were steadily advancing on Camden, the Southern partisan bands in Western Arkansas could be as effective as his soldiers, and began to display unusual activity a short time after General

Thayer's division left Fort Smith. A good many of the men of these bands wore the Federal uniform and were able to deceive and surprise small Federal detachments now and then when foraging or employed in any service that took them a few miles from their stations. There were details of ten to fifteen mounted Federal soldiers to carry the mails as often as once a week from Fort Smith to Fayetteville and thence to Springfield, and the route was over the Boston Mountains and through a rough wooded section in which there were very few houses along the road.

A telegraph line had been constructed from Springfield to Fort Smith along the road over which the detachments carrying the mails passed. The bandits frequently cut the wire at different points, so that parties had to be sent out to repair it, and if not adequately protected by an escort while repairing it they were almost certain to be fired upon and one or more men killed or wounded. The detachments carrying the mails, too, although well armed, were frequently fired upon by the bandits, and sometimes with fatal results. In view of the long distance—sixty miles—between Fort Smith and Fayetteville which the detachments had been marching without finding any friendly shelter, a station was established at Prairie Grove, about fifteen miles south of Fayetteville, where animals were kept for a relay and where there were a few soldiers to take care of the stock and to afford assistance to the Federal detachments passing over the road. Colonel M. La Rue Harrison, commanding the First Arkansas Union Cavalry, stationed at Fayetteville, kept part of his regiment constantly scouting through that section, in hunting down and punishing the Southern bandits wherever they could be found. But it was generally difficult to find them by scouting, for they could effectually conceal themselves in the broken and thinly settled parts of that mountainous region for weeks, and then by making

part of a night's march reach a point from which they could attack the Federal picket at Fayetteville, or cut the wire at one or more points on the wire road, or attack the parties carrying the mails on that road. These bandits operated in parties of about a dozen up to as many as fifty men, each party generally having a leader.

On the evening of April 7th, twenty-two of the most desperate bandits of the Boston Mountains, under a leader named Lyon, descended from their hiding-place, wearing the Federal uniform, and came to the mail station at the foot of the mountain near the battle-field of Prairie Grove, pretending that they belonged to the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry. As they were wearing the Federal uniform and pretended to be friends they were permitted to advance to the gate in front of the house. There were ten men of the First Arkansas Cavalry and one citizen at the station and nearly all the soldiers were in the house when the bandits came up. After a short conversation by the men in the yard with the bandits, the men in the house came out, and the bandits opened fire upon them, killing nine of them and the citizen, only one soldier making his escape. Some of the men thus murdered were shamefully mutilated by the desperadoes before they left the scene of the bloody tragedy. Information of the barbarous act was at once conveyed to Colonel Harrison at Fayetteville, who immediately sent Major Charles Galloway with a detachment of cavalry in pursuit of the bandits. The Major soon struck their trail, overtook and killed part of them, and captured four of them, who were tried by a commission and found guilty of murdering the men at the station, all of whom were unarmed, and the bandits were sentenced to be shot to death. The findings of the military court were approved by the President, and the four bandits were executed at Fort Smith on the 29th of July, at the southeast edge of the town. One of them was a red-headed youth who

appeared to be under seventeen years of age and who was charged with having committed a number of other murders in the section where he was captured.

Not only the Southern bandits wore the Federal uniform when they could get it, but companies operating with the regularly organized Confederate forces frequently wore it with the sanction and under the eyes of Generals Price and Marmaduke and other Southern officers commanding troops west of the Mississippi River. In wearing the Federal uniform the bandits might now and then get ahead in killing Union soldiers and citizens, but it is not likely that in the end they were ahead, for the chances were more than even that men of this character in active service would get killed, wounded, or captured in the course of a year or so, and if captured they were certain to be tried as spies or murderers, and if convicted shot to death.

#### *Action at Roseville, Arkansas.*

When it became known to the Southern partisan leaders in Southwest Arkansas that most of the Federal troops had been taken away from Fort Smith and vicinity for the Camden Expedition, they made desperate efforts to capture or drive off the Federal detachments stationed at points along the Arkansas River for the protection of navigation and the loyal people of that section. After concentrating nearly five hundred men they proposed to make an attack on Roseville, forty-five miles below Fort Smith on the south side of the Arkansas River. A battalion of troops had been stationed at that point during the past winter, but in the recent movement of the troops of the Frontier Division to join General Steele, *en route* to Camden, there were left at that place only two companies of the Second Kansas Cavalry under Captain John Gardner and one company of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry under Captain David Goss. Captain Gardner was the

senior officer and in command of the troops at the station, and directed their movements from that point. The mounted troops of this force were employed not only in hunting down and breaking up and dispersing the partisan bandits of that section to prevent them from collecting to attack the boats on the river, but with the infantry detachment they were also employed in guarding their supplies and several hundred bales of cotton which, later, had been seized by the Government, and were awaiting transportation to Little Rock and Memphis. Until ready for shipment the cotton bales were used by the Federal soldiers in making breastworks for defensive purposes in the event of attack. There were also several brick buildings in town which had port-holes made in them for small-arms. Captains Gardner and Goss knew that the country around Roseville was full of Southern partisan bands, and they now and then heard of the near approach of heavy cavalry scouts from Price's army in the southern part of the State.

On the morning of April 4th, a large Confederate force of Texans and Southern partisan bands under Captains Stone, King, and Basham, numbering about five hundred men, drove in the Federal pickets south of Roseville and immediately commenced a vigorous attack on the garrison. In a few moments after the alarm was given, Captains Gardner and Goss had their men out in line and their skirmishers thrown forward, protected by houses and fences, to keep the enemy out of town. The Federal soldiers used their long-range rapid-firing Sharp's carbines very effectively in holding the Confederates off from every point on which they made an attack. They also hastily constructed breastworks of cotton bales around a warehouse shed near the river, which made an effective shelter and protection against the Confederate small-arms. The Confederates made several efforts to charge and carry the Federal position, but were driven off every time with se-

vere loss. They were not permitted to approach nearer than one hundred feet of the breastworks. During the fight most of the Confederate force dismounted and sought sheltered positions from which they kept up a hot fire for nearly two hours, doing a good deal of damage. They were finally completely repulsed and driven off with the loss of 10 men killed and upwards of 30 wounded, leaving their dead and severely wounded on the ground. On the Federal side the Second Kansas had 5 men killed and 11 wounded and the Sixth Kansas had 4 men killed, number of wounded not reported. At the time of the fight there was no surgeon nor assistant surgeon with either of the Federal detachments to attend to the wounded, and Captain Goss despatched Sergeant W. A. Kelley with two men of his company up the north side of the Arkansas River to Fort Smith with a request that a surgeon be sent down at once.

The next morning shortly after daylight, Assistant Surgeon Stephen A. Fairchild, of the Sixth Kansas, with an escort of twenty-seven men under Lieutenant Sharp McKibbin, of the same regiment, left Fort Smith for Roseville. A woman on horseback passed out of the Federal lines at Fort Smith with Lieutenant McKibbin's detachment and rode with his advance for several miles, when, moving forward at a more rapid gait than he was marching, she disappeared ahead of him. His detachment marched along without interruption until about the middle of the afternoon, when he made a short halt at a farmhouse within ten miles of Roseville. He found the women at this place much excited, and they begged him to move on, expressing a fear that he would be attacked by a force of about four hundred guerillas who were encamped about three hundred yards from the road on his left front. He sent two or three men off in the direction of the reported camp to make a reconnaissance. They soon returned with the information that the guerillas had

just broken up their camp at the place designated and marched in a direction to intersect the road on which he was moving some distance in his front. He resumed the march, looking for an attack at any moment. He moved forward a mile or so to Stone's Farm, where the guerillas were in position on both sides of the road, prepared to attack him. The road on which he marched bore nearly due east, and at the point where the attack was made crossed a hollow running from a southwest to a northeast direction, with timber on its sloping sides. A hundred yards or so on his right and left front there were two fields, between which the road passed through a narrow lane. About two hundred yards on his left lay another field, the southeast corner of which joined the northwest corner of the field on the left of the road in his front.

Sergeant William H. Ward, Company E, Sixth Kansas, who was one of the escort, stated that on nearing the entrance to the lane, the guerillas, who were mostly on the right of the road, commenced to swing the left of their line across the road in the rear of the detachment and to move forward the right of their line to prevent the Federal soldiers from entering the lane, at the same time making a charge from their centre. Lieutenant McKibbin brought the escort right-wheel into line to meet them, but as they were dressed in Federal uniforms and he fearing that they might be Federal soldiers, the Lieutenant demanded to know who they were before firing. Their leader replied, "Stand there a moment, and we will show you who we are." The escort then delivered their fire, and in another moment, seeing the effort to cut them off from the entrance to the lane, made a dash for it and gained it before the guerillas could throw a sufficient force across it to hold it. On firing the volley from their carbines the Federal soldiers drew their revolvers and fired right and left into the guerillas who were endeavoring to cut them off from the lane. After the

escort broke through the guerillas at the mouth of the lane it was then a race for their lives the next two miles, and in the space of a few minutes twelve of the Federal detachment, including Surgeon Fairchild, were killed, or fell wounded and were afterwards murdered and their bodies horribly mutilated with knives and stripped of the outer clothing. It was reported at that time that the Southern bandits of that section had bound themselves together by an oath not to surrender to the Federal authorities and not to take any Federal soldiers prisoners, and the fiendish conduct of the bandits in mutilating the Federal dead showed what desperate characters the Confederacy had called into its service. The next day a detail was sent out from Roseville to collect and bring in the Federal dead, and on arrival of the bodies they were interred in the cemetery near town.

On the return of General Thayer's division to Fort Smith from the Camden Expedition, he had more cavalry to put into the field, and the guerillas along the Arkansas River who had participated in the Stone's Farm massacre met with swift punishment. Colonel A. H. Ryan, Third Arkansas Union Cavalry, stationed at Lewisburg on the Arkansas River, reported that different detachments of his command in the course of one week had hunted down and killed fourteen of the enemy, wounded sixteen, and captured fifty-five men and three officers, besides a large number of horses and mules and guns, without sustaining any loss. The operations of Colonel Cloud, who was stationed at Clarksville with the Second Kansas Cavalry, were scarcely less successful against the bandits of that section. Detachments of Federal cavalry were sent out from the different posts almost daily to scout the surrounding country, and they rarely returned to camp without chasing and running down and killing several bandits. Generally, before starting out, the commanding officer of the detachment had information of the

exact locality where the bandits would be found, and he was frequently able to surprise them so completely that few of them would get away. At almost every post citizen scouts were employed and sent out one or two together by the Federal commander to obtain information in regard to the movements of hostile bodies of men in the vicinity and within a day's march of the station. These scouts in most cases wore long hair, and travelling through the country visited Southern families and pretended to be Southern men in order to obtain the desired information. When encamped in the deep recesses of the mountains and forests the bandits were sometimes vigorously attacked by the Federal cavalry and routed with heavy loss on the reports of the citizen scouts who had thus been sent out.

#### *Action at Lee's Creek.*

Mention has already been made of the hazardous service imposed upon Federal detachments carrying the mails between Fort Smith and Fayetteville, a distance of sixty miles. During the spring and summer the mail escort on this route was fired upon nearly every week by guerillas and several men killed and wounded. The greater part of the route was over the Boston Mountains and through the deep and narrow gorges of that rough region. All the mail from the north and east for the Federal troops stationed at Fort Smith and in the vicinity came over this road once a week under escort of ten to fifty mounted men. The escorts leaving Fort Smith for Fayetteville took out the mail carrying the letters from the soldiers to their families and friends at home. A mail escort of twenty men of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Lieutenant J. C. Anderson of that regiment, left Fayetteville on the morning of August 11th on the return march to Fort Smith, taking the wire, or telegraph, road over the mountains. There were about twenty-five

foot-men, consisting mostly of soldiers returning to the front from on furlough, who accompanied the escort, besides eight or nine women on horseback who were going down to visit their husbands in the army. The party made a march of upwards of thirty miles that day, and crossing over the mountains, encamped at dark on the place of Benny Hale, an old settler, on Lee's Creek twenty miles north of Van Buren. Sergeant William H. Ward, Company E, Sixth Kansas, stated that his detachment had received information that the guerillas the day before had endeavored to capture a wagon train from Fort Smith to Fort Scott on the line road near Cane Hill, and that an attack on the mail escort the next morning was anticipated. It was believed that the movements of his party had been made known to the guerillas by a woman who had passed out of the Federal lines at Fayetteville on horseback just ahead of it and had not since been seen. Hoping to pass beyond the point of danger before the arrival of the guerillas, the mail escort started out at early daylight the next morning, but was soon detained for a short time by one of the mule teams stalling at a hill, requiring that the wagon be partly unloaded and reloaded to enable it to move forward again. Directly after resuming the march the party came to a house on the right of the road where there were several women who appeared much excited, and among them was observed the woman who had passed out of the lines at Fayetteville the morning before on horseback ahead of the escort.

Moving forward about half a mile south of the house the escort came to the entrance of a deep, narrow defile about two miles long, with very steep sides, known in that section as "the narrows." On entering the narrows the escort was fired upon by the enemy in ambush on the right, and in another moment the guerilla leader, Captain Buck Brown, threw a body of dismounted men across the

road in front, and another body of mounted men across the road in the rear of the Federal detachment, cutting off Lieutenant Anderson and one or two of his men who were still farther in the rear, but who on hearing the firing in front dashed forward right through the enemy and rejoined their comrades. Galloping up to the head of his detachment and seeing the guerillas formed across the road directly in his front, Lieutenant Anderson shouted to his dismounted men to save themselves as best they could, and then throwing his bridle reins over his neck and taking a revolver from each holster, spurred his horse in a desperate charge through the ranks of the enemy, followed by most of his mounted men. He was almost instantly followed in a hot pursuit by the guerillas for a distance of about two miles, to the exit of the narrows, but as their column was confined to the road through the gorge they could not make their fire very effective. At the point where the attack was made, the sides of the mountain on each side of the defile were covered with a heavy undergrowth, and as the dismounted men were mostly unarmed they discreetly took to the woods when the firing first commenced. A few of the mounted men let their horses climb the side of the mountain on the left of the road where the guerillas had left it unguarded, and after ascending several hundred feet came to a bench, or almost level ground, on which there was a fairly good road that ran parallel with the one that passed through the gorge and intersected it a short distance south of the narrows. Some of the men who came into the main road from the road that descended from the bench of the mountain were pressed so closely by the guerillas that they were obliged to leave their horses and take to the brush on foot. As most of the Federal detachment had now taken to the woods on foot, the guerillas gave up the chase, having captured two teams and all the mail for the troops at Fort Smith. Sergeant Ward, who was

one of the escort, reported the Federal loss in the affair at two mounted and five dismounted men killed.

#### *Action at Massard Prairie.*

While the Southern partisan bands were displaying unusual activity to interrupt General Thayer's communication with Springfield, the Confederate forces of General Maxey under the immediate command of Generals Cooper and Gano were advancing to the vicinity of Fort Smith in his front, some five or six thousand strong. As early as the 19th of July, General Cooper with a large Confederate force made a reconnaissance to Scullyville, advancing to within ten to twelve miles of Fort Smith. General Thayer was in great need of cavalry to meet these demonstrations of the enemy in his immediate front. He had been ordered to send the Ninth Kansas to Little Rock, and the Second Kansas under Colonel Cloud had been at Clarksville for several months, leaving only two battalions of the Sixth Kansas, many of whom were dismounted, at Fort Smith. With his small mounted force he could not hope to make a successful aggressive movement against the Confederate troops who were mounted. And his lack of aggressiveness impressed the Confederate leaders that it was his timidity that prevented him from marching against them. General Cooper, who had been repeatedly defeated by Blunt and Philips with the loss of his artillery, was now becoming so bold as to venture to attack General Thayer's outposts near Fort Smith.

For about three weeks in July, four companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, under Major David Mefford of that regiment, were stationed at Massard Prairie five miles south of Fort Smith, as an outpost, and to keep out scouting detachments to the front to watch the movements of the enemy. After his reconnaissance to Scullyville General Cooper ascertained from his scouts the

position of this Federal outpost near Fort Smith, and directed Brigadier-General R. M. Gano to take a well-mounted force of fifteen hundred men from three brigades, move forward, and approach near enough to the Federal detachment on the night of the 26th to make the attack early the next morning. Owing to the scarcity of forage, Major Mefford had been sending out to graze early every morning, under proper details, all his horses not required for scouting purposes, so that his command of two hundred men thus isolated was very little more effective than so many infantry. He kept his pickets properly posted and sent out every day scouting detachments on all the roads on which the enemy would likely approach; besides, citizen scouts were sent out every day by Captain W. S. Tough, Chief of Scouts, District of the Frontier, from Fort Smith, to watch the movements of Cooper's forces, who had for several days been encamped on Buck Creek about twenty-five miles southwest in the Choctaw Nation.

General Gano concentrated his force during the night on the Poteau River about ten miles southwest of the Federal camp, and moving forward before daybreak on the morning of the 27th, drove in the Federal pickets about sunrise, his advance arriving at Mefford's camp almost with the pickets. But the firing between the pickets and Confederate advance, perhaps half a mile off, aroused the camp, and Major Mefford got his men out in line before General Gano formed his troops to charge. When it was known that the enemy were approaching, Major Mefford ordered his herd brought in from the prairie where it had been sent to graze that morning at daylight. Before the herd could be secured and the men mounted, however, General Gano charged the camp and stampeded the horses, leaving Major Mefford with his command dismounted to make the best fight possible. The Federal camp was in the edge of the timber on the

south side of Massard Prairie, and there was no shelter by which Major Mefford could protect his men in the unequal contest. In making a hasty disposition for the fight, Companies E and H formed his left and Companies B and D his right, and by skilfully handling these companies, with their Sharp's carbines, repulsed three distinct charges of the enemy in defending his camp. In a short time the Confederates commenced to pass around his flanks and to form in his rear, and then he was obliged to retreat across the prairie in the direction of Fort Smith, using part of his force in firing well-directed volleys to break the lines of the enemy formed in his rear. He kept up this retreating fight for about a mile across the prairie to a house in the edge of the timber, and by his effective volleys repeatedly broke the lines and dispersed the Confederates who formed across his line of retreat. But now the Confederates had formed in such heavy masses between him and Fort Smith that he could not break their line again, and he was obliged to surrender, only a few of his men who were mounted being able to cut their way through the Confederate ranks and get away. He made a most gallant fight and held his men intact to the last volley, so that he did not lose a man from demoralization. The Federal loss in this action at Massard Prairie was 11 men killed, 20 wounded, and 127 men captured, including Major Mefford and Lieutenant J. M. Defriese. On the Confederate side there were 9 men killed and 26 wounded.

As soon as he captured the Federal detachment and disarmed the men, General Gano started his prisoners south on the double-quick, for fear that a large force would come out from Fort Smith and endeavor to retake them. On hearing of the fight General Thayer sent forward reinforcements, but they did not reach the field until the action was over and they were unable to overtake the enemy. It was a very warm day, and the

prisoners being obliged to march double-quick time for about ten miles, they were nearly exhausted and suffering terribly from thirst when General Gano went into camp that night south of Backbone Mountain. From this point the prisoners were taken to Tyler, Texas, where the Confederate authorities had an extensive stockade and prison pen for keeping Federal prisoners captured west of the Mississippi River, and where the treatment of prisoners was very little better than at Andersonville. Some of the men who were captured at Massard Prairie endeavored to escape from Tyler, but they were hunted down by bloodhounds and their limbs horribly lacerated by the fierce beasts.

General Gano's successful movement at Massard Prairie encouraged General Cooper to make a demonstration against Fort Smith with nearly his entire force, to ascertain if possible the strength of the Federal troops, and to make a diversion in favor of a force which he had ordered to cross to the north side of the Arkansas River above Fort Smith to attack some Federal detachments putting up hay for army use on Blackburn's Prairie. On the morning of July 31st, the Confederate advance attacked and drove in the Federal picket stationed on the Texas road four miles south of Fort Smith under Lieutenant L. F. Stewart, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and came up to within two miles of the outer line of fortifications. General Thayer immediately sent out Colonel Judson, Sixth Kansas, commanding Third Brigade, to check the enemy. He moved out with two regiments of infantry, the available men of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and the four guns of the Second Indiana Battery under Captain Espy, and taking up a position on the high ground about a mile south of town, sent forward his skirmishers to engage the enemy. In the disposition of the Confederate troops, Brigadier-General Gano commanded General Cooper's right wing and Brigadier-General Watie his left wing.

During the day General Thayer was on the field directing the movements of his troops, but he made no effort to bring the enemy to a general engagement. The opposing forces confronted each other on ridges somewhat more than half a mile apart a good part of the day without either party making a charge or attempting to join in close conflict. After some cautious skirmishing at long range, General Cooper brought up a section of Howell's battery, which threw shells at the Federal line for a short time, when it was withdrawn and a section of Humphrey's battery was ordered up to take its place. Directly after this last battery went into action, the four guns of the Second Indiana Battery opened upon it with shell, and on firing less than half a dozen rounds came near producing a panic among the hostile Indians of Cooper's command. A single shell from one of the Federal guns burst in the midst of the Confederate battery team, killing four horses and taking a leg off of one of the gunners, while another shot took a man's head off. As soon as the dead horses were cut loose from the limber, the disabled gun was drawn off by the men, and General Cooper immediately retreated from the field with his entire force. General Thayer did not follow up his advantage by pursuit, claiming that he did not have a sufficient mounted force to do so effectively. The casualties on the Federal side in the skirmish were four men killed and six men wounded. Colonel Judson was wounded in the leg by a piece of shell. As far as could be ascertained the casualties on the Confederate side were about equal to those sustained by the Federal forces.

The next day General Cooper fell back about forty miles southwest of Fort Smith in the Choctaw Nation to rest and reorganize his forces. This was the last demonstration that he made in force, but he soon afterwards commenced displaying some activity in sending heavy mounted detachments north of the Arkansas River

to attack and break up parties cutting and putting up hay for the Government and to destroy the hay put up. Most of Stand Watie's command of Cherokees under Colonels Adair and Bell were sent north of the river through the Cherokee Nation on the east side of Grand River, but after some skirmishing were driven south by the loyal Indian troops from Fort Gibson.





## CHAPTER XXXV.

### THE LAST FIGHT OF BILL ANDERSON, THE BANDIT.

DURING the year 1864, Bill Anderson became as notorious north of the Missouri River as Quantrill had south of that stream as a Southern guerilla leader. Both of these leaders of guerilla bands were commissioned by the Confederate Government to carry on their barbarous operations in Missouri during the war. Probably no age has furnished bands of outlaws composed of men of more desperate, cruel, and bloodthirsty natures than the men of these bands. Human life was not held at a lower estimate by the uncivilized savages of this or any other country than it was by these leaders and their followers. Even the Southern sympathizers of the localities where they ranged generally feared and dreaded them, for they nearly always wore the Federal uniform and often passed themselves off for Federal soldiers, and were thus able to deceive the secessionists as well as the Unionists.

In such cases a secessionist would now and then pretend to be loyal to the Government, and in answer to questions would pretend that he would truly inform the questioner of the whereabouts of any Southern guerillas if he knew. Secessionists who thus committed themselves almost invariably forfeited their lives. No subsequent pleading or explanation could atone for the error, unless the party thus trying to keep in favor with both sides had a friend or an acquaintance among the bandits

to intercede for him. There were a few men in nearly every neighborhood who wished to be neutral and who did not have very decided political convictions, and it was generally this class of men who suffered at the hands of the bandits. Very few Union men in the country in that section stayed at their homes unless they were very old or distress in their families demanded their presence. Of course there were many instances where men endeavored to return to their homes to stay for a few days or several weeks, even when the risk was very great.

The operations of Anderson's bandits were confined mostly to the counties of Clay, Ray, Carroll, Chariton, and Fayette, north of the Missouri River. They made raids into other counties, but generally soon returned to the Missouri River counties, where they dispersed themselves among their friends for better concealment when closely pursued by the Union militia. During the war these desperate men became heavily armed with the best arms used by the Government, and were mounted upon the best horses in the country. Through their secession friends in every town where the loyal militia were stationed, they were kept advised of the movements of the troops, whether in scouts of a hundred or more men, or of small detachments of a dozen or so. They rarely ever attacked a Federal detachment larger than their own force, unless they found it in a disadvantageous position. And they nearly always encamped in some out-of-the-way and secluded place, and their position was not generally known to the commanding officers of Federal detachments until they made a dash on some unprotected point or on some small detachment.

By these methods their operations were frequently successful, and it was in this way that they gradually came into possession of the best arms in use. Most of these desperate men were armed with one good carbine and from four to six revolvers each, and the strength of the

band was generally from one hundred to three hundred men. As they were so thoroughly armed and mounted, an equal number of the loyal militia or even the volunteer forces of the Federal army were not always eager to attack them when found. The loyal militia appear to have been better adapted to contend with such desperate characters than the volunteer forces stationed in the State, perhaps because they were better acquainted with the topography of the country in which the bandits confined their operations, and perhaps also because they adopted the guerilla tactics when they considered it necessary.

The Union people were scattered over the State as well as the secessionists, in some sections largely in the majority, in others largely in the minority; but always true to their cause, even under the severest tests, so that the camps of the guerillas, even when they supposed themselves perfectly secure in some secluded spot far away from roads or villages, was often made known by Unionists to the loyal militia officers, who, by making a night march, would strike them unexpectedly and rout them.

After the Centralia massacre, so many of the Federal troops and militia were withdrawn from points in the Missouri River counties to strengthen the defence of Jefferson City, the capital, and to oppose Price's invading army, that a sufficient number of troops could not be immediately collected to pursue and effectively punish Anderson's bandits.

On the 23d, four days prior to the Centralia disaster, a part of Anderson's bandits attacked the train of a detachment of the Third Missouri State Militia Cavalry, moving from Sturgeon to Rocheport, on the Missouri River, ten miles northeast of the latter place, under a small escort, and killed eleven men of the escort and teamsters, most of the men having been murdered after they had surrendered. The train and escort were attacked in a lane, and being overpowered, with no chance of escape, most of the

men were killed. But even before this event several Federal mounted detachments had been sent into Boone and Howard Counties in search of the bandits. As it was impossible to ascertain what point they intended to strike, the Federal officers were obliged to get on their trail and follow them up. The news of the massacre at Centralia spread rapidly through that section, and the next day a detachment of the First Iowa Cavalry from Columbia and a detachment of two hundred men of the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under Major A. A. King, Jr., came up and struck the trail of the bandits near the scene of Major Johnston's disaster and found them in camp near that point. In a few moments both sides formed line of battle, the line of the guerillas stretching out a quarter of a mile in length. Major King had a howitzer along and when his line commenced to advance opened fire on the bandits with shell. They at once broke and did not make another stand that day. The troops under Major King pursued them until dark, his advance frequently being in sight of their rear-guard. He bivouacked in the rain during the night within a mile or so of where they had encamped and the next morning renewed the pursuit, and soon coming in sight of their rear, pressed them so closely during the day that they broke up and scattered in every direction in the heavily wooded section of Howard County.

After this dispersion of the bandits, very little was heard of Anderson until he joined General Clark and participated in the attack on the Federal force under Colonel Chester Harding on the 15th of October at Glasgow. When General Clark recrossed his division to the south side of the Missouri River after the fight at Glasgow, and continued the march with the other divisions of Price's army up that side of the river, Anderson with his bandits marched up the north side of the river to Clay County, keeping as near the river as practicable so that

he might be continually advised of the movements of the Confederate forces. On his arrival in Clay County he heard of the fighting about Independence and on the Big Blue on the 22d and 23d of October, and of Price being driven south down the State line. He encamped with his men, about three hundred strong, in the Missouri River bottom near the Clay and Ray county line for several days after Price retreated south, and his presence soon became known to some of the Union families living in the vicinity. His atrocious acts during the past summer had made his name infamous in that section, but since the Centralia massacre he was more dreaded than ever by the Union men and loyal militia of North Missouri. After that disaster the militia officers were very cautious about attacking him, for they knew that if they were defeated in an engagement no quarter would be shown them.

Among the loyal militia there were gallant and competent officers who were not to be intimidated by Anderson's desperate deeds and who were unwilling to yield him undisputed sway in the counties along the north side of the Missouri River without a severer test of courage and tact than had yet been shown. Among such officers was Major Samuel P. Cox, of Gallatin, Missouri, who had justly earned a reputation for bravery, fearlessness, and tact in dealing with the guerilla bands of that section. He had raised Cox's battalion of six months' militia in 1861, and after the organization of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanded a battalion in that regiment. He had distinguished himself as a brave and competent officer at the battle of Kirksville, Missouri, in August, 1862, in which he commanded the left wing under Colonel McNeil, and in which the Confederate force was defeated with heavy loss. Shortly after this he was taken sick with typhoid fever and resigned and went home, and was unable to do anything

one the Major had intended taking, and led off with the advance-guard. Determined not to be surprised Major Cox marched his troops cautiously along until he got within about a mile of Anderson's camp. The Federal advance, however, came upon the picket of the bandits about two miles from their camp and it hastily retired to give the alarm, so that Anderson had notice of the near approach of the Federal force.

About three quarters of a mile from the guerilla camp, the Union militia came to a deep ravine which was crossed by a narrow bridge. Major Cox halted his command just back of the steep ravine, dismounted his men, and sent forward Lieutenant Baker with thirty mounted men to skirmish with the guerillas, and attract their attention by firing upon them, while he was forming and getting his other troops in position. After dismounting his men he directed the commanding officers of companies to have every fourth man hold horses, took the rest of his command across the ravine on the bridge, moved forward two or three hundred yards, and formed his line on each side of the road in the open timber between two fields in the Missouri River bottom. The camp of the guerillas was a little upward of half a mile in advance of this position. After showing his force to the bandits and firing upon them, Lieutenant Baker was instructed to retire back along the road through the Federal line. Having heard much of Anderson's mode of fighting, Major Cox was satisfied that the fire of Lieutenant Baker's detachment would quickly draw him out in a vigorous pursuit, and he was determined to meet him with tactics which were new to him.

Major Cox had just got his line formed when he and his men heard the volley fired by Lieutenant Baker's detachment, and in another moment they heard the guerillas coming, yelling like fiends released from the infernal regions, led by their chieftain, with waving plume that

was as red as the blood that flowed from the wounds of his recently murdered victims. In another moment they were coming in sight and the Federal soldiers could see that the foremost had their bridle reins in their teeth and a revolver in each hand. Realizing the desperate character of the men he was about to engage, and that it would probably be a struggle which meant the death of all his men or the defeat of the guerillas, Major Cox then for the first time announced to Major Grimes that it was Bill Anderson's band they were fighting and that he must make his men stand firm, for the conflict would likely be one of victory or death. He also instructed his officers to have their men reserve their fire until the bandits came up within seventy-five yards of his line, and then to deliver it with deliberation.

On they came in a furious charge, looking neither to the right nor to the left, but seemingly bent only on overtaking the detachment that had audaciously fired upon them. The moment was an exciting and a trying one, for the Federal commander knew that the slightest wavering or mistake on the part of his men would doom them to certain death. The bandit leader marched under the black flag and boasted that he gave no quarter. But the Union militia behaved admirably; they waited until the guerillas approached within easy range, and then the volley from two hundred rifles did its work well, as was plainly seen when the smoke was wafted away by the gentle breeze. Anderson and one of his men fell dead from their horses in the road just as they passed through the Federal line, pierced by several balls each; another guerilla was killed a short distance in the rear of the Federal line; five or six of the guerillas were taken off the ground by their comrades mortally wounded, besides a number of others taken off severely and slightly wounded. Anderson fell about ten steps from Major Cox and had a revolver in each hand, two in his pistol holster, and two in his

for six months. The service required just such an officer to check the operations of the guerillas under Anderson—one who could turn their own tactics against them. He led the detachment of loyal Missouri militia that killed the noted guerilla chieftain, and this version of that exciting incident is from his own lips. At the time that Anderson was encamped near the Missouri River not far from the line of Clay and Ray Counties, during the Price Raid, Brigadier-General James Craig commanded the District of Northwest Missouri, with headquarters at St. Joseph. The presence of the bandits in that locality was soon made known to the nearest command of loyal militia by some of their wives or children. In fact, the recent acts of the bandits had aroused the law-abiding people in all that section. The situation had become so desperate that Major Cox felt that no Union man in that section could stay at home if Anderson was not whipped, and whipped badly. Knowing that he could not stay at home in safety, the Major started to join his friends in the service for protection, and on the way met Major W. D. McDonald, commanding a detachment of the Thirty-third Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia at Hamilton, retreating from a Southern force which he supposed was Anderson's guerillas. Major McDonald admitted that he did not feel prepared to fight Anderson or the force from which he was retreating, and requested Major Cox to go to St. Joseph to see General Craig and explain to him the situation. The Major agreed to go at once; took a train at Hamilton for St. Joseph; arrived there that night; saw the General and talked over the situation with him fully.

In the meanwhile Major McDonald had telegraphed to the General that Major Cox would arrive in St. Joseph that night, and requested that he be sent back to Hamilton to take command of the force at that point to operate against the enemy. General Craig showed Major Cox

the telegram and asked him to go back and take command of Major McDonald's force. The Major replied that he did not see how he could, as he was out of the service. The General explained that he would give him proper authority to act; that he would appoint him acting lieutenant-colonel, and that if he would go he would put the troops under his command. Major Cox finally consented, returned to Hamilton, took command of Major McDonald's detachment the next morning, and made a forced march from there to Richmond, in Ray County, where he was joined by Major John Grimes with about 150 men of the Enrolled Militia and a company of Caldwell County militia. He now had a force of about three hundred effective men, armed with muzzle-loading muskets and a few revolvers with which some of his men had supplied themselves. He marched from Richmond four miles in the direction of Liberty; then south to Old Canden, on the Missouri River, and then west up the river to Albany, now Orrick, where he had the fight with the guerillas.

After leaving Richmond and when about three miles out, on the morning of October 26th, the command met a woman on horseback coming towards it at a rather hurried pace. On coming up to the advance-guard she at once inquired for the commanding officer and was pointed to Major Cox. She lost no time in going to him and making known her business. She told him that she had that morning been in Bill Anderson's camp; described where and how it was located, and said that he had between two hundred and three hundred heavily armed men. At first the Major was suspicious of this woman and inquired of Lieutenant James Baker, who was present, about her. The Lieutenant stated that he knew her and that she was all right and could be trusted—that her husband was along in the command; and that he knew the locality described and could take the troops to it by a nearer route than the

belt. Major Cox took one of the revolvers from his hand, and his bugler, Adolph Vogle, brought him the other five and his pocketbook, containing six hundred dollars United States paper currency. There was no time for looking closely into what the dead guerilla had on his person, for his band were in confusion, and to follow up his advantage Major Cox immediately ordered a forward movement and pursued on foot the bandits, skirmishing with them for about a mile in the river bottom. He then returned with his dismounted men to their horses, put the dead guerilla chieftain in one of his wagons, and took him back to Richmond that day ; that night he kept the corpse in the court-house under guard, and the next day buried it in the cemetery near town.

In this action Major Cox reported that he had one man killed and seven wounded. He also reported seeing four of the bandits dead on the field, and seeing the retreating force take off a good many of their wounded comrades on their horses. When Anderson came dashing forward at the head of his men he was so intent on the pursuit that he neglected to form his men in line, so that when they received the volley from the Union line they were almost instantly tumbling over each other and in each other's way for offensive or defensive operations. And when they saw their leader fall and that they were receiving a hot fire from both flanks, they commenced a hasty retreat ; nor did they show any disposition to fight for the possession of the body of their fallen leader. A good many of their horses having been killed and disabled by the heavy fire from the Federal line, in their retreat quite a number of the bandits rode off two on a horse ; but being mounted, they soon got out of range of the Union militia, receiving from them a continuous fire as they retreated.

When Vogle, the bugler, brought to Major Cox Anderson's pocketbook containing orders from General Price

authorizing the guerilla leader to tear up the North Missouri Railroad and to burn and destroy property, the Major instantly knew that it was Anderson, the notorious bandit, he had killed, and at once announced the fact to his men. The information quickly passed along his line and a rousing cheer went up from his men, and they would have fought then a regiment of guerillas. Among other things found on the person of the dead guerilla chief was a commission as colonel, signed by Jefferson Davis, President of the Southern Confederacy. He also had on each side of the brow-band of his bridle two human scalps, which he used as a decoration. Major Cox took these scalps, trophies with which Anderson had in his fiendish nature decorated his bridle, and sent them, together with a Confederate silk flag which he took off him, to Adjutant-General Gray, of Missouri. Very soon after the death of Anderson in this action, his band left the State and never returned to it in an organized capacity to carry on their savage operations of murder and robbery.

THE END.











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